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Summary of Thesis 
 
The First World War allowed for two sources of Pan-Islamism to mature in East Africa: the 
German Empire and East Africans and the African diaspora. The former had an incentive to 
develop Pan-Islamism as an element of the ‘special feature’ policy they were employing to 
assist in securing victory in the First World War. This was a policy ‘to foster and encourage 
any movements of unrest and sedition’, including the Pan-Islamic movement, ‘directed 
against the British Empire’.1 The latter, who, due to the military needs of the European 
empires, had been forced to converge in East Africa in a manner never previously seen, 
conversed about Pan-Islamism amongst themselves. Officials of the British Empire identified 
that Pan-Islamism had manifested itself into two threats: Pan-Islamic unity and the use of 
the machinery developed by Pan-Islamism by those who advocated for Pan-Africanism. 
The developing counter-intelligence arm of the British imperial intelligence establishment 
worked to counter these threats. This development resulted in the institution of the East 
African Intelligence Centre in 1917. They were successful: to a point. The British Empire in 
East Africa was not destroyed by Pan-Islamism during the First World War. But they were 
unable to remove the threat posed by Pan-Islamism from the East African region. 
In the early Twentieth Century the United Kingdom had revolutionised its intelligence 
establishment, but it had failed to realise that counter-intelligence in the British Empire had 
not been accounted for. Consequently, the British Empire was forced to institute a colonial 
counter-intelligence establishment during the hostilities of the Great War. With little 





                                                          
1 TNA: KV 1/19: M.I.5. ‘Part I. The Organisation of D. Branch.’ in M.I.5. D. Branch Report. Summary of the 





The East African Campaign of the First World War: an Historiographical Analysis  
 
The East African Campaign of the First World War was fought from 3rd August 1914 to 25th 
November 1918 between the British, Belgian, and Portuguese Empires and the German 
Empire. For the Allies, the British Empire was by far the more prominent power. Exact 
figures for combatants are impossible to come by; when ‘Excluding Allied and Naval 
personnel’, Malcolm Page has placed the figures at ‘about 114,000 troops.’ When ‘excluding 
those hospitalized for disease’, he placed the British Empire’s casualty rate at ‘62,220’, 
whilst the ‘[deaths] from disease were 48,328, mainly due to malaria.’ The majority of the 
military personnel for both the British and German Empires were not comprised of 
combatants but of porters. For the British Empire, Page placed these at ‘Between ‘400,000 
and 500,000 men’, of whom, at the end of the Great War, ‘40,000… could not be accounted 
for.’2 Many of these porters were Africans; the British Empire’s East African Force was 
comprised of Europeans, Indians, and Africans.  
The East African Campaign developed into a guerrilla war, which heavily impacted upon the 
East African population. It ‘prevented animal controls, such as quarantine, culling infected 
cattle, and the strategic application of vaccines that had kept diseases in check’. Tait Keller 
has recorded how ‘Rinderpest, along with tick and tsetse vectors of other diseases… spread 
rapidly along military routes.’ The population ‘also suffered a panoply of disease, including 
bubonic plague, dysentery, sleeping sickness, smallpox, and malaria.’3  Famine broke out 
due to the lack of these animal controls, the spread of diseases, the ‘forced recruitment of 
                                                          
2 Page, Malcolm. A History of the King’s African Rifles and East African Forces (South Yorkshire; Leo Cooper, 
1998), p.49. There are few exact figures available for personnel in the East African Campaign. Page’s figures 
compliment those of the likes of Hew Strachan in The First World War: Volume I: To Arms (Oxford; Oxford 
University Press, 2001), pp.641—642. 
3 Keller, Tait. ‘Mobilizing Nature for the First World War: An Introduction’, in Environmental Histories of the 
First World War, edited by Richard P. Tucker, Tait Keller, J. R. McNeill, and Martin Schmid (Cambridge; 
Cambridge University Press, 2018), p.13. 
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porters’, and the ‘Scorched-earth tactics [used] by the retreating German army [sic] in 
Ruanda-Urundi… in 1916-17’.4 
‘[Already] racked by the triple curses of war, famine and disease’, East Africa was to face yet 
another misfortune: the influenza pandemic of 1918-1919. Due to these three ‘curses’, East 
Africa suffered ‘death rates from flu higher than other regions of Africa’, which in turn were 
already ‘higher than those of Europe, varying between c.2 and 5 per cent of the population.’ 
In the East Africa Protectorate ‘as many as 150,000 people died, 5.5 per cent of the 
population.’5 
Having suffered from famine, disease, influenza, and the longest campaign of the entire First 
World War, East Africa was to encounter a further indignity; all of the suffering and all of the 
death was to be dismissed by historians as nothing more than a ‘sideshow’ to the 
contemporary events in Europe. A selection of diverse books demonstrates this: Karl P. 
Magyar’s entry for ‘Africa, 1914—18’ in The European Powers in the First World War: An 
Encyclopedia states that the African Theatre ‘remained a sideshow to the real war [in 
Europe]’ and ‘was largely a European concern, although most of those who died in it were 
native Africans.’6 The East African Campaign ‘was no more than an exotic sideshow’, 
declares Lother Höbelt in ‘Mourir pour Liège? World War I War Aims in a Long-Term 
Perspective’.7 Richard J. Popplewell writes that the German Empire’s ‘operations in East 
Africa were only a side-show in the war’ in Intelligence and Imperial Defence: British 
Intelligence and the Defence of the Indian Empire 1904—1924.8 The Obamas: The Untold 
Story of an African Family is an example of this term reaching beyond the histories of the 
First World War, although P.L. Firstbrook paraphrases it from the perspective of Paul von 
                                                          
4 De Waal, Alex. Famine Crimes: Politics & the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa (Oxford; James Currey, 1997), 
p.27. 
5 Phillips, Howard. Killingray, David. ‘Introduction’, in The Spanish Influenza Pandemic of 1918-1919: New 
Perspectives, edited by Howard Phillips and David Killingray (London; Routledge, 2003), p.9.  
6 Magyar, Karl P. ‘Africa, 1914—18’, in The European Powers in the First World War: An Encyclopaedia, edited 
by Tucker, Spencer C. (Oxford; Routledge, 2013), p.6—9.  
7 Höbelt, Lothar. ‘Mourir pour Liège? World War I War Aims in a Long-Term Perspective’, in The Purpose of the 
First World War: War Aims and Military Strategies, edited by Holger Afflerbach (Berlin; De Gruyter 
Oldenbourg, 2015), p.143. 
8 Popplewell, Richard J. Intelligence and Imperial Defence: British Intelligence and the Defence of the Indian 
Empire 1904—1924 (London; Frank Cass, 1995), p.178. 
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Lettow-Vorbeck, the commander of the German forces in the East African Campaign. In his 
fiction work Lost in Africa, Stuart Ford refers to it as ‘a strange little sideshow’.9  
In The First World War in Africa, Hew Strachan presents an argument for why this 
assessment is unjustified. He writes that whilst ‘the African campaigns of the First World 
War bore more relationship to the nineteenth-century campaigns of colonial conquest than 
they did to the Great War’ and that ‘In relation to the outcome of the war they were, as is 
too often remarked, sideshows’, ‘neither’ of these observations ‘should be allowed to 
trivialise [the] importance’ of the war in Africa.10  
The secondary literature on the East African Campaign is extremely limited, and this was 
officially sanctioned. The official history of the Campaign was entitled Military Operations 
East Africa. Vol. 1, August 1914-September 1916 and was compiled by Charles Hordern; 
finally published in 1941, there was never a Vol. 2 to cover the period from October 1916 – 
November 1918. This lack of official interest was then emulated by historians. 
In recent years more historians have been drawn to this poorly researched area of the First 
World War and period of East African history, many with a similar mentality to Strachan. Of 
the recent historians who have been drawn to this area: Michelle Moyd has placed African 
narratives at the centre of her works on the Campaign and has advocated for greater 
research of African narratives; Robert Gaudi has placed the German commander at the 
centre of his book African Kaiser: Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck and the Great War in Africa; 
Anne Samson has written numerous books and articles about the role of South Africa and 
the impact of inter-relations between those involved; Edward Paice’s Tip & Run: The Untold 
Tragedy of the Great War in Africa is the most comprehensive analysis of the Campaign.13 
Although not in the quantities of the European theatres of war, a sizeable amount of 
primary material does continue to exist.  Several diaries and memories from combatants 
                                                          
9 Firstbrook, P.L. The Obamas: The Untold Story of an African Family, (London; Preface Publishing, 2010), 
p.145.; Ford, Stuart. Lost in Africa. (USA; Wings ePress Books, 2005), p.232.  
10 Strachan, Hew. The First World War in Africa (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2004), p.12. 
13 Hordern, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles. Military Operations: Volume I August 1914 – September 1916 (London; 
His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1941); Moyd, Michelle. ‘Creating a sideshow: local experiences of the First 
World War in Africa’, First World War Studies, 7 (2016), pp.111—130; Gaudi, Robert. African Kaiser: Paul von 
Lettow-Vorbeck and the Great War in Africa (London; C. Hurst & Co., 2017); Samson, Anne. Britain, South 
Africa and the East African Campaign, 1914-1918 (London; Tauris, 2006); Paice, Edward. Tip & Run: The Untold 
Tragedy of the Great War in Africa (London; Phoenix, 2008). 
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remain. Amongst the most useful or complete include: von Lettow-Vorbeck’s My 
Reminiscences of East Africa; Richard Meinertzhagen’s Army Diary 1899-1926; W. Lloyd-
Jones’s K.A.R.: Being an Unofficial Account of the Origin and Activities of The King’s African 
Rifles; C. P. Fendall’s The East African Force 1915—1919. Some of the usual letters and 
photographs that one would expect from soldiers writing home have survived. In the 
National Archives of the United Kingdom and the British Library there remains a significant 
quantity of imperial documents concerning imperial counter-intelligence, the East African 
Campaign, and British colonialism in the region more generally. Whilst there is not the 
abundance of material that other areas of the First World War enjoy, there is enough that, 
since declassification, the lack of primary material is not a hindrance to research in its 
entirety. 
That the outcome of the First World War was not decided at the Battle of Kilimanjaro is not 
a view that is disputed by any person. The problem that the word ‘sideshow’ has presented 
in the literature is not that it does not accurately describe the East African Campaign’s role 
in the Great War militaristically, but that by dismissing the East African Campaign as 
unworthy of greater study historians have actually been dismissing the East African 
narrative itself as unworthy of greater study. This has unfortunate implications to the study 
of what was at the crux of the entire Campaign: colonialism.  
Paice has demonstrated that ‘there were many’ contemporary people ‘who regarded [the 
East African Campaign] as the very epitome of the “selfish imperialism” which had caused 
the Great War in the first place’: he lists Jan Smuts, Sir Harry Johnston, and W. E. B. Du Bois. 
‘Their point’, according to Paice, ‘was… that the war in Africa put imperialism itself, and all 
the highfalutin talk of the European Powers’ “civilizing mission”, on trial; and in doing so it 
exposed the unremitting ambitions of the colonial powers to a degree of scrutiny 
unsurpassed since the very beginnings of the Scramble for Africa.’14 
The lack of historical research on the East African Campaign of the First World War has thus 
hinged on two main points: that it was not the decisive Western Front, and that 
acknowledging it meant acknowledging the brutalities of European colonialism. In recent 
years the East African Campaign has been of interest to a new generation of researchers. It 
                                                          
14 Paice, Tip, p.4. 
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offers exciting new opportunities to study the military history of the early Twentieth 
Century, European colonialism in Africa, and the experiences of people of colour in the 
setting of the First World War: a setting that is both so recognisable and is yet so unknown. 
This newly developing literature has joined the growing literature on non-European centred 
narratives of the First World War. Guoqi Xu’s book Asia and the Great War: A Shared History 
is a remarkable insight into Asian experiences of the Great War and is one example of this. A 
collection of articles that were bound into two volumes entitled Through the Eyes of the 
Warring Countries’ Historians: The First World War Centenary Symposium offers the reader 
analysis from historians from across the world. The centenary commemorations have 
provided a platform for the experiences of minorities to reach a wider audience: The Muslim 
Experience in World War I twitter account being a case in point.15  
 
Research Considerations  
 
On approaching this large chasm of potential research, one could feel quite lost. It was, and 
still remains, easier to list what has been studied as opposed to what has not. I therefore 
approached it with two considerations in mind: 
The first consideration was that I intended to study the British Empire’s use of intelligence in 
the colonial setting of East Africa. My historical interests have long focused on colonialism 
and warfare in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. I was particularly interested in how 
intelligence developed in colonial settings within the British Empire during the First World 
War.  
The development of the British Empire’s imperial intelligence establishment outside of 
Ireland is underdeveloped within the literature for this era. Martin Thomas’ Empire’s of 
Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914 makes an important 
contribution to our understanding of the role of intelligence in supporting British imperial 
                                                          
15 Xu, Guoqi. Asia and the Great War: A Shared History (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2016); Yurdakul, 
İlhami et al. (eds.) Through the Eyes of the Warring Countries’ Historians: The First World War Centenary 
Symposium (Antalya; Akdeniz University, 2018) Available at: 
http://tarama.akdeniz.edu.tr/yordambt/yordam.php# [Accessed 6th June 2019]; @MuslimsinWWI. The Muslim 




control in the early Twentieth Century. His work focuses on the British and French Empire’s 
in the Middle East and North Africa from the start of the First World War to the start of the 
Second. Consequently, his conclusions are only partially relevant to our understanding of 
the British Empire in East Africa in the era examined in this thesis, for the British imperial 
political apparatus in this region was then comparatively too underdeveloped to support an 
imperial intelligence establishment comparable to those described in his work.16 Similar can 
be said of Priya Satia’s monograph Spies in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural 
Foundations of Britain’s Covert Empire in the Middle East. Her ‘focus’ for this work was ‘on 
the formation and fallout of the cultural imagination that shaped agents’ approach and 
methods’, for ‘the cultural formation of intelligence agents must lie at the heart of any 
effort to understand British intelligence-gathering in the Middle East’. The conclusions that 
she draws – that ‘These agents’ most important methodological innovation was an intuitive 
intelligence epistemology modelled on their understanding of the “Arab mind”’ where they 
desired the replication of ‘the apparently intuitive knowledge-gathering and navigational 
practices of nomadic Arabs’ – are drawn from a society and an imperial relationship quite 
different from that of early Twentieth Century East Africa.17 Potential developments in this 
area of this literature that focused on East Africa were clear. 
The branch of the imperial intelligence establishment that was tasked with conducting 
colonial counter-intelligence during the First World War was D Branch of M.I.5. The 
examination of this branch’s work outside of Ireland is virtually non-existent in the 
literature. In his book The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5 Christopher 
Andrew makes only two references to it. In the most substantial reference, which does not 
run to more than half a paragraph, Andrew writes that ‘According to a post-war report on D 
Branch, couched in unrealistically grandiloquent terms, “particulars were obtained of 
German activities in all parts of the world, from Peru to the Dutch East Indies and the Islands 
of the Pacific, and watch was kept on German propaganda through missionaries or 
otherwise on every continent.”’18 M.I.5. did amplify their successes in the First World War in 
                                                          
16 Thomas, Martin. Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914 (London; 
University of California Press, 2008). 
17 Satia, Priya. Spies in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain’s Covert Empire in the 
Middle East (New York; Oxford University Press, 2008), pp.4—5. 




this report; preventing the threat of Pan-Islamism, for example, was examined in much 
greater detail than other issues which were not as thoroughly prevented. But it is not true 
to write that it was ‘unrealistically grandiloquent’ to say that ‘particulars were obtained of 
German activities in all parts of the world’, for by the end of the First World War D Branch 
had examined every part of the British Empire for counter-intelligence needs, and had 
expanded to cover all those parts of the Empire that were judged to be of risk, even slight.19 
Elsewhere, whilst a handful of books do mention D Branch, Chris Northcott’s MI5 at War 
1909-1918: How MI5 Foiled the Spies of the Kaiser in the First World War being the most 
prominent, nowhere in the entire literature of either the First World War or the British 
intelligence establishment does anybody place D Branch at the forefront of their analysis.20  
Many of the primary documents for this thesis are drawn from the KV 1 Series of the 
National Archives of the United Kingdom entitled The Security Service: First World War 
Historical Reports and Other Papers. The National Archives describes this series as 
containing ‘the official history of the Security Service work during World War I compiled at 
the request of the Committee of Imperial Defence.’21 This is an extensive series, but it is also 
a curated one; on reading it, it becomes clear that many documents have not been 
preserved, at least not in the publicly available archives. Nevertheless, a large enough 
number have survived to ensure that one can construct narratives on the actions of M.I.5. 
during the First World War, especially when they are placed in an analysis with the many 
relevant documents from the War Office, the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office, and the 
India Office. 
Therefore, I understood that there was not so much a gap in the literature as there was a 
gaping hole. By joining together my interests in the East African Campaign of the First World 
War with the development of intelligence in colonial settings within the British Empire 
during the early Twentieth Century I was able to narrow this gaping hole into a manageable 
gap. 
                                                          
19 TNA: KV 1/15: M.I.5. Vol. I. “D” Branch Report. Report on the Establishment of a Special Intelligence Service in 
the Colonies and Overseas Dominions. 1921. 
20 Northcott, Chris. MI5 at War 1909—1918 (East Sussex; Tattered Flag Press, 2015), pp.179—184. 
21 TNA: KV 1: The Security Service: First World War Historical Reports and Other Papers. 1908—1939.  
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The second consideration was that I intended to study the British Empire within the British 
Empire. I wished the focus of my work to be the Empire itself. I wanted to better understand 
how the British Empire’s imperial intelligence establishment worked on the ground, as 
opposed to how it worked from an office in London. To this end, I endeavoured to place the 
centre of the narrative in East Africa, occasionally looking back at London; as opposed to it 
being located in the imperial capital, occasionally looking down at the imperial acquisitions. 
From the start, East Africa and East African concerns were to be at the heart of my research. 
Whilst there was a large chasm of potential research, I restricted myself to researching how 
the British Empire acted within the East African region. The only exception to this is Chapter 
Six, for I realised that for the narrative arc to continue in East Africa it was essential to 
understand the development of D Branch of M.I.5. in London. 
In addition, placing the British Empire at the heart of my work was a practical consideration. 
It would have been possible to have written a complimentary thesis to this that placed 
either the German Empire or East Africans at the centre of the narrative. I do not possess 
the German language skills required to undertake historical research of the German Empire, 
and I possess no East African language skills at all; it would have been extremely difficult for 
me to have conducted the oral history that would have been essential for the production of 
such a thesis. The British Empire retained an extremely limited amount of primary material 
that was concerned with African views on Pan-Islamism in the early Twentieth Century; 
there is no great East African archive that is the equivalent of the National Archives of the 
United Kingdom. Thus, oral history would have been the only avenue available to gain the 
information that I would have required had I chosen this path. Furthermore, I did not feel 
that it was ethically correct for a white British person to write a narrative of the British 
Empire from the perspective of an African. These practical and ethical considerations had 
the consequence of further limiting the large chasm of potential research to a manageable 
level. 
The historical research for this thesis was, by necessity, undertaken in archives. Having very 
little knowledge of what I would find there, I was originally somewhat overwhelmed. 
Bearing in mind the parameters of these two considerations, I soon became interested in 
those documents involved in M.I.5.’s role in securing the future of its empire in East Africa 
by preventing the threat of Pan-Islamism to it. Aside from being very interesting, these 
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documents allowed me to study the British Empire’s use of intelligence in the colonial 
setting of East Africa whilst placing East Africa and East African concerns at its heart. 
After returning to the secondary literature, I soon discovered that the Pan-Islamic narrative 
of the First World War was yet another area in which the East African voice had been 
seriously neglected, to the extent that it is usually absent. Rudolf Peters in Islam and 
Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History writes that ‘Despite the efforts of the 
Central Powers, the effect of the Ottoman jihad-proclamation and the subsequent stream of 
religious propaganda was minimal… [because] nowhere did anti-colonial revolts break out in 
support of the Turks.’ 22 This conclusion is not wrong, but it examined only the impact of the 
call for jihad within the Ottoman sphere. The measure of Pan-Islamic success in East Africa 
was not viewed by the British in terms of ‘anti-colonial revolts… in support of the Turks.’ 
Instead of being excluded, the East African voice has sometimes been dismissed. Jeff Haynes 
states in The Encyclopaedia of African History, Volume III, that although ‘the Ottomans 
issued a call to jihad against the Europeans that circulated widely in… parts of Kenya and 
Mozambique’, it circulated ‘without conspicuous numbers of African Muslims heeding the 
call.’ This in itself is not untrue, but, like Peters, Haynes has only examined the reaction of 
East African Muslims within the Ottoman narrative. Haynes continued, however, to write 
that ‘The crushing of the Ottomans during World War I, coupled with the apparently 
inexorable spread of European power, confirmed to many African Muslims that the 
Europeans could not be defeated by force and gradually they came to accept European 
rule.’23 This is simply not true; not staging a successful revolution is not the same as 
accepting European rule. From a wider perspective, revolt did occur: ‘in most of Africa, the 
early colonial period… was characterized by intermittent rebellions, revolts, and uprisings 
against the newly established colonial state.’24 This thesis demonstrates that far from 
‘accepting European rule’, the British Empire was forced to recognise the agency of East 
Africans to challenge imperial power, albeit on a limited scale. 
                                                          
22 Peters, Rudolf. Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History (The Netherlands; Mouton 
Publishers, 1979), p.94. 
23 Haynes, Jeff. ‘Resistance to Colonialism’ in The Encyclopaedia of African History, Volume III, edited by Kevin 
Shillington, (New York; Fitzroy Dearbon, 2005), p.1276.  
24 Usuanlele, Uyilawa. Edo, Victor Osaro. ‘Migrating out of Reach: Fugitive Benin Communities in Colonial 
Nigeria, 1897-1934’, in African Agency and European Colonialism, edited by Femi J. Kolapo and Kwabena O. 
Akurang-Parry (Maryland; University Press of America, 2007), p.71.  
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The use of Pan-Islamism as a German war strategy has been examined on occasion within 
the literature, but these examinations: locate it as a subsidiary analysis, rather than as the 
main analysis; view it through a European perspective; and/or place it in a non-African 
context. Two examples of such works would be Hew Strachan’s The First World War: 
Volume I: To Arms and Peter Hopkirk’s On Secret Service East of Constantinople: The Plot to 
Bring Down the British Empire. Within the literature concerned with the East African 
Campaign, the Pan-Islamic narrative has been conspicuously absent. This is particularly 
noticeable in Strachan’s The First World War in Africa where, apart from one very brief 
mention in the preface, the topic is not mentioned in his analysis of events at all.25  
Useful secondary literature on Islam in East Africa and colonial reactions to it in the era of 
the First World War is extremely limited but includes: Paice’s Tip & Run (although his 
narrative too is Ottoman-centric); Felicitas Becker, ‘Islam and Imperialism in East Africa’ in 
Islam and the European Empires; Rebekka Habermas, ‘Debates on Islam in Imperial 
Germany’ in Islam and the European Empires.27  
Useful secondary literature that places Islam into the wider setting of British and European 
imperialism in the pre-First World War era is much more fruitful and has been useful in 
locating this thesis within its broader context. John Darwin’s The Empire Project: The Rise 
and Fall of the British World-System has been beneficial in helping to place the importance 
of Pan-Islamism within the British Empire in 1914, as have both Ronald Hyam’s Britain’s 
Imperial Century 1815—1914: A Study of Empire and Expansion and Bernard Porter’s Critics 
of Empire: British Radical Attitudes to Colonialism in Africa 1895—1914. P.J. Cain and A.G. 
Hopkins’s British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion 1688—1914 and Popplewell’s 
Intelligence and Imperial Defence were both important in placing this information into a 
larger framework containing the Ottoman Empire. Further readings includes: John Slight’s 
The British Empire and the Hajj: 1865—1956 and Warren Dockter’s Churchill and the Islamic 
World.  
                                                          
25 Strachan, Africa, p.v. 
27 Becker, Felicitas. ‘Islam and Imperialism in East Africa’, in Islam and the European Empires, edited by David 
Motadel (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2014), pp.112—128; Habermas, Rebekka. ‘Debates on Islam in 
Imperial Germany’, in Islam and the European Empires, edited by David Motadel (Oxford; Oxford University 
Press, 2014), pp.231—253. 
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The role that M.I.5., and the British Empire more widely, played in identifying and 
preventing the threat posed by Pan-Islamism to the British Empire in the years of the First 
World War became my thesis’ overall concern. My central research question developed into 
its final form: How did the British Empire attempt to prevent what they perceived to be the 
dangers associated with Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in 





In addition to the introduction, the conclusion, and the bibliography, this thesis is comprised 
of three sections:  
Part I is entitled The Milieu of the Pan-Islamic Threat and presents how the changing society 
in East Africa in the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries allowed for the 
development of Pan-Islamism in the region during the First World War. This change in 
society was primarily brought about through European involvement in the region, 
principally due to the consequences of European colonialism and the termination of the 
Eastern Slave Trade.  
Part II is entitled The Identification of the Pan-Islamic Threat and is concerned with how 
British imperial officials identified Pan-Islamism as a threat to the security of the British 
Empire in East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War. 
Despite a counter-intelligence effort finally being enacted in the British Empire in East Africa 
in 1914, racial prejudices meant that the threat posed by the African population to British 
imperial security in the region was not acted upon in the first half of the Great War. 
Part III is entitled The Eradication of the Pan-Islamic Threat and analyses how the officials of 
the British Empire attempted to prevent the threat that they perceived to exist from Pan-
Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa, and the 
successfulness of their endeavour. An increase in the imperial counter-intelligence 
establishment in London allowed for the institution of an East African Intelligence Centre in 
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the East African region in 1917, which in turn was partly responsible for the attempted 




The restrictions placed upon doctoral theses, and my own personal practical and ethical 
restrictions, prevented me from also undertaking research that placed the German Empire 
and the East Africans and the African diaspora, the other two main actors in this thesis, at 
the centre of the narrative. It has also prevented me from undertaking research on the 
other avenues of interest that my archival research has presented. Therefore, there are 
many avenues for further research, the most obvious of which would place ‘how did the 
British Empire prevent what they perceived to be the dangers associated with Pan-Islamism 
from threatening the security of the British Empire in the years of the First World War, and 
how successful were they in this endeavour?’ as the central research question. It would be 
of great interest to research how Pan-Islamism as a threat to the security of the British 
Empire in East Africa during the First World War was viewed from the perspective of either 
the German Empire or East Africans and the African diaspora by placing them at the centre 
of the narrative, and to compare the outcome of this research to this thesis. Pan-Islamism 
was not exclusive to East Africa during the First World War. The long-term impact of Pan-
Islamism on the British Empire in East Africa after the end of the Great War, the impact, if 
any, that the development of Pan-Islamism in East Africa had on the outcome of the East 
African Campaign, and the relationship between Pan-Islamism and Pan-Africanism, are also 
clear avenues of future research.  
Future research on these topics would be highly beneficial not only in furthering the 
research presented in this thesis, but in the further construction of knowledge about the 
East African Campaign of the First World War. This thesis was begun in the autumn of 2014 
and was completed in the winter of 2018; through the years of the centenary of the First 
World War. Throughout these years the lack of knowledge about the First World War 
outside of Western Europe has been palpable. I hope that this thesis connects with other 
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research conducted on the events beyond that principal theatre, to demonstrate to readers, 


















































Chapter One Beginnings: British Colonialism in East Africa 
 
The formal establishment of the British Empire in East Africa occurred only twenty years 
prior to the outbreak of the First World War, British interest in the region had existed only a 
few decades more, and Europeans had ventured into the interior merely seventy years 
earlier; the British Empire that the British sought to secure from the threat of Pan-Islamism 
in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War had not been in existence 
long enough for its establishment to have passed from living memory. 
In these early years of British colonialism in East Africa the British felt secure in their ability 
to maintain their Empire in the region. They received no serious challenge to the land from 
any other colonial power and they received no serious challenge to the power from the 
population that lived on the land. The British basked in the apparent security of their 
imperial project until the world allowed them to savour it no more. 
 
The Arrival of the Europeans 
 
Occurring during the first wave of European colonisation, the Portuguese, led by Vasco da 
Gama, became the first Europeans to colonise a part of East Africa. Da Gama’s voyage 
journeyed from Lisbon to Calicut between July 1497 and May 1498, and his fleeting time in 
East Africa occurred in the spring of the latter year. This journey was ‘much longer’, 
‘technically more difficult’, and had a ‘far greater immediate significance than the 
celebrated voyages’ of Christopher Columbus – who left for his third voyage less than a 
fortnight after da Gama’s arrival at Calicut – because da Gama had found an over-sea route 
from Europe to India and the profitable trading links of the Indian Ocean. Because da Gama 
helped to lay ‘the foundation of global maritime trade’, some historians argue that his 
voyage was much more significant than Columbus’. Paul Kennedy, an adherent to this view, 
goes as far as to call the era between da Gama’s voyage and the start of the Great War in 
1914 the ‘Vasco da Gama Era’ due to the ‘European hegemony’ that resulted because of it.28 
                                                          
28 Boorstin, Daniel J. The Discoverers (New York, 1983), pp.175—176, cited in Northrup, David. ‘Vasco da Gama 
and Africa: An Era of Mutual Discovery, 1497—1800’, Journal of World History, 9 (1998), p.189; Northrup. 
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Portuguese Mozambique (otherwise known as Portuguese East Africa) was by far the 
longest lasting colony (or overseas province, as the Portuguese regarded it) of the European 
colonial era in Eastern Africa; it lasted from 1498 to 1975, when independence for 
Mozambique was proclaimed. The Portuguese failed to make a financial profit from 
Mozambique; this was an important reason for why nearly four centuries passed before 
other European nations developed significant colonial interest in the region. 
It was in 1844 that two German missionaries – Johann Ludwig Krapf and Johannes Rebmann 
– became the first recorded white people to enter the interior of what would later become 
known internationally as Kenya. ‘The evangelical revival in Britain, that led to the great 
missionary and humanitarian movements of the nineteenth century’ was one of the major 
factors for the European advance across Africa. The 1869 opening of the Suez Canal – which 
brought Eastern Africa ‘2,000 miles closer to Britain by sea’ – and the British abolition of the 
slave trade in 1807 were also significant contributors to the growth of interest Britain and 
other European nations showed to a part of the world with which they previously had had 
very little contact.29  
Settlement by white Europeans in East Africa gently increased over the decades that 
followed from 1844. At first many settlers were missionaries who did not immigrate to the 
region permanently but farming opportunities in the highlands of the future colonies of 
Uganda and Kenya gradually attracted a different sort of settler-coloniser. This second wave 
of colonisation – entitled New Imperialism – occurred in the late Nineteenth and early 
Twentieth Centuries. The European colonisation of Africa during this era has become 
colloquially known as The Scramble for Africa. As a result of the later invasion of Ethiopia by 
Italy in 1935, every part of Africa was colonised by a European or American power at some 
point in its history. The British Empire in Africa was particularly large relative to the other 
European and American empires on the continent. By 1914, the British ruled the following 
colonies and protectorates in East Africa: 
• The East Africa Protectorate (present-day Kenya) 
• The British Somaliland Protectorate (present-day northern Somalia) 
                                                          
‘Vasco da Gama and Africa’, p.189.; Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York, 1987), 
p.25, 244, cited in Northrup. ‘Vasco da Gama and Africa’, pp.189—190.  
29 MacPhee, A. Marshall. Kenya (London; Ernest Benn Limited, 1968), p.33. 
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• Northern Rhodesia (present-day Zambia) 
• The Nyasaland Protectorate (present-day Malawi) 
• Southern Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe) 
• The British Protectorate of Uganda (present-day Uganda)  
• The Sultanate of Zanzibar (present-day insular Tanzania) 
As a result of the First World War the British also acquired: 
• Tanganyika Territory (present-day mainland Tanzania)30 
In the wider African locality, the British also ruled: 
• The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (present-day Sudan and South Sudan) 
• Basutoland (present-day Lesotho) 
• The Bechuanaland Protectorate (present-day Botswana) 
• British Egypt (present-day Egypt) 
• The Union of South Africa (became a self-governing dominion in 1910; present-
day South Africa) 
• Swaziland (present-day eSwatini) 31  
 
A Colonial Paradox Builds an Empire 
 
The Anglo-German Partition of East Africa Agreement was signed in November 1886. With 
some significant exceptions, the German sphere of influence in East Africa was proclaimed 
as being south of a line from the Umba River to Lake Victoria, with the British sphere being 
to the north. 
That Britain’s involvement in East African colonialism was at first quite unwilling must 
appear illogical to the casual observer of history; at the turn of the Twentieth Century the 
British Empire was as yet still continuing its forward progression in size. Yet, still, this 
                                                          
30 Between 1922—1945 the Tanganyika Territory was administrated by Britain as a League of Nations 
mandate, and then between 1946 and independence in 1961 it was administrated by Britain as a United 
Nations trust territory. The administration of the Tanganyika Territory was thus, theoretically, different to the 
administration of the neighbouring British colonies and protectorates and was not technically a part of the 
British Empire, although it was often treated as being so. 
31 It is often the case that the boundaries of these colonies and protectorates do not directly correlate with the 
boundaries of the modern-day states which have succeeded them. 
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assertion is true, for Britain’s ‘unwilling… involvement in East Africa came through the 
actions of Germany’, who was securing its position of influence in certain parts of East 
Africa. Concerned with the potential economic gains to be made in the region, a British 
delegation persuaded the British Government to negotiate the said Agreement. 
Nevertheless, the British Government ‘was yet… reluctant to become too closely involved.’32 
This disinclination resulted in a paradoxical scenario for successive British Governments; 
they ‘were reluctant to spend money in acquiring new colonial possessions in Tropical 
Africa, but [they] were equally reluctant to leave the field entirely to other European 
powers.’ 33 For the Government, the purpose of keeping a British presence in the area was 
because the Germans in East Africa were ‘too near to the Middle East and India shipping 
routes for Britain’s comfort.’34 
The founding of the East Africa Protectorate presents an example of one route taken by the 
British Government to circumvent this paradox. They granted a royal charter to a British 
company that was willing to exploit the economic potential of the land. Consequently, so 
the theory went, the British would remain the primary authority in the area, other European 
countries would be limited in their influence, and the British Government would get what it 
wanted whilst having to do precious little to achieve it. Thus, it came about that in 1888 The 
Imperial British East Africa Company was granted a royal charter by Queen Victoria and 
gained control of the land that would ultimately become Kenya and Uganda. 
The potential flaws of such a scheme are clear, and in less than a decade the Imperial British 
East Africa Company became defunct. Poor fiscal management and personal infighting had 
led to its quick demise. In order to protect British interests in the region, the British 
Government proclaimed the Uganda Protectorate in 1894 and the East Africa Protectorate 
in 1895. 
The British Government’s disinclination for the area did not undergo a reversal once it was 
under its formal control. On the contrary, its disinclination was to continue, for it saw these 
territories proclaimed not colonies but protectorates, and they were placed under the 
                                                          
32 MacPhee. Kenya, pp.34—36.  
33 Munro, J. Forbes. Maritime Enterprise and Empire: Sir William Mackinnon and his Business Network, 1823-93 
(Suffolk; The Boydell Press, 2003), p.408. 
34 MacPhee. Kenya, p.34. 
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administration of the Foreign Office, not the Colonial. On this state of affairs, A. Marshall 
MacPhee summarised that: 
‘British administration had, however, come to East Africa in name only. Some years 
were to pass before it was a reality and this tardiness of Britain in accepting her 
responsibilities was typical of the attitude that promoted her intervention in eastern 
Africa. Little interest continued to be shown in the acquisition of a territory which, in 
the British view, had always rested on strategic considerations and the need to 
preserve a dominant position in the Middle East. In 1895 Kenya was economically 
valueless and the British Government was in no hurry to cover the country with a 
network of administrative stations or to pour capital into its development.’35  
Nevertheless, British colonialism in East Africa steadily grew in both size and immigration 
numbers in the almost two decades that it existed between the proclamation of the 
protectorates and the outbreak of the First World War. Taking on the characteristics of 
colonies, administration was passed from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office in 1905, 
although these territories technically remained protectorates and not colonies. 36 
The United Kingdom retained control of much of East Africa almost solely to prevent 
another European power from occupying the land, rather than out of any actual interest in 
developing or colonising it. In this respect, the British colonial occupation was a complete 
success; between the signing of the Anglo-German Partition of East Africa Agreement in 
November 1886 and the outbreak of the East African Campaign of the First World War in 
August 1914, Britain’s rights to the land were recognised internationally almost without 
dispute. 
 
The Composition of the Population of the British Empire in East Africa 
 
Whilst Britain’s rights to the land that formed its Empire in East Africa were recognised 
almost without dispute in the international sphere in the decades prior to the outbreak of 
                                                          
35 Ibid., pp.38—39. 
36 Wilson, George. Acting Commissioner. ‘“Notice.”’ Entebbe, April 11th, 1905.’, in The Official Gazette of the 
East Africa and Uganda Protectorates. Vol. VII – No. 131. (Mombasa, April 15, 1905.), p.123.  
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the First World War, the same cannot be said for the internal political sphere that existed in 
those lands; for the internal power structures that governed the population that lived on 
the land were not always favourable to the British. The power structures of the indigenous 
Africans, or of those immigrants who had preceded the Europeans to settle in East Africa, 
did not evaporate on the commencement of British colonial rule. 
As the most bureaucratised British territory in the region, it is in the study of the population 
of the East Africa Protectorate where these internal relations can be best observed. On a 
basic level this population can be extrapolated out to cover the entirety of the British 
Empire in East Africa. The East Africa Protectorate’s population in the immediate pre-First 
World War era can be loosely broken down into four racial divisions in ascending size: 
 
1. The Afrikaner ‘Boer’ Population 
2. The European Population 
3. The Indian Population 
4. The African Population  
 
The Afrikaner ‘Boer’ Population 
 
Arriving in substantial numbers after 1906, Afrikaners (popularly known as Boers, but also 
known by the British as the Cape Dutch) migrated to the Protectorate from South Africa. 
After the British Empire’s victory in the Second Boer War of 1899-1902 there was some 
immigration away from South Africa in protest at it being British controlled. Much of it was 
directed towards South America, but a minority headed north across the African continent. 
Paradoxically, many of these Afrikaners decided to settle in the British controlled East Africa 
Protectorate, instead of the German controlled German East Africa, despite Germany having 
been sympathetic to the Afrikaner’s cause during the Second Boer War (although they 
officially remained neutral). This is only paradoxical at first glance, however. Brian Du Toit 
has written an explanation as to why a British administered territory proved to be so 
attractive to migrant Afrikaners who wished to leave a territory because it was administered 
by the British: 
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‘The East African region into which the early Afrikaner settlers moved was ill defined 
and only sporadically administered. The Germans were more structured in their 
administration and more strict; the British allowed a much greater degree of 
freedom and personal decisions about where and how settlers established 
themselves. In time the latter would prove more acceptable, even attractive, as 
settlers who had originally trekked into German East Africa moved across the border 
into what later became Kenya.’37  
The majority of the Afrikaners in East Africa eventually settled under British rule, although 
some remained living in German East Africa; something that was to be unfortunate for them 
when the British Empire invaded the German colony during the East African Campaign of 
the First World War. 
 
The European Population 
 
In 1902 a Crown Lands Ordinance was enacted in the East Africa Protectorate to encourage 
European, or, more specifically, white, immigration to make the Uganda Railway profitable 
and to expand farming in the highlands of the Protectorate, which had a climate that was 
considered suitable for Europeans to live and farm in.38 
The East Africa Protectorate had traditionally been seen as a gateway to the rich interior of 
Africa – in particular the Uganda Protectorate – rather than a destination in its own right; 
the Protectorate’s Administration was keen to change this perception by improving the 
freehold rights of the settlers. The improvement of these rights was somewhat limited; 
Karuti Kanyinga writes that the settlers argued that it ‘effectively treated the state as a 
landlord, in which case the settlers were to be subjected to strict state control.’39 
Nevertheless, in pure immigration statistics the Crown Land Ordinance of 1902 had some 
                                                          
37 Du Toit, Brian M. The Boers in East Africa: Ethnicity and Identity (Westport, Connecticut; Bergin & Garvey, 
1998), p.2. 
38 The Imperial British East Africa Company had been occupied with building the Uganda Railway; the 
enormous financial liability passed to the British Government when the British Government took over the 
administration of the Protectorate from the Imperial British East African Company in 1895.  
39 Kanyinga, Karuti. Re-Distribution from Above: The Politics of Land Rights and Squatting in Coastal Kenya 
(Uppsala; Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2000), p.37.  
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success in achieving its objectives. In 1903 the Protectorate had an approximate immigrant 
population of ‘450 Europeans and Eurasians’. By 1911 this had increased to an ‘estimated… 
2,500 Europeans’, and within a few months of the outbreak of the First World War the 
white population had increased still further to 3,175.40  
The bureaucratic apparatus of the Protectorate was drawn almost without exception from 
this tiny white population. Racism was at the core of the British Empire in East Africa. Sir 
Charles Eliot was the Commissioner (and later Commander-in-Chief and Consul-General) of 
the Protectorate from 1900-1904, and he was a firm believer in keeping this state of affairs 
continuing for as much of the foreseeable future as he could control. This belief was one of 
the prime motivators behind his enactment of the Crown Land Ordinance with its 
promotion of white settlement. His successors as Commissioner (and eventually Governor) 
before the First World War broadly agreed with his plan to establish the seeds of growth for 
subsequent generations of a large white population, but not everybody who was present in 
East Africa at this time was in full agreement that this plan was the best for the future of the 
Protectorate.  
Captain Richard Meinertzhagen would go on to become one of the heads of the Intelligence 
Department of the British Empire’s East African Force during the First World War, but 
between 1902 and 1906 he was attached to the King’s African Rifles. He published his 
diaries from this period as Kenya Diary 1902-1906 in 1957, in which, in typical 
Meinertzhagen fashion, he did not hold back on expressing his feelings about the capability 
of the Commissioner. Eliot makes several appearances in Kenya Diary; not a man to miss a 
chance to make a cuttingly sharp remark when the opportunity presented itself, 
Meinertzhagen’s feelings towards the Commissioner can be summarised when he quipped 
that ‘never did a man more closely resemble to objects of his hobby. He is invertebrate, with 
an icy cold nature, unsympathetic, but a scholar of the first rank.’41 Eliot’s ‘hobby’ – his work 
on which ‘won him universal recognition as a leading authority’ – was on ‘British 
nudibranchiate molluscs’: sea slugs.42 Meinertzhagen knew the Commissioner a little 
                                                          
40 HC Deb (05 August 1903) Vol. 126, c. 1583; HC Deb (09 February 1911) Vol. 21, cc.431—2; HC Deb (14 April 
1914) Vol. 61, cc. 33—136.  
41 Meinertzhagen, Colonel R. Kenya Diary, 1902-1906. 23.XI.1902. Nairobi (Edinburgh; Oliver and Boyd, 1957), 
p.59. 
42 Miller, Charles. The Lunatic Express: An Entertainment in Imperialism (London; Head of Zeus, 2016), p.430. 
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socially, and he recounted how the Commissioner batted aside the topic of the potential 
downfalls of his plan in a discussion on the topic in 1902: 
‘He envisaged a thriving colony of thousands of Europeans with their families, the 
whole of the country from the Aberdares and Mount Kenya to the German border 
divided up into farms… the whole country… under white settlement. He intends to 
confine the natives to reserves and use them as cheap labour on farms. I suggested 
that the country belonged to Africans and that their interests must prevail over the 
interests of strangers. He would not have it; he kept on using the word “paramount” 
with reference to the claims of Europeans. I said that some day the African would be 
educated and armed; that would lead to a clash. Eliot thought that that day was so 
far distant as not to matter and that by that time the European element would be 
strong enough to look after themselves; but I am convinced that in the end the 
Africans will win and that Eliot’s policy can lead only to trouble and 
disappointment.’43 
The topic was revived at a dinner a couple of years later. Eliot admitted that even the 
Foreign Office in London thought that he was infringing on the rights of the Africans, so 
zealous was he in promoting white privilege within the Protectorate: 
‘He tells me he is having a terrific row with the Foreign Office over white settlement 
and their ridiculous attitude over grants of land in the Kikuyu country, which they 
regarded as an infringement of native rights. Eliot hopes to attract thousands of 
Europeans to East Africa and does not appear to accept the fact that natives have 
any “rights.” I suggested that East Africa belonged to Africans and that we had no 
right to occupy any land which is tribal land. We should develop East Africa for the 
African and not for the strangers. I like Eliot, but after tonight I doubt if he likes 
me.’44  
In this era, the conclusions of the likes of Meinertzhagen, who himself was hardily known for 
being a champion of the African population – he referred to having ‘killed… niggers’ in his 
diaries – were not given much consideration by the British administration of the 
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Protectorate. This was despite their reservations having been built on practical, rather than 
racial, reasons.45 This turned out to be a fallacy on their part; certainly during the First 
World War, but, more particularly, after the Second. Nevertheless, at the time of the 
outbreak of the First World War the tiny white population of the East Africa Protectorate 
controlled all of the major positions in the Administration of that Protectorate. By ensuring 
that there was a continued British presence in the area, their actions guaranteed that the 
absolute sovereignty of the British to the land in the international sphere was upheld. 
 
The Indian Population 
 
Despite the growth of the white population in the East Africa Protectorate, it was 
significantly outnumbered by another immigrant population; one which had had a presence 
in Eastern Africa for far longer than the Europeans: the Indians.  
The Indian population of East Africa was well established by the outbreak of the First World 
War: ‘the Indians were clearly the most numerous and conspicuous immigrant community’ 
there.46 In addition to those Indians who had been arriving for centuries to trade, 
indentured servants had been recruited from India to build the Uganda Railway, and these 
servants made up a substantial proportion of the Indian population of the Protectorate by 
the time of the First World War. Gregory ‘recognises that “what proportion of the 
indentured servants stayed in East Africa has long been a matter of conjecture” because of 
incomplete and inaccurate documentation. However, from records kept of the [Indian] 
workers returning [to India] between 1896 and 1923, he estimates that of 39,771 who went 
to East Africa, 32,493 returned and around 7,278 (18.3 per cent) remained in East Africa.’47 
This population was in addition to those Indians who inhabited Eastern Africa but were not 
indentured servants. ‘Coupland notes that by [1856] on the mainland, “Each Arab coast 
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town had its little group of Indian traders.”’48 These traders were later joined by their 
families and friends and some moved into the interior, so that in time ‘They monopolized 
the business life of the towns and acquired ownership of almost all the municipal land.’49 
It is therefore difficult to say with any accuracy how many Indians were living in the 
Protectorate during the years of, and immediately prior to, the First World War. Lord 
Harcourt (then Mr Harcourt), the Secretary of State for the Colonies between November 
1910 and May 1915), gave the population of ‘Asiatics’ resident there in 1911 as 11,886, but 
provided no breakdown as to the nationalities of these Asians.50 The Naval Staff Intelligence 
Department wrote that in 1912 ‘the majority’ of the ‘non-native’ non-European population 
‘were British Indians, but Coanese [sic: should read Goanese], Arabs, and natives of the 
Levant [were] also numerous’; these nationalities presumably are those referred to as 
‘Asiatics.’51 The India Office remained engaged with the Indian population in East Africa, and 
continued to concern themselves in their affairs.52 
Indians outside of commerce and indentured servitude were ‘largely employed on the 
Railways and in the Telegraphic and Postal Services’.53 They also held other posts within the 
Protectorate; when the East African Rifles was established by the British Imperial 
Government as a military force in 1895 300 Indian soldiers were recruited from the Punjab. 
Indians thus represented 3/7 – nearly 43 per cent - of this force when it originated.54 Hence, 
despite being unable to take on the administrative roles that were reserved for the white 
population, the Indian population had a large amount of influence on the running of the 
Protectorate through their various employments. 
This influence was recognised by the European population and tension built between the 
two communities in the decade leading to 1914.55 In summary, the Indian population was 
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oppressed within the non-African community, and prevented from areas and occupations 
on a racial basis:  
‘Indians were not nominated to important bodies… The pattern of European 
privilege in the central government was repeated at the municipal level. Socially, 
Indians were subject to a colour bar that denied them access to first-class hotels, 
restaurants, clubs, and resorts… The colour bar extended to the civil service, police, 
and military organizations in that Indians were never appointed to higher posts.’56 
The result of this tension was the creation of the East African Indian National Congress, 
which had amongst its grievances the discrimination of Indians by the European population. 
Unsurprisingly, the Indian seditionist movement surfaced in the British Empire in East Africa. 
It is not the purpose of this thesis to give an in-depth analysis of the Indian independence 
movement in East Africa during the First World War, and it would be difficult if it were, for 
there has been little scholarly attention paid to Indian seditionists in this region. This lack of 
scholarly attention is not an isolated case; there has been little scholarly work on Indian 
seditionists outside of India in general. Fischer-Tiné writes that:  
‘The radical wing of the Indian independence movement [popularly known as… 
“seditionists…” among British officials] in the first two decades of the twentieth 
century is an excellent example of the multilayered [sic] and multifaceted global 
entanglements of nationalist projects. Nevertheless, not many historians have 
widened the lens beyond the geographical bounds of India and looked at 
intercontinental connections in their attempt adequately to explain both the political 
strategies and the ideological contents of Indian nationalism in this crucial phase.’57 
Although the Indian independence movement is not directly relevant to this thesis, that the 
Indian population of the East Africa Protectorate, and East Africa more generally, were not 
disposed upon to always view the British Empire with a friendly eye plays into the larger 
narrative of this thesis; that the population of the British Empire itself was partly responsible 
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for threatening the security of that Empire in East Africa with Pan-Islamism. Threats to the 
security of the British Empire lay just as much within its borders as they did outside of them.  
 
The African Population  
 
The Afrikaner and white immigrant populations were significantly outnumbered by the 
Indian immigrant population, but the entire immigrant population was dwarfed by the 
indigenous African population. The East Africa Protectorate had an estimated population of 
2,765,000 in 1911, and of that the white and Indian (‘Asiatics’) populations accounted for 
only 3,175 and 11,886 respectively.58 The African population could occupy some roles in the 
King’s African Rifles and in the Police Force, but, despite comprising almost the entire 
population of the Protectorate, they had only a very limited role in the formal colonial 
administration.  
The African population primarily lived in, and thus was governed by, tribes. Taking its que 
from the indifference of the British Imperial Government towards its empire in East Africa, 
the Administration of the East Africa Protectorate had neither the inclination nor the 
personnel to change this status quo. Therefore, despite them having colonised the land, 
many East Africans had little regular contact with the British colonisers.  
This position was a matter of pride for some of the British. Eliot later wrote that as long as 
the African tribes realised that the white man was superior, which, in his view, every tribe 
did or would do, there was little need for the British Empire to have a larger presence in 
their lives, and therefore there was little need for a more comprehensive system of 
governance in East Africa:  
‘In the relation of European and African tribes, it is not true that familiarity breeds 
contempt. The hostile natives are almost invariably those who know nothing about 
Europeans, and kill some stragglers out of mere bravado. With the possible 
exception of the Somalis, who cannot be classed as ordinary African natives, every 
tribe appears to accept the white man as a superior and not unfriendly creature the 
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moment he appears as the representative of regular government, and it is surprising 
how small a force of police is sufficient to support our authority.’59 
Yet the idea of docile Africans as endorsed by the likes of Eliot is a fake. A brief look at the 
history of the East African Police Force, as noted by Eliot in his recollections, proves this 
contrary narrative to be the truth. 
David M. Anderson has examined the widespread offence of cattle theft by the African 
population towards the European farmer settler-colonisers. Whilst a minor grievance, this 
account proposes that the Africans living on their tribal reserves were not only not cowed by 
the British Empire, but that they had learnt to play the British governance at their own 
game. The British Empire relied on the tribal Chief to organise an effective tribal police force 
and mediate between the two groups; something that they were not always inclined to do: 
‘Unfortunately, criminals did not always restrict their activities to the jurisdiction of a 
single police force. Indeed, many of the most prevalent forms of crime were 
committed against the property of Europeans in the ‘White Highlands’, by persons 
who then fled to the Native Reserves. In these circumstances the Kenya Police could 
not normally pursue the fugitive beyond the limits of their jurisdiction except when 
in ‘hot pursuit’, and so had to hand the case over to the DC [District Commissioner], 
or chief, and the Tribal Chief. While there was usually no lack of co-operation from 
the DC in such circumstances, the response of an African chief was often more 
fickle.’60 
Aside from just a perfectly natural dislike of being colonised, there was a second reason for 
why African tribes did not exist in a perfect state of submission to their colonisers, no 
matter what colonisers such as Eliot chose to believe; many of them lived under two 
colonial powers. Some even lived under multiple. Resulting as a consequence of the lines 
that had been unilaterally drawn on the map of Africa by Europeans in Europe during the 
Scramble for Africa in the Nineteenth Century, such tribes were by no means uncommon in 
European colonies. The Wayao and Wangoni tribes, for example, mutually had significant 
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parts of their tribes living in both German East Africa and in Portuguese administrated 
Nyasaland, whilst the Manyema tribe was ‘[a] Congo tribe, from which colonies have been 
founded in many parts of German East Africa.’ The British considered the Wanyamwezi tribe 
to be ‘great wanderers [who were] to be found on the Coast and in all sorts of employment 
throughout German and British East Africa.’ Some border tribes supported one coloniser 
over another; the Wasukuma tribe, for example, were stated to be ‘a powerful tribe [who 
were] a constant source of anxiety to the Germans’ and who were ‘reported to have [had] a 
distinct leaning towards the British.’61 Hence, even if one were to support Eliot’s flawed 
notion that ‘every tribe [accepted] the white man as a superior and not unfriendly creature 
the moment he [appeared] as the representative of regular government’, the facts do not 
support any notion that the loyalties of Africans living in border tribes accepted each white 
‘regular government’ representative equally. The information that the African population of 
the British Empire in East Africa could be a threat to the security of that empire were there 
from the beginning. 
In this time era, the African population did not have the agency to take on the might of the 
British Empire; they did not have the agency to expel the coloniser. Yet this does not mean 
that they were ever accepting of it. As seen with the example of cattle rustling, minor acts of 
rebellion were common place. Although Jeff Haynes stated in The Encyclopaedia of African 
History, Volume III, that African Muslims ‘gradually… came to accept European rule,’ over 
the course of the first half of the Twentieth Century, this is simply not true; not staging a 
successful revolution is not the same as accepting colonial rule, especially when the 
adversary was a global superpower.62 As stated in the Introduction, revolt did occur: ‘in 
most of Africa, the early colonial period… was characterized by intermittent rebellions, 
revolts, and uprisings against the newly established colonial state.’63 But not accepting 
European colonial rule was also a state of mind. East Africans were not on the whole docile 
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and in possession of only a ‘simple… character’; they were humans, with human thoughts 
and human desires.64 
But the likes of Eliot could sell themselves this fantasy for one particular reason; the tribes 
were not themselves cohesive. The British studied the tribes, and in one such publication 
they confidently stated that ‘the tribes will not combine’ and were ‘loathe to leave their 
own tribal territory.’65 The East Africa Protectorate was not an African construction; the 
different tribes that found themselves living in the Protectorate did not have any special 
loyalty to one another. The same is true for the Uganda Protectorate, or any number of 
other British imperial territories in the region. Despite vastly outnumbering the immigrant 
population, the African population of East Africa had little to bring it together. Thus, despite 
colonial grievances, they could not unite to oppose the colonisers. When added to the 
reality that they had not the agency to expel the might of the British Empire, this lack of 
cohesiveness allowed the British to rule its Empire in East Africa in the years prior to the 
East African Campaign of the First World War with a very small white administration, 




Having never previously received any serious challenges to the land from any other colonial 
power and having never previously received any serious challenges to the power to 
administer it from the population that lived on the land, the British Empire was to enter the 
Great War in East Africa in a naïve manner. Their belief that neither of these two conditions 
would change was shattered. They were forced to grapple with credible threats to the 
security of the British Empire in East Africa. Having made little provision, preventing these 
threats from threatening British imperial security was to become a focus for the British 
during the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War.  
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Chapter Two Power: The Islamic World of 1914 
 
When Vasco da Gama and his crew arrived in East Africa in the spring of 1498 they 
experienced ‘astonishment’ at the ‘wealth and architectural magnificence of the trading 
cities of the Swahili coast’; their ‘astonishment’ was ‘mixed with avarice.’66 Traders from 
across the Indian Ocean had been arriving on the shores of Eastern Africa to exchange goods 
since well before the time of Christ. Favourable monsoon winds had been utilised by many 
traders across the ages, so that those living on the coast in Eastern Africa had traded with 
merchants from across the Indian Ocean; from as far afield as the Indian subcontinent, 
Assyria, China, and the Arabian Peninsula.  
It was to this culture that the Europeans first arrived at the end of the Fifteenth Century; a 
highly complex society which had existed for millennia. The arrival of widescale European 
colonialism in the late Nineteenth Century was to change this culture irrevocably. Islam, a 
major religion on these trading routes, was to be a recipient of this change. 
The Swahili people lived (and continue to live in large numbers) along the Eastern African 
coast and have traditionally been adherents of the Islamic faith. The first recorded Muslims 
to arrive in East Africa were two brothers from Oman, Suleiman and Said, in the Seventh 
Century. They were in due course followed by other Muslims. Many of these early arrivals 
were fleeing from persecution on the Arabian Peninsula, and so the settlements founded on 
the eastern coast of Africa ‘became more and more Arab in character’; the years between 
975 and 1498 ‘is often called the time of the Zenj empire [sic]’ and was a period of Arab 
settlement in this area. The Swahili people spoke (and continue to speak) Swahili (a Bantu 
language with significant Arab vocabulary) and practised (and continue to practise) Sunni 
Islam. Their trade traditionally focussed upon ivory, slaves, and spices. However, except for 
when it served the purposes of this trade to travel there via a caravan, they ‘were not to be 
found in the [African] interior.’ Despite the rich trade that was occurring on the coast, the 
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interior therefore remained almost entirely devoid of Islamic influences until the Nineteenth 
Century.67 
The entry of the European empires into the East African region was to fundamentally 
change the local power structures. A consequence of these changes was that Islam spread 
rapidly away from the coast to people who had been virtually untouched by any previous 
Islamic influence. By its promotion of Islam this transformation paved the way for Pan-
Islamism to threaten the security of the British Empire in East Africa in the years of the East 
African Campaign of the First World War. 
 
Entry into the Interior  
 
After becoming the ruler of Oman in 1804, Seyyid Said turned his attention to consolidating 
his possessions on the Eastern African coast, which by this date were nominally ruled by the 
Sultan of Oman for various geopolitical reasons, but in actuality were almost independent. 
As well as reinforcing his rule by forming an alliance with the British Empire, Said 
considerably increased the trade, and the subsequent profit, that passed through East 
Africa. However, similarly to the previous Islamic settlers, he had little interest in the land 
beyond the coast except for when it directly impacted upon his trade. While caravans did 
enter the interior under his flag, after his death it was ‘[hard] to define the lands over which 
he [had] ruled’.68 No real attempt was made to export Islam into the heart of Eastern Africa; 
‘the Koran… positively forbade any Muslim to enslave another’, and since much of their 
trade rested on slavery, it would have been counterproductive (from an economic, rather 
than a missionary, viewpoint) for Said and his fellow merchants to have spread Islam too far 
amongst the African people.69 Islam was therefore seen to be the religion of the coastal 
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elites. The slave trade grew under Said’s rule and the results of this trade on the interior 
were ‘catastrophic.’70   
The Slave Trade Act passed through the Parliament of the United Kingdom in 1807. It 
outlawed the trade, although not the practise, of slavery within the British Empire. It was 
followed in 1833 by the Slavery Abolition Act, which outlawed the practise of slavery within 
the British Empire, with some exceptions. Although not subjected to it, the strength of the 
Royal Navy in enforcing blockades was to have a significant impact upon the slave trades 
enacted under the flags of other nations. In time, the Eastern Slave Trade, also known as the 
Arab Slave Trade, was massively curtailed, and large parts of East Africa were to become 
free of slavery. Slavery as an important part of Swahili trading culture largely disappeared.  
There was thus no more an economic hinderance to the conversion of Muslims in the 
interior of East Africa, but there was an economic hinderance to the cessation of the Eastern 
Slave Trade. Consequently, larger caravans entered the interior to conduct trade of the non-
human variety. These two events were amongst the most important changes which 
occurred in East African trading culture during the Nineteenth Century; both were to 
precipitate the rapid spread of Islam amongst the population. 
‘Islam’, writes David C. Sperling, ‘was an entirely urban phenomenon [in the early 
Nineteenth Century in East Africa], and the very process of Islamization was centred on the 
towns – what we might call “urban Islamization.”’71 “Urban Islamization” increased in the 
early Nineteenth Century, as the start of the documented spread of Islam in what would 
become European colonial lands began slowly, but in earnest: 
‘The presence of Muslims in rural areas thus grew in several ways: the emigration of 
Muslims from established towns to found new rural settlements; greater initiative 
on the part of Muslim traders, who began to frequent and in some cases even settle 
in the rural hinterland; and the general expansion of agriculture by Muslims into 
areas that bordered on or intermingled with non-Muslim peoples… Thus, the 
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number of non-Muslim Africans adopting Islam may have been increasing, but most 
of these would have still gravitated to urban life. In spite of closer and more frequent 
contact between Muslims and non-Muslims, there is little evidence that Islam had 
begun to take hold among peoples in the rural hinterland before the second half of 
the nineteenth century.’72 
Sperling continues by reminding us that ‘Because of the limitation of our sources and 
consequent lack of knowledge, the history of Islam [in East Africa] necessarily lies hidden 
behind the secular and commercial activities whose details are so much better known.’73 
Recorded history has not thoroughly recorded this history; yet, it is possible to reconstruct 
enough of it to partially understand Islam’s spread throughout East Africa. In particular, the 
creation of “Rural Islamization” was a ‘significant turning point’ in this narrative: 
‘By the third quarter of the nineteenth century, there is evidence that some non-
Muslim Africans had adopted Islam and continued to reside in their rural villages – 
the beginnings of what we might call “rural Islamization.” This change marked a 
significant turning point in the spread of Islam. Previously, the emigration of 
Islamized Africans away from their own people to settle in Muslim towns had 
removed elements that might otherwise have proved innovative, if not disruptive, to 
their own societies. Now, the presence of indigenous African Muslims in rural 
villages created new circumstances and the potential for change.’ 
There were a couple of reasons behind the growth of “rural Islamization” in East Africa. One 
cause was ‘remigration’; the ‘return of Muslim Africans from residence in towns to their 
original rural homes.’74 ‘The British”, writes Sperling, ‘unintentionally fostered the spread of 
Islam’: 
‘Initially, the process of establishing and consolidating colonial rule, in British East 
Africa and German East Africa, offered Muslims an unprecedented occasion for 
expansion throughout the interior. The military conquest preceding the 
establishment of colonial rule was carried out in large part by Muslim soldiers, many 
of whom were then stationed in the new administrative centers they helped to 
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create… During the early years of colonial administration, both the British and the 
Germans relied on Muslims to occupy key positions as chiefs, headmen, clerks, and 
tax collectors… Colonial governments also founded new administrative centres in the 
interior in places untouched by the earlier caravan trade… Thus, communities of 
immigrant Muslims came to live and settle in areas that had previously been closed, 
unsafe, or only partially accessible to Muslims, and in the midst of non-Muslim 
societies with little or no previous exposure to Islam.’75 
Zoë Marsh and G.W. Kingsnorth agree with the assessment that ‘both the British and the 
German relied on Muslims to occupy key positions’, but their notion of ‘key positions’ (or 
‘openings’, as they define it) varies slightly. Amongst the positions they list are: ‘troops, 
traders, skilled craftsmen, interpreters and domestic servants etc.’; key positions for 
everyday life for the new colonial administration.76 Along with Muslims from the coastal 
regions, Muslims from India came to fulfil some of these new positions, as examined in 
Chapter One. 
That they had precipitated the spread of Islam in East Africa resulted in a rather ironic 
situation for the Europeans. For they who so often used the notion of Christian missionary 
to justify their imperial ambitions were a major contributor to the spread of Islam, and ‘[by] 
the time of the First World War, Muslim communities existed in or near most colonial 
administrative centres’ in the region.77 
 
The British Construction of East African Islam 
  
The officials of the French Empire developed a narrative that segregated Islamic groups 
along racial lines. The various works on this topic cumulated in the writings of Paul Marty, 
who published several books on this topic between 1916 and 1930. In this French 
understanding, Islam bidan (white Islam) and Islam maure (Moorish Islam) were separated 
from Islam noir (black Islam), which was regarded as a mix of pure Arab Islam and African 
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beliefs and traditions. Although the British Empire ‘never enunciated a doctrine as elaborate 
as the French’, Felicitas Becker argues that ‘their view of African Muslims was quite 
similar.’78 
The British construction of East African Muslims must be located within the imperial 
specificities of East Africa itself. Becker writes that ‘The internal diversity of Islam in East 
Africa, already evident at the onset of European rule, increased further in the colonial 
period’ and ‘The intensity of this dialogue within coastal society and with the African 
mainland helps explain the absence of a concerted response, in the name of Islam, to 
imperial encroachment.’79 This ‘internal diversity’ consisted not only of the differences 
between rural and urban Muslims, but also amongst the urban Muslims of the coast. Due to 
the geopolitical events concerning Said in East Africa, there was some immigration from 
Oman into the region during the Nineteenth Century. Randhall L. Pouwels writes that as a 
result there were ‘differences in outlook’ amongst the coastal Muslims, and ‘a deeper rift in 
religious authority [that] stemmed from the overall political, social, and economic gains 
made by Arab newcomers in the nineteenth century.’80 
This lack of cohesiveness was mirrored on the side of the imperialists, for ‘representatives of 
European imperial interests had been on the scene for some decades before [1890], 
expressing widely divergent stances on Islam.’ This ‘disunity lived on in the diversity of 
opinions concerning how best to relate to Islam that prevailed among Europeans in the 
early colonial period. Colonial officialdom, missionaries, and government experts debated 
the merits and problems of Islamic influence without getting close to consensus.’81 
A debate initiated by Isaac Taylor, the Canon of York, in October 1887 between Islamicists 
and missionaries highlighted what was at the crux of much of this disunity: racial theory. In 
this era ‘race had an important place in debates in anthropological and scientific circles and 
had long been associated with ideas of ‘scientific racism’ based upon notions of biological 
hierarchies between racial types analogous to those between different biological species.’82 
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Taylor’s argument was that Islam ‘though quite unfitted for the higher races… is eminently 
adapted to be a civilizing and elevating religion for barbarous tribes’ for whom ‘Christianity 
is too spiritual, too lofty.’83 The response of the missionaries was no less racist. Malcolm 
McColl ‘disputed Taylor’s view of Islam as appropriate to the “child-like” African mind by 
offering a counter-metaphor: “A child will develop into a man. But an adult man, deprived of 
arms and legs, is not in a process of development”.’84 The argument was not over whether 
racial theory was correct, but in what exact form it took.  
It was against this background that the officials of the British Empire constructed their view 
of Islam in East Africa. These officials ‘took some pains to cultivate amicable relations with 
the [coastal] elites freshly displaced from political power’ for they, along with the Germans, 
held ‘the default assumption that Muslim religious and political representatives of coastal 
milieus made better intermediaries than other Africans… (in keeping with many coastal 
notables’ view of themselves as unrelated to ‘mainland’ Africans, than ‘Africans’). They 
considered Muslim patricians the most ‘civilized’ part of the population’.85 
This did not include the Islam noir population. Whilst this was partly to do with the Arab 
ancestry of the coastal Muslims, ‘Part of the explanation lies in a view of African Muslims, 
especially recent converts, as ‘not really’ Muslims, and, in particular, largely untouched by 
the doctrines of jihad’. Consequently, ‘British officials and their coastal Muslim 
intermediaries jointly elaborated notions of Muslim separateness, while largely ignoring, as 
inauthentic and politically irrelevant, those Muslims who were undeniably African.’86 
This separateness was so entrenched that it continued until well past the end of the Second 
World War. J.K. Leslie ‘deemed the majority of African Muslims in [Dar es Salaam] 
“fundamentally irreligious”’ in 1963; Felicitas Becker contends that this ‘contrasts sharply 
with oral recollections of Sufi activity in late-colonial Dar.’87 W. Montgomery Watt wrote 
further in 1966 that Islam in the then modern-day East Africa ‘is by no means monolithic’ 
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and that ‘from the political point of view’ the ideological differences which separated 
different Islamic sects ‘are less important than the racial ones.’88 
There were varied reasons for why the British and the French Empires believed the African 
Muslims to not be real followers of the faith of Islam. In addition to the racial arguments 
about whether African people were mentally proficient enough to fully understand religion, 
as argued by the likes of Taylor and McColl, they stemmed from arguments for their 
conversion. Paul Marty himself believed in a mix of reasons: that conversion was ‘out of 
snobbery’; that certain people ‘suffer from a need to believe’ and Islam was merely a 
convenient faith; or, for traders, conversion was simply for the ‘sheer practicality’ that Islam 
sometimes provided on trading routes.89 Becker argues that conversion sometimes took 
place because the converts wished to improve their social standing: 
‘Marginal townspeople, including advantageously placed slaves, were also 
experimenting with Islamic identities. In a context of sometimes extreme social 
mobility, Islam was for established patricians an issue of hierarchy, while for the 
“plebeians”, as Jonathan Glassman has called them, it was about entitlement. It 
enabled these “plebeians” to challenge their ascribed marginality.’90 
The conversion of East Africans to Islam was not usually judged by the Europeans to be 
because of a profound belief in, and understanding of, the teachings of the Prophet 
Mohammed.  
Although these ideas were based on racist tropes, they do not appear to have been entirely 
without foundation. In 1919 the Admiralty’s Intelligence Department wrote that Christianity 
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and Islam in Africa were ‘important rather as social influences than as creeds, and from this 
point of view Mohammedanism especially is a strong force’. In particular regard to Islam 
noir, the Admiralty’s Intelligence Department described their perceptions of the piety of 
religion by black Africans by stating that ‘A belief in witchcraft and much primitive animism 
and magic is still widely spread among the natives [of the East Africa Protectorate] in spite 
of the spread of Christianity and Islam’. They continued: ‘The negroid type of 
Mohammedanism, which is followed by the Swahili and the tribes under their influence, 
embodies many heathen practices, for example the initiation ceremonies and dances’.91 
As the British construction of Islam in East Africa was based upon the social, scientific, and 
religious arguments then prevalent in the United Kingdom, the prism through which they 
understood African Islam was through that of the European Christian gaze. Frank 
Schildknecht reminds his readers that ‘[the] concept of conversion in Islam is also different 
from that of Christianity.’ This is a crucial point, because the Christian Europeans viewed 
religious conversion differently to that of the converting African. Schildknecht states that: 
‘In Christianity it is (as a first step) an aversion from something accepted, and thus a 
full change of life which brings about a complete change of outlook, a break with the 
past and a kind of disintegration from, for example, the convert’s tribal society… 
[therefore] In this instance, for Christians, the notion of natural law was forgotten. 
Everything African was “pagan,” hence the necessary “aversion” towards the past 
which was asked of a prospective convert.’ 
This was different to Islam: 
‘Islam does not know, at least not in theory, such a dichotomy. African custom is 
accepted, and a convert to Islam may continue in his former tribal life as before, 
taking part in all ritual functions and believing in them virtually as before. Therefore, 
according to the Christian notion, no real conversion takes place.’92  
This different view of religious conversion made it possible in East Africa for the spread of 
Islam to occur amongst a tribal system without Islam bringing it down, something 
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impossible from the European gaze. The new Muslims of East Africa were therefore 
adherents of the Islamic faith, whilst also remaining part of tribal life, with all that that 
brought with it.  
By viewing everything through a European and imperialist lens, the British construction of 
East African Islam was flawed at its centre. The British did not attempt to understand how 
East African Muslims viewed their religion, dismissing them casually as barely worth the title 
of Muslim. By failing to understand them, the British were left with a limited ability to exert 
imperial control over them. 
 
Politico-Administrative vs. Religious Power 
 
By the time of the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 many of the world’s Muslims 
lived in lands that were ruled under the banners of the Entente Empires: The United 
Kingdom, Russia, and France. These three countries had quite different political systems: the 
U.K. had a Liberal Government under a constitutional monarch, Russia had an autocratic 
tsar, and France had the Third Republic. In common they each had a society which was 
broadly Christian in nature; a Christian society which was officially recognised in law by the 
former two countries and, despite the introduction of Laïcité in 1905, continued to exist in 
the latter. Therefore, under Islamic law all three of these Entente Empires were considered 
non-Islamic, or infidel. 
Islamic law, also known as Sharia Law, governs numerous areas of life for Islamic believers: 
marriage, hygiene, inheritance, and food are some examples of the differing spheres of 
interests that are covered by religious legislation. However, there is little in the Quran, or in 
the six canonical books of the Hadiths, about how political governance ought to be 
structured. Hence, it is possible for Muslims to live under diverse types of political 
governance – from autocratic regimes to democratic governments – without technically 
breaking any Quranic teachings, and although some ‘conservative jurists claim a right to 
debate whether new laws are in accordance with’ Sharia Law, ‘statesmen are unwilling to 
concede this.’103 Therefore, in this regard it is not against Islamic law for Muslims to live 
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under an imperial style of governance, such as they did within the British Empire in 1914. 
The United Kingdom, thus, held the politico-administrative power over the Muslim 
inhabitants of the British Empire. 
Despite the lack of instruction in the Quran or the Hadiths about how political governance 
ought to be structured, there are verses within the Quran which strongly imply that Muslims 
should not live under non-Islamic, or infidel, rule. For example, verse 61:9 of the Quran 
states that ‘It is He who sent His Messenger with guidance and the religion of truth to 
manifest it over all religion, although those who associate others with Allāh dislike it.’ A few 
verses before, in 61:4, it is written that ‘Indeed, Allāh loves those who fight in His cause in a 
row as though they are a (single) structure joined firmly.’104 These verses, amongst others, 
have been interpreted by some, but by no means all, to mean that Muslims should fight, 
perhaps physically, against non-Islamic rulers. Jamal al-Din al-Afghani was one such person; 
he ‘was troubled by his experiences in British India, where Muslims were ruled by non-
Muslims… in his view [Muslims] should only be governed by the faithful’, and he was not 
content to keep his views to himself.105  
Whilst the United Kingdom, Russia, and France, along with the other European empires that 
had Muslim inhabitants, including the Dutch and the German Empires, held the politico-
administrative power over a substantial majority of the world’s Muslims, they did not hold 
the religious power. 
There had been some attempt, notably by Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, to change this and 
allow the European colonialists to assume at least some of the religious, as well as the 
politico-administrative, power over the Muslims of their empires. On an 1898 voyage to the 
Holy Land, Kaiser Wilhelm ‘described himself to great public effect as the “friend” of the 
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“300 million Mohammedans”.’106 This image lasted some time, with the idea that the Kaiser 
had actually converted sometimes added for additional effect. Wilhelm Wassmuss, a 
German diplomat and spy, told Muslims on the Persian Gulf in 1915 that ‘the German 
Emperor had himself embraced their faith, and [had] ordered all his subjects to do likewise. 
The Emperor, he added, had even made a secret pilgrimage to Mecca, thereby entitling him 
to wear the sacred green turban, and to adopt the name “Haji” Wilhelm Mohammed.’107 
However fanciful as this may seem in hindsight, Jacob M. Landau reminds his readers that 
what Kaiser Wilhelm thought and did, and what others believed Kaiser Wilhelm was thinking 
and doing, mattered; unlike his relations in the United Kingdom, he ‘did not just reign, but 
ruled, participating actively in major policy decisions, including military ones. Hence his 
attitude to Pan-Islam had an impact.’108 
Nor was the Kaiser alone in his attempts to woo the Islamic world. As will be examined in 
Chapter Seven, the British admitted privately in 1917 that they had also attempted ‘to pose 
as a great Mohammedan power’ before the First World War. However, this policy had been 
‘found wanting, partly from the inconsistency naturally inherent in a Christian Power posing 
as a Mohammedan, and partly from the ineptitude of the results obtained.’ It was 
consequently dropped when the British cultivated their strength in the Islamic world as a 
method of trying to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British 
Empire in East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War.109 
Despite the attempts of some of the European colonial powers to gain the religious control 
of their empire’s Muslims, by the time of the First World War none of them were able to 
legitimately claim that they held both the religious and the politico-administrative power 
over the Muslims who resided within their empires.  
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The Caliphate Debate 
 
By the end of the Nineteenth Century the Ottoman Caliphate was one of the few Muslim 
states that had not been colonised. The Caliph of the Ottoman Empire, who, naturally, was 
loyal to no empire but his own, claimed the religious authority over the world’s Muslims; yet 
this claim to religious authority was by no means uncontested.  
The noun Caliph is usually taken to refer to the person who is considered by Muslims to be 
their chief religious and civil leader on Earth; the successor to the Prophet Mohammad 
(although the Caliph is not himself, for it is always a man, considered to be a Prophet). The 
noun Caliphate can refer either to the rule of a certain Caliph (or occasionally groups of 
Caliphs, such as with the Rashidun Caliphate) or the area ruled by that Caliph during his 
reign (the Ottoman Caliphate, for example). However, because the Quran lacks reference on 
how political governance had ought to be structured, furthered by the differences between 
the two main Islamic branches, the Shias and the Sunnis, agreeing on who possesses the 
legitimate right to the position of Caliph has proved impossible across the Islamic world. 110  
Followers of the religion of Islam have failed to unify behind one earthly leader since the 
time of the Prophet Mohammad. In the Tenth Century, for example, three men claimed to 
be the Caliph, reigning at Baghdad, Cairoan, and Cordova respectively. This ‘Triple Division 
of the Caliphate’ agreed on only two points: that they should all ‘[excommunicate] each 
other’, and ‘that a sectary is more odious and criminal than an unbeliever.’111 By 1914, 
therefore, the Islamic world had been tearing itself apart over who was the true Caliph, and 
where the seat of the Caliphate ought to be located, for about as long as there had been an 
Islamic world. The British Empire held the politico-administrative power over the Muslim 
inhabitants of its Empire at the start of the First World War, but there was no conclusive 
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agreement on who held the religious power over them. The only thing that everybody 




The French Empire in Africa was predominantly located in the west of the continent. 
Although Marty’s works were published after the start of the First World War, the ideas 
behind the concept of Islam noir had been present within the academic community of the 
L’Afrique Occidental française (A.-O. F.) for some years.112 Islam in West Africa had a 
different history to that of East Africa; Becker has made the argument that the lack of jihad 
in the latter as opposed to the former was due to the differing social constructions found in 
each: 
‘The apparent contrast between East Africa and North and West Africa, where armed 
resistance to European rule under the banner of Islam occurred frequently, 
therefore does not point to an explicitly different interpretation of legal rules on 
jihad or Muslim-Christian relations. Rather, it is indicative of the way Islam in East 
Africa was interwoven with a long-standing practice of exchange in the Indian 
Oceans setting. These antecedents combined with the social tensions among the 
region’s Muslims to ensure that the European imperial challenge did not unite 
them.’ 
This phenomenon was not confined only to Islam, she continued; social construction in East 
Africa more widely had developed to naturally reduce conflict: 
‘The intensity of this dialogue [between the different Islamic denominations] within 
coastal society and with the African mainland helps explain the absence of a 
concerted response, in the name of Islam, to imperial encroachment. But it was not 
just coastal Islam that was “pacific”, but rather coastal society, which had long 
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thrived on minimizing conflict with both African mainlanders and overseas contacts 
in the pursuit of exchange.’113 
Whilst Becker’s argument stands up to research it is not comprehensive, for it does not 
analyse the impact that the enormous social changes that took place in East Africa in the 
early colonial era had on the East African experience of the East African Campaign of the 
First World War. The notion that adherents of Islam across the African continent, and the 
world, acted as a single group is one of the major flaws in the historical research that has 
been conducted on Pan-Islamism and jihadism in the First World War. For by the time of the 
First World War these new Muslims of East Africa were changing the traditionally 
established divide in Africa; far from being ‘interwoven with a long-standing practice of 
exchange in the Indian Ocean setting’, many of these Muslims would have had little to no 
traditional contact with these trading routes. To write about the Muslims of East Africa as if 
they remained a homogenous group allows one to present only a partial analysis. 
The history of the interaction between Islam and European imperialism in the Nineteenth 
and Twentieth Centuries is greater than can be fully examined here.114 Concisely, it emerges 
that the potential for Islam to present a cause by which the East African population could 
challenge imperial rule was ignored by the British Empire precisely because they believed 
that most of these recent Muslim converts were simply not learned enough to understand 
complex theological doctrines such as jihad, and that the ‘pacific… coastal society, which 
had long thrived on minimizing conflict… in the pursuit of exchange’, would continue to 
prevent responses similar to those that had occurred in Western Africa and the A.-O. F. 
Yet whilst the British Empire confidently wrote in 1916 that ‘the tribes [of East Africa] will 
not combine’ and were ‘loathe to leave their own tribal territory’, the changing social 
structures of the early colonial era combined with the British Empire’s military personnel 
needs of the First World War to make both of these comments redundant during the years 
of the East African Campaign.115 
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Islam presented a concept by which some Africans could combine: it gave them a shared 
experience; a shared focal point. Members of separate tribes could feel unity through their 
new Islamic faith. Whether the tribal members really were ‘loathe’ to leave their ‘tribal 
territory’ may or may not have been true, and probably was and wasn’t in individual cases; 
but for officials of the British Empire to have written this in 1916 without accounting for the 
contemporary events seems astonishing. For the agency on whether to leave one’s ‘tribal 
territory’ or not was not solely the personal decision of the tribal member in that year, nor 
the previous two. For in 1916 the First World War would reach its second anniversary of 
raging conflict in East Africa; thousands of Africans were conscripted, sometimes forcibly, to 
fight on both sides of the conflict. Many thousands more were to be displaced. The 
systematic and non-systematic movement of Africans by their European colonisers for their 
own purposes took little heed as to whether the individual African was themselves ‘loathe 
to leave their own tribal territory’. 
By the summer of 1917 one British intelligence official had noted this change. Captain Tracy 
Philipps wrote that ‘Islam has a tendency in Eastern Africa to consider itself a political, as 
much as a spiritual force. Latterly Muhammedans [sic] have in this area tended to consider 
themselves a Muhammedan nation. So much so that in enquiring the tribe of natives one is 
frequently met with the reply “I am a Muhammedan”.’116 By the unwitting dictation of the 
white colonisers, the First World War presented an opportunity for Africans to acquaint and 
learn that they were both Muslims, and that, despite their differing tribal allegiances, that 
they were both considered Africans by the European colonisers. With such shared affinities, 
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Chapter Three Emergence: The German-Ottoman Pan-Islamic Threat 
 
In November 1914 the German and Ottoman Empires jointly proclaimed a call for jihad. This 
was meant to be the beginning of the German-Ottoman Pan-Islamic threat to the Entente 
Powers, with whom they were fighting against in the First World War. In actuality, it was to 
be its climax.  
The German-Ottoman Pan-Islamic threat was initiated by the German and Ottoman Empires 
for different reasons, but both wished to use Pan-Islamism to undermine the British Empire. 
For the German Empire, Pan-Islamism was one of the multiple ways in which they 
attempted to subvert the British Empire. One of their strategies to weaken the United 
Kingdom’s efforts in Europe was to destabilise the colonies to divide the British Empire’s 
interests. This strategic policy was also the rationale for the four-year East African 
Campaign, in which thousands fought and died in the battle for land that all agreed was 
strategically unimportant for victory in the Great War. For the Ottoman Empire, Pan-
Islamism had been used as blackmail to attempt to gain concessions from the British Empire 
in the pre-First World War era and their use of it during the War was a continuation of this 
policy.  
The German-Ottoman Pan-Islamic threat was not the same Pan-Islamic threat that was to 
threaten the security of the British Empire in East Africa in the later years of the East African 
Campaign, but it was the precursor to it. Pan-Islamism in East Africa was to develop to 
threaten the security of the British Empire, but it was only able to do this because the 
groundwork of Pan-Islamism as an anti-Colonial and anti-British movement had already 




‘Over the years, few ideas have excited such passions as Pan-Islam. Few have been 
subject to so many, divergent – even contradictory – interpretations. As early as 1902, 
two of the best-known Orientalists of that time, E.G. Browne and C.A. Nallino, gave their 
expert estimates of Pan-Islam. The former considered it non-existent, while the latter 
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saw it as a major trend in modern Islam. The controversy has continued unabated to the 
present.’117 
Jacob M. Landau’s introduction to his book Pan-Islam: History and Politics demonstrates the 
difficulty that the likes of the British Empire had in providing a definition to the term Pan-
Islam in the early Twentieth Century; there was simply no consensus. It was a relatively new 
term; Umar Ryad argues that ‘Historians still differ on exactly when in modern times the 
term “pan-Islam” emerged in Muslim politics’, although ‘the first extensive use of the word’ 
occurred ‘in the 1880s’.118 
For the purpose of this thesis, the importance lies with what the British Empire considered 
Pan-Islam to represent, for the threat of Pan-Islamism to the security of the British Empire in 
East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War came about by 
their interpretation of it as being a threat to British imperial rule. In March 1917 Captain 
N.N.E. Bray, an expert on Pan-Islamism in the British Empire, wrote an essay entitled 
Intelligence and Notes on the Pan-Islamic Movement. In this he wrote that Pan-Islamism was 
‘a political weapon, used to unite certain peoples, on common ground, otherwise widely 
separated, even in religious convictions, as for instance the Shias and Sunnis’.119 Captain 
Philipps, one of the few officials of the British Empire with expertise in Pan-Islamism during 
the First World War stated, along with two colleagues, Colonel Sykes and Captain Willis, that 
it was ‘Characteristic of Islam to attempt to unite different nations under the one religious 
flag as if they were a single nationality’.120 Immediately after the War had ended, G. Wyman 
Bury, a British political officer who had been involved with the Arab Revolt, asserted that it 
was ‘… a movement to weld together Moslems throughout the world regardless of 
nationality… pan-Islam [sic] is more than a spiritual movement: it is a practical, working 
proposition which has to be reckoned with when dealing with Moslems even in secular 
matters.’121 The British Empire did not see Pan-Islamism as a religious threat, but as an anti-
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colonial one; Pan-Islamism represented an anti-colonial, not a religious, movement to the 
British Empire. 
This identification of Pan-Islamism as an anti-colonial movement by the British Empire 
during the First World War was not a paradigm shift away from how the British Empire had 
identified Pan-Islamism since the 1880s. There can be no doubt that Britain’s earlier 
interactions with the movement influenced the writings of Bray and Philipps.  
Richard Popplewell specifies that after 1876 and the ascension of Abdul Hamid II to the 
throne, the Ottoman Empire ‘used the caliphate much more vigorously as a diplomatic 
weapon against those European powers which ruled over large numbers of Muslims: namely 
Russia, France and Britain.’122 A brief examination of the events that occurred in the mid- to 
late-1870s provides an explanation for why the Sultan, who was also the Caliph, decided on 
this course of action.  
In 1875 and in 1876 respectively, there were insurrections in Herzegovina and revolts in 
Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro. Azmi Özcan writes that ‘public opinion in Europe turned 
strongly against the Ottomans’ as a result of their actions to putdown these threats, and 
they were ‘quickly represented in the press as Christianity versus Islam.’ On his succession 
‘the immediate task before’ Abdul Hamid ‘was to preserve the integrity of his country and to 
resist external pressure for the survival of his Empire’, but then the Russo-Turkish War 
erupted. ‘As a result of the wars’, Özcan explains that in addition to the hostility of Europe, 
‘the demographic situation within the Empire also underwent a dramatic change. By the end 
of the 1870s… the population of the Empire was overwhelmingly Muslim, more than 
seventy per cent.’ Özcan concludes that these events forced Abdul Hamid to choose the 
policy of Pan-Islamism: 
‘Against this background what was Abdulhamid to do? He was left with only one 
option, Pan-Islamism. Thus he had no choice but to put emphasis on Pan-Islamism as 
the means for bringing about the unity of Muslim subjects and thereby maintaining 
the integrity of the Empire. At the same time he wanted to use it as a powerful 
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device for mobilizing Muslims in support of the Caliphate and thereby resisting 
European powers, which had large numbers of Muslims under their sway.’123 
In short: the new Sultan warned that he was prepared to use his position as the Caliph to 
unleash the threat of Pan-Islamism against the British Empire; the threat that the Muslims 
of the British Empire would unite against their colonisers at his word. Although this new 
approach of using Pan-Islamic loyalty to the Ottoman Empire ‘did not amount at this time to 
a threat to subvert the British Empire’, Popplewell clarified that it was seen ‘as a kind of 
insurance policy’ by the Ottomans, ‘for use should trouble arise with the colonial empires.’ 
Rather than use it as a threat to ‘subvert the British Empire’, something which would have 
been militaristically beyond the Ottoman Empire as a sole belligerent by this period, the 
‘insurance policy’ approach was to be used by the Ottomans to gain concessions from the 
British if trouble should arise between the British Empire and its Muslim inhabitants. 
Fundamentally, the idea was to use the threat of Pan-Islamism, Abdul Hamid having 
‘claimed a religious authority over all Muslims, whether [they] were his subjects or not’, as a 
sort of ‘diplomatic’ blackmail in the fractious relationship between politico-administrative 
and religious power in the Islamic world. 124 
A ‘wary respect for Islamic ‘fanaticism’’ had been’, according to John Darwin, ‘the most 
powerful influence on British policy’ in the Edwardian era. This was defined as ‘the supposed 
ability of Muslim rulers or preachers to arouse intense popular feeling against ‘infidel’ 
imperialists. The Indian Mutiny of 1857, Gordon’s fate at Khartoum, and bloody disasters in 
Afghanistan had ingrained this deeply in the ‘official mind’.’125 Of the former occurrence, 
Ronald Hyam is in agreement; the British Empire had not forgotten that ‘Among some 
Muslim communications there were plans for jihad’, even if ‘this fanatical religious 
dimension was limited.’126 By ‘the early twentieth century there was… extreme pessimism 
about trouble brewing in India.’127 ‘[If] a large part of the British public still retained their old 
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arrogance’, Bernard Porter continues on the same point, ‘those who administered the 
Empire did not share it to the same degree. The Indian Mutiny had taught them the futility 
of the simple British-pattern method of cultural imperialism.’128 Thus, the spectre of Pan-
Islamism as a security threat against the British Empire was a very real concern for the 
officials of that Empire. Moreover, British relations with the Ottoman Empire declined 
further after the Young Turks came to power in 1908. P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins conclude 
that ‘Far from promoting congenial allies for Britain, the advent of the Young Turks 
heightened tensions within the Ottoman Empire, encouraged regional defections, and 
brought the European powers closer to partition.’129 In this era the British Empire was faced 
with the very real challenge of having both an Islamic power, the Ottoman Empire, and part 
of its Islamic population, predominantly but not exclusively in India, hostile to it.  
‘As the ‘great Muhammadan Power’, Darwin states, ‘Britain could not be seen to act against 
the interests of Islam.’ And yet, he continues, ‘few British observers thought pan-Islamism 
counted for much… [for they] tended to regard Islam as a culture in decline… Whatever its 
premises, this sanguine view of Anglo-Muslim relations looked plausible enough before 
1914.’130 It is important not to overstate how much importance the officials of the British 
Empire placed on the ability of Pan-Islamism to threaten the security of the British Empire in 
the immediate pre-First World War era. Four reasons can be examined to demonstrate this: 
Firstly, the core problem with such an ‘insurance policy’ was that the divisions across the 
Islamic world over who truly held the religious power over the world’s Muslims, as 
examined in Chapter Two, meant that nobody actually held the religious power over all of 
the world’s Muslims in this era. Thus, using Pan-Islamism ‘as a diplomatic weapon’ against 
the Entente Powers could have success that was limited only to those that recognised the 
Ottoman Caliph as holding the legitimate religious power. 
Donald M. McKale has demonstrated that it has been possible for such a tactic to work as a 
sort of ‘diplomatic weapon’ under certain conditions: ‘Medieval history had shown that… 
the circumstances under which modern Islam could successfully unite different nations 
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behind Mohammed’s banner… [were] if there existed a powerful Muslim leader and a 
comparatively weak national feeling in the different lands forming the whole of Islam.’131 
But Abdul Hamid II, as the Caliph of the Ottoman Empire, was not ‘a powerful Muslim 
leader’, and national feeling was not ‘comparatively weak’: 
‘The central government [of the Ottoman Empire] which existed in Istanbul was 
weakened by centuries of decline and loss of empire, and it no longer held 
ascendency, not even spiritual, over Muslims, except for Turks, either inside or 
outside its remaining territories. Moreover, the earliest stirrings of nationalism 
among some Muslims, most notably the Arabs of the Ottoman Empire prompted by 
their dislike of the Turks or Entente, encouraged among many of them greater 
interest in the political and economic development of their lands than in the pan-
Islamic principle.’132 
To construe in summary: suggesting that all of the Muslims of this time era would have 
followed the lead of the Caliph of the Ottoman Caliphate is like suggesting that all of the 
Christians of this time era would have followed the lead of the Pope of the Roman Catholic 
Church; that is to say, whilst not theoretically impossible, most unlikely. The British were 
perfectly aware of this. 
The need behind why it was necessary for the Ottomans to undertake such a political 
approach in the first place demonstrates a second reason for why the British were limited in 
their response to this threat: namely, the continuing decline of the Ottoman Empire itself, 
and its relativeness to the British Empire, which had not yet reached its physical peak. By 
1876 ‘Paris, Berlin, Vienna and Rome’ thought that the Ottoman Empire ‘had sunk into 
irreversible decline.’ The Marquess of Salisbury, who as the British Secretary of State for 
India visited Constantinople in the same year, ‘never did… revise his conviction of [the 
Caliph’s] worthlessness.’133 
A third reason is put forward by Darwin himself: that some of the Muslims of the Empire 
were preoccupied elsewhere or had benefited from British colonial rule, and were therefore 
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not in a place to, or inclined to, oppose the British. An example of the former could be 
observed ‘In India, where most of Britain’s Muslims subjects could be found, Muslim 
political attitudes were coloured by the fact of competition with Hindus and fear of Hindu 
predominance.’ As to the latter, in ‘Northern Nigeria, the colonial pax had helped the emirs 
against their over-mighty subjects and permitted the extension of Islamic influence over 
long-resistant ‘pagan’ peoples.’134  
A fourth reason presented itself to the British: the Young Turk Revolution had occurred in 
the Ottoman Empire in 1908 and Abdul Hamid II was deposed in 1909. For the Committee of 
Union and Progress (the CUP), which now ruled the Ottoman Empire, ‘the overriding 
emphasis was not on Pan-Islam as a state ideology but on Ottomanism.’ This, clearly, would 
have diminished how much importance the officials of the British Empire placed on the 
ability of Pan-Islamism to threaten the security of the British Empire. ‘However’, continues 
Özcan, ‘subsequent political developments and the persistence of the non-Muslim 
components of the Empire to maintain their separate ethnic and religious identity at the 
expense of the State, soon clearly showed that Ottomanism was not a viable ideology and 
nothing more than a utopia.’ This, in addition to ‘the disaster of the Balkan wars… inevitably 
brought Pan-Islamism to the fore as a political force’ and ‘the enthusiasm shown by the 
Muslims of India, Egypt, and Iran during [them] undoubtedly encouraged the CUP to adopt a 
Pan-Islamic policy.’135 The use of Pan-Islamism during the Balkan War raised the interest of 
the officials of the British Empire to the prospect of its use against them. 
The First Balkan War of 1912-1913 saw the United Kingdom take a neutral position when 
the Balkan League (comprising the kingdoms of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro) 
fought against the Ottoman Empire. Despite Britain having ‘maintained a strict neutrality’ 
during that war, ‘large quantities of Ottoman [Pan-Islamic] propaganda found its way into 
[British controlled] India.’ This propaganda ‘[called] on Muslims to support their Turkish co-
religionists in their struggle against the Christian powers of Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece [and 
Montenegro].’ 
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Whilst the British had believed the Ottoman Empire’s propaganda ‘did not amount… to a 
threat to subvert the British Empire’ in 1876, ‘British concern about the Ottoman 
government’s [sic] fostering of Pan-Islamic loyalties came… during the First Balkan War of 
1912-13’; just a year prior to the outbreak of the First World War.  Popplewell writes that 
the British ‘saw this development… [with] concern’, for ‘By the beginning of the twentieth 
century, there were clear signs that [Indian Muslims] were concerned both about the weak 
state of the Muslim powers and about their own decline in importance within India… Indian 
Muslims felt that Britain’s lack of sympathy for the Ottoman Empire during the Balkan wars 
paid little respect to their religious feeling.’ 
Nevertheless, British concern about the threat posed by the Ottoman promotion of Pan-
Islamism to the security of the British Empire in the immediate pre-First World War era 
should not be overstated . Popplewell concludes that ‘British concern about pan-Islamism 
[sic] within India should not be exaggerated… the Government of India was probably less 
worried by Muslim support for Turkey at the beginning of the [First World War] than it was 
during the Balkan wars.’136 
However, the overall picture was a little less one-sided than it first appears, for although this 
‘diplomatic weapon’ had not been successful in the sense that it did not force the hand of 
the British Empire in 1913, and thus the Ottomans still lost the First Balkan War, it was yet 
successful in the sense that the British ‘saw [the] development’ of ‘large quantities of 
Ottoman propaganda’ in India with ‘concern’. The precedent that the Ottomans evidently 
saw was that whilst their ability to physically attack the British Empire was restricted, they 
had some ability to cause difficulties for the British in their Empire by kindling parts of the 
Islamic population in opposition. This opposition could be constructed for their own benefit. 
If war was to occur between them after 1913, the British Empire was aware that ‘the Turks 
[would be] quick to play the pan-Islamic card’. They were also aware of the ‘clear signs’ that 
the Indian Muslims had displayed in relation to their perceived beliefs of the diminishing 
level of Muslim importance within their region of the British Empire.137 The potential threat 
posed by the Ottoman Empire to the security of the British Empire was not a major concern 
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for the British in the pre-First World War era because of the relative situation of the 
Ottoman Empire in relation to themselves. If the Ottoman Empire was to make an alliance, 
that relativeness could change, perhaps dramatically.  
 
The Outbreak of the First World War: the Call for Jihad 
 
The German and Ottoman Empires formed an alliance on 2nd August 1914, mere days after 
the outbreak of the First World War. For the Germans, this alliance, amongst other 
considerations, provided them with an overland route from Europe to the British, French, 
and Russian Empires in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. In turn, the Ottomans gained 
German support against a potential Russian threat; the British had refused to form an 
alliance with the Ottomans several times in the years prior to the First World War, which 
had left the weak Ottoman Empire anxious about the wholly conceivable threats that could 
come to them from that quarter.  
The Ottoman Empire, despite being aligned to Germany, did not itself enter the War until 
11th November 1914: over three months later. Whilst the Ottomans declared war on Russia, 
France, and the United Kingdom on this date, these three countries had taken the initiative 
and had already declared war on them: the former on 1st November and the latter two on 
5th. 
On 14th November 1914 the Caliph of the Ottoman Caliphate declared jihad on the Entente 
Allies: 
‘“Of those who go to the Jihad for the sake of happiness and salvation of the 
believers in God’s victory, the lot of those who remain alive is felicity, while the rank 
of those who depart to the next world is martyrdom. In accordance with God’s 
beautiful promise, those who sacrifice their lives to give life to the truth will have 
honor in this world, and their latter end in paradise.”’ 138 
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Now that they were openly antagonistic towards the ‘European powers which ruled over 
large numbers of Muslims’, the Ottoman Empire thought it opportune to use what they saw 
as their position as the caliphate ‘much more vigorously as a diplomatic weapon’ in the late 
autumn of 1914. However, the Ottoman Empire was now in an alliance, and for these two 
allies their reasons for promoting Pan-Islamism in the hope of causing a jihad that would 
threaten the security of the Entente Empires, and the outcomes they wished its promotion 
to produce, differed. 
 
The German Pan-Islamic ‘Policy’ 
 
Despite being in an alliance, the Ottoman and German Empires possessed different 
motivations for promoting Pan-Islamism. The reasons for why the Ottoman Empire would 
promote Pan-Islamism and release a call for jihad have already been examined in this 
chapter. Whilst certainly disliking the fact that so many Muslims lived in lands controlled by 
so-called infidel powers from a religious perspective, their primary intention was to secure 
their own fledging position in the world order by employing Pan-Islamism as a ‘diplomatic 
weapon’. By utilising what religious power it held to control the political actions of the 
world’s Muslims, the Ottoman Empire hoped to gain greater political sway over the 
European empires. 
Germany’s reason for allying itself with the Ottoman Empire and supporting the call to jihad 
played directly into its strategy to win the Great War. At its heart, it too wished to use it as a 
weapon against the Entente Empires, but it did not need to do so to secure its own 
existence in the world order. It did so to improve its military prowess and secure victory on 
the battlefields of the Western Front.  
Germany used varies strategies in its attempt to win the First World War; it is their attempt 
to subvert the British Empire with Pan-Islamism with which this thesis is concerned. After 
the war, M.I.5. wrote the following on this strategic objective: 
‘Apart from attempts to obtain particulars of naval and military affairs, it was a 
special feature of Germany’s policy to foster and encourage any movements of 
unrest and sedition directed against the British Empire. Thus it came about that the 
66 
 
Sinn Fein movement in Ireland and America, the Home Rule and seditionary 
movements in India, the Egyptian nationalist, Turkish Nationalist, Pan-Islamic and 
Greek Royalist movements, all of which with their accompanying plots and 
conspiracies, were supported and in some cases promoted by Germany, became the 
concern of M.I.5.’ 
To achieve this, M.I.5. continued, the Germans would become involved in: ‘Espionage, 
sedition, treachery, [the] fomentation of strikes and sabotage, and [the] dissemination of 
peace propaganda.’139  
This approach was part of an existing wider German strategic approach towards the First 
World War. Germany understood that, despite its large army, it would find it logistically very 
difficult to fight on two fronts in Europe against the Russians and the French, who, by 1914, 
were in an alliance with each other and the United Kingdom. Whilst the Schlieffen Plan was 
designed to help prevent this situation from occurring, it went wrong from the beginning; 
Germany soon found itself fighting in both the Western and Eastern Theatres of the First 
World War in Europe.  
Germany knew that for it to have a chance of succeeding on the battlefields of these 
theatres it would have to reduce the number of enemy troops it faced. This, seemingly, was 
an obvious strategy; to wound the enemy fatally by killing more of its troops then it kills of 
yours is perhaps the most obvious of all war strategies. Yet, to varying degrees, the Triple 
Entente possessed something that Germany did not: colonial troops it could import to 
Europe.140 
Despite owning colonies, Germany could not import colonial troops to Europe, for the 
oceans were dominated by the Royal Navy of the British Empire. To attempt such a move 
would be akin to a suicide mission for everybody onboard. Hence, whilst the Entente 
Powers could call for troops to come to Europe from the vast lands that they controlled 
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across the globe, the Germans were forced to be content using only troops that could reach 
Central Europe by land.  
The German Empire’s strategy to subvert the British Empire was borne out of their 
realisation of this position; the more it managed to subvert the British Empire the more the 
British Empire would be forced to keep troops in the Empire to maintain the peace. 
Consequently, less troops would be available to fight for the British Empire on the 
battlefields of Europe. Popplewell explains that this strategic policy became of importance 
at the most senior levels of the German Government very early in the war: 
‘German interest in the possibilities for subverting the British Empire extended to 
the highest levels of the German government. A month after war broke out, 
Bethmann Hollweg, the German Chancellor, stressed the strategic importance of 
weakening Britain through a campaign of colonial subversion. As he told the German 
Foreign Office: “… Thus one of our main tasks is gradually to wear England down 
through unrest in India and Egypt”.’141 
Whilst a detailed analysis of the different strategies used by the German Empire in its 
attempt to win the First World War is not the purpose of this thesis, an understanding of 
this particular strategy explains why Germany was interested in promoting pan-Islamism 
(despite the Kaiser’s past antics, it was not out of a desire to spread the word of the Prophet 
Mohammed) and why the Germans established, and then continued, a campaign in East 
Africa, when everybody involved, themselves very much included, was perfectly aware that 
victory in East Africa would make little significant difference to the outcome of the war in 
Europe in any purposeful way. 
The German strategy in the East African Campaign is one of the most theoretically 
successful examples of this policy to subvert the British Empire. The reasons for its relative 
successfulness, although technically multiple, truly lie with one man alone. 
Germany was both lucky and fortunate to have appointed as their commander in German 
East Africa a man who, in relation to the analysis of his efforts in the First World War, has 
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repeatedly been described as ‘brilliant’. Roger Broad states that he was ‘a brilliant guerrilla 
fighter’ [emphasis added], who, according to W.O. Henderson, ‘brilliantly fulfilled the task 
which he had set himself.’ [emphasis added.] 142 He outmatched his British rivals and was 
responsible for the East African Campaign continuing for longer than any other campaign of 
the entire First World War. 
General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck arrived in German East Africa in the January of 1914. 
Although he later stated that at this time he had ‘hardly suspected the nature of the task 
that was to confront me in a few months’ time’, he also stated that ‘during the past ten 
years the universal war had more than once seemed so imminent that I was obliged 
seriously to consider whether the force under my command would be called upon to take 
any part in that conflict, and, if so, what its task might be.’ 
Von Lettow-Vorbeck was greatly experienced in colonial military concerns and guerrilla 
warfare. He had been commissioned in 1890 and had subsequently served in the Boxer 
Rebellion and both the Namaqua and Herero insurrections in German South-West Africa. He 
knew enough about military matters to know that East Africa would be highly unlikely to 
play a significant role in a potential future war that would put Germany against the United 
Kingdom. He perfectly understood in 1914 that he alone could not bring down the might of 
the British Empire in a colonial war between two European powers in East Africa where his 
forces would be surrounded by the British, Britain’s allies, a British controlled Indian Ocean, 
or neutrals. Unfortunately for the British, he also knew enough about military matters to 
know where, despite being unable to physically defeat the British Empire, he would be able 
to make a significant contribution to such a future war. In his memoires he wrote that he 
‘knew that the fate of the colonies, as of all other German possessions, would only be 
decided on the battlefields of Europe’. ‘The question’ he asked himself ‘was whether it was 
possible for us in our subsidiary theatre of war to exercise any influence on the great 
decision at home. Could we, with our small forces, prevent considerable numbers of the 
enemy from intervening in Europe, or in other more important theatres, or inflict on our 
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enemies any loss of personnel or war material worth mentioning?’ He ‘answered this 
question in the affirmative.’ 
He was able to answer this question in the affirmative because he had already devised a 
rough plan about what action to undertake. He ‘considered that hostile troops would allow 
themselves to be held only if we attacked, or at least threatened, the enemy at some really 
sensitive point.’ He concluded ‘that it was necessary, not to split up our small available 
forces in local defence, but, on the contrary, to keep them together, to grip the enemy by 
the throat and force him to employ his forces for self-defence.’ 143  
Knowing that he could not actually win such a war, and knowing that there was no 
guarantee that gambling on the security of German East Africa to detain British imperial 
forces in the region would actually pay off for the Germans in Europe (which it did not), it is 
permissible to wonder why von Lettow-Vorbeck did not decide to try and endorse a 
scenario in which his colony remained neutral, and so prevent the great loss of life that 
would surely occur (and did occur) if his plans were to be executed. There were some 
grounds for such an action in the Congo Act of 1885, but, although he examined the lack of 
legal necessity for such an action, von Lettow-Vorbeck’s reasoning in not pursuing such a 
scenario rested much more on his overall strategy. To do so, he reasoned with sound logic, 
would only help the British war effort, whilst continuing in military affairs in the region 
would prevent the British from moving troops to the battlefields of Europe.144 Von Lettow-
Vorbeck’s plan worked brilliantly in theory; the East African Campaign lasted so long that it 
extended a fortnight beyond Armistice Day. It worked less well in reality; the British Empire 
never diverted great numbers of troops to the Campaign. Their focus remained on Europe 
and did not deviate. However, von Lettow-Vorbeck did about as much as he possibly could, 
and for his actions he was lauded as a hero on his return to Germany in 1919. 
Therefore, the German ‘special feature’ to ‘foster and encourage’ the Pan-Islamic 
movement in East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War 
was not ordained as a strategy to cause the destruction of the British Empire in East Africa, 
but was part of a larger design to force the British to waste as much time and as many 
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resources as possible defending an area that was tactically worthless in this conflict, but 
which the British Empire could never relinquish without destroying its imperial prestige. In 
doing so, the Germans hoped to cause such distractions in the East African region to wound 
British efforts in Europe, and hence contribute to a German victory in the First World War.  
Compared to von Lettow-Vorbeck’s masterful use of guerrilla tactics, this ‘special feature’ of 
Germany’s strategic plan has not featured within the terribly limited narrative of the East 
African Campaign. Yet this neglect does not diminish its importance; its importance lies not 
just in providing a greater understanding of the experiences of the entire British Empire in 
the First World War, but also because it involved Africans occupied in African affairs right at 
the heart of the East African Campaign.  
 
The Failure of the Ottoman-German Pan-Islamic Threat 
 
As stated, McKale demonstrates that it was possible for Pan-Islamism to work as a sort of 
‘diplomatic weapon’ under certain conditions. He concludes that ‘signs in the fall of 1914 
warned… that the reverse held true’: these conditions were not present.145 Thus, the use of 
Pan-Islamism as a ‘diplomatic weapon’ against the British Empire did not work. 
A full analysis for why the German-backed Ottoman call for jihad failed is also not the 
purpose of this thesis. As has been examined, the short explanation is simply that the 
Ottoman Empire did not have the religious power to execute such an action; a worldwide 
Pan-Islamic uprising would never have occurred given the circumstances of 1914. An 
important conclusion was drawn from these events that was to impact upon the potential 
for Pan-Islamism to threaten the security of the British Empire in East Africa in the years of 
the East African Campaign; once the immediate aftermath of the call had passed, the Pan-
Islamic threat was considered to be dead by the British Empire, and has been considered to 
have died by historians. This was, and is, incorrect. 
Bray wrote in his essay of March 1917 that ‘Experts, who have studied the Pan Islamic 
movement in European Turkey, tell us that the Pan Islamic idea is dead or ineffectual’.146 
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Erik-Jan Zürcher writes in Jihad and Islam in World War I that ‘It has become almost a 
commonplace in the historiography of the Middle East in World War I to say that the 
German-inspired call to Jihad was a complete failure, and it is an indisputable fact that 
neither mass desertions of Muslims soldiers in the British, French and Russian armies nor 
large-scale uprisings in their imperial possessions took place.’147 
Conversely, Bray continued that these experts ‘were on the wrong lines when specialising 
with Turkey or by ceasing to study it because it is extinct in that country. They perhaps 
considered Turkey as setting the lead to the Mohammedan world, which was, and is far 
from being the case.’148 Zürcher concurs and states that ‘this negative assessment has to be 
nuanced.’149 
Bray concluded that just because Pan-Islamism had failed in Turkey these experts were 
‘erroneous to maintain that similarly or in consequence the pan Islamic ideal [was] dead or 
[had] become ineffectual’ elsewhere. ‘I am convinced in my own mind’, he stated after 
studying the subject, ‘that there are thousands of sincere Mohammedans sincerely working 
for Mohammedan independence, there are thousands of more fanatics running before they 
can walk trying to bring about in a few years, a transformation requiring generations to 
mature. Gradually I have seen the ideal permeating the minds of the masses.’150 
Thus, the narrative of the role of Pan-Islamism in the First World War did not end with the 
failure of the German-backed Ottoman call for jihad. The Pan-Islamic idea continued to exist 
after 1914 beyond the borders of Turkey. Having concluded that the Pan-Islamic threat was 
dead, the British imperial intelligence establishment had not prepared for the appearance of 
this threat in the Islamic population of East Africa. 
Supporting and promoting the Pan-Islamic movement ‘was a special feature of Germany’s 
policy to foster and encourage any movements of unrest and sedition directed against the 
British Empire’. Supporting the call for jihad in 1914 was one way in which the Germans 
were successful in planting the seeds of ‘unrest and sedition’, for in the spring of 1917 the 
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threat that Pan-Islamism posed to the security of the British Empire in East Africa began to 
be acknowledged by officials within the British imperial intelligence establishment. They 
were forced to dispense with the notion that because the German-Ottoman Pan-Islamic 
threat of 1914 had failed Pan-Islamism itself was no longer a threat.  
After reading Bray’s long essay, Lieutenant Colonel Wilson of the British Mission at Jeddah 
wrote to Sir Reginald Wingate, the High Commissioner for Egypt, to state that: ‘I agree with 
Captain Bray’s statement that Pan-Islamism is by no means dead and I personally believe 
that issues of first importance to us as an Empire, with our millions of Moslem subjects, 
depend upon how the Mohammedan question is handled now and in the near future.’151 
Far away from the battlefields of Europe, and beyond the sight of the historians who have 
flocked to cover them, the closing stage of the First World War was to be spent fighting 
against the threat of Pan-Islamism to the security of the British Empire in East Africa and 




There has long been differing positions as to whether the Ottoman Empire would have 
called for jihad even if their German allies had not been in favour of that course of action. 
This debate began almost as soon as the jihad was proclaimed, for in 1915 Snouck 
Hurgronje published his pamphlet The Holy War “Made in Germany.”152 Hurgronje argued 
that there was strong historical evidence for this accord: the First Balkan War of 1912-1913. 
During that War ‘the independence of Turkey was certainly no less seriously menaced than 
was now the case before the jihad-declaration; but even then it received little support from 
its German friend.’153 Despite sending pan-Islamic propaganda to the British Empire, the 
Ottoman Empire did not proclaim jihad, in spite of the serious territorial dangers it then 
faced. 
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This argument has been vigorously challenged. Mustafa Aksakal has argued that ‘The 
manifold presence of jihad in Ottoman… politics… down to 1914… makes a strong case that 
jihad would have been an important aspect of Ottoman warfare in 1914 without Wilhelm II 
and the German orientalists.’154 
The notion that the Ottomans may have declared jihad independently of the backing of the 
Kaiser is interesting, for it shows how the Ottomans believed, as Aksakal puts it, in the 
‘malleability’ of jihad; they believed that jihad would shape itself in 1914 into something 
that would be of benefit to them and their situation, rather than merely having been 
pressed into that course of action by the Germans, for the gain of the Germans.155 That 
Aksakal’s argument acknowledges the role that the Ottomans played is also interesting in its 
own right; instead of performing the supportive part, this narrative allows the Ottomans to 
act as the leading role in their own play. This narrative also allows the Ottomans a leading 
role in ‘Germany’s policy to foster and encourage any movements of unrest and sedition 
directed against the British Empire.’ Without the Ottoman’s actions the Germans would 
have found it much harder to support and promote the Pan-Islamic movement within the 
British Empire more widely. 
The Ottoman Empire would not play a large role in the continuing threat of Pan-Islamism to 
the security of the British Empire in East Africa; as Sykes, Willis, and Philipps were to put it, 
the threat there came from the potential of an ‘African Jehad’, not a ‘Turkish Jehad’.156 But 
the importance of the German-Ottoman Pan-Islamic threat to this narrative should not be 
underestimated; the promotion of Pan-Islamism within the Islamic population of the British 
Empire by these two powers was heard by that population, and inspired them. Without it, 
the Pan-Islamic narrative in East Africa may have been much reduced and may not have 
formed a part of Germany’s subversive policy at all. 
Supporting and promoting the Pan-Islamic movement within the British Empire was, as 
quoted from Popplewell above, part of Germany’s strategy to ‘[weaken] Britain through a 
campaign of colonial subversion.’ By forcing the United Kingdom to waste resources 
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analysing and combating the Pan-Islamic movement in the strategically unimportant region 
of East Africa, one could argue that despite the early failure of the Ottoman Pan-Islamic 























Chapter Four Inaction: Imperial Counter-Intelligence in the British Empire in East 
Africa pre-1917 
 
There is no record in the surviving archives of any imperial counter-intelligence 
establishment having existed in the British Empire in East Africa prior to the First World War 
to perform risk analyses of possible threats posed to the British Empire by the African 
population who lived there. The first attempt to execute an imperial counter-intelligence 
effort in East Africa occurred on the outbreak of war in the East Africa Protectorate. It 
discovered that threats existed to the British Empire from amongst the African population, 
but nothing was done to counter them; nothing was done because racial prejudice clouded 
the judgement of the officials of the British Empire. 
Instead, this early imperial counter-intelligence effort focused on countering the threat 
posed to the British Empire in East Africa by the use of traditional intelligence methods by 
the Germans; an approach that utilised secret agents and embedded missionaries. This 
threat was identified early and was mostly eradicated. Unfortunately, from promising 
beginnings this counter-intelligence effort failed to diversify to examine all threats. There 
were no orders from London to do so. That was, until 1917, when the threat posed by Pan-
Islamism to the British Empire as a whole, and East Africa in particular, forced M.I.5. to act. 
As in Chapter One, this chapter focuses on the East Africa Protectorate. The Protectorate 
was at the centre of the bureaucracy of the British Empire in the region and became the 
centre of the British imperial military effort of the East African Campaign. As such it can 
clearly show the growth of the counter-intelligence effort of the British Empire in the region 
as it responded to the events of the First World War. 
 
Intelligence Acquisition in the British Empire in East Africa prior to the First World War 
 
M.I.5. and the so-called M.I.6. were established in 1909; a fact that M.I.5. openly states in its 
officially published literature.157 Yet 1909 was by no means the beginning of intelligence 
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work by the British; it is not called the world’s second oldest profession for nothing.158 
Having known that the proficient use of intelligence can be very beneficial in helping one 
achieve one’s own ends, the British have not been collecting and analysing intelligence only 
in those years which have passed since 1909; they have been doing it for centuries. The 
1908 document Organization of Secret Service, possibly the first document produced by the 
British Intelligence service that was to be formally established the following year, 
acknowledged that the ‘Successes of Frederick the Great, Napoleon and ‘[the Duke of] 
Wellington were largely due to carefully elaborated spy systems.’ 159 Dating from the 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, Wellington was not the first Briton to have been 
recorded using intelligence; Elizabeth I of England, who reigned from 1558-1603, was 
documented as having had a network. But British intelligence prowess fluctuated. There was 
not, before the Twentieth Century, a continuous intelligence service in existence in the 
United Kingdom. 
 
The African Catalyst to British Intelligence Growth 
 
The Second Boer War of 1899-1902 was a major catalyst for the establishment of this 
continuous intelligence service in the United Kingdom and presents an interesting 
comparison of the British Empire’s use of intelligence in Africa in two separate conflicts. 
The Second Boer War was fought in present-day South Africa and eSwatini between the 
United Kingdom, and the South African Republic (also known as the Transvaal Republic) and 
the Orange Free State. The reasons for this war are complex and varied, and are not of 
importance here, but, just like the East African Campaign of the First World War, this was a 
war between white colonialists, the white British and the white Afrikaners, or Boers, who 
                                                          
158 The idea that spying is the second oldest profession originates from the Book of Joshua, the sixth book of 
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the reign of King Josiah (of Judah, the 27th in Matthew’s account of the genealogy of Jesus), who reigned from 
640—609 BCE. This early date, and the presence of the ‘prostitute named Rahab’ – who practised the first 
oldest profession – have combined to give spying this epitaph.   
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were descended of Dutch colonisers, that took place on the African continent, in which not 
only was the indigenous African population forced to become involved, but in which there 
was also a quick descent into guerrilla warfare that would last for several years. 
The Second Boer War was, however, different from the East African Campaign of the First 
World War because Southern Africa was the only place where fighting occurred. Hence, the 
British were able to focus the entirety of their strength – both physically and mentally – in 
this location, rather than, as was the case in the latter conflict, being compelled to fight with 
limited resources. As such, their military intelligence forces in Africa were much better 
prepared, and have been much more widely studied by historians, than those of the East 
African Campaign of the Great War. 
The British had anticipated the possibility of war with the Afrikaners and had attempted to 
establish something like an intelligence establishment in South Africa. They had, as 
recommended in The Soldier’s Pocket-Book, sent officers to South Africa covertly from as 
early as 1896, and less covertly from June 1899, to collect intelligence information that 
could be of use in such a future war. These officers ‘collected a great deal of information’ 
which was considered ‘useful’ to both the Military Intelligence Department in London and 
the Field Intelligence Department which was to be founded on the outbreak of war in South 
Africa.160 
Despite this attempt, Thomas G. Fergusson has examined how by the outbreak of war in 
October 1899 several problems had been found to exist regarding intelligence collection in 
South Africa:  
1. There were too few intelligence officers, ‘given the enormity of the potential theatre 
of war’. 
2. There was ‘not enough money’. 
3. Official restrictions ‘prohibited the establishment of a field intelligence department 
until after the declaration of war and which made it illegal for them to develop their 
own sources of information’. Officers themselves ‘had to collect intelligence on their 
own, whilst masquerading as tourists.’  
                                                          




4. ‘Some of the officers… had had previous intelligence assignments, but many had 
not.’ 
It was ‘only when the war began’ that ‘the need for change clearly [became] evident.’161  
Changes were made to the Field Intelligence Department during the Second Boer War to 
improve or minimise the consequences caused by these problems, but these changes did 
not always work brilliantly. Two examples demonstrate this: 
Firstly, the British appointed a large number of intelligence officers to combat problem one, 
but this placed ‘an unbearable strain on the army’s ability to assign qualified, experienced 
intelligence officers… an ability that was questionable even at the outset of the war’, which 
plainly exacerbated problem four. 162 
The descent into guerrilla warfare saw further modifications in the Field Intelligence 
Department, one of which was the centralisation of much of the intelligence operations 
under Lieutenant-Colonel David Henderson, who was the third and final Director of Military 
Intelligence during the Second Boer War. This second example saw the British attempt to 
counteract the issues caused by problem three, for had the Field Intelligence Department 
existed before the outbreak of war it would have been able to formulate a network of ‘spies 
and informants’. As the Afrikaners themselves could demonstrate, such a network would 
have been of use to the British during the guerrilla warfare, and so the modification to 
attempt to rectify this problem made theoretical sense. However, despite the 
improvements and modifications that Henderson enacted, Fergusson has concluded that 
‘the natural advantages of the Boers as guerrillas fighting in their own land with the support 
of the civilian population were virtually impossible to overcome. Their intelligence system 
was so effective that they were able to outmanoeuvre British troops in some situations, 
even when the Field Intelligence Department had accurate intelligence of their strength and 
disposition.’163 
The conclusion drawn from these events was that it was evidently necessary for Britain’s 
military to not only have a greater amount of better trained intelligence officers, but to 
organise them in a more beneficial manner in preparation for potential future conflicts. Jim 
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Beach’s conclusion on the topic is that the ‘ad hoc’ intelligence arrangements which the 
likes of the Duke of Wellington had used were now ‘inadequate for the new conditions’ of 
warfare that were in existence at the turn of the Twentieth Century, since the ‘Boer 
republics and their guerrilla successors were a complex and challenging intelligence target’. 
Thus, ‘a more sophisticated and formalised system was required to defeat them.’164 
These conclusions were also reached by the British contemporarily, and in the years of 1904 
and 1907 respectively Henderson published the pamphlets Field Intelligence: its Principles 
and Practice and The Art of Reconnaissance, which contained, amongst other features, his 
recommendations for how intelligence structures should be reorganised to fulfil the 
conclusions drawn.  
In Field Intelligence, Henderson gave five points for a successful intelligence organisation: 
1. ‘[Predictive] intelligence analysis was to be conducted by regular intelligence staff 
officers in the headquarters of every independent formation’, who would then 
‘disseminate’ it. 
2. ‘[Intelligence] resources both human and financial were to be administrated 
centrally by a chief of intelligence at the main headquarters.’ 
3. ‘[That] any additional manpower should be recruited and controlled through the 
raising of a temporary Intelligence Corps for the duration of the campaign.’ 
4. ‘[Local] liaison, interpreters, topographical and counter-intelligence work was to be 
included within the intelligence portfolio.’ 
5. ‘[Perhaps] most significantly, that although intelligence collection would include 
prisoner and document examination, secret agents and signals intelligence, it would 
be reconnaissance by cavalry and intelligence personnel that would remain the 
predominant means of collection.’165 
As a result of Henderson’s work, a great amount of change did occur within British 
intelligence; the establishment of M.I.5. in 1909 to work on counter-intelligence was one 
beneficiary. In Europe, this change meant that when the deterioration of Anglo-German 
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relations worsened in the approach to the outbreak of war in 1914 the British had an 
existing intelligence establishment to help them achieve success in their objectives. 
Unfortunately, this work was not replicated in the British Empire in East Africa. Despite so 
much of the change having been fuelled by the knowledge gained in Africa, Africa was not 




The British Empire colonised almost a quarter of the land surface of the planet; colonialism 
did not look the same in every part of it.  The term ‘exploitation colonialism’ has been used 
to describe colonialism where the features were ‘a policy of conquering territories with the 
intention of exploiting natural and human resources by force, for immediate profit, such as 
by extracting cheap raw materials and enslaving the native population.’166 ‘Kenya,’ writes 
Olúẹ́mi Táíwò, was a mix of two different variations of colonialism: ‘exploitation’ 
colonialism, and ‘settler’ colonialism; literally, colonising by settling. 
Some, such as Táíwò, state that the economic exploitation – through ‘exploitation 
colonialism’ – of the colonies was the prime motivator for the British Empire: 
‘Colonies of exploitation were coveted for their resources and the primary aim of 
white colonists was to exploit these resources for the benefit of Britain and for those 
colonies to serve as closed markets for British manufacturers. All other 
considerations… in short, the civilizing mission – pale into insignificance when placed 
alongside the need to possess and exploit the land and labor of the colonies under 
this regime.’167 
The problem with this definition is not that it is necessarily wrong, but more that it is not 
entirely comprehensive; for it does not acknowledge the exploitation of knowledge by 
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extraction from Africa by the colonists, who subsequently used it not for the benefit of 
Africa, but for the benefit of themselves. One is unable to say that this extraction of 
knowledge – such as that extracted by the British in South Africa at the turn of the 
Twentieth Century – falls under the definition of exploitation colonialism as defined above, 
for while it does seem to fall under the broader meaning of exploitation colonialism, it was 
not a physical entity extracted for profit making purposes – in this scenario, it was not even 
extracted for profit making purposes, but instead for security ones – and thus does not fully 
fit the definition. The idea of knowledge extraction being itself an independent form of 
resource extraction by colonialists seems to be lacking in the literature on colonialism. 
Despite the British having fuelled much of the change in its intelligence use in the early 
Twentieth Century by knowledge extracted from Africa as a result of the Second Boer War, 
Africa was not itself to be a beneficiary of this change. The change was focused in Europe, 
on European needs. It was a form of extraction colonialism but varies from the accepted 
definition; it was an extraction of knowledge production in a colonial setting.  
(Ironically, this could, and, in this case did, present something of a paradoxical situation. Had 
the British used the knowledge that they had extracted out of Africa on the East African 
population, this would have inevitably further suppressed the East African people, for they 
would have been subjected to the observation of some sort of ‘secret service’. Therefore, by 
not having used the knowledge that they had extracted from Africa in Africa on Africans, the 
African population had greater freedom from the British colonisers than they otherwise 
would have had. Nevertheless, this paradox does not itself legitimise the colonial extraction 
of knowledge from Africa.) 
 
The Situation in East Africa 
 
In conjunction with the lack of interest shown towards East Africa by the Imperial 
Government in London as was examined in Chapter One, it thus occurred that there was no 
innovative change in intelligence, including counter-intelligence, use in the British Empire in 
East Africa in the years prior to the start of the First World War. Yet, whilst it is true to say 
that there is no record in the surviving archives of any imperial intelligence establishment 
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having existed in this time era in this region to perform risk analyses of the possible threats 
to the security of the British Empire from the East African population, it is not true to say 
that there was no intelligence establishment at all.  
The Intelligence Department of the King’s African Rifles (K.A.R.) was less of an intelligence 
department, and more something that vaguely resembled an intelligence department. 
M.I.5. later recorded the attitude that existed in the regiment before 1914: ‘each battalion 
of the King’s African Rifles was supposed to have an Intelligence Officer with a small office, 
and a certain amount of permanent records… these departments were starved, partly for 
want of necessary funds and because of the opinion of some of the authorities that 
information must be followed by offensive action, partly also because the civil and police 
authorities did not send on all information.’168 
In his book on the K.A.R. published in 1926, W. Lloyd-Jones first expressed his feelings of the 
competency of this department in the contents page; there, he had described it as ‘The 
“Intelligence” department.’169 This view was shared by Charles Hordern, who wrote the 
official account of the first half of the East African Campaign. In relation to the usefulness of 
this Intelligence Department on the outbreak of war, he wrote in Military Operations: 
Volume I August 1914 – September 1916 that ‘When war broke out the two British 
protectorates [the East Africa and Uganda Protectorates] were in all respects entirely 
unprepared and gravely at a disadvantage… from a military point of view, especially in the 
complete absence of intelligence data, the situation was disquieting.’170 
The activities of the Intelligence Department of the K.A.R. as it existed prior to the outbreak 
of the First World War do not anywhere seem to have been thoroughly analysed, either 
contemporarily or by historians. Two comments written by Lloyd-Jones in his work provide a 
suggestion for why the Intelligence Department of this regiment was apparently so lacking 
in ability. He wrote that ‘the K.A.R. were certainly never intended or expected to take part in 
anything but localised operations against a savage, or at the most a semi-savage, enemy’ 
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and that ‘Although some officers serving with the K.A.R. fully realised the possibility, even 
the probability, of a European conflagration spreading to Africa, the responsible authorities 
refused to believe in the likelihood of such a contingency.’171  
One could argue as a result of these statements that, since the Intelligence Department of 
the K.A.R. had not been expected to establish an intelligence portfolio that would be of use 
for such a war as the First World War occurring in a colonial setting, it was not inactivity that 
prevented it from doing so, but orders. Lloyd-Jones refuted this stance and argued that the 
Intelligence Department did have such a remit: ‘In Nairobi there was an Intelligence 
Department whose especial duty it was to prepare for eventualities, but they remained 
obstinately deaf to all warnings.’  These ‘warnings’ included warnings regarding German 
colonial intentions:  
‘On one occasion a planter who had recently returned from a tour of what was at 
that time German East Africa reported to his brother, who happened to be serving 
with the K.A.R., that the German colonists, though they deplored it, believed in the 
imminence of war and were making arrangements accordingly. The matter was 
reported to the Intelligence Officer, and a meeting duly took place. The planter 
repeated his warning, and even offered to return to German East Africa and bring 
back definite proof to confirm his statements. But all in vain. “Superior Intelligence” 
knew better, and regaled the brothers with some wonderful tales of how, according 
to reliable information, it was reported that the askaris in the German service had 
sworn, in the unlikely event of hostilities, to leave their “brutal” German masters and 
desert to the British.’172 
These ‘warnings’, reported Hordern, came to the Intelligence Department not only from 
within the K.A.R., but also from other interested parties within the British Empire: 
‘As early as 1904 Army Headquarters in India, doubtless anticipating the possibility of 
Indian troops being involved [in any future colonial war in East Africa], had suggested 
that information of military value regarding East Africa should be collected, but 
nothing came of it. A similar proposal made by the War Office in 1911 was, it is 
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understood, negatived by the Government of the British East Africa Protectorate in 
the interests of a pacific policy… The British consul at Dar-es-Salaam, Mr. Norman 
King, had of his own initiative collected some general information which was 
afterwards utilized.’173 
The conclusion thus must be that the Intelligence Department of the K.A.R. was lacking 
because the ‘responsible authorities’, which eventually must become the British Imperial 
Government in London, refused to prepare the British Empire in East Africa for what was 
considered by ‘some officers’ of the K.A.R. to be the probable experience of a war similar to 
that which had been seen in the Second Boer War, in spite of several suggestions to do so. 
After the cessation of the First World War, the second and last head of the East African 
Intelligence Centre, a Major Muggeridge, wrote that the ‘pre-war state’ of ‘East African 
Intelligence’ had been one ‘of Parochialism.’174 That it was, but it was not so for the want of 
knowledge. 
The failings of the Intelligence Department of the K.A.R. are apparent, and, evidently, were 
apparent to those involved. Nevertheless, there were five years between the establishment 
of M.I.5. in 1909 and the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 for M.I.5. to have 
remedied the situation from a different angle; from that of imperial military colonial 
intelligence. On examination, the answers for why M.I.5. did not remedy this situation can 





The Structure of the Intelligence Services  
 
M.I.5. have stated that after Vernon Kell and Mansfield Cumming jointly established the 
Secret Service Bureau in the autumn of 1909 in the United Kingdom they decided that, in 
order ‘to fulfil the Admiralty’s requirement for information about Germany’s new navy’ 
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(then considered the most pressing matter that required the gathering of intelligence) it 
would be better to ‘divide their work’ up. ‘K’ (Kell) became ‘responsible for counter-
espionage within the British Isles’ (the future M.I.5.) whilst ‘C’ (Cumming) became 
‘responsible for gathering intelligence overseas’ (the future so-called M.I.6.). The evident 
omission here is that there appears to have been nobody who was responsible for counter-
espionage, or counter-intelligence more generally, overseas in the British Empire.175 Thus, 
from the start, Britain’s secret service broke Henderson’s fourth point, for there was no 
counter-intelligence within the ‘overseas’ intelligence portfolio. 
 
The Magnitude of Work  
 
In a letter that he sent to the Colonial Governors concerning colonial ‘counter-espionage’ in 
August 1915, Andrew Bonar Law, then the Secretary of State for the Colonies, wrote that 
the ‘Pressure of work at the War Office has prevented this question from being dealt with 
before, by the Bureau [M.I.5.] concerned.’176 Given the magnitude of the Great War, this 
provides a reasonable explanation as to why ‘[this] question’ of colonial intelligence was 
only being considered in August 1915: one year after the outbreak of the hostilities. It does 
not provide an explanation for why M.I.5. had failed to deal with ‘this question’ in the 
Empire before the outbreak of war when it had dealt with it in Europe. 
M.I.5. themselves offered an explanation to this some years later. After the end of the First 
World War they wrote that ‘this question had been under consideration even before the 
outbreak of war, and had only been deferred owing to the enormous volume of work which 
had to be dealt with in other directions.’177 A subtle, but important, difference, is noticeable 
between the two: the ability to perform this work had been above M.I.5.’s structural ability 
prior to the First World War, not just during the first year of it. The outbreak of war had 
therefore presented an opportunity of growth to the bureau.   
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But Hordern, as written above, wrote that the War Office had wished to collect ‘information 
of military value regarding East Africa’ in 1911, and only did not because the idea was 
‘negatived by the Government of the British East Africa Protectorate in the interests of a 
pacific policy.’ And that, ‘as early as 1904’ the ‘Army Headquarters in India’ had suggested 
the same thing, ‘but nothing came of it.’ So exactly when this idea came about in London 
seems to be a little confusing; different people seem to have had different recollections. 
The two different answers for this category intersected with one another. The structure of 
Britain’s intelligence establishment had been designed in such a way that counter-
intelligence work away from the United Kingdom was in neither Kell’s or Cumming’s original 
remit, whilst the amount of work, coupled with limited resources and apparent obstructions 
from others, had prevented Kell from resolving the discrepancy: either prior to the First 
World War – if one believes M.I.5.’s recollection of the event – or during the first year of the 
First World War – if one believes Bonar Law’s 1915 letter – or 1911, supported by 1904 – if 
one believes Hordern.  
What appears to be the conclusion here is that Kell was simply given so much work to 
undertake that the colonial aspect to his counter-intelligence work was side-lined with the 
genuine intention that it would be undertaken in the future; the First World War simply 




In November 1915 Major Notley, the Provost Marshal of the East Africa Protectorate, stated 
that ‘Previous to the outbreak of war no Counter Espionage Bureau existed in British East 
Africa or Uganda, and the very comprehensive German system of espionage, which has 
since come to light, was neither suspected or appreciated. This was due to:’ 
 




Notley appears to be implying here that the idea that one or one’s enemies could, or would, 
use intelligence was so foreign to the character of the British that it would not enter their 
heads to suspect such an eventuality. This seems to be ironic, when one considers that 
Notley wrote this statement in a memorandum to Kell after receiving the letter written by 
Bonar Law on the matter quoted from above, to say nothing of the history of intelligence 
use by the British as was observed earlier in this chapter. Perhaps, rather, what Notley 
meant was that the thought that the Germans might be using such tactics in the East Africa 
Protectorate, or the British Empire in East Africa more widely, had not entered his mind, nor 
the minds of his peers in the administration of that Protectorate, nor the minds of the 
officers of the K.A.R., and that this was surely down to ‘the unsuspicious nature of the 
British character’, rather than any neglect on their part. 
In this scenario, the answer given for why there was no imperial counter-intelligence 
establishment prior to the outbreak of the First World War in East Africa seems to be that 
Notley and his peers did not believe in the morality of such work. The real answer from this 
scenario – if one assumes that a Provost Marshal and the entire British administration of the 
East Africa Protectorate and all the officers of the K.A.R. did not genuinely have a moral 
objection to this type of work –  seems to be that Notley and his peers simply did not 
consider the idea at all.  
 
‘[The] fact that no officer or department was specially detailed for such work.’ 
 
This appears to be a much more credible, if rather straightforward, reason given by Notley. 
The lack of an officer or department employing somebody to do ‘such work’ as counter-
intelligence provides a perfectly plausible reason for the absence of anybody doing ‘such 
work’. No one was there to realise that ‘such’ work was needed or was being missed, and so 
therefore it was not undertaken. 178 
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Taking these answers together, the blame for the lack of an imperial counter-intelligence 
establishment covering threats to the British Empire’s security in East Africa does not seem 
to have existed with any one person. In the years leading up to the outbreak of the First 
World War there must have been multiple people for whom the need for a counter-
intelligence establishment in East Africa passed straight by. These included such 
departments as: the British administration of the East Africa Protectorate; the K.A.R.; the 
Colonial Office; the War Office; the India Office; M.I.5. Nevertheless, it was the British 
Imperial Government who was ultimately responsible for ensuring the security of the British 
Empire. 
 
Intelligence Acquisition in the German Empire prior to the First World War 
 
This thesis is not concerned with the structure of German imperial intelligence, except for 
when an understanding of it is necessary for the examination of the central research 
question. This is one of those occasions, for it would be incorrect to imply that German 
imperial intelligence was systematically organised to bring about the subversion of the 
British Empire on the outbreak of the First World War. In respect of his statements quoted 
above, Popplewell has cautioned that ‘it would be misleading to speak at this time of a 
German secret service organized for the destruction of the British Empire. The Intelligence 
Bureau for the East [a branch of the German intelligence system that was responsible for 
subversion in India] gathered suitable officers wherever it could find them. The Germans 
who worked for it mostly combined their intelligence functions with their original jobs.’179 
What is clear is that the Germans had developed a skilfully organised traditional intelligence 
service in the pre-First World War era and had deployed themselves into East Africa unseen 
by their British counterparts, due to the latter’s lack of an imperial counter-intelligence 
establishment. 
The main historical subject matter of the document entitled ‘Organization of Secret Service’ 
previously mentioned was a concise analysis of the performances of the respective 
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intelligence services of Germany and France during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. 
Its conclusions were ones that were full of praise for the former’s intelligence service and 
full of condemnation for the latter’s, and it suggested recommendations for the 
development of Britain’s intelligence service to prevent it from arriving at the same ominous 
situation as the French service did during that war.  
The main thrust of the argument is that ‘The French failure in 1870 was largely due to [the] 
want of [a] Secret Service,’ whilst ‘The German [intelligence] system in France 1870-71 was 
carefully prepared some years before.’ The French War Minister, realising the mistake, 
attempted to formulate a French Secret Service on 14th July 1870 by wiring to General 
Frossard (Charles Auguste; Général de Division dans l'armée française) ‘“Improvise a Secret 
Service: I allot you one million francs; you will be the eyes of the army.”’ With war on 19th 
just five days away, ‘It was too late’ for such an action, for ‘the Prussian general staff was 
famed for the precision and accuracy of its intelligence and war-planning’ at this time; 
‘[Planning] and organization were… strengths,’ according to Geoffrey Wawro, which were 
‘not conspicuous in the French Army.’180 As the French learnt to their great cost, launching 
an effective ‘Secret Service’ in a time of war is very difficult, and can even be used as a 
weapon for the benefit of the enemy, for ‘the French found themselves actually dependent 
on the agents the Germans chose to send them, and were misled.’181 The conclusion that 
was clearly to be drawn from the account of this story was that it is imperative to have 
established such a ‘Secret Service’ some time prior to the commencement of hostilities, or 
else risk defeat.182 Evidently, the Germans were in possession of such a conclusion. 
Along with the testimony of the planter hitherto cited, evidence that the Germans of 
German East Africa were preparing for the possibility of hostilities commencing between 
themselves and the British Empire in the region can also be seen in the reminiscences of 
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Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, as examined in the previous chapter. The Germans had thus 
organised, as Notley termed it, ‘the very comprehensive German system of espionage’ that 
only came ‘to light’ after the hostilities had commenced and which was ‘even then being 
employed to gain information of our movements etc.’183 
Notley wrote that ‘The following [were] the known channels of German Espionage in British 
East Africa before the war:’ 
1. ‘Military Officers visiting the Colony on shooting or other expeditions. 
2. Enemy subjects employed on the Uganda Railway. 
3. Enemy subjects residing in the Colony as scientific collectors etc. 
4. Enemy subjects in Government Departments. 
5. Missions. 
6. Enemy business houses. 
7. Certain neutrals, having business relations with the enemy.’184 
The Major gave no analysis about the importance of the intelligence that had already 
crossed from the East Africa Protectorate into German hands. However, an analysis for the 
same situation has survived from Uganda. There, ‘the local German and Austrian merchants 
and planters were believed to have been in possession of all available [intelligence] 
information’ which, one can presume, was relayed to their respective governments. It was 
also believed ‘that reports may also have been sent to the German and Austrian 
Governments by the various scientific parties who periodically visited the Colony [sic].’185 
Since M.I.5. was to later concede that it was the East Africa Protectorate ‘more than in any 
other colony [sic], [where] the disadvantages arising from [the] lack of any organisation for 
dealing with espionage, had been seriously apparent at the beginning of the war’, one must 
assume that the situation there was even worse than the situation in the Uganda 
Protectorate. 
With the focus on planting military officers, their own ‘subjects’, and neutrals involved in 
business in situations where intelligence could be gleamed, the pre-First World War 
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‘channels of German Espionage in British East Africa’ were not focused on the ‘special 
feature… to foster and encourage any movements of unrest and sedition directed against 
the British Empire’ but on more traditional uses of intelligence: gaining ‘information of our 
movements etc.’ 186 
This ‘special feature’ was not absent. George Wyman Bury wrote that ‘Quite early in the 
War those of us who had to deal with pan-Islamic propaganda realised that the widespread 
organisation which Germany had grafted on to the original Turkish movement must have 
existed some time before the outbreak of actual hostilities.’187 A British Foreign Office 
report from October 1915 detailed the issues that had been occurring on German East 
Africa’s southern border with Portuguese East Africa. There, German agents had been 
‘preaching a Holy War, in the name of the Sultan of Turkey, among the natives of the Nyassa 
territory, especially among the Mussulmans [sic], and [were] endeavouring to stir the 
natives up generally’ early on in the War.188 As will be examined in Chapter Five, the 
Germans of German East Africa had been promoting Pan-Islamism in East Africa prior to the 
outbreak of the First World War. Nevertheless, as far as East Africa was concerned this 
‘special feature’ was not a priority for Germany at this time; traditional methods of 
intelligence acquisition to gain intelligence on military matters was at the fore.  
The German method was vindicated when they won the Battle of Tanga in November 1914. 
The loss was disastrous for the British Empire, who, along with failing to prevent German 
acquisition of military intelligence, had failed to adequately prepare their own military 
intelligence on the German military.189 The consequence was that, unlike in the other 
campaigns of the African Theatre of the First World War, the East African Campaign would 
last for all four years that were to pass until the Armistice. Therefore, after identifying this 
threat the British turned their attentions to preventing any further intelligence acquisition 
by the Germans in the British Empire in East Africa. Apparently losing the East African 
Campaign, the British were concerned only with preventing this, and not with Germany’s 
‘special feature’ of using Pan-Islamism to subvert the Empire. The call for jihad occurred less 
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than a fortnight after the Battle of Tanga, but there was as yet little to tie them together in 
the minds of the officials of the British Empire in East Africa.  
 
Imperial Counter-Intelligence in the British Empire in East Africa: 1914-1915  
 
In addition to his wartime post as Provost Marshal, Major William Notley was also the 
Commissioner of Police of the East Africa Protectorate’s police force. It was for this reason 
that he undertook the work countering German intelligence in the East Africa Protectorate 
in the early First World War period; accordingly, he was chosen by the Governor of the 
Protectorate to correspond with Kell at the request of the Colonial Office.190 This 
memorandum was entitled Memorandum on the Employment of a Counter Espionage 
Bureau in British East Africa and was compiled and sent in November 1915.  
At the outbreak of the First World War there had been approximately ‘125 enemy subjects’ 
– citizens of Germany or Austria – who were known by the British authorities to be resident 
in the East Africa Protectorate, the Uganda Protectorate, and the Sultanate of Zanzibar. On 
7th October and 11th December 1914 respectively, eighty-five and thirty-two of them were 
deported from East Africa to India. At an unknown date or dates between 12th December 
1914 and 30th November 1915, a further five were also deported. Major Notley was thus 
able to write in his memorandum to M.I.5. that ‘no enemy subject of a dangerous character 
is now resident in B.E.A.’ (British East Africa: the East Africa Protectorate). 
However, he was also forced to report that these deportations had ‘by no means removed 
the dangerous element’ present within the Protectorate’. Of the several different concerns 
he had uncovered, he cited in particular that the ‘Persons of enemy parentage who had 
recently become naturalised American, Russian, Swiss and even British subjects, were even 
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The promotion of Christianity was used by the European empires as justification for their 
colonial ambitions; therefore, there were multiple mission stations dotted around East 
Africa. These were useful for German intelligence purposes for two reasons: they provided a 
large number of sympathetic people who possessed legitimate reasons for being in the East 
Africa Protectorate, and these people had access to ‘educated Africans who, from their local 
knowledge, would prove most useful.’ Notley stated that he ‘believed’ that the Missions had 
been ‘the most fertile ground for the seeds of German espionage.’ They had been 
‘tampered with and perhaps heavily subsidised by the German Government.’ Some had 
even been ‘placed on likely Lines [sic] of advance from German East [Africa] into British East 
[East Africa Protectorate].’ 
Notley recorded that missionaries were ‘believed to [have been one of the two] channels of 
enemy espionage’ that the Germans had been able to continue to employ in the 
Protectorate ‘after the declaration of war.’ This was because ‘A large number’ of them 
employed ‘either enemy subjects or neutrals of enemy parentage and sympathy’, and ‘The 
American Missions [contained] a lot of German-Americans.’ Consequently, whilst all of the 
enemy subjects were deported, many who were sympathetic to the German cause still 
remained. Through Notley, the British Empire investigated these people; all those who were 
suspected had ‘their movements and correspondence watched, and in many cases [had 
their] free movement… restricted.’ If the threat level increased from ‘suspected’ to 
‘suspicion’, ‘the individual [was] deported at once, it being considered that this method 
[was] safer than allowing the individual to remain in residence in the hope of securing a 
conviction.’192  
 
‘Secret Agents resident in British East Africa’ 
 
The second of the two ‘channels of enemy espionage’ that the Germans were able to 
continue employing in the Protectorate ‘after the declaration of war’ was the work of the 
‘Secret Agents [who were] resident in British East Africa.’ Notley divided them into six 
groups: 
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1. ‘Enemy subjects.’ 
2. ‘Cape Dutch.’ 
3. ‘Recently naturalised neutrals of enemy extraction.’ 
4. ‘Somalis.’ 
5. ‘Other Africans.’ 
6. ‘Indians.’ 
To counteract their work, Notley recorded that ‘The methods employed in Counter 
Espionage work [were] principally as follows.’:  
1. ‘Agents Provocateurs. 
2. Intercepted correspondence, Postal and Telegraphic. 
3. Police enquiries 
4. Secret Agents both European and Native. 
5. Enemy subjects in our pay. 
6. Coercion and intimidation.’193 
Due to the limited number of surviving documents it is impossible to fully see how these 
methods were employed by Major Notley. Nevertheless, enough can be gleaned to give one 
an understanding. Only records pertaining to the former three methods remain. Thanks to 





The employment of Agent Provocateurs was entirely recorded in relation to an episode that 
concerned the Afrikaner ‘Cape Dutch’ population of the East Africa Protectorate. As 
examined in Chapter One, there was a small population of Afrikaners who arrived in the 
Protectorate in between the end of the Second Boer War and the outbreak of the First 
World War. Although, like all other European powers, Germany had remained neutral 
during the Second Boer War, the German population had sympathised with the Afrikaners in 
their fight against the British Empire. This feeling was exploited by those in power in 
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Germany who wished to use the situation to procure the passage of Tirpitz’s Naval Laws, 
which were to allow for Germany’s navy to be built up to compete with Britain’s Royal Navy, 
by the Reichstag.194  For several reasons not entirely relevant here, in the end the Germans 
‘firmly rejected all proposed interventions by third powers’ in the Second Boer War, which 
‘was undoubtedly of great assistance to Britain’s war effort.’195 Nevertheless, the knowledge 
that Germany had been pro-Boer was not quickly forgotten by the Afrikaners.  
Thus, at the time of the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 many in the British 
Government well recollected both the German population’s sympathies with the Afrikaners 
and the German Government’s potential use of Britain’s difficult relationship with them to 
increase their own military capabilities at sea. For this reason, the Afrikaner population 
present within the East Africa Protectorate was a source of concern for the British 
authorities, as it was an obvious environment from which pro-German espionage activity 
could emerge; an activity that could threaten the security of the British Empire. 
Referring exactly to this concern, Major Notley wrote in his memorandum that ‘It is known 
that soon after the declaration of war, the enemy made great efforts to secure the 
sympathy and active co-operation of a Dutch Community resident on the “Uasin Gishu 
Plateau.”’ Knowing that his audience in London were in full possession of the history of the 
Afrikaner population of the East Africa Protectorate, he continued without elaboration:  
‘Very little response was made, though certain individuals, very much in the minority were 
inclined to listen. Those Dutch, suspected of disloyalty were closely watched and “tested” by 
Agents Provocateurs. One man only fell, and he was at once deported. From that time, 
which was nearly coincident with the fall of German South West Africa, no further suspicion 
has rested on the Boers of British East [Africa], who are now loyally and actively assisting 
our forces.’196 
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That this ‘one man’ fell to Agent Provocateurs whilst the fighting in German South-West 
Africa was underway was not coincidental. Because of the moral support offered by 
Germany in the Second Boer War many of the Afrikaners still residing in South Africa were in 
return sympathetic to the German cause in South-West Africa, with which it shared a land 
border, and were not best pleased at the idea of fighting against them there for the British 
Empire in the South-West Africa Campaign. Partly because of this, a Boer rebellion, 
sometimes known as the Maritz Rebellion, erupted in the September of 1914. 10,000 to 
20,000 Boers revolted, and were met by General Botha, then the Prime Minister of South 
Africa and a Boer himself, with a force of 30,000 Unionist soldiers. To prevent inflaming the 
situation still further, Botha had wisely chosen for these 30,000 Unionist soldiers to be 
Boers. The rebellion was mostly over by the November, and officially ceased in February 
1915.197 Although this all took place a great distance from the East Africa Protectorate, the 
Afrikaners of East Africa had retained ‘ethnic linkages’ – ‘die Suid’ – with the Afrikaners of 
South Africa through family, education, and the church, and so the Afrikaners of East Africa 
must have quickly heard about the rebellion in the South through these links. Although the 
South-West Africa Campaign concluded in early July 1915 after only five months, because of 
the Maritz Rebellion the invasion had been delayed until the March of that year and martial 
law was only declared in German South-West Africa in the May. It is therefore plausible that 
a man on the other side of the continent would still be inspired by the failed Maritz 
Rebellion and still believe in German strength – as well as harbouring anti-British sentiments 
(even if they were not enough to prevent him from settling within the East Africa 
Protectorate) – in the late spring of that year when Notley implies his ‘fall’ took place. 
Those Afrikaner settlers who had decided to stay and settle in German East Africa rather 
than follow most of their fellow travellers across the border to live under British rule in the 
East Africa Protectorate were especially unfortunate when confronted by the British 
Empire’s counter-intelligence effort. The British Empire interned them as enemies along 
with the German population when it invaded German East Africa in 1916, and eventually 
deported them to Germany after the cessation of fighting.198 
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Although there is no explicit evidence to prove such a hypothesis, the evidence contained in 
Notley’s memorandum and Brian Du Toit’s statement in Chapter One does implicitly suggest 
that there was a logical basis for why the Afrikaner population of the East Africa 
Protectorate almost without exception did not attempt to betray the British Empire to the 
Germans. As those Afrikaners who were fervently anti-British had chosen to stay in German 
East Africa rather than join their peers and travel on to the ‘much greater’ advantages of the 
East Africa Protectorate, almost all of those who would have been so inclined to betray the 
British Empire had settled under German, rather than British, rule; they had inadvertently 
self-selected themselves out of the possibility of doing so.199 Luck, rather than the hard work 
of the Agents Provocateurs, was perhaps the real reason for this danger to British imperial 
security being eliminated. Nevertheless, the preferred outcome was the same.  
According to the information provided by Major Notley in his memorandum, the 
employment of the ‘Police enquires’ and the ‘Interception correspondence, Postal and 
Telegraphic’ methods were centred on the actions of the European and Indian populations 
of the East Africa Protectorate.  
As recorded in Chapter One, the European (white) population was relatively tiny 
proportionally to the African population, and this was beneficial to the British counter-
intelligence effort in East Africa in the early years of the First World War, for it allowed the 
actions of this population to be easily tracked. Notley felt that the European community was 
‘so small and inhabited areas so restricted, that European strangers could not possibly move 
about [the East Africa Protectorate, or, indeed, East Africa more generally] and hope to 
escape detection.’ Consequently, ‘the movements of suspected persons residing in British 
East [Africa] [were] very easily watched and there [was] little chance of their communicating 
with the enemy by correspondence or otherwise.’ 200 Notley’s assertions were put to the 
test in his prevention of enemy intelligence work conducted by ‘Recently naturalised 
neutrals of enemy extractions’. 
The Major identified two key nationalities as a cause for concern: American and Swedish. 
(Curiously, in a previous comment on this issue within the same document, he had named 
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four problem nationalities which had not included the Swedish: ‘American, Russian, Swiss, 
and British.’ He did not go on to discuss the latter three within the rest of the memorandum, 
seemingly because the enquiries that were made into their actions by the East Africa 
Protectorate’s police force did not warrant further examination, although he does not make 
this fact explicit. His exclusion of the Swedish in this first mention is more problematic. 
Excluding the possibility of it being a simple typing error, the only probable solution that 
stands out in the face of the evidence is that the Swedish problem was so large that it ought 
not to be associated with the other four, lest the reader get the wrong notions about the 
seriousness of them. His inclusion of British and Russians – who most assuredly were not 
neutral countries in the First World War – seems to be for convenience sake, as recently 
neutralised Britons and Russians of ‘enemy extraction’ could also have acted for the enemy 
for intelligence purposes in a similar manner to those of other ‘Recently naturalised’ non-
enemy nationals. On the contrary, his inclusion of the Americans as neutrals in his 
assessment is correct here, for it was not until 6th April 1917 that the United States would 
declare war against the Germans.)  
That Americans were suspected of acting for the enemy would have come as no surprise to 
Notley, for continual large-scale immigration to the United States in this era had truly made 
that country a melting pot of people, many of whom had no natural allegiance to the United 
Kingdom, and some of whom were actively in opposition to it. Yet, despite this melting pot, 
it was the Swedish, and not the Americans, who concerned Notley a great deal more; this 
was a concern that was to last for the entirety of the East African Campaign. 
The claims made in the memorandum against the recently naturalised Swedish subjects of 
enemy extraction by Notley were that they had ‘shown a marked sympathy for the German 
cause’, and that although ‘nothing of a definite nature [had] transpired’ Notley seemed to 
be warier of them than the Americans. Unlike the Americans, the investigation into the 
Swedish did not end with the happy note of ‘none have been suspected of more than 
sympathy’. The British had to conclude that there was more going on within the Swedish 
population in the East Africa Protectorate as regarded German intelligence work, and so by 
the time of the writing of the memorandum in November 1915 their movements were 
‘restricted and… closely watched.’ 
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It was probably for the same reason as the missionaries that whilst ‘full enquiries’ were 
made ‘in all cases’ of ‘Recently naturalised neutrals of enemy extraction’, and ‘some arrests 
[had] been effected,’ there had been ‘no convictions secured’; deporting without trial was 
simply safer.201 
Of the Indian population of the East Africa Protectorate, Major Notley wrote: 
‘The low class of Indian in British East [Africa] and the Eastern [sic] love of money, 
coupled with sedition, has rendered all Indians suspect. There is little doubt that the 
enemy has employed them largely in prompting discontent among our Indian and 
African troops in passing over information over the border and in actively assisting 
enemy patrols etc.’ 
Along with their posts in commerce and the K.A.R., and their positions as indentured 
servants, the Indian population was, as examined in Chapter One, ‘largely employed on the 
Railways and in the Telegraphic and Postal Services’ in East Africa.202 This, clearly, placed the 
Indian population in a position of potential threat to the British Empire during the East 
African Campaign of the First World War; if swayed to an enemy, the Indian population 
could use these roles to threaten the security of the British Empire in the region. 
Harald Fischer-Tiné writes that the ‘second objective’ of his paper on transnational and 
diasporic Indian nationalism at the eve of the First World War ‘has been to provide a litmus 
test for the hypothesis that the First World War constituted a turning point in the 
relationship between colonized and colonizing peoples, and thus can be seen as the 
beginning of the end of the imperial world order.’ Although his paper focuses on London, 
New York, and Tokyo, his evaluation here is also relevant to the Indian situation in East 
Africa. He writes: 
‘To be sure, this war brought about new opportunities in terms of finance, arms 
supply, and transmission channels to spread the anti-imperial gospel as well as 
prospects to build new political coalitions. It is equally obvious that the atrocities on 
the European battlefields provided particularly powerful ammunition for anti-
Western agitation. However, from a South Asianist’s perspective one is left to 
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conclude that the importance of 1914 has been overstated at the expense of 
another global moment, namely the year 1905, which witnessed the coincidence of 
the Russo-Japanese War, the Swadeshi movement and the launch of The Indian 
Sociologist. As the history of the rapid growth of Krishnavarma’s worldwide anti-
imperial web has once more underscored, it did not take the butcheries of Verdun 
and Gallipoli to instil doubts about European superiority and the legitimacy of 
existing global power-structures into the minds of colonized elites. Nor were they 
required to provide the discursive resources and organizational set-up to effectively 
challenge the ideological justifications of those structures.’203 
Although the Indian population of the Protectorate posed a threat to the security of the 
British Empire in East Africa, the threat posed did not mature only on the outbreak of the 
First World War: it was already in existence. This placed the Indian relationship with German 
colonial intelligence more on a level with the Afrikaners than that experienced by the 
‘Recently naturalised neutrals of enemy extraction’, for the Indians and the Afrikaners 
already had narratives which involved attempts to subvert the British Empire. Notley noted 
that ‘Several convictions’ of Indians were ‘secured’, which were ‘followed in some cases by 
execution’; with only one Afrikaner discovered supporting the Germans, more Indians were 
involved with subversive activities, although it is unknown what the relative percentages 
were.204 Notley did not record which methods were used to discover these Indians, although 
the context confirms that at least one of these methods was employed. 
The previous history with subversion towards the British Empire from two of the four 
populations of the East Africa Protectorate, in addition to those persons deemed suspicious 
from within the white population, forced the hand of its British Administration at the 
commencement of the First World War. Notley recorded that ‘On the outbreak of War, the 
Intelligence Department [of the K.A.R.] and local Police Administration [his own 
department], working in closest co-operation, soon began to realize that an elaborate 
system of espionage had been in existence in the past, and was even then being employed’. 
The work that was quickly commenced was successful in stemming this ‘elaborate system’ 
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and, as demonstrated, much of the hostile activities that had been undertaken by some 
members of the Afrikaner, Indian, and ‘Recently naturalised neutrals of enemy extraction’ 
populations. Off the seven ‘known channels of German Espionage in British East Africa 
before the war’ that Notley recorded, he wrote in his memorandum of November 1915 that 
they had all ‘been closed since the outbreak of war.’ As already stated, he also confirmed 
that ‘No enemy subject of a dangerous character [was] resident in’ the East Africa 
Protectorate by the same date. 205  
Thus, having certainly prevented German intelligence from persisting to threaten the 
security of the British Empire in East Africa by employing counter-intelligence, at first glance 
the initial attempt of the British Empire in preventing the second of the two ‘channels of 
enemy espionage’ that the Germans had been able to continue to employ in the 
Protectorate ‘after the declaration of war’ seemed to have been a success. 
 
The ‘greatest evil’ 
 
Notley wrote in comparative depth about the methods he had employed to prevent German 
espionage being conducted in the East Africa Protectorate through the four groups of 
‘secret agents’ hitherto examined: ‘Enemy subjects’, ‘Cape Dutch’, ‘Recently naturalised 
neutrals of enemy extraction’, and ‘Indians’. Yet there were two further groups that he 
listed under this heading: ‘Somalis’ and ‘Other Africans’.  
An examination of these latter two groups reveals that the initial attempt of the British 
Empire to conduct imperial counter-intelligence in East Africa was not a complete, long-
term, success, despite the achievements listed above. By not ensuring a complete success at 
this initial attempt at counter-intelligence work, the British Empire allowed for the threat of 
Pan-Islamism to grow unabated in its East African Empire; a threat that was to threaten the 
security of that Empire in the later years of the East African Campaign.  
The memorandum dealt little with the threat posed by the Somalis because by the time of 
writing Notley considered ‘the Somali question to be well in hand’. He was able to conclude 
this because that population was ‘closely watched and [had had] severe restrictions… placed 
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on their movements.’ This population had been rendered ‘a likely source of leakage from 
the Colony [sic]’ because of their ‘treacherous and scheming nature… and their lack of 
nationality’, and ‘Some’ of the British Empire’s ‘Somali troops [had] deserted to the enemy,’ 
whilst ‘German Somali agents [had] entered the country from Abyssinia.’206 Of which of the 
six methods employed by Notley helped him come to this conclusion, no evidence was 
recorded.  
Notley split the ‘Other Africans’ section into two parts: ‘Arabs and high-class Swahilis’, and 
the rest of the population. As practitioners of Islam for hundreds of years and descendants 
of non-Africans, the former group were mostly exempted from the racial classification of 
Islam noir and the derogatory stereotypes that went with it, as was illustrated in Chapter 
Two, and thus they were considered more dangerous as they were considered more 
competent. The Provost Marshal would therefore have undoubtedly been pleased to report 
to M.I.5. in London that ‘On the Coast [sic], several Arabs and high-class Swahilis have been 
tried and executed for espionage, but during the last three months such agents have been 
quiet, due partly to our having caught and executed the Native Head of the German Secret 
Service, who foolishly paid a visit to Zanzibar.’  
The first of Notley’s comments on the rest of the African population of the East Africa 
Protectorate, which included, but was not limited to, the l’Islam noir population, was one 
which racially gloated about this population’s lack of mental ability and the ease that this 
presented to the British imperialists: ‘Elsewhere, the simple and uneducated character of 
the native, has not lent itself to espionage, and, except, as guides, their use is not of such 
value. Their detection is comparatively easy and several convictions have been secured.’ 
But in the very same memorandum Notley was forced to retreat on two fronts. The first 
retreat surrounded his statement that for those tribes who lived on ‘both sides of the 
Border… this form of spy work’ [‘guides’] was rendered ‘particularly easy.’207 Chapter One 
briefly examined that due to their location over multiple different colonies and 
protectorates, border tribes did not exist in a perfect state of submission to one coloniser; 
thus, their usefulness as guides to transport people or knowledge across the borders 
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erected by Europeans seems logical. There was no guarantee that the border tribes of the 
East Africa Protectorate were loyal to the British Empire. 
Yet it is a contradictory statement, for in the section on ‘Christian Missions’ in the same 
memorandum Notley had written that ‘Missions are also peculiarly attractive to the 
enemy’s secret service as they nearly always contain a proportion of educated Africans who, 
from their local knowledge, would prove most useful.’208 On the face of it this does not 
seem wholly contradictory; in the first instance Notley talked of ‘uneducated Africans’ and 
in the second of ‘educated Africans’: an important distinction. However, he stated that the 
value of the ‘uneducated African’ came from them being ‘guides’ to the enemy, whilst the 
value of the ‘educated African’ came ‘from their local knowledge’ and the useful 
information that this may have provided to the Germans. The former group of people, 
however, had ‘not lent itself to espionage’ whilst the latter were ‘peculiarly attractive to the 
enemy’s secret service’, despite them both being adapt at what appears to have been the 
same thing. Notley thus appears to have been downplaying the ability of ‘Other Africans’ to 
conduct ‘spy work’ that would be damaging to the British Empire, without having proofread 
his work to realise that he had contradicted himself on the same matter a few pages earlier. 
The second retreat concerned the detection of ‘Other Africans’ conducting ‘spy work’. 
Whilst it was ‘[not] considered possible for enemy Europeans to enter British East as Secret 
Agents’ due to the work that had been conducted by Notley, Notley conceded that ‘With 
coloured African races it is different, and the enemy sends in numerous agents at most 
points of the frontier.’ Effort had been made to check this, he asserted, but it was not 
wholly successful: ‘A large number have been apprehended and dealt with, and the evil has 
been to some extent checked; but reliance that can be placed on native reports has proved 
to be so small, as to render their information of doubtful value.’ 
‘Their detection’ was therefore not ‘comparatively easy’. Instead, it seems to have been 
‘comparatively easy’ to detect the other ‘enemy subjects’ on account of their skin colour. 
Notley reported that ‘In British East Africa, the European Community is so small and 
inhabited areas are so restricted, that European strangers could not possibly move about 
and hope to escape detection. For the same reasons, the movements of suspected persons 
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residing in British East are very easily watched and there is little chance of their 
communicating with the enemy by correspondence or otherwise.’ ‘[Several] convictions’ 
may well ‘have been secured’, but there was nothing in Notley’s memorandum that would 
correspond with his argument that the detection of ‘Other Africans’ acting in the name of 
German intelligence was ‘comparatively easy’. 
Conversely, it appears that Notley was fully aware of these contradictions, despite his 
apparent lack of proofreading. He concluded that ‘Though [‘coloured Africans’] is the 
greatest evil we have now to contend with in the Colony [sic], we understand it does not 
concern you so much as the question of European Agents, and the matter will not be dealt 
with further.’209 
It is here that the proof lies for the argument that the initial attempt of the British Empire to 
conduct imperial counter-intelligence in East Africa did not maintain its promising 
beginnings: it could not maintain long-term success. This initial attempt was so focused on 
preventing the traditional acquisition of intelligence by the Germans that it failed to grasp, 
in spite of the evidence Notley himself presented, that the African population, and not the 
European population, of East Africa, was by November 1915 ‘the greatest evil’ to the British 
Empire. The first attempt at imperial counter-intelligence in the British Empire in East Africa 
did not diversify itself. 
 
M.I.5. Inaction during the First World War 
 
It is not true to say that nobody in London appreciated that there was a continuing threat 
from the population of East Africa to the security of the British Empire that needed to be 
countered; merely, it is true to say only that nobody appreciated that this threat needed to 
be countered during the years of the East African Campaign.  
Notley explicitly stated that there was no cause to expand or improve the British imperial 
counter-intelligence effort in the East Africa Protectorate beyond that which had been 
practised in 1914 and 1915. ‘No Counter Espionage Bureau has been formed in this Colony 
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since the outbreak of war’, he explained, ‘as all necessary work has been done by the 
Intelligence Department and the Provost Marshal’s Department.’210  
‘A Counter Espionage Bureau’ was in the pipeline for establishment in the post-war era; 
Notley’s ‘arrangements could only be provisional’, wrote M.I.5., because ‘it was impossible 
to make any changes as long as hostilities were going on’. M.I.5. recollected that ‘it was 
considered to be of the greatest importance not to lose sight of the desirability of organising 
a local system of counter-espionage as soon as War should be over, especially if there was 
any likelihood that German East Africa should remain in foreign hands.’211  
Notley propositioned that ‘At the close of hostilities… such duties should be delegated to a 
police officer, with full powers to act as he considers necessary, and who should freely 
consult the Senior Military Officer in the Colony [sic] on all necessary points.’ He may have 
wished to keep these ‘duties’ within the police force, but he did offer a practical 
consideration as well: the ‘tenure of office for Military officers in this Colony seldom 
exceeds 5 years’, he wrote, ‘and if such work were given to a Military Officer, continuity 
could not be relied on.’212  
Actions were undertaken to achieve this. It was recorded that ‘[The] outline of a scheme for 
the organisation of the special [counter-intelligence] Bureau after the war was prepared on 
2nd February 1916, by an experienced authority on the subject of East African affairs and 
was sent to the Special Intelligence Bureau’, and that ‘[this] authority considered that it was 
absolutely essential for counter-espionage in East Africa to be handled as much from a 
military as from a political and police point of view, and laid special emphasis on the 
maintenance of close touch between the Head of the Bureau and the Officer Commanding 
Troops’. This authority’s proposal was ‘that the Head of the new Bureau should be a police 
official nominated by the Governor and that a Military Intelligence Officer should always be 
attached.’213  
But it is here that the trail runs dry; there are no surviving documents about the 
effectiveness of the British imperial counter-intelligence effort in East Africa between the 
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end of 1915 and the summer of 1917. Furthermore, there are no references within the 
surviving documents that suggest that any such documents ever existed. After being 
informed that there was an effort being conducted in East Africa to prevent the threat that 
was posed to the British Empire from Germany’s traditional intelligence endeavour, and that 
this effort was fairly successful, M.I.5. appear to have lost interest in this situation for 
around eighteen months. 
Accordingly, M.I.5., Notley, and the others involved with the production of Notley’s 
memorandum, which included Captain Meinertzhagen, must have all agreed in the winter of 
1915 that this imperial counter-intelligence effort was able to adequately counter threats 
from Germany to get the Protectorate, and, ergo, the British Empire in East Africa more 




The initial counter-intelligence effort of the British Empire in East Africa was not structured 
to deal with the threat from Pan-Islamism in the years of the East African Campaign of the 
First World War because it focused, almost exclusively, on the more traditional intelligence 
threats to the British Empire’s security that originated from within the non-African 
population of that region. The ‘very comprehensive German system of espionage’ was the 
main beneficiary of this activity, but the Indian sedition movement was also a recipient. 
Therefore, the threats that existed to the security of the British Empire from within the 
African population were, despite having been deemed the ‘greatest evil’, cast aside.  
It was not that Africans were not identified as a source of threats against the British Empire 
in the first year of the First World War; merely that the threats posed by Africans were 
deemed unimportant and ignored on racial grounds. As will be examined in the following 
chapter, these threats, of which Pan-Islamism was dominant, grew to such an extent that by 
1917 the British Empire was no longer able to ignore them: to do so would be to risk its 
security. In 1917 M.I.5. decided that Notley’s counter-intelligence effort was no longer 
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sufficient to deal with the growing threat of Pan-Islamism: the East African Intelligence 

























Chapter Five Identification: The Pan-Islamic Threats 
 
An examination of how the entry of the European empires into the East African region 
fundamentally changed the local power structures was undertaken in Chapter Two of this 
thesis. A consequence of these changes was that Islam spread rapidly away from the coast 
into the interior, where Islam had hitherto remained largely absent for geopolitical reasons. 
This transformation of religious scope paved the way for Pan-Islamism to threaten the 
security of the British Empire in East Africa during the First World War. But a second event 
that further changed the society of East Africa had to also occur for this threat to transpire: 
the First World War itself. 
The First World War allowed for two sources of Pan-Islamism to mature in East Africa: the 
German Empire, through German East Africa, and East Africans and the African diaspora. 
The former had an incentive to develop Pan-Islamism as an element of its ‘special feature’, 
whilst the latter, having converged in East Africa in a manner never previously seen, 
conversed about Pan-Islamism amongst themselves. 
Two threats posed by Pan-Islamism to the security of the British Empire in East Africa were 
identified. The first, and lesser, threat was the traditional threat of Pan-Islamism: that of 
Pan-Islamic unity. The second threat was identified as being the greater threat; this was the 
possibility that another ideology, one that was more dangerous to the security of the British 
Empire than Pan-Islamic unity, yet one that was unable to spread easily on its own, could 
use the machinery developed by Pan-Islamism to grow itself. This ideology was Pan-
Africanism: Pan-African unity. 
Within the documents relating to Pan-Islamism in East Africa, the officials of the British 
Empire did not examine their interpretation of the term ‘Pan-Africanism’: a term without a 
single definition. It was simply taken by the British to mean “Africa for the Africans”: an 
Africa without the British Empire. The concept of an Africa without the British Empire would, 
by its very definition, be a threat to the security of the British Empire in East Africa.  
 




There were two sources of the Pan-Islamic movement in East Africa in the years of the First 
World War: the German Empire through German East Africa, and East Africans and the 
African diaspora. 
 
The German Empire 
 
The German Empire as a Source of Threat: Hypocrisy  
 
The German Empire’s strategic plan to ensure victory in the First World War by using Pan-
Islamism to subvert the British Empire was observed in Chapter Three: 
‘… it was a special feature of Germany’s policy to foster and encourage any 
movements of unrest and sedition directed against the British Empire. Thus it came 
about that the… Pan-Islamic… [movement]… [was] supported and… promoted by 
Germany...’ 215 
Unlike in much of the Islamic world, the uniqueness of the relatively recent spread of Islam 
across East Africa meant that the Pan-Islamic movement was unknown in large parts of the 
region prior to the First World War. Thus, whilst in most cases the Germans planned to 
‘foster and encourage’ the Pan-Islamic movement, in East Africa the Germans were also a 
source.  
In East Africa the ‘policy to foster and encourage… the… Pan-Islamic… [movement]’ was 
centred around the German Empire’s only colony in the region: German East Africa. 
Germany’s attempt to promote Pan-Islamism through German East Africa required work on 
both the imperial and the local levels so that they could not only be a source of Pan-
Islamism to the British Empire in East Africa, but also so they could attempt to counteract 
the hypocrisy that being such a source ensued. 
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Imperial Level   
 
The ‘proclamation of the men on the Committee of Unity and Progress’ – the call for jihad – 
of the Ottoman Empire was ‘to the effect’ of: 
‘The Lord of all Mohammedans declares holy war against the enemies of Islâm, who 
plunder the countries of Islâm and slaughter their inhabitants or reduce them into 
slavery, it is the duty of all Mohammedans in this world to take part in this war with 
life and goods; that therefore especially the Mohammedan subjects of France, 
Russia, and England are also obliged to participate in it; that those who neglect this 
duty and avoid the struggle incur the anger of God; that, however, Mohammedans 
who live under the rule of the said powers or their allies and help them wage war 
against Germany and Austria, the supporters of Turkey, commit a great sin that will 
certainly bring on the wrath of God.’216 
The evident drawback that was to be encountered by the Germans in their ‘special feature’ 
to use Pan-Islamism to threaten the security of the British Empire is that they too had an 
Islamic population in their own empire: particularly, although not exclusively, in German 
East Africa. If one were to declare war against those ‘who plunder the countries of Islam’, 
one would also have to declare war on Germany; something Germany would be somewhat 
unlikely to think was a wise idea to promote. By writing that ‘all Mohammedans… especially 
the Mohammedan subjects of France, Russia, and England are… obliged to participate in’ 
the War and that ‘Germany and Austria [are] the supporters of Turkey,’ the Ottomans 
clearly made a half-hearted attempt to circumvent this conspicuous problem in this 
proclamation, yet the final result remained clumsy and unconvincing.  
Mustafa Aksakal has written that for Kaiser Wilhelm II, and many German scholars and 
politicians, ‘pan-Islamism meant the fomentation of resistance against formal and informal 
Entente imperialism, while Germany played the role of the liberator’. Such a strategy was 
clearly wholly hypocritical with the continued existence of German East Africa, and the 
other colonies of the German Empire.217 A reading of Christian Snouck Hurgronje’s pamphlet 
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The Holy War “Made in Germany.” offers the clarification that ‘the coal-black Moslems do 
not count for much even in the eyes of Turks and Arabs.’ A notion wholly consistent with 
the French idea of l’Islam noir, this would suggest that Germany’s continued rule over 
African Muslims was excused, for these Muslims were not considered by the Ottoman 
Empire to be true Muslims.218 Even with this explanation the problem does not entirely 
disappear, for the Swahili Muslims were not usually considered to be Islam noir, as was 
examined in Chapter Two. 
On the matter of German imperialism more widely, Snouck Hurgronje wrote that the 
German Empire was not considered morally superior by being smaller than the British 
Empire:  
‘Where no such natural obstacles existed [to imperialism], Germany took her part as 
greedily as the others; and in Africa she even has subjected two million 
Mohammedans to her authority, an authority which will not be found by those 
concerned to be less tyrannical than the British-Indian and North-African 
Mohammedans… find the British or French administration.’  
He also implied that this hypocrisy did not go wholly unnoticed by the Ottomans, even if in 
1914 they saw more benefits to an alliance with Germany than another antagonistic 
relationship: ‘The Sultan in his manifesto… mentioned the full three hundred million 
[Muslims of the world], at which the Kaiser estimated the adherents of Islâm, as victims to 
be set free, and… thus by mistake included amongst them the two million German subjects 
and the Moslims under Austrian and Italian rule, not to mention any others.’219 The 
pretence was certainly noticed by Enver Pasha, the Minister of War of the Ottoman Empire. 
He was ‘perhaps more accurately informed about the realistic potential of pan-Islamism’ 
than the Kaiser, and he ‘reminded Berlin that the declaration of jihad would necessarily be 
directed against all ‘infidel’ powers, including Germany.’220 
Accordingly, from the very start of German support for Pan-Islamism, everybody involved, 
including the Germans themselves, knew that it was altogether insincere of the Germans to 
take the moral high ground and accuse the Entente powers of imperialism over the Muslim 
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population of their empires, when they themselves held imperialist power over a Muslim 
population in their own empire. Thus, using Pan-Islamism ‘to foster and encourage… unrest 
and sedition directed against the British Empire’ was something of a dangerous game for 
the German Empire; ‘pan-Islamism’ could result in ‘the fomentation of resistance against 
formal and informal Entente imperialism’, but that did not automatically mean that 
‘Germany [would play] the role of the liberator’. The German Empire was a danger to the 
security of the British Empire because by fostering and encouraging Pan-Islamism they were 




Despite the German Empire implementing this hypocritical approach, the administration of 
German East Africa was not lacking in awareness that the Islamic population of German East 
Africa could, if infused with Pan-Islamic ideas, be a danger to the safety of the German 
imperial project. Captain Philipps outlined the four phases that the relationship between the 
German administration and the Islamic population of German East Africa progressed 
through between the formation of the colony and the invasion by the British Empire in 
1916, which demonstrated how it seesawed between co-operation and disunity. The threats 
that Pan-Islamism posed were not lost on those who navigated this changing relationship:  
‘The policy of the German Government in East Africa towards Islam has passed 
through four distinct phases:- 
1st phase: On occupation of the hinterland, the political power of the Arab-Swahili 
slave traders had to be broken, as being the most antagonistic element to white 
government. With this object in view the first official policy was anti-Islam. 
2nd phase: Arabs, ex-Mahdists from the Sudan, Somalis, and Swahilis were enlisted to 
form the nucleus of the German Askari forces for the subjugation of the local central 
tribes. These were all Moslems… Muhammedans were everywhere encouraged 
during this period.’ The second official policy was pro-Islam. 
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‘3rd phase: In 1912-14 the local German administrations were very apprehensive of 
the increase of Islam among local native populations, as likely to threaten white 
supremacy by a black Pan-Islamic organisation. Hence the complete volte-face in 
policy depicted by the Moschi papers (1913).’ The third official policy was anti-Islam. 
‘4th phase: During the war local policy had to be subjected to German Imperial 
needs, necessitating another change of attitude to Islam in the colonies, consequent 
on the Turkish declaration of Jehad.’ The fourth official policy was pro-Islam.221 
Elsewhere Philipps made his conclusion on this subject plain: ‘In spite of their first 
willingness to make use of Islam, conversations which I have had with German African 
administrators before the war showed clearly their apprehensions of what may be 
abbreviated into an “African Jehad”, viz, a conjunction of an African political Islam versus 
Europeans.’222  
Therefore, far from always being supporters of the promotion of Pan-Islam, in the 
immediate pre-war years the German administration of German East Africa had, due to 
their concerns about the local conditions and the impact that an ‘African Jehad’ could have 
on the security of the German Empire in East Africa, actively tried to hinder its growth in 
their colony  
Consequently, the German Empire as a source of Pan-Islamism in East Africa was 
hypocritical not only because Germany had little right to portray itself as an anti-colonial 
liberator, but because the security of the German Empire would itself be threatened if an 
African jihad came to fruition. The threat posed by the Germans to the entire European 
colonial project was rightly identified by Philipps as being a threat to the security of the 
British Empire in East Africa. 
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The German Empire as a Source of Threat 
 
With the exception of Abyssinia, which was not to be colonised until Mussolini’s Italians 
invaded in 1935, the entirety of East Africa was under some form of European colonial rule 
during the First World War. Either of the two threats posed by Pan-Islamism to the security 
of the British Empire in East Africa, Pan-Islamic unity and the use by another ideology, such 
as Pan-Africanism, of the Pan-Islamic machinery, would be a danger to all the European 
empires across East Africa: the German Empire included. It was somewhat ironic, therefore, 
that, due to the German Empire being a source of Pan-Islamism in East Africa, Captain 
Philipps was forced to declare in 1917 that ‘The chief danger zome [sic]… [for the] 
conjunction of Islamic propaganda with the cry of “Africa for the “African”… might be 
expected to be German East Africa’.223 German East Africa was therefore both a source of 
Pan-Islamism and a potential threat to the security of the British Empire in East Africa. Had 
the German Empire achieved full success with its fostering and encouragement of Pan-
Islamism in this region, the phrase ‘Africa for the African’ may have been heard on the 
streets of Dar-es-Salaam: the Germans may have won the War but lost their empire.  
Philipps’ reasoning for why German East Africa was ‘the chief danger zone’ centred on three 
factors:  
The first factor was that German East Africa was ‘common ground for Pan-Islam and Pan 
Africa.’ 224 Located in the centre of East Africa, it was well placed geographically to not only 
be a source of Pan-Islamism to the region but to also be a meeting place of both the Pan-
Islamism that came from the northern parts of Africa and Pan-Africanism from the south. As 
will be examined later in this chapter, the First World War was the catalyst for the 
movement of a great number of Africans to the locality of German East Africa; its central 
location became important for the spread of ideologies. 
The second factor was that in 1917, after the British Empire’s invasion of German East 
Africa, Philipps had found ‘The Arab-Swahili (i.e. educated) element in German East Africa’ 
to ‘still [be] sullen’ and to be a population that ‘generally [preferred] German rule, though 
                                                          




not so ill-advised as to admit it.’ ‘The German pre-war policy’, he stated, ‘was to enlist, by 
commercial fellowship, the sympathy of this element as a buffer state against native 
rebellion’: the ‘2nd phase’ recorded above.225 The German Empire had been a source of Pan-
Islamism to this ‘Arab-Swahili’ population, which had turned many of them against the 
British Empire. 
This ‘commercial fellowship’ focused primarily on one issue: The Eastern Slave Trade. The 
German administration had produced propaganda on this subject which placed them in a 
positive light and the British Empire in a negative one. 
As previously examined in this thesis, the Eastern Slave Trade had been a significant part of 
the economy in eastern Africa until its termination at the hands of the Royal Navy in the 
Nineteenth Century; it was this termination which helped to facilitate the spread of Islam 
throughout the interior of the region. The German Empire had, along with the other major 
European empires and several other countries, been a signatory to the Brussels Conference 
Act of 1890. The attendees of this conference stated that they were ‘equally actuated by the 
firm intention of putting an end to the crimes and devastations engendered by the traffic in 
African slaves, of efficiently protecting the aboriginal population of Africa, and of securing 
for that vast continent the benefits of peace and civilization’. Article I Section 2. of the Act – 
properly known as the Slave Trade and Importation into Africa of Firearms, Ammunition, 
and Spirituous Liquors (General Act of Brussels) – stated that ‘The gradual establishment in 
the interior, by the powers to which the territories are subject, of strongly occupied 
stations, in such a way as to make their protective or repressive action effectively felt in the 
territories devastated by slave hunting.’226 
Accordingly, the German Empire had confirmed in an international arena their intention to 
be a partner in both the interruption and the termination of the slave trade in Africa. Yet 
Lieutenant Colonel Sykes and Captains Philipps and Willis were able to discuss in the early 
summer of 1917 that in German East Africa ‘the temper of the Mohammedan natives is 
alienated from British rule since they have been taught by the Germans that the British are 
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responsible for the anti-slavery treaties and the Germans only carried them out to the 
letter, winking at the maintenance of old methods under the guise of labour contracts.’227  
William Mulligan has written an interpretation as to why the German Empire would be 
involved in the pomp of signing such an Act and yet subvert it via ‘the guise of labour 
contracts’. He states that the ‘proclaimed aims’ of the Act – ‘to eradicate the slave trade, to 
prohibit the importation of arms, and to regulate the consumption of liquor in Africa – seem 
either cynical or naïve when viewed in the context of the violent wars, brutal labour 
regimes, and economic exploitation which characterized the European conquest of Africa.’ 
Hence, whilst eradicating slavery was laudable, its eradication did little to unburden the 
continent from colonial oppression. When placed in a wider understanding of European 
colonialism in Africa Germany’s actions – terminating the slave trade but enacting a ‘brutal 
labour regime’ in response – were not outside of the norm.228  
Mulligan continues by arguing that this Act was never expected to be anything more than a 
gesture and that one should view the continuation of slavery under another name after its 
enaction by some of the signatories less as a disappointment and more as a ‘significant’ first 
diplomatic step on the long road towards the eradication of slavery:  
‘Given that its promises and spirit were honoured more in the breach than in the 
observance, the gathering of the diplomats from Europe, the United States, and 
leading Muslim powers in Brussels in late 1889 and 1890 appears to have been little 
more than a talking shop. Yet the event in Brussels was significant in that it was the 
first diplomatic meeting of the major European powers devoted solely to the 
suppression of the slave trade.’229  
Be that as it may, the Germans were able to undermine the idea that it was the first step on 
a long diplomatic road by ‘winking’ that they had signed the Act only to maintain face 
diplomatically, rather than out of any sincerity to the cause of the eradication of the slave 
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trade. In propagating this narrative, the Germans fostered anti-British feelings amongst the 
Swahili population of German East Africa who had once been slave traders. The British 
Empire identified that the pro-slavery propaganda would make the Swahili population of 
German East Africa more amenable to other ideas, such as Pan-Islamism, which were 
inherently anti-British.  
‘The Turkish flag’, had, Philipps wrote for the Arab Bureau in 1918, ‘since the proclamation 
of Jehad, been flown together with that of Germany’ in German East Africa. Philipps argued 
that ‘A Swahili control is needed to meet this conjunction.’230 Ergo, Philipps’ argument was 
that it would be necessary for the security of the British Empire to pull the Swahili 
population away from their loyalty to the German Empire, and to gain it for the British. 
Although there was a focus on ‘the Arab-Swahili element’, the German administration also 
wished to ‘enlist… the sympathy’ of the entire Islamic population of German East Africa, and 
the entire Islamic population of the region more widely, and they attempted to accomplish 
this by the production of propaganda.  
One mode of propaganda ‘took the form of personal correspondence and of printed 
proclamations in Arabic and Swahili, signed by Governor Schnee [of German East Africa] and 
the ex-Sultan Khalif of Zanzibar’. It was to be ‘continuously intercepted by [the British 
Empire’s] Military Intelligence Agents in the Uganda-Congo-Sudan area’ during the First 
World War.  
In 1914 the Germans ‘at once endeavoured to exploit the personal element by instigating 
prominent Mohammedans [in German East Africa] to correspond with their former 
associates along the old slave routes in Uganda and the Congo Belge’. In the middle of the 
war, in ‘1915-16’, this mode of propaganda ‘assumed a new phase’ when it took the form of 
‘Printed proclamations, with the green flag’ which were ‘despatched’ across East Africa. This 
‘German-Islamic Propaganda… set forth: 
1. The Jehad, laying down that Islam required of all true believers not merely a passive 
but an active resistance to the Allies. 
2. Importance of Allied attempts against German East Africa. 
                                                          
230 TNA: WO 106/259: Philipps, J.E. ‘Notes on Control of Pan-Islam in the Swahili Area’, in Memorandum on 
East and Central Africa with papers on Pan Islamism and Ethiopianism, 2nd January 1918. 
118 
 
3. Certainty of eventual German victory in Europe, based on Allied territory actually 
held. 
4. Consequent:  
a. Establishment of Islamic Empire of North and East Central Africa, under 
benign German “protection”. 
b. Assistance to be forthcoming for all rebellions, as Mohahi in French and Ali 
Dinar in Egyptian Sudan (Darfur) 
5. complete failure of Allied attack on Stanbul (sic).  
6.  mutiny of Indian troops at Singapore.’231 
The British Empire, through Philipps, did not leave any specific details on how many people 
this method of propaganda reached, or how those persons whom it reached responded to 
it, but the concern felt by Philipps was palpable. This concern stemmed from the ease at 
which the Germans were able to spread this propaganda, and the difficulties the British 
Empire, through Philipps, had in preventing it. ‘With one brigade only on a 300 mile front’, 
he explained, ‘it [had] been possible for native enemy agents to pass through our lines by 
night’ and, ‘Once through, every Mohammedan [was] a “brother”’. This was important, he 
continued, because the ‘native fear of legal complications or odium consequent upon 
betrayal of a co-religionist, even if his errand is divulged, induces the “friend” rather to pass 
on the agent quickly than denounce him.’ To diminish the possibility ‘of legal complications’ 
or any resulting ‘odium’, ‘Further agents were cleverly chosen by clan according to the area 
to be traversed, ensuring them at least tolerance and probable immunity from “betrayal” to 
the European.’ 
The ease at which the Germans were able to spread this propaganda ‘of personal 
correspondence and of printed proclamations’, and the difficulties that Philipps faced in 
preventing it, meant that, on understanding the scope of it, Philipps identified it as a threat 
to the security of the British Empire in East Africa, for it spread the Pan-Islamic idea away 
from German East Africa to the wider region. As will be further examined in Part III of this 
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thesis, Philipps was forced to neutralise this threat with ‘A vigorous counter-espionage by 
the pecuniary and political bribery of prominent enemy pagan chiefs’.232  
The German administration of German East Africa also undertook a second mode of 
propaganda: newspaper publication. They used these newspapers to control the narrative 
of events depicted to the African population of their colony. Philipps was to summarise their 
importance when he himself wished for the British Empire to replicate their publication:  
‘The German Government in German East Africa maintained two native papers 
containing items of news from each station and district, compiled by natives for 
natives under white supervision, with leading articles explaining any native 
legislation, and giving general ideas of the development of the country. These papers 
were published fortnightly and monthly. They had a wide circulation among all 
classes of literate natives and were a great assistance to the Administration. They 
were much appreciated by the natives’.233 
These German newspapers ‘set forth German Imperial doctrine, local news, items from 
other German tropical colonies, and explained simply any new native legislation and [gave] 
general ideas of development of the country.’234 Elsewhere, Philipps wrote that these 
newspapers ‘were in great demand and exercised a quietly penetrating influence’. 235 These 
newspapers supported and promoted Pan-Islamism and assisted in ensuring that the Islamic 
population of German East Africa received their news from a source that was fundamentally 
pro-German and, after August 1914, anti-British. As Part III will demonstrate, Philipps 
identified that if the British Empire was to replicate this idea they could be of use to 
challenging the Pan-Islamic threat. 
The third factor for Philipps’ reasoning centred on the subdivision above: on the German 
Empire’s hypocrisy and its inability to maintain absolute control over their Islamic 
population and, consequently, the Pan-Islamic movement that they had released. Although 
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they were a source of Pan-Islamism into East Africa, the German Empire had limited control 
on how that movement then developed within the region. Although it had the potential to 
benefit militaristically from the impact of Pan-Islamism on the British Empire during the First 
World War, the German Empire was as much at danger from the threats of Pan-Islamic unity 
or the use of the Pan-Islamic machinery as the British Empire was. 
A fourth factor, one that was not directly mentioned by Philipps but is always implied within 
his work and on which his three factors were built, is also of primary interest: that of the 
size of the Islamic population of the German colony.  
Captain Buxton, in the document Notes on Philipps’ Memorandum that he authored in 
December 1917, agreed with Philipps’ assessment about the importance of German East 
Africa; he furthered this argument by directing the reader to contemplate the size of the 
Muslim population in the colony: ‘The chief danger zone, Captain Philipps points out, is 
German East Africa (where there are at present about 300,000 Mohammedans).’236 It is 
impossible to know the exact number of Muslims that lived in East Africa in this era, as 
census records of the African population were not kept with any accuracy. As previously 
stated, Snouck Hurgronje wrote that the German Empire had ‘in Africa… two million 
Mohammedans to her authority’. Of Germany’s three other African colonies, Togoland and 
Kamerun would have had Islamic minorities, whilst German South-West Africa would have 
had a small Islamic population. If Snouck Hurgronje’s number were correct, German East 
Africa would have had to have had some of these further 1,700,000 Muslims. It is possible 
that Buxton was referring only to the Swahili population. Whatever the true figure was, the 
Islamic population of German East Africa was clearly a significant minority. 
Captain Bray wrote in March 1917 that ‘We [the British Empire] must constantly bear in 
mind that the active and propelling force lies in territories over which we have no control, in 
countries either independent or under the guidance of other Powers.’ Furthermore, he 
judged that ‘those working in countries over which we have little or no control are the more 
insistent in their endeavours.’237  
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Thus, the Germans had an excellent start to the implementation of their ‘special feature… to 
foster and encourage’ Pan-Islamism ‘against the British Empire’ in East Africa: they had a 
large Islamic population that was under their jurisdiction , to which they could be the source 
of the Pan-Islamic movement in the East African region. This was not a factor that was under 
their control per se, but it was one from which they benefitted. The British, through 
Captains Buxton and Philipps, identified that this large Islamic population in German East 
Africa was a source through which the Pan-Islamic threat against the British Empire from the 
German Empire was being channelled in East Africa. If they wished to counter this threat 
they would have to counter this population. 
The only way in which the British Empire could suppress the dangerous anti-British 
components of Pan-Islamism in this large Islamic population would be to implement policies 
that would suppress those anti-British components. The only way that that would be 
possible would be to successfully occupy German East Africa. 
 
Despite the potential problems that implementing this hypocritical approach could have in 
German East Africa, the German Empire proved to be an active source of Pan-Islamism into 
East Africa in both the pre-First World War and First World War eras. The location of this 
colony allowed for the ‘special feature of Germany’s policy’ to use the movement of Pan-
Islamism to threaten the security of the British Empire in East Africa. Without a dedicated 
imperial counter-intelligence establishment monitoring this threat, it took the work of a 
single man, Captain Philipps, to identify this threat; something he was unable to fully 
achieve until 1917. 
 
East Africans and the African Diaspora. 
 
The African Diaspora in East Africa 
 
The German Empire as a source of Pan-Islamism in East Africa can be clearly seen from the 
surviving documents; their support and promotion of it was undertaken in such a way that 
allowed the officials of the British Empire to record it in a chronological manner. The same is 
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not true of the narrative of the African diaspora as a source of Pan-Islamism in East Africa. 
There, Pan-Islamism was not used as a ‘special feature’ of a country’s strategic policy. It was 
instead one of the several ideologies that were informally discussed in the imperial melting 
pot that was the East African Campaign of the First World War.  
The East African Campaign of the First World War began on 3rd August 1914, and, after the 
aborted efforts of 1914, the invasion of German East Africa began in early 1916, led by Jan 
Smuts. Smuts brought with him a large army of white men from South Africa; 20,000 African 
labourers from East and West Africa were joined by Indian bearer companies to serve with 
them. Due to the political tensions in South Africa Smuts refused to allow black South 
Africans to participate, although a small amount of ‘coloureds’ were permitted to 
fight.238From late 1915 onwards these latter troops mixed together in the East African 
region and then with the local African population before also mixing with the troops and 
civilians of German East Africa. Therefore, by the centre point of the First World War an 
African diaspora had been sent to, and was becoming scattered across, East Africa, joined in 
part by Indians.  
Philipps wrote several documents dated 15th July 1917, one of which was jointly compiled 
with Sykes and Willis. In one of his solo documents, Philipps wrote about the mixing of these 
troops fighting in the East African Campaign. He recorded that ‘During 1916-17’, when the 
British Empire invaded German East Africa, ‘there has been an unprecedented meeting of 
the tribes of Africa campaigning in “German East”’. The wording of this document in the 
present tense submits that at the time of its writing this ‘unprecedented meeting’ was still 
occurring and was therefore a present concern. These ‘tribes of Africa’ were ‘Natives of the 
West African Coast and the Cape’, who had then ‘met those from Nyassa, East Congo, 
Somaliland, Zanzibar and Uganda’ in East Africa.239 ‘Natives… of the Cape’ would suggest 
that some black South Africans somehow did make it to East Africa, although he could also 
have been referring to the ‘coloureds’ recorded as having come from South Africa. 
In the joint document, which was actually the notes of a conversation that had occurred on 
29th June in Whitehall, these nationalities were chronicled in more depth. They detailed that 
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in East Africa there had ‘been an unprecedented mixing of representatives of almost all the 
black races of Africans, Nigerians, Gold Coast natives, Hausa porters, Cape boys, Zulus, 
Matabele etc. meeting Sudanese, Azande, Baganda, Somalis and all the local tribes.’240 
Philipps listed that because he was ‘both Intelligence and Political Officer in an area from 
Rhodesia to Abyssinia and the Congo to British East Africa, [operated] in German East 
[Africa] and [spoke] the languages’, he had ‘been happily situated for the observation of 
effects resulting from this meeting of the tribes.’ It was happy for the British Empire that he 
was in such a position, for his documentation of the observed effects of these meetings did 
not make for light reading regarding their potential impact on the security of that Empire in 
East Africa. His diligence in not only performing his imperial intelligence work but 
thoroughly recording it stands him apart within the entire imperial intelligence effort in East 
Africa. Of the conversations amongst Africans converging in East Africa, he summarised: 
‘Round the camp fires there has been much talk – in the lingua franca which never 
fails the African – starting from stomach and wife, and the distance which they 
themselves have been brought from home to hardship, and touching on the killing of 
white by black as illustrated before their eyes. True that the magnitude of a 
nebulous Empire is made known, but the increasing utilisation of black troops vice 
white is generally attributed to the lack of the latter, and the consequent 
doubtfulness of the result of the European struggle where white men are being 
decimated.’241  
Therefore, around the campfires of the East African Campaign, Africans from different parts 
of Africa conversed about the white imperialists whose war had arrived on the East African 
shore; they conversed not as docile members of a mighty British Empire, but as conscripted 
people who doubted the ability of the white colonisers to continue the hostilities without 
their input. Philipps doubted the ability of Africans to understand these concepts on racial 
grounds. He wrote that ‘‘Liberal’ ideas from the Cape and Sierra Leone [had] been discussed 
over the camp fires and a good deal of rather vague political generalisation [had] been 
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implanted in minds ill-adapted to digest the matter or to use it properly’. He offered nothing 
to suggest that these ‘minds’ were ‘ill-adapted’ except implicit racial undertones. 
There is no record that any oral history was conducted to record what exactly was discussed 
by these troops from a primary perspective. Philipps’ work heavily implied that he himself 
spoke to Africans about these conversations, but there is no documentary proof that he did 
so within the publicly available archives. It was recorded in cabinet papers in 1915 that ‘In 
the East Africa Protectorate… the reverse at [the Battle of] Tanga and our failure to make 
any appreciable progress during the course of a whole year have brought about a 
considerable change and reports state that our prestige has suffered considerably in the 
eyes of the natives.’242 1915 was before Philipps’ first surviving document on this topic in 
the publicly available archives was written, so it is possible that another person was also 
speaking to Africans and reporting to London at this earlier date; yet this could easily have 
also been Philipps. Knowledge of what Africans spoke about from a primary source would 
be hugely beneficial to the narrative of African participation in both early anti-colonial 
movements and the First World War in East Africa. Nevertheless, it is possible to continue to 
answer the central research question posed by this thesis, for this central research question 
is concerned with understanding how the British Empire attempted to achieve their goal of 
safeguarding the security of their Empire in East Africa during the First World War. How the 
British Empire perceived the threat, and how the threat actually existed, are two separate 
entities, and here it is the former, and not the latter, which is of interest. As was identified 
in the Introduction, further work needs to be undertaken on the African perspective.  
The officials of the British Empire identified that two ideologies were prominently discussed 
around these campfires: Pan-Africanism and Pan-Islamism. From the surviving documents of 
the British imperial officials, it appears that the first of these ideologies was the more 
dominant topic of conversation. 
In Pan-Africanism The Idea and Movement 1776-1963 P. Olisanwuche Esedebe examines the 
lack of an agreed definition for the term ‘Pan-Africanism’. His first statement was his 
summarised conclusion: ‘there is still no agreement on what it is all about’. He lists the 
                                                          




‘major component ideas’ of the term: ‘Africa as the homeland of Africans and persons of 
African origin, solidarity among men of African descent, belief in a distinct African 
personality, rehabilitation of Africa’s past, pride in African culture, Africa for Africans in 
church and state, the hope for a united and glorious future Africa.’ ‘With some 
simplification’, he continues: 
‘we can say that Pan-Africanism is a political and cultural phenomenon which 
regards Africa, Africans and African descendants abroad as a unit. It seeks to 
regenerate and unify Africa and promote a feeling of oneness among the people of 
the African world. It glorifies the African past and inculcates pride in African values. 
Any adequate definition of the phenomenon must include the political and culture 
aspects.’243  
Olisanwuche Esedebe’s approach is a useful approach to place here because it identifies 
well the confusion that the British felt on observing the introduction of the Pan-African idea 
into East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign. They repeated several times one 
of the same segments that Olisanwuche Esedebe himself used: ‘Africa for [the] Africans’. 
Sykes, Willis, and Philipps, on discussing the introduction of Pan-Africanism into East Africa 
as a result of these fireside chats, observed that ‘Especially has the doctrine of “Africa for 
the African” taken a definite form as an ideal in the minds of many.’244 Captain Beaton 
specified that for the British Empire ‘the doctrine of Africa for the Africans… meant the 
elimination of the European and governing power’.245 Unlike Olisanwuche Esedebe, the 
British Empire examined the phrase ‘Africa for the Africans’ entirely through a European 
gaze. Never was there a nuanced attempt by the British officials of East Africa to truly 
understand what Pan-Africanism was; it was merely ‘Africa for the African’, which, by 
default, was taken to mean an Africa without the British Empire.  
Willis expanded on this perception in the following January of 1918. In this expansion, one 
can see how the introduction of such an anti-colonial concept as Pan-Africanism to East 
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Africa and East Africans during the East African Campaign was seen as a threat by the 
officials of the British Empire: 
‘He [Philipps] contends that the introduction of ideas, more especially of a rather 
advanced political kind, from the natives of e.g. the Cape or Sierra Leone, to tribes 
who were already imbued with a considerable spirit of independence has been 
prejudicial to the prestige of the white man as a dominating race, that there has 
been already in existence a political conception of “Africa for the Africans” which 
previously was isolated within the borders of separate and unconnected tribes, who 
have come into contact with one another during the war and found sympathetic 
feelings on this subject… that what would otherwise be a heterogeneous miscellany 
of tribes unconnected by any binding tie is liable to be joined by the bond of Islam 
into an united whole with common religious and political ideals’.246 
It was in the last sentence of this statement that the concerns of the British were laid bare. 
The British officials of the British Empire in East Africa had observed that the changing 
power structures of East Africa in the decades prior to the outbreak of the First World War 
had meant that the previously ‘heterogeneous miscellany of tribes unconnected by any 
binding tie’ were now often joined by Islam. This phenomenon was, as examined in Chapter 
Two, observed by Philipps himself, who documented that: ‘Islam has a tendency in Eastern 
Africa to consider itself a political, as much as a spiritual force. Latterly Muhammedans have 
in this area tended to consider themselves a Muhammedan nation. So much so that in 
enquiring the tribe of natives one is frequently met with the reply “I am a 
Muhammedan”.’247  
Whereas the Intelligence Department of the East African Force had confidently written in 
1916 that ‘the tribes will not combine’, by 1917 Philipps was cautioning against using 
previously gathered information on tribes to make such conclusions. Such had been the 
growth of Islam and the upheaval of the First World War in East Africa that one could no 
longer write of tribal relations without serious references to these events. To use such 
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outdated narratives to understand the relationships between the tribes, and the potential 
for threat that this created, would render these sentiments misconstrued: 
‘It may be urged that the incoherence of native tribes in Central and Eastern Africa, 
outside the littoral, renders any general conflagration improbable. One should, 
however, beware of arguing, now or subsequently, on any pre-war premises or 
relying on opinions not modified in accordance with the enormous upheaval of 
native thought brought about by the war in these parts. The case of Mopahi (Mopoi) 
who in 1916 destroyed two French garrisons on the borders of the Congo Belge and 
French Sudan, and immediately set about organising the surrounding tribes under an 
Islamic guise, is a case in point. The basis of his movement was anti-white.’248 
The reason for why the partial bonding of the tribes via Pan-Islamism was important for the 
doctrine of ‘Africa for the Africans’ was summarised by Philipps in a later appendix, written 
in October 1917, to his memorandum of July of the same year. This summary stated that: 
‘Pan Africanism is scarcely likely to develop into a widespread Pan-African 
movement without some outside influence, such as political Islam. That is to say, an 
active “Africa for the black” movement is quite possible, for example, throughout a 
territory such as Portuguese East Africa under half caste leadership but such an 
influence would not normally penetrate, or harmonise of itself with similar 
organisations in say Ruanda [Rwanda; then a part of German East Africa]. In 
Portuguese territory, however, the Mulatto has both brain to conceive the idea and 
intelligence to organise parallel movements to one common end… Neither Islam nor 
Paganism are likely normally to be the least antagonistic to Pan-African feeling.’249  
Colonel French, a military intelligence officer at the War Office, clarified that for him 
‘Ethiopianism (which I do not think finds its source in Abyssinia) is I believe by far the more 
dangerous to the white race, playing as it does upon the characteristic conceit and 
excitability of the African.’250 A continuation of the lack of nuance showed by the British 
Empire to this threat, French and his colleagues considered the terms ‘Pan-Africanism’ and 
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‘Pan-Ethiopianism’ to mean the same thing, and used them interchangeably. Philipps did 
not record his thoughts so openly nor so frankly, but the amount of work he dedicated to 
this topic demonstrated that his thoughts were analogous to those of French’s. He detailed 
how the outbreak of the First World War had brought about an eruption of anti-European 
sentiment amongst some parts of the African population. He wrote that ‘On the declaration 
of War there was a further outbreak of anti-Europeanism on the part of [the ‘Nabingi cult’ 
who lived in, but were considered ‘a foreign element throughout’, Rwanda] with such cries 
as: “We will get rid of the Europeans” etc’. Later in the same document he further furnished 
the danger posed by this ‘cult’ to his reader, and told them that ‘Members of this 
confederation were the actual agents who carried Pan-Islamic proclamations (1915) 
between the Moslems of German East Africa (North West) and the Arab Swahili settlements 
on Lake Albert, again illustrating the connection between Pan-Islam and Anti-White 
movements in Africa.’ Philipps realised that these people had, just like the ‘Mulatto’ of 
German East Africa, conceived ‘the idea… to organise parallel movements to one common 
end’.251  
Bray wrote that ‘At first sight’ Pan-Islamism ‘does appear to be… disjointed and incapable of 
cohesion’ yet ‘on close examination… we see that this is not the case.’ This conclusion was 
drawn by looking at ‘what it has accomplished and in reality it has achieved a great deal. It 
has bound together the vast majority of educated men and an increasing number of the 
cases, in each individual sphere, it will do so to a greater extent in the future’. He continued 
that it had ‘produced a desire in individual countries for independence, which is being 
resisted in some, assisted in others, yet in none can the Power that governs be indifferent to 
its insistence.’252 Whilst Bray wrote generally of the worldwide Pan-Islamic movement, his 
description matched the narrative that Pan-Islamism was a cohesive force across the tribes 
of East Africa.  
These British imperial officials were quick to note that if East Africans took up an anti-
European ideology the British Empire would be in their direct firing line. French wrote ‘It is 
likely that, in the future, the British Empire, as holding and controlling the greatest areas in 
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Africa, may provide a focussing point for a great rebellion of black against white and the 
Britisher will probably be regarded as the chief enemy of the black man or at least most of 
the converts to Ethiopianism will be found [there]’.253  
Sykes, Willis, and Philipps documented that ‘Thus, apart from the dangers of Pan-Islam [Pan-
Islamic unity] there is a possibility of the nationalist feeling being tainted by this very 
dangerous doctrine [of Pan-Africanism] if it is allowed to creep [into East Africa]… 
Moreover,’ they continued, ‘the doctrine can be applied to Mohammedans and although 
admittedly a Turkish Jehad would find few followers, an African Jehad would be widely 
acceptable and would be likely to spread in a very alarming manner.’254 An ‘African Jehad’ 
was consequently identified by the British Empire as a security concern to that Empire in 
East Africa in the latter half of the First World War. 
The African diaspora was a source of Pan-Islamism into East Africa in the years of the East 
African Campaign. This same community was also a source of Pan-Africanism. It was the 
identification that this latter movement could potentially use the structural machinery of 
the former movement to propagate itself that helped the British identify Pan-Islamism as a 
threat to the British Empire in East Africa.  
 
East Africans as a Source of Movement 
 
After it was imported into East Africa by the German Empire and the African diaspora, East 
Africans were important as a source of Pan-Islamism by moving it throughout the region. As 
examined in Chapter Four, East Africans had a greater ability than Europeans of moving 
without detection, and thus they were the obvious choice to move political contraband.  
The movement of the German-Islamic propaganda previously detailed is one such example 
of East Africans as a source of Pan-Islamism. Without the ‘native enemy agents’ willing to 
move it through the British lines, the Germans would never have been able to disseminate 
their propaganda beyond their own borders. A similar scenario occurred to the south of 
German East Africa. During the East African Campaign, the British Empire also became 
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concerned about German support for the Pan-Islamic movement in Mozambique. This 
concern related to the porosity of the border between the colonies of Portuguese and 
German East Africa. Concern about the porosity started in earnest in 1915, when, despite 
rising tensions, Portugal and Germany were not yet at war.255 The British were concerned 
‘that certain Germans’ were ‘endeavouring to profit’ from ‘the Department of Posts and 
Telegraphs’ in Nyassa ‘not [being] under the jurisdiction of the Head Office at Lourenco 
Marques.’256  A letter from the Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs recorded that 
there was: 
‘little if any room to doubt that the traffic in food supplies and the passage of 
correspondence between… [Mozambique] and the neighbouring German Colony 
[had] been carried on since the outbreak of the war to a considerable extent, chiefly 
through the agency of the German Firms of W. Philippi & Co. and the Deutsche Ost-
Afrika Geselleschaft, established at Mozambique… and other places in the Nyassa 
Company’s territory.’257  
Some of this intelligence was actually taken across the border by European Germans, which 
‘doubtless’ caused ‘the death of several of our [British] men.258 
Although the British Empire had been confidently assured by the Portuguese Governor in 
Mozambique that they would clamp down on the passage of intelligence (and material 
goods, such as food) across the border in August 1915, the British themselves were not as 
certain of success. A Mr Siggins (a private citizen living in Mozambique who had several 
sources of intelligence and had made himself available to the British imperial authorities on 
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that regard) wrote that he had ‘no doubt that a certain amount of this illicit traffic [was 
being] carried on.’259  
Legitimate correspondence between Mozambique and German East Africa via the post 
office was soon banned. On 6th September 1915 an order was published in Lourenco 
Marques stating that ‘all correspondence between any of the German Colonies in Africa and 
Portuguese colonies will in future not be allowed to pass through the Portuguese post 
office.’260 The German authorities protested and ‘[insisted] that the Portuguese authorities 
should allow the free passage of correspondence, passenger and provisions across [the] 
frontier.’261 Despite the implemented measures, Mr Siggins reported to the British in 
October 1915 that ‘correspondence between here [Portuguese East Africa] and German 
East Africa still continue native runners being employed to carry the letters’ to bypass these 
restrictions.262  
By this point of the war Africans were crossing the border south into Mozambique in search 
of the food and employment they could no longer find in German East Africa, and the British 
Empire was using Africans as messengers to travel the opposite way to find useful military 
intelligence. As will be examined in Chapter Seven Subchapter Eight, the hand carrying of 
letters around Africa was comparatively easy for Africans as opposed to Europeans, and 
thus Mr Siggins was probably right that ‘native runners’ were still ‘being employed to carry 
the letters’. 
Once Pan-Islamism had entered East Africa, East Africans themselves became a source of 
the movement. Their ability to move throughout the region spread Pan-Islamism further 
into the region than it would have otherwise been able to go.  
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Major Notley did little to dissuade Africans from spreading Pan-Islamism, nor undertaking 
any other antagonistic activity towards the British Empire in East Africa, in the first half of 
the First World War, but by the second half the British Empire, led by Philipps, had firmly 
identified that East Africans and the African diaspora were sources of Pan-Islamism in East 
Africa. Having identified the sources of Pan-Islamism, it remained for the British Empire to 
define the actual threats posed by Pan-Islamism to its security. 
 
The Threats Posed by Pan-Islamism to the British Empire in East Africa 
 
Two sources of Pan-Islamism in East Africa were thus identified by British imperial officials: 
the German Empire, who had proven to be an active source of Pan-Islamism into East Africa 
in both the pre-First World War and First World War eras, and the East African population 
and the African diaspora, who, as well as both importing and moving Pan-Islamism around 
the region, were also responsible for importing Pan-Africanism. Because these two sources 
were identified, the British Empire was able to identify the exact threats posed by Pan-
Islamism in East Africa. Two interlinked threats were identified: 
 
1. Pan-Islamic Unity 




The concern that Pan-Islamic unity would threaten the security of the British Empire in East 
Africa from the ‘diplomatic weapon’ viewpoint that had been espoused by the Ottoman 
Empire is largely absent from surviving documents about the Pan-Islamic threat in East 
Africa. As was observed in Chapter Three, the use of Pan-Islamism as a ‘diplomatic weapon’ 
against the British Empire did not work. As the Ottoman Empire did not have the religious 
power to execute such an action, a worldwide Pan-Islamic uprising would never have 
occurred given the circumstances of 1914. This holds true for the Islamic population of East 
Africa, both in 1914 and the years of the First World War that were to come after. All of 
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Philipps’ surviving documents on this topic were written in the latter half of the First World 
War, as were the vast majority of the other documents on the topic written by his 
colleagues; thus, when the potential for Pan-Islamism to threaten the security of the British 
Empire in East Africa was identified, the realistic potential for this threat to be formed by 
Islamic unification under the leadership of the Ottoman Empire had already passed. If the 
use of Pan-Islamism as a ‘diplomatic weapon’ against the British Empire had worked, then 
the German Empire in East Africa, acting as a source of Pan-Islamism, would no doubt have 
promoted the unity of the Muslims of the East African region with the Islamic population of 
the rest of the world as part of its ‘special feature’. How much impact this would have had 
on the internal security of the British Empire, history never found out.  
Despite this failure, the potential for Pan-Islamic unity amongst only East African Muslims 
continued to pose a threat in the latter years of the First World War in East Africa. A major 
reason for the failure of the Ottoman-led jihad was because many Muslims did not 
recognise the Sultan as being the true Caliph. Such discord would not be a problem for a 
unification that was East African specific, as there was no such Caliph leading the drive for 
unification in East Africa. 
There were three reasons why Pan-Islamic unity in East Africa remained a threat to the 
British Empire: 
Firstly,  if the Islamic population was to unify, this unification could then be used by another 
power for their own ends. Bray wrote in 1917 that ‘The danger lies, not so much in what the 
Mohammedan countries can accomplish of themselves, but what they can effect as a whole 
or by the agency of another Power, european [sic] or asiatic [sic].’ The Ottoman Empire had 
not managed to control such a unification, but this did not automatically mean that another 
power, such as the German Empire, would not be able to do so. 263 Secondly, Bray explained 
that Pan-Islamic unity might be used to help the Islamic population of the world gain 
something else: independence. ‘There are thousands of sincere Mohammedans sincerely 
working for Mohammedan independence’, he wrote, and ‘there are thousands of more solid 
fanatics running before they can walk trying to bring about in a few years, a transformation 
requiring generations to mature. Gradually I have seen the ideal permeating the minds of 
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the masses.’264 Pan-Islamic unity in East Africa would be a direct threat against European 
colonialism. 
These two reasons were in addition to the most ominous reason for why the potential for 
Pan-Islamic unity continued to be a threat to the British Empire in East Africa during the 
years of the First World War, despite the failure of the worldwide ‘diplomatic weapon’ style 
of unity espoused by the Ottoman Empire: the potential that other dangerous ideologies 
could make use of the structural machinery of Pan-Islamism to spread themselves across 




The Pan-Islamic machinery was the very structure by which Pan-Islamism was constructed in 
East Africa: the interlinked tribes and the communications between Muslims. It was the 
possibility that this machinery could be used by another, more dangerous, ideology to 
spread itself across the region that was identified as being the main threat posed by Pan-
Islamism to the security of the British Empire in East Africa in the latter years of the East 
African Campaign of the First World War. The ideology in question was Pan-Africanism 
Captain Philipps, as the regional expert on this topic, was incredibly forceful in narrating the 
dangers that would be posed to the British Empire if Pan-Africanism was able to use the 
structural machinery of Pan-Islamism. ‘[A] very real danger’, he asserted in July 1917, ‘is to 
be apprehended from any conjunction of Islamic propaganda with the cry of “Africa for the 
African”. Islam would at once provide a cementing factor [between the two], and 
consequent fanaticism would enormously increase both the military and political difficulty 
in dealing with the movement. Converts are notoriously more fanatical than those born in 
the cult.’265  
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Bray, in his more generalised essay, completely agreed with Philipps’ point about the 
difficulty that the British Empire would face ‘in dealing with’ Pan-Islamism if it became 
politicised. He wrote that: 
‘History teaches us that ideals of nationality once instilled in the popular fancy can 
never be dispelled or supressed… It can not [sic] and never will cease to play the 
chief role in mohammedan politics. We must but acknowledge that this is so and if it 
is true, can it not be equally true that two such communities, linked together on the 
common ground of religion and hope of obtaining government by themselves, may 
unite for a common purpose, and if two such peoples can unite there is nothing but 
the Occasion to limit the number.’266  
The use, by the probable merger, of Pan-Islamic machinery by Pan-Africanism, was thus 
identified as a threat to the British Empire, because dealing with such a merger would be 
incredibly difficult, and the numbers that it would involve would be great. There would 
therefore be a rapid spread of anti-colonial sentiment amongst the Islamic population of 
East Africa at exactly the same time as the British Empire was fighting the First World War. 
The British Empire had little reserves to spare to put down such an insurrection even in East 
Africa, where the guerrilla war propelled by Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck continued ever on, let 
alone from elsewhere in the Empire: the Third Battle of Ypres (also known as the Battle of 
Passchendaele) was about to erupt on the Western Front. 
Philipps affirmed that ‘A Turkish Jehad has not been, and never would be, popular in East or 
Equatorial Africa, but an African Jehad is not an improbability and would meet with 
enthusiasm. The Muhammedan is the trading and travelling element. Propaganda travels 
quickly and unostentatiously by this means. Islam affords a free-masonry which is not 
hindered by custom, tribes, or dialect.’267 He had identified a threat to the security of the 
British Empire in East Africa which the British Empire would have to fight, and it would have 
to fight it without any significant access to troops or resources. 
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Having identified the threats posed by Pan-Islamism to the security of the British Empire in 
East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War, and with the 
clear understanding that the British Empire was unable to offer to East Africa any significant 
increase in troop numbers or resources to counter the threat, the officials responsible for 
securing the security of the British Empire hatched upon a plan: prevent the further spread 
of Pan-Islamism in East Africa.  
Buxton praised Philipps’ work; Philipps’ memorandum “Africa for the African” and “Pan-
Islam” Recent developments in Central and Eastern Africa, Buxton wrote in December 1917, 
‘[showed] that the war [had] created a danger in Eastern Africa which did not previously 
exist.’ 268 The actions and surviving documents of Philipps’ colleagues and M.I.5. in London 
attest to their agreement with this statement. The only word of dissent came from Sir 
Charles Lucas of the Colonial Office, and his objections were raised not on the potential 
threat of Pan-Islamism to the security of the British Empire in East Africa, but to the lack of a 
threat to the security to the United Kingdom itself; ergo, it was of negligible importance. He 
claimed that he was ‘slow to believe in the possibility of African combination or of African 
Mohammedanism being ranged en bloc against England’, and in this he was probably 
right.269  
On behalf of the entire British Empire, Captain Bray made the following statement to his 
readers in London in his essay: 
‘We are seriously engaged in a war of the greatest magnitude, all eyes are naturally 
turned to Europe, but I most earnestly ask that this most serious question, so 
important to our Empire, should be seriously and fully discussed at our approaching 
councils. 
During the war it has made steady progress, after the war it will make even greater 
strides. 
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We are working for such guarantees as will make for a lasting peace among the 
powers of Europe, such a solution can never be attained so long as the 
Mohammedan question is not seriously taken in hand.’270 
As regarded East Africa, London listened. Buxton wrote in December 1917 that ‘It is clear, at 
least, that some uniform native policy is wanted to deal adequately with the new 
situation.’271 As Part III of this thesis will attest, by December 1917 policies of this nature 
and others were already underway. The goal was to prevent Pan-Islamism from continuing 
to threaten the security of the British Empire in East Africa in the years of the East African 
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Chapter Six Growth: The Imperial Counter-Intelligence Project of M.I.5.D 
 
The imperial counter-intelligence project of M.I.5.D. began in London in the summer of 
1915, when Andrew Bonar Law, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, enclosed in a letter 
to the Colonial Governors of the British Empire ‘a secret Memorandum with regard to 
counter-espionage which has been drawn up in the War Office.’ This secret memorandum 
declared that ‘The present war has brought into prominence the importance of arranging 
for the widest possible interchange of Confidential Intelligence bearing especially upon the 
activities of hostile secret service agents “throughout the Empire”.’  
This ‘prominence’ was brought about by two factors. The first factor was that counter-
intelligence work in the United Kingdom was so well organised that it shone a spotlight on 
the comparatively dire state of affairs that existed in the British Empire. This memorandum 
stated that: 
‘[A] stable organization… exists in this country [the United Kingdom] in the form of a 
Central Counter-Espionage Bureau with permanent records and a small permanent staff. 
This Bureau has gained valuable results from their experience in trading and recording 
the personal histories of some 160,000 aliens, enemy agents and suspects, and by the 
investigation of numerous cases of espionage during a number of years. Experience has 
shown [:] 
(a) That this co-ordination necessary ot [sic] obtain effective results cannot be 
expected if such work is confined to the technical Intelligence Sections either of 
the Army, or the Navy, or to the Criminal Investigation Branches of the Civil 
Police and Post Office. 
(b) That the best results can only be obtained by a Central Bureau, under an officer 
who commands the personal confidence and assistance of all concerned, and 
brings to a common focus all the intelligence services.’ 
The second factor was the dire state of the colonial intelligence records and the limited 
tenure of colonial service appointments. The memorandum reported that:  
‘Colonial Intelligence Reports rendered to the War Office, the Admiralty, and other 
Departments do not as a rule deal closely with Counter-Espionage and would appear 
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to be the work of persons who have had but limited facilities and brief local 
experience. Moreover owing to the short tenure of local appointments by Service 
Officers these reports lack the width of view and continuity of purpose which is 
derived from a stable organization having access to all the sources of Intelligence in 
the country, which is essential in peace and in War; and for the efficient working of 
such an organization.’ 
So poor were these reports, and so neglectfully had colonial intelligence been treated in the 
pre-First World War era, that the War Office was forced to concede that ‘It is possible that 
there is already some such confidential organization for the work of counter-espionage in 
existence’. The War Office, and, by default, the British Imperial Government, did not know 
for certain who, if anybody, was undertaking counter-espionage work in the name of the 
British Empire.  
The issue of the lack of an imperial intelligence and counter-intelligence establishment 
having existed in the British Empire in East Africa prior to the First World War was examined 
in Chapter Four. But this was not a situation that was unique to East Africa, and in the 
summer of 1915 the War Office, having identified the problem as existing across the British 
Empire, made their first attempt to counter it. ‘It [was] felt’, the War Office wrote, ‘that a 
free interchange of information about enemy agents, and an effective co-ordination of the 
means for defeating their activities throughout the Empire, is essential.’272 Suggestions for 
the establishment of local bureaus, modelled on the London office, were provided, and the 
desire for greater communication on the topic of counter-intelligence was what led to Major 
Notley writing his memorandum on his activities in the East Africa Protectorate.  
A local bureau was not established in the East Africa Protectorate, or in East Africa more 
widely, in 1915. There were two reasons for this. The first was one that was previously 
examined in Chapter Four: Major Notley himself explicitly stated that there was no cause to 
expand or improve the British imperial counter-intelligence effort there during the First 
World War beyond that which had been practised in 1914 and 1915. ‘No Counter Espionage 
Bureau has been formed in this Colony since the outbreak of war’, he explained, ‘as all 
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necessary work has been done by the Intelligence Department and the Provost Marshal’s 
Department.’273 
The second reason was that in 1915 there was not a dedicated department in the War 
Office in London whose purpose it was to evaluate the need for East Africa to have a 
dedicated counter-intelligence establishment of its own. From the summer of 1915 the 
knowledge that such a department was needed grew in the minds of those employed by 
M.I.5. In the September of 1916 D Branch of M.I.5., variously called M.I.5.D. or the Central 
Special Intelligence Bureau (C.S.I.B.), was established to fill this need. 
In August 1917 M.I.5.D. ordered the establishment of a local intelligence centre for the 
British Empire in East Africa, amongst whose duties was preventing Pan-Islamism from 
threatening the security of the empire there. This intelligence centre was entitled the East 
African Intelligence Centre and was to stay in existence for the remaining fifteen months of 
the First World War. 
This change in the imperial intelligence establishment in London which brought about 
M.I.5.D. was vital for preventing Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British 
Empire in East Africa, for without it the East African Intelligence Centre would never have 
been established. The East African Intelligence Centre communicated regularly with London 
and other local centres; by the end of the First World War preventing Pan-Islamism from 
threatening the security of the British Empire had become a global concern. 
Much of the information in this chapter was recorded in a report compiled by M.I.5. in 1921. 
This report was written for the purpose of demonstrating the scope and importance of the 
work that had been undertaken by M.I.5. during the Great War; probably to promote its 
continued existence and budget in the post-First World War era. As such, it was not 
compiled to be a dedicated history of M.I.5.’s activities during the First World War. Primary 
documents exist within it, but these are usually memorandums and post-war analyses. It is 
clear that many documents were destroyed, although it is possible that some of the 
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documents continue to exist but have not been declassified. Therefore, only a limited 
number of primary documents of M.I.5.’s war time exploits remain in existence.  
References to missing raw intelligence and the need to summarise intelligence papers by 
the authors of individual documents provides the evidence within the 1921 Report that 
these documents once existed. One such example appears in the document Summary of the 
Report on the Establishment of a Special Intelligence Service in the Colonies and Oversea 
Dominions, where it was written that: ‘Details of the arrangements made in certain of the 
Dominions and Colonies are given below [the remainder of the document] as examples of 
the system which was instituted throughout the Empire.’274 All that is left today are these 
‘examples’; no explanation was given as to the methodology used – if, indeed, one was used 
– to choose which examples to include within the report.  
Therefore, it is worth noting in this chapter that the history of M.I.5.D., and through that the 
East African Intelligence Centre, will always be incomplete; it will never be possible to fully 
reconstruct the knowledge of how this Branch came about, and how its duties were decided 
and acted upon. It will never now be possible to truly understand M.I.5.’s position in 
relation to the British Empire during the First World War. By extension, it will also never 
now be possible to fully understand the workings of the British in relation to their Empire 
during the First World War. 
This problem appears to have played on the mind of the author of the report on G Branch of 
M.I.5., who gave this assessment of their work: 
‘It is as well to emphasize strongly here the limitations of the “G” report, and the 
large area of the un-investigated field. Much has been done in the time available, but 
much has been omitted, and the report though apparently voluminous, necessarily 
omits much that should be included. Most historical reports are more or less 
misleading for it is ever very difficult to write down the truth very satisfactorily. It is 
so often not only difficult but impossible to know what is the truth.’275 
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Subchapter One: The Establishment of M.I.5.D 
 
M.I.5. was established under Vernon Kell in 1909 and became ‘responsible for counter-
espionage within the British Isles’. With Mansfield Cummings becoming ‘responsible for 
gathering intelligence overseas’ there was, as was examined in Chapter Four, the evident 
omission that there was nobody who was responsible for counter-intelligence overseas in 
the British Empire.276 The events of the First World War rendered this position untenable 
and so, from 1915 onwards, M.I.5. made a concerted effort to improve the situation. 
The establishment of M.I.5.D. was to be the result of this concerted effort. This branch of 
M.I.5., which was also known as “D Branch”, was responsible for counter-intelligence in the 
British Empire. Due to the difficulties that M.I.5.D. was to experience with terms such as 
“espionage”, the term “special intelligence” was usually substituted. M.I.5.D. thus acquired 
its third moniker: The Central Special Intelligence Bureau, or the C.S.I.B. These three terms 
were interchangeable and tended to be used at the preference of the author; there appears 
to have been some preference for those located within the British Empire to use the term 
‘C.S.I.B.’ to refer to it, with those in London using the term ‘M.I.5.D.’, but this was not a hard 
and fast rule. 
East Africa was just one of the many regions of the British Empire that was to fall under 
M.I.5.D’s sphere during the First World War. Understanding how this colonial counter-
intelligence department developed in London is vital for understanding how, and why, the 
East African Intelligence Centre, which was tasked with preventing the threat of Pan-
Islamism to the British Empire in East Africa, came not only into existence, but came into 
existence so late during the Great War. As was examined in Chapter One, the British Empire 
retained control of much of East Africa almost solely to prevent another European power 
from occupying the land, rather than out of any actual interest in developing or colonising it. 
The disunity that had existed between the British administrations in the colonies and 
protectorates of the British Empire in East Africa and the British Empire’s Imperial 
Government in London had thawed in the years between the late Nineteenth Century and 
the First World War, but they had not fully melted; the security of the British Empire in East 
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Africa had always been low on the list of interests of the British Imperial Government, and 
the outbreak of the First World War did little to change that. 
 
The Creation of M.I.5.D. 
 
The internal structure of M.I.5. changed regularly, and sometimes considerably, throughout 
its entire first decade of existence. These changes intensified, rather than diminished, during 
the First World War, as the rising number of personnel employed within it strived to grasp 
and execute the ever-growing complex work that was demanded of them for the war effort. 
By the time of the cessation of fighting in 1918, M.I.5. was comprised of six separate, yet 
deeply interlinked, branches: A, D, E, F, G, and H. Of these branches, it is D Branch with 
which this thesis is most concerned.277 
D Branch did not exist for the first two years of the First World War. It was only in the 
summer of 1915 that the British Government, through the Colonial Office, really came to 
notice, and feel the lack off, a designated department dedicated to organising, 
administrating, and formulating colonial counter-intelligence throughout the British Empire. 
Two important events were reported to have occurred in July 1915 that set into motion the 
creation of D Branch. The first event was when: 
‘[The] Colonial Office was approached by M.I.5. with a view to putting into execution 
the long-projected scheme of establishing direct communication with the British 
Self-Governing Dominions and Colonies for the purpose of co-operation in Special 
Intelligence work.’278 
The second event was when: 
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‘[The] scheme for establishing a system of counter-espionage throughout the British 
Empire, which should be linked up with M.I.5. as a Central Bureau, was initiated by 
the officers of A and B (afterwards G and F), Branches.’279  
In the 1921 Report M.I.5.D. recorded a synopsis about how it comprehended its own 
creation to have come about in the summer of 1915: 
‘At that time little was known in this Office of what was happening in the Colonies. 
Only occasional papers were received through the War Office, the Foreign Office, 
and the Colonial Office, and an investigation of all possible sources of information 
had not only revealed the fact that, beyond the Intelligence Summaries of the 
various Commands abroad, there was no organised system of records, but had 
shown that, if the activities of hostile secret service agents throughout the Empire 
were to be defeated, it was essential that there should be an interchange of 
confidential Intelligence on the subject. 
The Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence, who was consulted, was of the 
opinion that the taking up of Colonial Counter-Espionage work was highly desirable, 
and the Colonial Office also showed complete agreement with the scheme. 
On the 5th August 1915, a secret Circular Memorandum, based on a draft which had 
been prepared in M.I.5., was sent semi-officially to the Governors General of the 
Self-Governing Dominions with a covering letter from the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, and on the 18th August copies of the same memorandum were sent to all 
Colonial Governors and Administrators of Colonies not possessing responsible 
Government, with a similar covering letter from the Under Secretary of State… 
The suggestions made by the Colonial Office met with a prompt response. By 
February 1916, replies had been received from almost all the Dominions and 
Colonies, and a report drawn up in March shows that bureaux similar to the Central 
Special Intelligence Bureau had already been set up in Australia and Malta, while 
touch with M.I.5. had been established by the Governor or his representative in 
every other Colony, with only a few exceptions. [This did occur in the East Africa 
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Protectorate but, as will be examined later in this chapter, there was then little 
correspondence between M.I.5. in London and the British imperial administration in 
East Africa between the end of 1915 and the summer of 1917.] 
The Reports forwarded to the head of the Central Special Intelligence Bureau 
showed that except in Malta, where, at the beginning of the war, a small bureau had 
been established under the Military Intelligence Depart for the purpose of collecting 
information, no definite organisation for counter espionage work had ever existed in 
any Dominion or Colony. Since the outbreak of war, certain preventive measures, 
such as the institution of the Censorship, had been put into force, in some Colonies 
Martial Law had been proclaimed, and in other the Governor had made use of his 
power under an Order in Council of 26th of October 1896 to make emergency 
Regulations. Where naval and military interests were concerned, Special Intelligence 
was in the hands of naval and military Intelligence Services, usually working in co-
operation with the Civil Police. In some cases the arrangement was satisfactory, in 
others it suffered from an insufficiency of personnel and from the difficulties 
entailed by the combination of counter espionage with other duties. In Canada the 
work was being efficiently carried on by the Police Administration, but wherever it 
was dealt with by a number of separate Departments or Agencies, as in Australia and 
Egypt, the lack of centralization was felt. 
In certain instances the need of a definite system had led to serious consequences. 
This had been the case in the Straits Settlements, where the trouble which had 
arisen among the native troops was believed to have been attributable to German 
influence, while in British East Africa a comprehensive system of German espionage 
had been discovered which had been entirely unsuspected owing to the absence of 
any organisation for the centralization of information. The military authorities in 
British East Africa were also said to have been handicapped by want of information, 
which might have been provided had such an organisation been in existence before 
the war.’280 
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The officers of A and B Branch did not immediately see the need to establish an entirely new 
Branch to deal with this new workload, so for the academic year of 1915 to 1916 the work 
was given to A Branch, which then became G Branch. The structure of G Branch was not 
terribly well organised for such work, as this paragraph suggests: 
‘The work of correspondence and of co-operation with the Counter-espionage 
services in the Overseas Dominions, Crown Colonies and Protectorates regarding 
Espionage, sedition, treachery, fomentation of strikes and sabotage, and 
dissemination of peace propaganda was placed in the hands of G.3., which was 
already responsible partly in collaboration with G.1., for the preliminary investigation 
of cases of a similar description in Ireland. For the time being, co-operation with the 
counter-espionage and police services in India and Egypt on the above subjects 
remained in the hands of G.2. [b].’281  
By the September of 1916 the work had grown to such an extent that this configuration had 
become untenable, and D Branch was created: 
‘[The] Colonial work had assumed such large dimensions that it became necessary to 
create a special branch to deal with it. Accordingly G.3. was constituted a separate 
Branch to be known as D [M.I.5.D. by War Office designation] its duties remaining as 
before with the addition of correspondence with the Eastern Mediterranean Special 
Intelligence Bureau, recently established at Alexandria for C-E work in Egypt, in 
liaison with M.I.5.’282  
The work which had caused D Branch to outgrow G Branch spread right around the world 
and was undeniably of ‘large dimensions’. It was geographical concerns which were the 
principle behind the creation of D Branch: 
‘According as the necessity arose for dealing with these matters, [such as those of 
the Sinn Fein movement in Ireland and America, Home Rule and Sedition 
movements in India, Egyptian and Turkish nationalism, and the Pan-Islamic and 
Greek Royalist movements which were espoused by the ‘special feature’ of German 
policy] further extensions of the M.I.5. office organisation were required. The duties 
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of the several Branch sections had from the first been apportioned according to 
geographical areas and race divisions. These principles were followed in the 
formation and development of D. Branch.’283 
After the First World War, M.I.5. was keen to emphasise the growth of D Branch in relation 
to the overall Bureau: 
‘Originally formed to deal with Colonial correspondence as well as whatever cases of 
espionage might be reported from Ireland, D, or the Overseas Branch gradually came 
to be responsible for all work in which M.I.5. was concerned outside [of] Great 
Britain. Its history shows the expansion of the work of M.I.5. both on its preventative 
as well as on its detective side. Even before the outbreak of war the need of 
establishing close relations for the Colonies had been a subject of consideration in 
this Office, and as, after the commencement of hostilities, it became more and more 
evident that the secret activities of the enemy extended throughout the whole 
Empire, it was necessary that the work of M.I.5. should be organised in such a way as 
to provide means for the acquisition of information whenever mischief was likely be 
brewing.’284 
As was examined in Chapter Four, whether ‘the need of establishing close relations for the 
Colonies’ really had ‘been a subject of consideration’ for M.I.5. ‘Even before the outbreak of 
the war’ is debateable. 
Exactly how the term ‘counter-espionage’ was defined by M.I.5. during the First World War 
was never clarified by D Branch. Confusion about the working definition of this term was felt 
by those who communicated with M.I.5.D. from within the British Empire: 
‘In corresponding with the Colonies, it was found that the term “Counter Espionage” 
was misunderstood by many of them, and in some cases the fear of its connection 
with “secret service” caused a reluctance to fall in with the suggestions made for 
establishing a universal system throughout the Empire. The term “Special 
Intelligence” was therefore substituted for “Counter Espionage” and used in all 
communications with the Dominions and Colonies. Thus, M.I.5., as represented by D. 
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Branch, became known to our overseas correspondents as “the Central Special 
Intelligence Bureau”.’285  
The ‘Central Special Intelligence Bureau’ was often shortened in correspondence to its 
initials: “the C.S.I.B.” This passage shows that this change was made at a point sometime 
prior to October 1917: 
‘In October, 1917 a printed Report was issued by the Central Special Intelligence 
Bureau, copies of which were forwarded to the Self-Governing Dominions as well as 
to 30 Colonies, including Egypt; also to the Colonial Office, Foreign Office, India 
Office, Admiralty Intelligence Division, Bureau Central Inter-Allie, M.I.1. and M.I.1.c. 
In this Report the functions of the Central Bureau are clearly defined and special 
attention from the rapid means provided for a direct interchange of information. It is 
pointed out that the term ‘Special Intelligence’ has been adopted in preference to 
the narrower term ‘Counter-Espionage’, which was found to be misleading as 
suggesting “Secret Service”.’286 
The ‘fear of its [counter-espionage] connection with “secret service”’ having caused ‘a 
reluctance to fall in with the suggestions made for establishing a universal system 
throughout the Empire’ was a direct result of the pre-war disdain and ignorance for 
intelligence. It was not gentlemanlike enough for those in the colonies to wish to become 
involved with it, as was demonstrated by Major Notley’s pretext that he and his colleagues 
had not ‘suspected or appreciated… the very comprehensive German system of espionage’ 
that had existed in the East Africa and Uganda Protectorates because of the ‘unsuspicious 
nature of the British character.’ Forced by the hand of the Great War, the likes of Major 
Notley were forced to put aside their apprehensions for this type of work; the change of 
name was a concession to this retraction. 
On the same theme, the October 1917 report was keen to express and emphasise D 
Branch’s respectability, for it: 
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‘…also expressly stated that the Central Special Intelligence Bureau derives its 
information from official sources, not from ‘agents’, and that its powers are all 
covered by legislative enactments.’287 
Issues relating to the use of terminology were not exceptional to D Branch, and also 
occurred elsewhere within M.I.5. The term ‘“Defence Security Intelligence”’ was found to be 
problematic, as was the word ‘spy’: 
‘[Speaking] generally, the difference between the methods and aims of German 
espionage in peace and war is one of degree and emphasis rather than of quality. Its 
elements are so various and inclusive that in legislation the wider term, “German 
agent” is now substituted for that of spy, and similarly the expression “Defence 
Security Intelligence” of larger connotation that “Counter-espionage” has been 
adopted to express more adequately the work done by M.I.5.’288 
The work that D Branch conducted was always considered by M.I.5. to be permanent, and 
they laid emphasis on this in the report of 1921. Changing the terminology to both placate 
people’s sensitivities and to ensure wider understanding of the work that was required of 
them was a small price to pay to ensure, as was desired by M.I.5., good, continuing 
communication between them and the imperial counter-intelligence efforts within the 
British Empire both during and after the First World War: 
‘From the first, the work was organised with a view to permanence, and the question 
of reconstruction was carefully considered as soon as the war had ceased. The object 
aimed at throughout was to secure the same personal relations with the component 
parts of the Empire as was established before the war, and was afterwards fully 
maintained, between M.I.5. and the various Constabulary Forces in the United 
Kingdom.’289 
 
The Duties of M.I.5.D. 
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The main duties of D Branch were to collect information on enemy intelligence activities 
from within the British Empire (and from other locations where it was relevant to the 
security of the British Empire), to disseminate this information to whomever it concerned, 
and to aid and facilitate the establishment of local bureaus to combat these antagonistic 
activities. 
When the idea of such a scheme was first floated in M.I.5. in the summer of 1915 – when 
the officers of the then A and B Branches initiated it – the talk focused not on the security of 
the British Empire per se, but on the security of the United Kingdom itself. Whilst 
maintaining the security of the British Empire grew in importance for D Branch over the First 
World War, maintaining the security of the United Kingdom always remained the primary 
objective: 
‘It was hoped that if M.I.5. could get into touch with the Colonies the Bureau might 
act as a clearing-house for all parts of the Empire, and thus a rapid interchange of 
information would be secured. In this way a watch could be kept on the movements 
of suspects, and means could be taken to prevent the entry of any undesirables into 
the United Kingdom.’290 
M.I.5. considered the ‘clearing-house’ side of D Branch’s operation to have been a success. 
Their own assessment of the progress of the Branch by the end of the war was that: 
‘Lists of the papers show how far-reaching the work of M.I.5.D. had now become, 
and the vast quantity of information that had been accumulated by means of the 
system of overseas Intelligence organised by the Branch even when direct 
communication did not take place, arrangements had been made for reports to be 
sent to M.I.5. through other Departments of the War Office or through the Foreign 
Office. Thus particulars were obtained of German activities in the remotest parts of 
the world, from Peru to the Dutch East Indies and the Islands of the Pacific, and a 
watch was kept on German propaganda through missionaries or otherwise in every 
continent.’291  
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For almost the entire period of the War for which it was operational, this ‘clearing-house’ 
side of D Branch was, as a rule, guarded by D Branch as their territory for security reasons; 
bureaus who wished to communicate with each other were almost always compelled to go 
through D Branch as an intermediary. This changed in the closing weeks of the war: 
‘Until the autumn of 1918, only a few of the Central Special Intelligence Bureau’s 
Overseas correspondents were permitted to communicate directly with one another. 
Frequent requests were received by the Bureau from its principal “links” that they 
might be placed in direct touch with each other, so that the interchange of reports 
regarding suspects might be facilitated, but for a long time it was impossible to find a 
suitable cipher which could be made common to all. This difficulty was at last 
overcome, and on the 19th September 1918, a memorandum was circulated to 
thirteen of the Special Intelligence Bureau’s Overseas correspondents, giving a list of 
those between whom intercommunication was to be established, with their postal 
and telegraphic addresses, and instructions as to secret correspondence by cable. It 
was requested that, in order to keep the Central Special Intelligence Bureau fully 
informed on all points of general interest, copies of messages exchanged direct by 
any other stations should be sent to London for record.’292 
Not all of the Bureaus were allowed to communicate in this manner, but the East African 
Intelligence Centre was included on the ‘list’. M.I.5. established that ‘The following were 
included in the new arrangements: 
• Australia 
• South Africa 
• Canada 
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• Nairobi [the East African Intelligence Centre, which was stationed at Nairobi.] 
As well as the Military Control Officers, in charge of Passport and Travel Control, at 
Tokio [sic] and New York, and the British Military Missions in Washington and 
Rome.’293 
M.I.5.D. was also considered a success by M.I.5. due to both the geographical reach that it 
managed to formulate and the sheer scope of the subject matters (which often contained 
matters related to Germany’s ‘special feature’) which were contained within its papers: 
‘The constant exchange of information led to useful results. All the Self-Governing 
Dominions except Newfoundland, as well as India, Egypt and the more important 
Colonies were provided with the M.I.5. Black List and the circulars amending it, and 
warnings about general subjects such as forged passports, the activities of Indian 
seditionists and of certain Societies, missionary and otherwise, which were known to 
the Bureau as German agencies were forwarded whenever occasion demanded.’294 
The Dominions, Colonies and Protectorates of the British Empire were not created equal in 
the eyes of D Branch. One example of such a policy can be seen in its filing formulae: 
‘The Contre-Espionage [sic] Control Sub-Division deals with papers belonging to four 
different classes… 1. British Dominions and Colonies. The papers belonging to this 
group are filed geographically. In the case of those possessions in which Special 
Intelligence Bureaux have been established, all papers dealing with general policy 
and administration are filed together under the name of that Bureau. Reports on 
suspects are filed in personal files and indexed in the geographical files. The lesser 
colonies and most of the protectorates are, however, grouped together under 
general headings.’295 
In February 1917, ‘the duties of D [Branch] as a whole were described as: “the co-ordination 
of Imperial Counter Espionage”’. The knowledge that the Dominions, Colonies and 
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Protectorates of the British Empire were not treated equally by D Branch’s ‘Imperial Counter 
Espionage’ work can also be seen through its work in Ireland: 
‘Since the discovery of the help given to Ireland by Germany in connection with the 
Rebellion of April 1916, the Irish work of M.I.5. had become more important. By 
February 1917, in addition to the investigation in consultation with G, of cases of 
espionage and sedition in Ireland which had considerably increased in number, D. 
Branch had now become responsible for the examination of intercepted 
correspondence relating to Colonial or Irish-American affairs, and co-operated with 
the Home Office and other Government Departments on matters connected with 
German-Irish-American intrigues; it also dealt with Irish Intelligence Reports, in co-
operation with G.H.Q, H.F.’296 
Given the historic occurrences then happening in Ireland, with the shift away from support 
for Home Rule towards Sinn Féin after the ‘Rebellion of April 1916’ – the Easter Rising – and 
the geographical closeness of Ireland to both the island of Great Britain and the Western 
Front in continental Europe, it is obvious why, out of all of the regions of the British Empire, 
it was Ireland that M.I.5., and the British Imperial Government more generally, was most 
concerned regarding imperial security, for these events threatened the security of the 
United Kingdom itself. 
The duties of M.I.5.D. ever increased over the First World War. M.I.5. partially charged that 
Germany’s ‘special feature’ was responsible for this growth: 
‘During the later years of the War, owing partly to the disruptive and deterrent work 
of M.I.5. acting in England, and M.I.I.6. acting abroad, partly to the progress of 
hostilities ashore and afloat, the Germans seem to have laid even greater stress 
upon sabotage and the fomenting of discontent and revolution’.297 
As to whether the establishment of local bureaus to counter enemy intelligence can be 
considered a success requires a more comprehensive analysis that would examine all of the 
local bureaus; an analysis that, by necessity, would need to go beyond the realms of this 
thesis’ capabilities. D Branch, naturally in a report that M.I.5. wrote to demonstrate the 
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scope and importance of the work that it had been undertaking during the First World War, 
deemed it a success: 
‘By degrees the objects set forth in the Colonial Office circular Memorandum of 
August 1915 came to be achieved. In each of the Self-Governing Dominions and in 
every Colony means were provided for acquiring information and for handing it on, 
so that it was hardly possible for the movements of an enemy agent to escape 
observation. Special measures were taken for the prevention of espionage, notably 
in connection with the control of the ports, and much benefit was derived from a 
comparison of Colonial war legislation with the D.R.R. and A.R.O. Touch was 
established between the Central Special Intelligence Bureau and every part of the 
British Empire, even the most remote, and the value was proved of cultivating 
cordial personal relations with the overseas authorities. The Colonial Governors or 
their representatives were invited to visit the Central Bureau whenever the 
opportunity should arise, and those who availed themselves of this invitation were 
shown all the details of the work done in M.I.5. and given a full explanation of the 
office system.’298 
 
The Structure of M.I.5.D. 
 
At its foundation in 1916, D Branch was divided into a ‘Head Section,’ known as ‘D’, and 
three sub-sections, known as ‘D.1.’, ‘D.2.’, and ‘D.3.’ respectively. All four of these sections 
had one or more officers, with the officers of the three sub-sections ‘subordinate’ to the 
officer in charge of ‘D’, and each section or sub-section were reported to have had their 
‘own secretary and clerical staff’, although only secretaries were mentioned and named 
subsequently. 
The responsibilities of the four original sections of D Branch were as follows: 
‘D:’ ‘Co-ordination of Imperial Special Intelligence services in the Overseas 
Dominions, India and the Colonies; Correspondence with the Dominions, India and 
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the Colonies by letter and cable; Collection and communication of Special 
Intelligence affecting the Dominions, India and the Colonies. 
Co-operation with Colonial Office.  
Investigation of cases of espionage in Ireland in consultation with G. Co-operation 
with Home Office and other Government Departments on matters connected with 
German-Irish-American intrigues.  
Ciphers.’ 
‘D.1.’ ‘Irish-American Affairs.  
Examination of censored letters or intercepted correspondence dealing therewith.  
Irish Intelligence Reports and co-operation with G.H.Q., H.F. thereon.  
Questions affecting Ireland.’ 
‘D.2.’ ‘Colonial Affairs, general correspondence with the Colonies.  
Questions affecting the Dominions and Colonies except Wei-Hai-Wei, Hong King, 
Sarawak, North Borneo, Labuan, Straits Settlement, Ceylon, Aden and Egypt.’ 
‘D.3.’ ‘Oriental Affairs.  
Investigation (in consultation with G) and all correspondence regarding suspected 
espionage, sedition and treachery among Asiatics and Egyptians.  
Co-operation with India. Office.  
Questions affecting India, the Middle East and the Colonies excepted from the scope 
of D.2.’299 
 
D Branch became the centre of the British Empire’s worldwide efforts to counter the work 
of enemy intelligence, such as Germany’s ‘special feature’, that was being undertaken in, 
and/or was detrimental to the safety of, the British Empire. As knowledge about such 
enemy intelligence was transmitted to London from across the Empire by the likes of 
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Captain Philipps, it became responsible for countering it; thus, it grew. As M.I.5. adjusted to 
this influx of new knowledge, multiple internal reorganisations were necessary within the 
Bureau to attribute this work formally to D Branch. One such internal reorganisation 
occurred in September 1917, when 
‘[The] scope of D’s duties was further enlarged. Hitherto cases of suspected 
espionage or treachery among Asiatics and Egyptians in the United Kingdom 
together with the dissemination of hostile and revolutionary Oriental propaganda 
had been dealt with by G.2B, afterwards G.5, which in January 1917 had been 
formed into a separate Branch known as B. The two Branches B. and D were now 
amalgamated, and Oriental affairs became the concern, as well as Irish matters, of 
Branch D of M.I.5. which had now come to be known as “The Imperial Overseas 
Intelligence Bureau”.’300 
In October 1918 the First World War was clearly, and finally, drawing to a close. M.I.5. 
undoubtedly had their eyes on their position in the post-war world, and it seems that it was 
for this reason that there was another internal reorganisation of D Branch. This 
reorganisation demonstrated both the increasing scope and the great importance to the 
British Empire of the work undertaken by this bureau during the First World War, and M.I.5. 
saw fit to have this scope and importance thoroughly recorded in the report published in 
1921. 
There were two important consequences of this reorganisation for D Branch. The first of 
these consequences was the addition of two new sub-sections, to be known as ‘D.4.’ and 
‘D.5.’ ‘D.4. was assigned the duty described as “Co-ordination of Special Intelligence 
Missions in Allied Counter”.’ ‘D.5. was made responsible for ciphers and codes, the despatch 
of telegrams other than those addressed to M.C.Os [sic] in neutral capitals (sent though 
M.I.1.c.) and inland telegrams en clair, as well as for the receipt and distribution of code and 
cipher telegrams.’ As the report made clear, ‘The code and cipher work had always been 
part of D’s duties’ and had previously been part of the head ‘D’ section. 301 That it became in 
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need of a sub-section of its own appears to have been due to the positive results seen from 
the use of the ‘suitable cipher’ in September 1918. 
The second of these consequences was an internal reorganisation within the D Branch sub-
sections that dealt with seditious movements in the ‘Near East:’ 
 ‘A re-arrangement of the Branch was also made by the transfer from D.3. to D.2. of 
work dealing with suspects or seditious movements in, or in connection with, the 
“Near East” – a geographical area comprising not only the former Ottoman Empire 
(excepting Mesopotamia) but also the countries of North Africa and of the Eastern 
Mediterranean. The subsection known as the “Far East” which dealt with the 
activities of Japanese, Chinese, and Siamese all over the world still remained part of 
D.3.’302 
Collecting and collating D Branch’s files was considered vital for it to function: 
‘The importance of the several sections of overseas work was shown by the fact that 
as each division of D. Branch was made, a separate section of the Registry [H2] (i.e. 
H.2., sub-section two of H Branch) was formed to take charge of its papers. Each 
section had its own card-index, apart from the general indices of the Registry itself, 
and a specially chosen H.2 worker was made responsible for the files. Thus by the 
end of the war the subject files of D. were grouped as follows:- 
 Indian and Oriental Matters. 
 Far East. 
 Near East.’303 
It was not stated which subject file was responsible for the files from East Africa. 
These papers were, it is presumed, subsequently destroyed after the writing of M.I.5.’s post-
First World War report of 1921, for they are absent from the surviving archives that are 
publicly available. It is possible, however, that they continue to exist, but the modern British 
Government has not declassified them. 
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Therefore, between its formation and the end of the War D Branch grew quickly in both 
importance and scope.  By the latter date ‘M.I.5.D. had reached its fullest development and 
its sub-divisions and duties as set forth in I.P. Book 9 M.I.5. Distribution of Duties were as 
follows: 
‘M.I.5.D. 
Imperial Overseas Special Intelligence. 
Irish Oriental and Near Eastern Affairs. 
(I) Co-ordination and Imperial Special Intelligence Services in the Overseas 
Dominions, India and the Colonies. 
(II) Co-ordination of the work of Special Intelligence Missions in Allied 
Countries. 
(III) Correspondence with the Dominions, India and the Colonies by letter and 
cable. 
(IV) Collection and communication of Special Intelligence, affecting the 
Dominions, India and the Colonies. 
(V) Co-operation with the Colonial Office. 
(VI) Investigation of cases of espionage and sedition in Ireland in consultation 
with G. 
(VII) Co-operation with the Home Office and other Government Departments 
on matters connected with German-Irish-American intrigues. 
(VIII) Ciphers and Codes.’ 
 
The duties of the sub-sections were as follows: 
D.1. 
(I) Irish-American Affairs. Examination of censored letters or intercepted 
correspondence dealing therewith. 




(I) Colonial Affairs. General correspondence with the Colonies. 
(II) Questions affecting individuals of Near Eastern nationalities and Near Eastern 
Affairs. 
D.3. 
(I) Oriental affairs. Investigation [in consultation with G] and all correspondence 
regarding suspected espionage, sedition and treachery among Asiatics.’ 
D.4. 
(I) Co-ordination of Special Intelligence Missions in Allied Countries. 
(II) Receipt, distribution and despatch of correspondence. 
(III) Posts. 
D.5. 
(I) Ciphers and codes. 
(II) Despatch of telegrams, other than those addressed to M.C.O.s in neutral 
capitals [sent though M.I.1.c] and inland telegrams en clair. 
(III) Receipt and distribution of code and cipher telegrams.’304 
 
The Personnel of M.I.5.D. 
 
As the structure of D Branch expanded throughout the course of the First World War, so too 
did its personnel. The most complete D Branch figures from the 1921 M.I.5. report exist for 
the year of 1918, when the Branch was at its largest size; the personnel directly employed 
by M.I.5.D. in London did not, even by the end of the First World War, number two dozen. In 
October 1918, the personnel staff numbers of M.I.5.D., broken down into the main section 
and the sub-sections, were given as follows: 
Section Officer Secretary 
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D 1 G.S.0.2. in charge 5 Secretaries 
D.1. 1 G.S.O.3 1 Secretary 
D.2. 1 Attached Officer 1 Secretary 
D.3. 2 Attached Officers 2 Secretaries 
D.4. 2 Attached Officers 1 Secretary 
D.5. - 2 Secretaries305 
 
In a different document, which focused more generally on the staff employed by M.I.5. 
during the First World War, some of the names of these personnel were given. Sub-sections 
D.4. and D.5. were not included, as this list of names was given on 20th September 1918, one 
month before their establishment: 
 
There is little direct information about the hiring procedures for the personnel of M.I.5.D. 
within the surviving documents, although a wider examination of M.I.5. more generally 
provides a larger, if still incomplete, scope. 
“H” Branch, which by 1921 had changed designation to “O” Branch, saw itself as integral to 
the M.I.5. for it was, by modern designation, the Human Resources Department. H Branch 
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D. Branch Lt. Col. F. Hall Miss E.M. Hodgson 
Miss E. Lorrimer 
Miss E. Somerville 
Miss V. Brooke 
Miss F. Armstrong 
D.1. Captain F. Jackson Miss M.I. Dicker 
D.2. Captain C.W.J. Orr Miss V. Voyle 
D.3. S Newby, Esq. Miss E.D. Tarlov306 
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wrote that, by necessity, their section dealt with the wider Bureau as well as the 
composition of H Branch itself, for the Branch dealt ‘in a great measure with the growth and 
composition of the Bureau as a whole with its other branches, A, D E, F, & G. All these sub-
branches turned to H and its registry for information and records, and also for the providing 
and supervision of their personnel.’307  
This H Branch report did subsequently give some brief comments about the hiring 
procedures for officers for the Bureau. An important, and early, part of this procedure was 
the exclusion of those officers who were deemed not suitable for such appointments. As 
befitted a military which had historically placed little importance or respectability on 
military intelligence, only those men (for there could be no women officers in the regular 
British Army in this era) who were considered physically unfit for general (active) service 
were to be considered. Only in ‘very special cases’ were these rules to be discarded, with 
little consideration given to the intelligence training, academic competence, or, indeed, 
physical fitness that would have been necessary to assume these highly skilled positions:  
‘Officers are selected from a list kept in H. containing the names of those officially 
recommended by S.D.1 and M.I.6.c. or privately from other sources… The following 
circumstances should, except in very special cases, be held to disqualify a candidate:  
• Military Officer Medical fitness for General Service, or the likelihood of being fit 
within six months.  
• Officers of the Indian Army or Indian Government Services – Probability of recall 
to India within twelve months.   
• Civilians – Liability to be called up for military service.’308 
Furthermore, it was considered advantageous, but apparently not mandatory, for officers of 
D Branch – which, of course, specialised on the British Empire – to have some experience of 
conditions within the British Empire. It was written that: 
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‘As regards the personnel of D. Branch, several of its officers were selected as having 
already had experience in India and the Colonies and were thus cognisant of local 
conditions and the peculiarities of race and nomenclature.’309 
It was also not compulsory, only desired, for officers employed by M.I.5. to have had 
experience of working in intelligence. The ‘qualifications’ for employment for officers in 
M.I.5. was as follows: 
‘The principal qualities looked for are sound common sense and knowledge of the 
world. No hard and fast rule can be drawn as to age, but the ordinary limits are 25 
and 50. Technical qualification vary greatly; those most useful are previous 
intelligence, police, legal or administrative experience. A knowledge of languages 
and foreign countries is also valuable; and while familiarity with the routine of public 
offices is more valuable than that of private business, it is useful to have an 
acquaintance with commercial affairs of the larger kind.’310 
No statistics were provided by M.I.5. Nevertheless, one would have to presume that the 
number of officers in the British Armed Forces during the First World War who were unfit 
for active service, and yet were fit enough to assume office work during the duration of the 
War, or else were willing to come out of retirement to do so, and also had some experience 
in India and the colonies, and furthermore were known, or at least believed, to have 
possessed both a general academic competency for this type of work and an ability to 
remain silent about it, and were aged roughly between 25 and 50, and were not going to be 
recalled to India within the next year, and were recommended to the Bureau by whichever 
source, and had some useful technical qualifications, and had a knowledge of languages and 
foreign countries, and had sound common sense (however that was to be quantified), and 
were themselves actually willing to take up such a position, was very small indeed.  
The man chosen to head M.I.5.D. was Lieutenant Colonel Hall. Hall’s appointment as the 
head of D Branch demonstrated the importance the British Empire placed on intelligence 
work in Ireland over any other colony. Already working for M.I.5. at the time of his 
appointment, he was, as a landowner from County Down, their ‘Irish expert’ who had, 
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before the war, been the ‘military secretary of the Ulster Volunteer Force and a gun-runner 
himself.’311 Winston Churchill ‘later noted that [Vernon] Kell was “not specially acquainted 
with Irish matters” and relied on Hall’s expertise’, which Churchill himself ‘admired.’312 
Christopher Andrew has written that Hall had ‘a strong dislike of Irish nationalism,’ while his 
colonial credentials appeared to consist of ‘a keen sense of imperial pride’; he ‘[claimed] 
when he joined MI5 in December 1914 to have visited “every Imperial defended port N. of 
the Equator except Sierra Leone.”’313 East Africa was a concern for the British Empire, but it 
was not its only concern, or even its chief concern. Ireland, especially after the Easter Rising 
of 1916, was the chief concern of M.I.5.D., and this was reflected in the choice of its 
leadership. 
Conversely, the appointment of Hall also demonstrates the wider concern of M.I.5.D. 
towards the entire British Empire. This is a contradiction only at first, for, whilst Irish 
concerns remained predominant, the knowledge that Hall had gained from dealing with 
nationalism in Ireland – Martin Thomas reminds us that ‘MI5 was immersed in covert 
surveillance and infiltration of Irish nationalist organizations long before the Easter Rising of 
1916’ – placed him in good steed to deal with the nationalism that was bubbling away in the 
colonies. ‘The stereotypical subversive nationalist dedicated to terrorist methods to 
overthrow colonial rule and operating in a cosmopolitan environment of internationally 
planned covert operations’, Thomas also reminds us, ‘was not entirely a creature of 
myth.’314 Although constructed in a different manner to the nationalism of Ireland, 
nationalism, via the ideology of Pan-Africanism, did, as previously examined, cause great 
concern to the British Empire in East Africa in the years of the First World War. This, 
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amongst others, was the type of concern that D Branch had been established to face, and 
the appointment of Hall demonstrated M.I.5.’s commitment to combating it. 
To be appointed to their posts, the female secretaries, known as ‘Women Clerks’, had to 
undergo interviews. The ‘Controller’ who interviewed them ‘[decided] whether she [was]: 
i. Trustworthy, discreet and tactful. 
ii. Mentally and physically suitable. 
iii. Technically efficient.’ 
 
The ‘Qualities’ she had to hold, whose ‘importance [were] chiefly attached [to the position, 
were]: 
i. A high sense of honour. 
ii. Discretion and reliability. 
iii. Sound common sense. 
iv. Accuracy. 
v. Readiness to take responsibility. 
vi. Keenness. 
vii. Physical fitness. 
viii. Good temper and tact. 
 
Comparatively little stress is laid on technical accomplishments, but 
ix. For the Registry the candidate should be able to type thirty words per minute. 
x. For clerical work a somewhat higher speed and shorthand are desirable. 
xi. For précis writing a University degree in research or literature is desirable. 
xii. Knowledge of languages is useful in any capacity.’ 
 
There were two factors that could disqualify a woman for the role: 
 
i. ‘Age under 20 or over 30, except in special cases. 
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ii. Alien parentage.’315 
 
The hiring procedures for men and women were separated in the document, Organisation 
and Administration: annexures; Duties of H Branch, which recorded them. This mirrored the 
separation of the genders within the personnel of M.I.5., including M.I.5.D., in this time era. 




After its establishment in September 1916 D Branch of M.I.5. grew quickly. By the end of the 
First World War it was a small yet rapidly expanding branch of the British intelligence 
establishment which was developing innovative methods both for the implementation of 
counter-intelligence and for the growth in communications between regions of the British 
Empire on the topic of security. 
However, as a result of it not being established until 1916 the department it was to task 
with preventing Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East 
Africa could, naturally, not be instituted until after this date: it was instituted in November 
1917. Whilst this department, the East African Intelligence Centre, was able to make gains in 
the fight against the threat posed by Pan-Islamism in the few months of its existence, it was 
unable to eliminate it, and British imperial officials in East Africa recognised that the threat 
posed by Pan-Islamism continued to exist after the end of the First World War. 
It is impossible to know whether an earlier date of establishment for M.I.5.D. would have 
resulted in an earlier date of establishment for the East African Intelligence Centre, and 
whether that would have in turn allowed for the elimination of the Pan-Islamic threat, 
rather than the curtailment of it. The unknowable answer to this question is an intriguing 
one. 
 
                                                          
315 TNA: KV 1/54: M.I.5. ‘I. Personnel. D. – Women Clerks.’, in Central Special Intelligence Bureau (M.I.5.) Duties 
of H Branch, December 1917, p.10. 
167 
 
Subchapter Two: The Institution of the East African Intelligence Centre 
 
On 20th August 1917 M.I.5.D. directed the institution of the East African Intelligence Centre, 
and it began its operations two and a half months later, on 4th November.316 The Centre 
always remained small; the tiny personnel were supported in their work by a few associated 
people. Yet in the fifteen months in which it existed between the August of 1917 and the 
November of 1918 it established itself as a fully working department within the British 
imperial effort to fight the East African Campaign of the First World War. At all points it had 
a commander, it communicated with other regional bureaus across the British Empire and 
with M.I.5.D. in London, and it had three interlinked subjects of interest which formed the 
backbone of its work.  
This subchapter will focus on the Intelligence Centre’s physical institution and its personnel. 
The work that it undertook to prevent the threat posed by Pan-Islamism to the British 
Empire in East Africa during the years of the First World War will be examined in Chapter 
Seven. 
 
The Establishment of the East African Intelligence Centre: Location and Co-operation 
 
M.I.5.D. summarised the establishment of the East African Intelligence Centre thus: 
‘The Department [the Intelligence Centre] was started as the result of a telegram 
dated August 20th 1917, from the Colonial Office to the Governor of the British East 
Africa Protectorate stating that it was proposed to form a “Permanent Intelligence 
Centre” under the command of Major C.E. Foster.’317 
The East African Intelligence Centre was, as its name suggests, an intelligence centre for the 
entirety of East Africa; it was not, as Major Notley’s operation was, an establishment 
primarily for the protection of the security of the East Africa Protectorate. By the time of the 
Centre’s establishment the fighting of the East African Campaign had long since spread 
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throughout the region; it was no longer possible to plan the protection of each British 
colony or protectorate in Eastern Africa as an individual entail. It was essential to coordinate 
it on a larger footing. Furthermore, Major Foster’s original orders from the Directorate of 
Military Intelligence in 1917 had stated that he was ‘to obtain all information possible about 
the Belgian Congo, Italian Somaliland and Abyssinia’; the work of the Intelligence Centre was 
to be extended to cover not just the British Empire and the arena of hostilities, but the 
entire region of Eastern Africa. 
Nevertheless, a centre of operations had to be chosen for practical reasons, and that, stated 
M.I.5.D., was to be Nairobi. They recorded that ‘all Intelligence records of permanent 
interest about the British protectorates and those collected during the military operations in 
German East Africa were also to be filed at Nairobi.’318 As M.I.5.D. chose Nairobi as the place 
for the library of collected intelligence information, the East Africa Protectorate became the 
centre of operations of the Intelligence Centre by default. 
Nairobi would have been chosen for three interlinking reasons: historical, military, and 
geographical.  In 1920 A Handbook of Kenya Colony and the Kenya Protectorate, which had 
been written by the Geographical Section of the Naval Intelligence Division, was published 
publicly. It documented that: ‘Nairobi is the administrative centre and capital of British East 
Africa; head-quarters of the chief Government departments; and chief town of Ukamba 
province… [with a population of] about 19,000, of which 2,000 are Europeans and 5,000 
Asiatics.’ In addition to housing many government buildings and institutions, Nairobi had a 
fairly substantial infrastructure, relative to contemporary Eastern Africa. It had, amongst 
others: a railway station, telephone and wireless stations, and ‘swampy ground… [that had] 
been drained.’ Being ‘5,450 ft. above sea-level’ and ‘327 miles from the coast’, Nairobi had a 
climate that was considered ‘pleasant’. It was because of these advantages that, the 
Handbook stated, ‘[during] the war Nairobi had been practically the base as well as the 
head-quarters of the military forces in the colony [the interior of Kenya became a Colony in 
1920].’319 This had also been the state of affairs in the pre-war era. The Intelligence 
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Department of the King’s African Rifles, which had been ‘obstinately deaf to all warnings’, 
had been located ‘in Nairobi’ before the War.320  
The Intelligence Centre was not required to become engaged in combat itself, and so the 
pleasant surroundings of Nairobi, coupled with the government and military departments 
based there, made it an attractive prospect. Much of the fighting was taking place some way 
from Nairobi by the time it was instituted in late 1917, yet for practical reasons Nairobi 
remained the physical base for the Intelligence Centre. While Nairobi was the geographical 
core it was never to be the sole focus of the Centre; from the beginning, it was to be a 
centre concerned with the protection of the security for the whole of the British Empire in 
Eastern Africa. 
The original telegram from M.I.5.D. referenced in the quote above was written to the 
Acting-Governor of the East Africa Protectorate, but it was not meant to be for his eyes only. 
The telegram ‘directed that its contents were to be repeated to the Governors of Uganda 
and Nyasaland, H.M. Commissioner for the Somaliland Protectorate and to the 
Administrator Wilhelmstal [of the Conquered Territory and later to the Resident at 
Zanzibar].’ M.I.5.D. did not wish for these men to be merely informed of the institution of 
the Intelligence Centre: ‘it was hoped [by M.I.5.D.] that the Governments concerned would 
give every assistance to the new Department.’321 
One part of the M.I.5. report from 1921 stated that the Intelligence Centre was to be 
focused specifically around the East Africa Protectorate, Uganda, and German East Africa: 
‘In August 1917 when arrangements were being made for the establishment of a 
permanent intelligence centre at Nairobi for British East Africa, Uganda and German 
East Africa… the Governor [of Uganda] was asked by the Colonial Office to take steps 
to ensure the collaboration of the Uganda civil and police officials with the new 
Intelligence officer.’322 
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This may have been the case purely because these three protectorates and colonies formed 
the bureaucratic nucleus of the East African Campaign. Nevertheless, the original telegram 
proves that while these three protectorates and colonies may have been considered the 
primary focuses, never were they to be considered the sole focus. Indeed, such a conviction 
was reiterated several times by M.I.5.D. For example, ‘A further telegram from the same 
source [M.I.5.D.] dated January 5th 1918’ continued to propagate the desire for the 
Intelligence Centre to spread beyond the boundaries of Nairobi and the Protectorate which 
housed it, and further expanded the ambitions of this collaboration. This telegram, the 
contents of which were communicated to all concerned as detailed above, made clear the 
intention that “close collaboration” was to be established “in regard to every kind of 
Intelligence between the Civil and Military Officers in all Protectorates”, and referred to the 
possibility of “General Intelligence Centres which would be branches of that in Nairobi”, 
being ‘formed in each in course of time.’323 
The Intelligence Centre followed these orders and did not focus exclusively on the East 
Africa or Uganda Protectorates, or German East Africa; instead, the Centre opened itself up 
to collaboration across the British Empire in the region. It communicated with the other 
‘British possessions in the East African area’, to inform them of what was required from 
them. ‘Shortly after his arrival’, Major Muggeridge later wrote, ‘Major Foster addressed a 
memorandum giving the headings under which information was required to the Secretariat 
in each of the British possessions in the East African area, at the same time indicating the 
nature of the collaboration and assistance which was sought for.’324 
Foster’s aims for this collaboration were concisely sketched thus: ‘It was hoped that with 
the help of the Governors, Major Foster would secure the cooperation not only of the 
battalion Intelligence officers [of the East African Force] but also of the civil and police 
authorities of British East Africa, Uganda, Nyasaland, Somaliland and German East Africa, so 
that all information should be available in the one office.’325 It is telling that after three and 
a half years at war, cooperation between ‘the civil and police authorities of British East 
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Africa, Uganda, Nyasaland, Somaliland and German East Africa’, which had been invaded the 
previous year, was not already in existence.  
Eventually, this collaboration went beyond even the ‘British possessions in the East African 
area’ and the ‘Conquered Territory’ (German East Africa) to encompass the entirety of the 
eastern part of the continent outside of even nominal British control. ‘The term “East 
African area”’ was ‘employed for the sake of brevity and is intended to apply to those 
districts with which the East African Intelligence centre [sic] is primarily concerned. These 
are: Uganda, British East Africa, Conquered Territory, Zanzibar, British Somaliland, 
Nyasaland and contiguous foreign countries, such as Abyssinia, the Congo Belge, Italian 
Somaliland and Portuguese East Africa.’326 ‘Nairobi was made the centre’ for this ‘area’.327 
One month before the Great War ended the following was reported: ‘In October 1918, the 
result of Major Foster’s efforts was reported to the C.S.I.B. and it was stated that all local 
administration under the Intelligence Centre at Nairobi, except Nyasaland, had fallen in with 
the registration of aliens entering their territory.’328 This infers that the Intelligence Centre 
did not have the power to force the Governors of the British protectorates and colonies in 
East Africa to follow their orders. The Intelligence Centre gained its powers from M.I.5.D., 
which gained its from M.I.5, which gained its from the War Office, which gained its from 
Parliament, which gained its from the, limited, British electorate. Nyasaland was, like most 
British colonies and protectorates, mostly an autonomous region for many of its internal 
purposes; if Nyasaland failed to ‘fall in with the registration of aliens entering their 
territory’, as directed to do so by the Intelligence Centre, one must ask exactly how much 
control did the Imperial Government in London truly have over the British Empire? 
 
Subjects of Interest 
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The work that the newly established East African Intelligence Centre was ordered to 
undertake can be broken down into three subject areas. These three subjects were 
interwoven and formed the backbone of the work undertaken: 
1. The collection and collation of intelligence records and files from across the wider 
region to a central library located in Nairobi. 
2. The enactment and enforcement of port controls and the ‘registration of aliens’ to 
prevent the importation of enemy-backed literature, especially religious literature, 
to prevent the undermining of the programme of censorship. 
3. The use of ‘counter-espionage’ to intercept agents in East Africa who possessed 
propaganda with the intention to spread Pan-Islamism.329 
This work, and its impact on preventing Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the 
British Empire in East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World 
War, will be examined in Chapter Seven: principally in Chapter Seven Subchapter Eight. 
 
The Commander of the East African Intelligence Centre 
 
There is limited content in the publicly available archives on the consecutive heads of the 
East African Intelligence Centre: Major – later Lieutenant-Colonel – Claude (sometimes 
incorrectly Claud) Edward Foster and Major Charles Ernest Muggeridge. 330 The sources that 
are available are the M.I.5. report of 1921, Foster and Muggeridge’s service records (known 
as their Personal Files or Long Service Papers), their Medal Cards, and, in the case of Foster, 
his private papers. Beyond the occasional mention, there has been no serious analysis in any 
secondary literature of these men, or how they came to be appointed to their jobs.331 One 
must piece together morsels of information from these different sources to present this 
narrative. 
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M.I.5.D. recorded that ‘Major Foster of M.I.2.B. (after having visited M.I.5.) was sent out to 
Nairobi, where he was to join the staff of the King’s African Rifles and to form an Intelligence 
centre [sic]’.332 The documents do not state if Foster was appointed on 20th August 1917, or 
at a later date before 4th November 1917. 
Foster was born on 1st August 1876; at 41; he was nearly a decade older than Major Notley. 
He received his commission on 20th February 1897, whence he joined the Suffolk Regiment. 
On his appointment as a Captain he joined the Royal Lancaster Regiment on 23rd April 1902, 
before being seconded to the Egyptian Army from 23rd May 1904 to 21st October 1905. He 
resigned his commission in the October of the following year.333 He re-joined the army on 
the outbreak of the Great War. This must have occurred at some point before 29th 
November 1914, for it was on that date that he wrote to the Adjutant of the 6th Battalion of 
the Royal Lancaster Regiment requesting to be transferred to the Royal Flying Corps. He 
documented in support of this application that he ‘had experience with internal combustion 
engines.’334  
As it had been decided that ‘officers belonging to units in the 3rd Army (1st New Army) 
[were] not to be considered for appointment to the Royal Flying Corps’ he was rejected on 
20th January 1915 and instead was moved with the 6th Battalion to Gallipoli.335 By the 
November he was sick with both enteritis – so common at Gallipoli that one officer present 
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described it as one of the four ‘Gallipoli plagues’ – and jaundice.336 He was subsequently 
invalided home on 29th November and placed on leave for 6 weeks.337 
Records detailing the following eighteen months of Major Foster’s life are absent from his 
Personal File. The next chronological piece of information contained within this file was 
another ‘Proceedings of a Medical Board’ form, this time dated 17th May 1918 from the 
British General Hospital in Nairobi. This medical board found that Foster was ‘suffering from 
D.A.H.’ (Disordered Action of the Heart - an anxiety disorder; it is possible that Foster was 
suffering from P.T.S.D.) and that he had ‘had 7 severe attacks of a similar nature during the 
past few years... He looks very ill, is sallow in appearance and anaemic.’ 338 As a result, he 
was found ‘unfit for service at present’ for ‘six months’ and was invalided to the United 
Kingdom for ‘further treatment.’ He did not return to service in East Africa and was 
demobbed on 23rd September 1919. He was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel on 
the same day.339 
What was not recorded within these documents was Foster’s relationship with M.I.5. This 
relationship most definitely existed before he was sent to Nairobi, for D Branch itself 
recorded that on his arrival in Nairobi he ‘established close touch with the Central Special 
Intelligence Bureau, where he was personally known, as well as with M.I.1. (Fighting 
Intelligence).’ 340 
As was examined in the previous subchapter, the origins of M.I.5.D. were set in motion in 
the summer of 1915, with D Branch itself formed in the September of 1916; thus, to be 
‘personally known’ to the C.S.I.B. when the Intelligence Centre was placed under his 
command Foster must have had contact with them after he returned to the United Kingdom 
from Gallipoli, for it did not exist prior to his departure. There is no record within Foster’s 
Personal Files as to his location and activities between 29th November 1915 and 4th 
November 1917, excepting that he was invalided to the United Kingdom on the former date. 
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Therefore, it seems evident that at some point between December 1915 and November 
1917, Foster became known to M.I.5. After becoming known to M.I.5., he became ‘of 
M.I.2.B’ and became ‘personally known’ to M.I.5.D. 
The declaration that Foster was ‘of M.I.2.B.’ makes perfect sense in relation to his later 
appointment, for this was ‘The geographical section of the War Office’s military intelligence 
directorate responsible for the collection and collation of information about various regions 
of the world, each assigned a subsection.’341 Michael Smith has elaborated that M.I.2 was: 
‘Military information concerning the Americas (except Canada), Spain, Portugal, Italy, 
Liberia, Tangier, the Balkan States, the Ottoman Empire, Arabia, Sinai, Abyssinia, Egypt, 
Sudan and West Persia.’342  
There are very few primary documents relating to M.I.2. in the surviving archives, so there is 
very little primary evidence to present an explanation of Foster’s work in M.I.2.B., except to 
say that it was clearly international in nature: a professional characteristic that would surely 
have been of importance for M.I.5.D. when they sort to engage a suitable person for the 
position of the commander of the East African Intelligence Centre. 
The picture formed when one examines the information contained within these morsels of 
information directs one to the understanding that Foster was most probably working for 
M.I.2.B. in the period immediately prior to him assuming his duties for M.I.5.D. in Nairobi, 
and that through this work he was in some way known – either personally or by reputation, 
or more conceivably both – by his colleagues in M.I.5., and maybe also by those in M.I.1 
(Fighting Intelligence), and that the personnel at M.I.5.D. – probably Hall or one of his 
subordinates – recommended him for the job in Nairobi, which he was disposed upon to 
accept.  
(Exactly what ‘M.I.1. (Fighting Intelligence)’ was is not clear. In common with all parts of the 
British intelligence establishment, M.I.1s went through several reorganisations during the 
First World War, but none of the sub-sections appear to have ever officially been called 
‘M.I.1. (Fighting Intelligence)’. Presumably this was an informal name used within the 
organisation that did not need to be clarified for the external reader, for, as a secret 
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intelligence document, it was not designed to be read by such a person. Nigel West provides 
the following brief structural breakdown for M.I.1. during the Second World War, with 
various notes on the activities of the sub-sections during the First World War:  
• ‘MI1 (b), a cryptanalytical organisation developed during World War I, located at 
Cork Street, Mayfair, and staffed by Intelligence Corps personnel; later responsible 
for censorship, publicity, and propaganda policy’. 
• ‘MI1 (c), the original War Office military intelligence designation for the Secret 
Intelligence Service, referred to in official handbooks as “special duties”.’ 
• ‘MI1(d), the clerical division responsible for the distribution of paper and the 
allocation of travel grants’. 
• ‘MI1 (e), a cipher bureau based at Le Touquet during World War I for the study of 
German codes; later responsible for artillery, small arms, explosives, and 
mechanization intelligence’.343 
Of these four sub-sections, M.I.1. (b) and M.I.1. (c) seem to be the most likely for Foster to 
wish to ‘establish close touch with’ professionally in relation to his work in the East African 
Intelligence Centre, and so could have been the official name for ‘M.I.1. (Fighting 
Intelligence).’ Unfortunately, neither of these sub-sections have left a sufficient number of 
primary records to positively establish which one of them was being referred to. 
John Ferris has stated that: ‘MI1b, the War Office code-breaking bureau during 1914-18, is 
the worst documented of British intelligence agencies between 1900 and 1945.’344 Peter 
Freeman provides two reasons for this. One is simply that there was a ‘near-total failure to 
preserve any records of its wartime achievements’.345 The second reason is that it has 
suffered an unfair comparison to the famous Room 40 ‘within the secondary literature’; 
they had similar functions in different organisations: 
‘The War Office’s First World War cryptanalytic bureau MI1(b) has been severely 
overshadowed by its more glamorous equivalent in the Admiralty, ‘Room 40’. In 
particular its diplomatic decryption work has gone completely unnoticed; yet this 
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was its main activity, and it contributed more than did Room 40 to their common 
successor, the Governor Code and Cypher School (GC&CS).’346 
1917 ‘saw a revolution in MI1(b)’s size and scope. They solved diplomatic codes of 
Argentina, Brazil, Denmark, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Persia, Sweden, Uruguay 
and the Vatican.’347  
As for the other option, M.I.1(c) is, as previously stated, referred to by West as ‘the original 
War Office military intelligence designation for the Secret Intelligence Service’: S.I.S. It was 
the ‘cover’ name for the section of military intelligence which, during the First World War, 
was being run by Mansfield CummingL the future so-called M.I.6.348 This was the 
organisation ‘responsible for gathering intelligence overseas’. 349 
‘Fighting Intelligence’ in this instance could have thus meant ‘Fighting’ enemy ‘Intelligence’ 
by decrypting diplomatic messages, or it could have literally meant ‘Fighting’ the enemy via 
‘Intelligence’ means; i.e. espionage.) 
A second, less likely, possibility for the first contact between Foster and the British 
intelligence establishment also presents itself: before the outbreak of the First World War. 
This would help to partly explain his application for the Royal Flying Corps. Founded in April 
1912, the R.F.C. pioneered imagery intelligence (IMINT) in the British military. Thus, had he 
been accepted, the R.F.C. would have allowed Foster to work within the Military Intelligence 
apparatus, whilst still being an officer who was fit for general service.  
Yet Foster’s own explanation for his application to the R.F.C. was that he had ‘experience 
with internal combustion engines’; there was no mention of any experience with enemy 
reconnaissance, or that he had any expertise which could have been of use to the newly 
developing IMINT. Presumably he must have had some experience with internal combustion 
engines for, had he not, his lie would surely have been discovered almost instantly. The 
simplest explanation would seem to be that he applied to join the R.F.C. because he 
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genuinely did have ‘experience with internal combustion engines’ and, since it was not 
formed until April 1912, he had not had the chance to do so during his first commission 
Therefore, the most likely chain of events would appear to be that Foster was unknown to 
the British intelligence establishment prior to his return from Gallipoli. After submitting to 
the third medical board of his career as a result of that Campaign, and in respect of his age 
being advanced for that of a front-line soldier, Foster was recommended to join M.I.2.B., 
after which he moved to the East African Intelligence Centre. 
Exactly what his credentials were to be placed in command of that Centre, and so 
consequently be tasked with preventing Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the 
British Empire in East Africa, must now remain lost to history; one must accept that in the 
eighteen months or so that Foster was most probably working for the British intelligence 
establishment in London he learnt enough skills to qualify him for the role. 
‘In May 1918, Major Foster was invalided home and was succeeded by Major C.E. 
Muggeridge, G.S.O., 2. King’s African Rifles, a local planter who had joined up for the War 




Similarly to the appointment of Major Foster, the appointment of Major Muggeridge to the 
post of the commander of the East African Intelligence Centre was not clearly recorded in 
the surviving records. Whilst the two men shared the similarity of having no direct 
connection to the intelligence establishment prior to the First World War recorded within 
their personal records, unlike Foster there is no surviving evidence within M.I.5.’s publicly 
available records, or any other publicly available document, that Muggeridge had any 
contact with M.I.5. at all before his appointment to the above post in May 1918. 
Muggeridge’s narrative does possess evidence that proves he had a solid background in 
military intelligence; however, it is not clear exactly in what form of military intelligence this 
background was spent, or how this equipped him to run the East African Intelligence Centre. 
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Muggeridge was born on 4th January 1876. He applied for a temporary commission in the 
Regular Army for the period of the War on 29th May 1915 and was subsequently admitted 
on 5th July of the same year.351 On the outbreak of the War he had been resident in the East 
Africa Protectorate, and on receiving his temporary commission he left Africa to participate 
in the hostilities in Europe.352 He had two separate periods of service during the War; the 
distinction between these two periods was important: they were from 5th July 1915 to 17th 
January 1917, and then again from 25th June 1917 to 3rd August 1919, the date on which he 
was demobbed.353 (As opposed to his Service Papers, The London Gazette gave a different 
date – 17th September 1919 – as the date on which Muggeridge relinquished his 
commission. The date of 3rd August 1919 is recorded several times within his Long Service 
Papers so, on balance, the latter date seems to be more likely; in relation to the argument of 
this thesis, it makes little difference either way.354)  
He returned to East Africa in the break between these two periods of service. In his first job 
on his return, from 25th June to 24th October 1917, he was employed at a POW Camp 
somewhere within Eastern Africa; the details were not recorded. On 31st July he was 
promoted to the rank of temporary Captain, as recorded in The Supplement to the London 
Gazette.355 Why he returned to East Africa is not made known within his Long Service 
Papers, except that there are no medical board documents currently included within it; ill 
health was probably not the cause.356 Nor is there any reasoning for the long gap of five 
months between the two periods of service, except possibly for the long journey. What else 
he was doing during this time is unknown, although a ‘C E Muggeridge’ was recorded as 
having registered a firearm – a D B shot gun 12 – at Mombasa on 6th June 1917, giving his 
place of residence as Nairobi. This was a new licence, and not a renewal of an existing one; 
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Muggeridge had registered a gun in the Protectorate before the War, but the licence must 
have expired during, or as a result of, Muggeridge’s European war service.357  
Muggeridge’s Service Papers state that there was no gap in his service after he left the POW 
Camp, but it is impossible to know with absolute certainty what he was doing between 
leaving the POW Camp on 24th October 1917, and succeeding Foster to the command of the 
Intelligence Centre on 24th May 1918, for it was not recorded within his Papers.358 However, 
it is possible with informed speculation to make an educated deduction about his 
whereabouts and activities for these missing seven months. 
It is certainly possible, even probable, that it is not coincidental that his departure from the 
POW Camp occurred less than a fortnight before the Intelligence Centre began operations 
on 4th November 1917; it logically may have also corresponded with Foster’s physical arrival 
on the continent. Such a proposition that Muggeridge worked under Foster for these 
months would seem likely, given that the former immediately took over the leadership of 
the Intelligence Centre from the latter as its commander – not its caretaker – when Foster 
was suddenly invalided. Foster’s medical board occurred on 17th May and he left the 
department on 24th, there was only exactly one week to arrange for Muggeridge’s 
succession; a little quick, perhaps, for an outsider to be appointed to such a post in such a 
location.359 
Two pieces of evidence in particular stand out strongly in favour of this notion. Whilst 
Muggeridge’s periods of service were recorded in his Service Papers as being, as previously 
stated, from 5th July 1915 to 17th January 1917, and then again from 25th June 1917 to 3rd 
August 1919, the distinction between the period of ‘Imperial service’ and the period of ‘total 
service’ for financial reasons is an interesting one, for these financial periods did not divide 
equally with his periods of service. Muggeridge was in ‘Imperial service’ for the entirety of 
his first period of service, but only from 25th June 1917 to 24th October 1917 in his second; 
the financial period of ‘Imperial service’ ended when he left the POW Camp for the 
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unrecorded work that he must have been performing prior to 24th May 1918. His salary for 
the period 25th October 1917 to 3rd August 1919 was not paid for by imperial funds as had 
been the case for the previous period under ‘Imperial service.’ His salary for this period was 
paid from another source. Since his salary from 24th May 1918 to 3rd August 1919 must have 
been paid by, or on behalf of, M.I.5., it stands to reason that this was also the case for the 
period of 25th October 1917 to 23rd May 1918 as well, as no distinction was made within the 
document that concerned the change of Muggeridge’s own status between 23rd and 24th 
May 1918.360 
The second piece of evidence in favour of the idea that Muggeridge was originally appointed 
as Foster’s assistant is a statement by M.I.5.: ‘No establishment beyond the appointment of 
Major Foster as G.S.O.2 [General Staff Officer Section 2 – Intelligence, security and 
information operations] and that of a Staff Captain as Assistant was arranged [prior to 4th 
November 1917].’361 No further information was given about the identity of the ‘Staff 
Captain’, but it does prove that there was an assistant to Foster, who logically could have 
been Muggeridge. If this is the correct deduction, it would prove that Muggeridge had 
connections with M.I.5. prior to 31st July 1917 – the date on which that edition of The 
Supplement to the London Gazette was published – and would also help to support the 
argument that Muggeridge’s return to East Africa occurred with the principle objective of 
his employment with the Intelligence Centre in mind. In such a scenario, his work at the 
POW Camp may have simply provided him with work until he could assume his position. 
Conversely, the provenance of the source works against this notion; the author of this 
sentence for M.I.5. was Major Muggeridge himself in 1919 and referring to oneself in that 
manner seems somewhat uncomfortable. Nevertheless, no other candidate for the position 
presents itself at all.  
Confirmation of Major Muggeridge’s war work cannot be fully achieved with such limited 
surviving documentation; it must remain, to some degree, mere conjecture. However, these 
financial considerations strongly support the concept that Muggeridge worked for the 
Intelligence Centre for the entire period of 25th October 1917 to 3rd August 1919. Yet, as 
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likely as these dates may seem, they offer one no insight into the qualifications possessed 
by Muggeridge to hold such positions as the commander and the assistant to the 
commander of an Intelligence Centre, particularly during the fighting of the East African 
Campaign, which had descended into guerrilla warfare by this period. M.I.5. recorded only 
one sentence which can properly be described as providing an example of a relevant 
qualification held by Muggeridge which qualified him to hold these posts; that he was ‘a 
local planter who had joined up for the War and returned to Nairobi after seeing active 
service.’362  
Naturally, the official story is not quite the full story. How the British defined ‘local’ – as in 
‘local planter’ – was not explained. As was examined in Chapter One, the British 
Administration of the East Africa Protectorate encouraged white immigration in the years 
prior to the First World War. In an edition of the Official Gazette of the East African 
Protectorate dated 15th December 1913, a ‘C. E. Muggeridge’ was recorded as having been 
awarded a ‘One Year’s Resident’s Licence’ on 12th August 1913.363 There was no remark to 
suggest that this was a renewal, although there was also no remark to say that it definitely 
was not. The 1902 Crown Land Ordinance leased the land for 99-years; if he had arrived 
earlier and applied under the terms of that Ordinance he would have had no need to apply 
for a One Year’s Resident’s Licence in August 1913.  
Exactly how long Muggeridge had been in the Protectorate prior to the outbreak of war is 
unclear. Although he was not recorded in the censuses of 1901 and 1911 in the United 
Kingdom, this does not prove that he was resident in East Africa, and the above evidence 
strongly indicates that he had not been in the Protectorate very long prior to the summer of 
1914. Presumably he was one of the six hundred and seventy-five Europeans to arrive in the 
Protectorate between 1911 and 1914 as part of the Administration’s efforts to increase 
white settlement, but that, at least prior to August 1913, he had not yet applied for, or been 
allocated, land under the Crown Land Ordinance.364  
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Accordingly, Muggeridge was only a ‘local planter’ in the sense that he had briefly been 
present in the East Africa Protectorate before the outbreak of the War. For M.I.5.D. to have 
called him a ‘local planter’ seems to have been something of an exaggeration, except that 
due to the tiny number of Europeans who lived in the Protectorate he could well have been 
the only person who worked for M.I.5. to have any claims to such a title whatsoever. M.I.5.’s 
report of 1921 was compiled for the purpose of demonstrating the scope and importance of 
the work that had been undertaken by M.I.5. during the Great War; exaggerating to imply 
that they had employed a man who knew the local area would not appear to be amiss, 
especially when one considers that Foster was not presented with any claims to such a title.  
Muggeridge’s upbringing had been typically English and upper middle class. A biographical 
note in a book on alumni of the University of Cambridge states that he was born at 
Carshalton, Surrey, and attended Winchester School before graduating from Trinity College 
Cambridge in 1897. He was also present in England on his death on 15th October 1941, 
which occurred in Tunbridge Wells.365 Muggeridge was well decorated for his war work; he 
held a Military Cross, which was awarded on 1st February 1917, and an O.B.E., which was 
awarded on Tuesday 3rd June 1919 in the King’s Birthday Honours ‘for valuable services 
rendered in connection with military operations in East Africa’.366  
As far as can be seen, Muggeridge seems to have been a well-connected and well-regarded 
member of the British establishment. Although the book on the alumni of the University of 
Cambridge contained only a short segment on Muggeridge, one short sentence stands out 
in relation to his work with the East African Intelligence Centre: he ‘Served in the Great War, 
1914-19 (Intelligence Section, 1915-19…).’367 This is the only firm record of Muggeridge 
having had any involvement with the British intelligence establishment prior to May 1918. 
Therefore, the façade that M.I.5.D. used to portray Muggeridge in their very brief 
characterisation of him, that he was merely ‘a local planter who had joined up for the War 
and returned to Nairobi after seeing active service’, appears to have been a disingenuous 
one, albeit true. Since he was admitted to a temporary commission in the Regular Army in 
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the summer of 1915 and would have had to have travelled from East Africa in the same 
year, he must have immediately begun work for the military ‘Intelligence Section’ on his 
arrival in Europe. He left the ‘Intelligence Section’ for reasons unknown in 1917 and began 
work for M.I.5. Such a narrative could be constructed to suggest, but, once again, not to 
prove, that Muggeridge may have had some connection with people working for the British 
intelligence establishment prior to his war work; a background such as Muggeridge’s would 
make him holding personal acquaintances with the relevant people a possibility, although 
any acquaintances could also have been professional. What does seem to be clear is that 
Muggeridge was less connected than Foster with M.I.5. and similar departments, for there 
was no mention of him having been acquainted with any of the sub-sections in the way that 
Foster was. Nevertheless, as Priya Satia writes in respect to the imperial intelligence growth 
then occurring in the Middle East, ‘It is difficult to overstate the importance of personal 
relationships to the form of this organization [intelligence]’, and so any personal connection 
between Muggeridge and a person or persons within M.I.5. would have been following a set 
precedence.368  
An overview of these sources therefore suggests that the only appropriate qualification held 
by Muggeridge that made M.I.5.D. believe him to have been eligible for the appointment to 
the position of commander of an Intelligence Centre was that he had around eighteen 
months previous war work with the ‘Intelligence Section’ in Europe. Two other pieces of 
evidence exist that suggest that Muggeridge was qualified for such a position; however, 
they are extremely circumstantial, to the extent of almost being inadmissible.  
The first of these two pieces is that in the immediate aftermath of the War Muggeridge 
expressed the opinion that ‘it was important that East African Intelligence should not be 
allowed to relapse into what he described as “its pre-war state of Parochialism”.’ This would 
imply that he had some understanding of the pre-war state of intelligence in East Africa, 
that he understood that this state had been parochial, and that it would not be in the long-
term interests of the British Empire for this state of affairs to be repeated in the post-First 
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World War era. Both of these stances could easily have been formed during his service in 
the First World War, but his use of the word ‘Parochialism’ is quite strong. 
The second piece of evidence is even more tentative. M.I.5.D. recorded that ‘The relations 
between the Central Special Intelligence Bureau and Major Muggeridge became extremely 
cordial and much information was furnished by Major Muggeridge as to the work of the 
Intelligence Centre at Nairobi and its prospects after the War.’369 Almost all of this 
correspondence is either lost, or, if it survives, is not in public archives, so it cannot be 
analysed itself. This sentence would indicate that not only was Muggeridge affable, but that 
he was also good at his job; or at least good enough to please the personnel of M.I.5.D. in 
London. Again, Muggeridge may simply have been a quick learner, a natural even, and an 
affable-like gentleman, no doubt helped by class affiliation; yet it is also possible that 
Muggeridge had some sort of previous experience which helped him to build such a 
successful working relationship in such a short space of time. 
The one major downside to the conception that Muggeridge held other qualifications or had 
gained previous experiences which were relevant to his appointment to the position of the 
commander of the East African Intelligence Centre is that M.I.5. did not record any previous 
connection with him in what was a secret document. The report of 1921 was not produced 
to be an official history of M.I.5.’s war time activities; therefore, an in-depth analysis of 
Muggeridge would have been inappropriate, but more morsels of information relating to 
Foster were included. 
As will be examined in Chapter Seven, Foster was reasonably successful in his command of 
the Intelligence Centre. It would seem odd to have appointed as his successor a man with 
no credentials to his name other than that he was a ‘local planter’; unless there was a 
complete breakdown of reason amongst the personnel at M.I.5.D., which is not supported 
in any way by the surviving documents, Muggeridge must have had credentials enough for 
them to be assured of the continuing performance of the East African Intelligence Centre 
under him. As with Foster, we must content ourselves with this limited knowledge. 
 
                                                          





Very little information about the structure of the work force of the East African Intelligence 
Centre has survived in the publicly available archives. Excepting the Majors Foster and 
Muggeridge, few names were recorded; when referred to, which is itself a rare occurrence, 
other members of the East African Forces attached to the Intelligence Centre were usually 
described simply as ‘Officer’ or ‘N.C.O.’ One paragraph written by Muggeridge, which was 
briefly quoted from above, illustrated that the work force employed by the Intelligence 
Centre was not large: 
‘No establishment beyond the appointment of Major Foster as G.S.O.2 and that of a 
Staff Captain as Assistant was arranged but an Officer of the K.A.R. [King’s African 
Rifles] for cipher and other duties, and two N.C.O’s for correspondence were 
attached to the Central Office. More recently [as of 7th January 1919 – must have 
occurred in 1918] it has been arranged for three officers of the K.A.R. to act as 
representatives of the Department in Uganda, Conquered Territory and Nyasaland in 
addition to their other duties in each case, and several N.C.Os have been temporarily 
lent too, in connection with the searching of passengers passing through the ports 
for mischievous correspondence.’370 
Assuming this to be correct, for there is no other extant source with which to cross-examine 
it with, only six officers ever worked for the Intelligence Centre. Only a maximum of five of 
these could have been working after 24th May 1918, since there is no evidence that any 
external officer replaced Muggeridge after he replaced Foster; the ‘Assistant’ role remained 
empty. Three of these officers only worked for the Intelligence Centre part time; hence, 
Muggeridge and the unnamed K.A.R. Officer ‘for cipher and other duties’ must have been 
the only officers working fulltime in the Intelligence Centre after the departure of Foster. 
The ‘two N.C.O’s’ appear to have been permanent staff members, whilst the ‘several N.C.Os’ 
were not. This would result in a sum of five, and, after Foster’s departure, four, permanent 
members of staff for the Intelligence Centre, with an unknown, but seemingly small, 
number of part time or temporary members of staff attached in some way.  
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Although there were only a few N.C.O.s they were imperative to the work of the Intelligence 
Centre. Muggeridge later wrote that: ‘[the Intelligence Centre] is… greatly indebted to the 
King’s African Rifles Headquarters Staff for the loan of several N.C.Os without whom it 
would have been impossible to find a suitable personnel to supervise and carry out the 
searching’ for port controls.371 
In continuation of the above quote that begins ‘It was hoped that with the help of the 
Governors, Major Foster would secure the cooperation not only of the battalion Intelligence 
officers but also of the civil and police authorities…,’ the following sentence was written: ‘it 
was also hoped that at least one civil and one police officer might be associated with the 
Intelligence officer so that all branches of the Administration might be represented in the 
Intelligence office.’372 If this actually occurred as written is unrecorded, but since there was 
cooperation between the Intelligence Centre and the different colonies and protectorates, 
one can assume that at least some civil and police officers became associated with the 
Centre; therefore the number of people who worked in some capacity for it was increased 
slightly from the formal numbers above. 
No mention is made of any non-Officer or non-N.C.O. having worked for the Intelligence 
Centre. It would be unthinkable for this to have been the case. Unless the five permanent 
staff members of the Centre were unusually, almost to impossibly, physically active in a 
region with little permanent infrastructure which was in a state of guerrilla warfare, it must 
have been the case that others were involved. Much of the legwork of the labour 
accomplished by the Intelligence Centre was almost certainly exerted by Africans employed 
as soldiers and porters; their exertions were not recorded for posterity by M.I.5.D. One must 
read between the lines to see that while the Intelligence Centre was commanded by white 
male Britons, black Africans were integral to its achievements. 
Overall, the actual number of people who would have worked in some capacity for the 
Intelligence Centre would have been larger than the official figures already stated. Over and 
above the Majors Foster and Muggeridge, the other permanent and part-time staff 
members, the associated civil and police officers and the unmentioned Africans, the 
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Intelligence Centre had connections with other administrative bodies across the wider 
British-controlled region. Along with the overlap with the East African Force’s Intelligence 
Department, the likes of the various censors, Provost Marshals and Governors would, by the 
very nature of their work, have facilitated the aims of the Intelligence Centre. Nevertheless, 
it seems clear that in spite of its large geographical range, at no point in time was the East 
African Intelligence Centre a large operation in terms of its workforce. The obscurity 
surrounding the exact size and composition of this workforce is not a historiographical 
problem that is unique to East Africa in the study of the use of counter-intelligence in the 
British Empire during the First World War. Again in respect to the events then occurring in 
the Middle East, Satia has concluded that ‘As intelligence began to widen its domain to 
include administration and operations planning, it also sank further into the recesses of the 
covert world.’373 Said covert world provides many interesting sources to the historical 




The institution of the East African Intelligence Centre occurred on 20th August 1917. 
Excepting the unfortunate event of Major Foster having to be invalided back to the United 
Kingdom in the May of 1918, this institution appears to have been smooth and orderly. The 
Intelligence Centre cultivated cordial communications with M.I.5.D., to whom it reported, it 
developed a small workforce, and it encouraged interactions with other interested parties in 
the region. 
Although small, the Intelligence Centre was solid. This solidity allowed it to undertake the 
work that was required of it to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the 
British Empire in East Africa during the East African Campaign of the First World War, as will 
be examined in Chapter Seven. However, its limited size restricted its ability to be fully 
successful in all of its endeavours on this matter. 
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Conclusion: Chapter Six 
 
The imperial counter-intelligence project of M.I.5.D. began in London in the summer of 1915 
and continued throughout the remaining years of the First World War. The commencement 
of this project was vital for preventing Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the 
British Empire in East Africa during the latter part of this war, for it brought about the 
institution of the East African Intelligence Centre. This Intelligence Centre immediately set 
about tackling the tasks in hand in November 1917 and, although small, achieved some 
success. 
The deficiency of the Intelligence Department of the King’s African Rifles was examined in 
Chapter Four; the British Imperial Government in London refused to prepare the British 
Empire in East Africa for the potential of a war on the African continent between two white 
colonisers, as had occurred in South Africa at the turn of the Twentieth Century. This 
Department evolved into the Intelligence Department of the East African Forces during the 
East African Campaign of the First World War and was led by Captain Richard 
Meinertzhagen from early 1915 to the summer of 1916. It was concerned with military 
intelligence and, whilst there was overlap, as befitted a region experiencing guerrilla 
warfare, it was not directly responsible for preventing Pan-Islamism from threatening the 
security of the British Empire. As such an in-depth look at its structure, duties, and 
accomplishments is not necessary to answer this thesis’ central research question. 
The most obvious example of this overlap can be seen in an analysis of Major Notley’s 
Memorandum on the employment of a Counter Espionage Bureau in British East Africa, 
November 1915, which has previously been cited in this thesis. Whilst this was signed only 
by Notley, it was written in the first-person plural.374 In the “D” Branch Report. Report on the 
Establishment of a Special Intelligence Service in the Colonies and Overseas Dominions the 
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reason for this was made clear; the memorandum had been ‘drawn up’ by ‘the Provost 
Marshal [Notley], and the Chief of the Military Intelligence Staff’: Meinertzhagen.375 
The Intelligence Department of the East African Forces had relatively little to do with 
preventing Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa. 
However, its expansion demonstrated the wider growth of the British Empire’s intelligence 
network in this region in the years of the First World War.  
The British Empire could potentially have also been represented by another intelligence 
department in East Africa in 1918: the ‘Eastern Africa Mohammedan Bureau. (Under the 
Arab Bureau)’.376 In the January of 1918 Captain Philipps was ordered to draw up the 
particulars for the proposed scheme. His particulars were well detailed, but there is no 
evidence that they were ever adopted.377 Why this was the case was not recorded, but it 
may have been due to the institution of the East African Intelligence Centre two months 
previously. In January 1919 Major Muggeridge wrote that ‘Pan Islamism, Pan Ethiopianism, 
and the activities of Missionaries [were] amongst the subjects in regard to which every 
endeavour [had] been made [by the Intelligence Centre] to collect information and record 
the opinions of those competent to judge.’378 Whilst the British imperial intelligence 
establishment was expanding, the officials involved may well have considered it 
unnecessary for the British Empire to found and financially support two counter-intelligence 
departments which were working on the same subject in the same location at the same 
time. 
Although in 1918 Philipps became ‘attached to the Arab Bureau Force, and served in Cairo, 
Jerusalem, Syria, and Abyssinia’ he remained active in dealing with the threat of Pan-
Islamism in East Africa. He eventually returned to Uganda to become a District 
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Commissioner.379 Muggeridge thought so highly of Philipps’ work that after the end of the 
war he took the trouble to write to him to say ‘thank you for all the assistance you have 
given the [East African Intelligence Centre]’, and to inform him that ‘The information you 
have sent from time to time has been most useful and has been carefully carded. I am very 
grateful.’ According to Muggeridge, Philipps’ ‘heart was in the work.’380 As will be examined 
in Chapter Seven, Philipps’ work was vitally important for preventing Pan-Islamism from 
threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa during the years of the East 
African Campaign of the First World War 
The argument Thomas presents in his subchapter ‘Intelligence Gathering and Stereotyping’ 
in Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914 is a pertinent 
one for both this chapter and its successor: 
‘Colonial intelligence gathering was not everywhere a matter of 
misperception and chimerical fears… But in times of acute political crisis, 
security service personnel reverted to a simpler typology. When the colonial 
order was under threat, indigenous subjects were more often viewed 
monolithically as potentially, if not actually, dangerous rather than as a 
differentiated, heterogeneous national population among which only a tiny 
minority of individuals harboured seditious ideas. This conflation of the 
dependent population into the category of potential enemy – a classic case of 
“othering,” … – reflected the underlying structural weakness of colonial 
states. 
The propensity to stereotype suggests that additional sources of information 
and new intelligence bureaus to process it did not invariably mean better 
analysis of local social conditions.’381 
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The establishment of M.I.5.D. and the institution of the East African Intelligence Centre 
made a large impact upon the use of counter-intelligence by the British Empire in East 
Africa, but they did not change the character of the imperial relationship upon which they 
were built. Thomas continues by stating that ‘It was perhaps an obvious point, but one that 
was often lost by more senior officials: to understand the indigenous population – and avoid 
the worse of stereotyping – one had to move among it.’382 The short time that it was in 
existence, coupled by the very limited number of personnel it could employ, meant that the 
Intelligence Centre, and through it M.I.5.D., was unable to mitigate its inherent 
impediments. The work done by the Intelligence Centre was an improvement on the work 
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Chapter Seven Action: Preventing Pan-Islamism from Threatening the Security of the 
British Empire in East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the First 
World War 
 
After identifying the threat posed by Pan-Islamism to the security of the British Empire in 
East Africa, as was detailed in Chapter Five, Captain Philipps concluded that ‘A small 
commission of enquiry, or at least an officer’ should ‘be detailed, to submit full first hand 
[sic] information and practical suggestions to the Government with the object of obtaining a 
definite co-ordinated policy and specific measures to cope with these movements in the 
territories concerned at the earliest possible date.’383 
Yet there was a note of caution looming over this entire issue. At the beginning of his essay 
Captain Bray took the trouble to make one fact very plain: the British Empire would be 
unable to prevent Pan-Islamism from existing in the British Empire. 
He began this note of caution by informing his reader that ‘The effort against us, is… spread 
over a wide area, in fact over the whole of the Mohammedan world… It must be recognised 
that the movement [Pan-Islamism] has been going on for a considerable number of years, it 
has gained many adherents, it has become an ideal with thousands of the younger 
generation, and those imbued with modern mohammedan [sic] ideas of education’.384 
The consequences of this were, Bray continued, that ‘We [the British Empire] can not [sic] 
hope to eradicate by suppressive measures in [the British Empire], the elements forming 
dangerous material, we can not hope to wipe out by violent measures so deep-rooted, so 
widely spread a movement; any more than we can hope by similar measures to supress the 
Socialist movement in Europe.’ Therefore, the conclusion was that ‘Purely suppressive 
measures merely drive it [Pan-Islamism] under-ground and we lose its threads, wholesale 
arrests merely frighten for the moment and eventually lead to greater discontent; while 
those arrested, being regarded as Martyrs in a noble cause, will by their sacrifice, draw more 
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into the field against us, while those working in countries over which we have little or no 
control are the more insistent in their endeavours.’385 
Bray ended this section with a substantial recommendation to those in the British Empire 
who were tasked with preventing Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of that 
empire: 
‘The point therefore I wish to emphasise is, that the movement has taken too firm a 
hold in the minds of Mohammedans, for us ever to hope to eliminate it. That even in 
India however severe our suppressive measures, it will gain new direction, in 
countries outside India it will gather fresh momentum. 
Therefore the methods we use and the policy we adopt in the near future will make 
for us many friends or many enemies. If we show ourselves completely hostile to this 
movement, the fact will be welcomed by those working against us and is the very 
attitude they would wish us to adopt.’386 
In short, Bray’s argument was that attempting to prevent Pan-Islamism from existing within 
the British Empire was not only impossible but would actually backfire. Consequently, the 
British Empire would need to prevent the threat from Pan-Islamism without being seen to 
work against Pan-Islamism itself. British officials in East Africa heeded these words, and 
developed strategies to prevent the threat without openly preventing the movement. 
It does not appear that ‘A small commission of enquiry, or at least an officer’ was ‘detailed’ 
for the work until the institution of the East African Intelligence Centre. All of the major 
players in the region, the Intelligence Centre included, suggested various ideas to prevent 
only the threat, not the philosophy, from Pan-Islamism to the security of the British Empire 
both across the world and in East Africa specifically: 
Bray himself suggested that ‘The influence of Islam for good or evil will depend on its ethical 
quality and political character. Consequently the importance of securing the best and most 
enlightened Islamic teaching is very great, and effort and money should be expended to this 
and in combatting detrimental and reactionary opinions.’387 Sir Reginald Wingate suggested 






that ‘Christian Missionary enterprise… may [check], and even in places [prevent]… Islam, as 
a creed and social system’. 388 Sir Charles Cleveland, the Director of Criminal Intelligence in 
India, suggested ‘that the detailed information put into our hands justifies and requires an 
effort on the part of Government to destroy the lines of communication and intrigue which 
have been revealed to us and to repress a few of the more important individuals concerned, 
for the good of the whole community and for the peace and safety of the Empire.’389 The 
East African Intelligence Centre was to suggest various ideas, such as the enactment and 
enforcement of port controls to prevent ‘the hand-carrying of letters [including Pan-Islamic 
propaganda] in and out of [East Africa]’.390 Lieutenant Colonel Sykes and Captains Willis and 
Philipps recorded what the Imperial Government in London had suggested. They recorded 
that ‘it [appeared] that the policy of H.B.M’s Government in this area should be to the 
development of national feeling within its natural divisions, to develop deliberately the 
‘insulating area’ between the great Mohammedan populations, to restrain by means of 
religious toleration and secular education the inroads of religious fanaticism of whatever 
origins, and to prepare the way for intelligent participation by the natives in their own 
administration and self control [sic] within the limits of their nation.’391 
These suggestions were all based upon Bray’s substantial recommendation. If implemented, 
they would not appear as if the British Empire was hostile to the Islamic world; if successful, 
they would prevent the threat posed by Pan-Islamism to East Africa. 
Therefore, whilst the need to develop a strategy to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening 
the security of the British Empire in East Africa was unanimous amongst the British imperial 
officials concerned, suggestions of what this strategy should be were not unanimous. Eight 
different strategies were suggested in total; rather than examine them and decide which 
strategies presented the best prospects for success, the British Empire went with a blunt 
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approach and tried to implement all eight simultaneously. Amongst the reasons for this 
blunt approach were that some of these strategies began to be implemented before the 
institution of the East African Intelligence Centre, whilst others were implemented as a 
result of the changing military landscape of the East African Campaign. 
The eight different strategies proposed were as follows:  
1. The Physical Expansion of the Size of the British Empire in East Africa. 
2. The Development of the East African Force Along Tribal Lines. 
3. The Growth of the Attributes of the Imperial Intelligence Establishment of the British 
Empire. 
4. The Cultivation of British Imperial Strength in the Islamic World. 
5. The Promotion of Weak Central Government and Strong Nationalist Feelings 
amongst the Islamic Population of East Africa. 
6. The Securing of the ‘Insulating Belt’ of East Africa. 
7. The Implementation of Counter-Intelligence in East Africa. 
8. The Production and Dissemination of Pro-British Propaganda.  
Alas, the surviving documents demonstrate that despite trying to simultaneously implement 
eight different strategies for the same problem tempers did not fray; everybody remained 
affable, even friendly. A loss to a detached reader perhaps, but no doubt a relief to those 
who were attempting to implement them. 
These surviving documents also do not treat all eight of these proposed strategies equally; 
some of the eight strategies were recorded in multiple documents, and some only in a few. 
As was previously noted in the Introduction to this thesis, due to the constraints imposed 
upon doctoral theses the analysis of these eight strategies will cease at the end of the First 
World War. In some cases, the primary sources dry up rather quickly, before even the end of 
the War, whilst in some they carry on for years after 1918; in all cases more work needs to 
be undertaken on this topic in the post-First World War era.  
Care has been taken to demonstrate the breadth of labour that was undertaken in both the 
planning and implementation of these strategies. Extensive research into these surviving 
documents allows one to construct the narrative for how the British Empire prevented Pan-
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Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa in the years of the 
























Subchapter One: The Physical Expansion of the Size of the British Empire in East Africa 
 
As the German Empire had been identified as a source of the Pan-Islamic movement in East 
Africa one path forward seemed clear to the British Empire: the removal of German 
influence from East Africa. As Pan-Islamism had a second source into East Africa through the 
actions of some East Africans and the African Diaspora, the removal of German influence 
would not prevent the threat from coming to fruition; yet removing one source, that of a 
major European colonial power no less, could be nothing but beneficial to preventing the 
threat posed by Pan-Islamism to the British Empire. The proposal to remove German 
influence from East Africa was simply outlined: colonise German East Africa for the British 
Empire. Thus, the first of the eight strategies proposed to prevent Pan-Islamism from 
threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa was to win the East African 
Campaign of the First World War and expand the physical size of the British Empire to 
encompass that land which had hitherto been part of the German Empire in the region. A 
relatively simple outline, but, as any history of the East African Campaign will inform its 
reader, one that proved to be harder in practice than theory.392  
Nevertheless, when the threat from Pan-Islamism in East Africa was identified in 1917 the 
East African Campaign had already swung in the British Empire’s favour. The 
implementation of this first strategy was successful before it had even been suggested, for 
by 1917 great swathes of German East Africa were already under the control of the British 
Empire and German influence in the region was dropping dramatically. This success resulted 
not only in the removal of the relatively large Islamic population of German East Africa from 
the colonial authority of a power with which the British Empire was at war, but in the 
relocation of most of this authority to the British Empire itself.  
The British Empire expanded in East Africa to gain physical control of German East Africa, 
but the formal status of the former German colony was to remain unsettled throughout the 
First World War. This problem forced the British Empire to consider the positions of the 
different colonial administrations and states who possessed some jurisdiction over the 
                                                          
392 See, amongst others: Hordern, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles. Military Operations: Volume I August 1914 – 
September 1916 (London; His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1941); Paice, Edward. Tip & Run: The Untold Tragedy 
of the Great War in Africa (London; Phoenix, 2008). 
199 
 
Islamic population of the East African region when it interacted with this population. They 
were forced to fudge the problem; a settled status for German East Africa did not occur until 
after the end of the First World War. 
 
The Physical Conquest of German East Africa 
 
After the abortive attempt of 1914, the invasion of German East Africa by the British Empire 
began in 1916 under the leadership of Jan Smuts. The future Prime Minister of South Africa, 
Smuts switched from fighting the British Empire during the Second Boer War to become one 
of the Empire’s most important figures in both the First and the Second World Wars. Smuts’ 
invasion marked 1916 as the year in which the British gained the advantage against the 
German Empire militaristically in the East African Campaign; in early 1917 Smuts ‘marked his 
withdrawal from the fray with a declaration of victory in East Africa.’ As Paice has 
considered, ‘It was certainly the case that his decisive leadership in the field, and his 
willingness to take risks, had wrested more than one million square miles of German 
territory from the Kaiser’ in less than a year.  
However, Paice concludes that this ‘declaration of victory’ was proclaimed ‘In order to 
safeguard his reputation’, for ‘von Lettow-Vorbeck and [Governor] Schnee [of German East 
Africa] remained undefeated in the field’.393 Despite the fall of one million square miles of 
German territory, von Lettow-Vorbeck’s troops did not vacate German East Africa for good 
until 1918. Travelling then to Northern Rhodesia, von Lettow-Vorbeck accepted the 
armistice on British imperial territory, for which he returned to Germany a hero. The First 
World War in East Africa was to continue for the better part of two years after Smuts made 
his declaration of victory.  
Nevertheless, most of German East Africa was in the hands of the British Empire by the start 
of 1917; the physical conquest of German East Africa placed great swathes of former 
German territory under the control of the British Empire. Not only was the relatively large 
Islamic population of the former German colony removed from living under the authority of 
a power which wished to threaten the security of the British Empire by the promotion of 
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Pan-Islamism, it, due to them being the conquering powers, came under the authority of the 
British Empire itself. 
 
The Unsettled Status of the Conquered Territories 
 
Despite Smuts and his successors’ hard work, there was never any assurance at any point 
during the First World War that German East Africa would become a part of the British 
Empire at the cessation of fighting; there was not even any assurance that it would not 
remain a part of the German Empire. This was unfortunate for Britain’s aspiration to prevent 
German influence upon the Pan-Islamic movement in East Africa, for Germany remaining 
absent from the region was considered to be fundamental to the success of many of the 
other seven proposed strategies. On this topic, a Colonel from M.O.2., another branch of 
the British imperial intelligence establishment, stated in July 1917: ‘So much turns on 
German East Africa remaining British… that it is impossible to lay down definite schemes for 
development at present.’394  
Notwithstanding this statement, officials of the British Empire felt that it was essential to 
attempt to ‘lay down’ some ‘schemes’ across the East African region to help prevent the 
threat from Pan-Islamism, even if these ‘schemes’ would not be ‘definite’ in the intervening 
time period before ‘German East Africa remaining British’ could be assured. However, the 
major stumbling block to the idea to go ahead and implement ‘schemes’ in East Africa was 
that there were other administrations and states that had, in a variety of forms, jurisdiction 
over the Islamic population of East Africa: it would be necessary to co-ordinate them all. 
Sir Reginald Wingate wrote that ‘The requisite co-ordination of policy’ was ‘complicated by 
the fact that the Moslem regions in Eastern Africa’ were in February 1918 ‘administered 
(eliminating Germany) by four separate authorities – the Colonial Office, the Anglo-Egyptian 
Government (under the Foreign Office), Abyssinia and Italy.’395 
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When he wrote that it was ‘clear, at least, that some uniform native policy [was] wanted to 
deal adequately with the new situation’, Captain Buxton agreed with Wingate on the 
necessity of co-ordinating policy across jurisdictions, but Buxton calculated them differently. 
Instead of totalling four, Buxton made it five with the addition of Germany: ‘But such 
uniformity can hardly be realized’, he wrote, ‘if the area concerned is still to be 
administered by five separate authorities – the Colonial office [sic], the Egyptian (or Sudan) 
Government, and the governments of Abyssinia, Italy, and Germany.’ Buxton, it emerges, 
was not quite as prepared to eliminate Germany from German East Africa as Wingate was; 
there had been no fundamental change in the East African Campaign in the two months that 
separated their statements. Buxton then furthered his sum still further: ‘If the desire of the 
settlers in British East Africa for responsible Government should be granted’, he continued, 
‘a sixth would be added.’396 
Neither Wingate nor Buxton was correct, for both failed to note that the Portuguese and 
Belgian Empires also administered Islamic populations in East Africa and, in the case of the 
latter, Central Africa. To truly be able to organise ‘The requisite co-ordination of policy’ 
across ‘the Moslem regions in Eastern Africa’ the British would also need to co-ordinate with 
these two colonial administrations.  
There was yet a further authority – the ninth – that must be added to such a list: The United 
States of America. Having entered the war on 6th April 1917 on the side of the Allies, the 
Americans would need to be either consulted or pointedly excluded from discussions 
involving territorial changes in any peace settlement. Buxton was in favour of the latter 
approach, arguing that it was ‘important… that this colony should become British, and not 
“international”, as suggested by Liberal and Labour Politicians’, for administrating German 
East Africa internationally would require the presence of the Americans, and any American 
influence, he argued, would be a recipe for disaster: ‘Any kind of international 
administration would almost certainly be weak, and would probably be controlled by the 
Americans, who have shown a marked incapacity for dealing with negroes.’397 
                                                          




Setting aside the USA’s racial difficulties – which could not possibly be comprehensively 
analysed here – Buxton may well have had a point. The idea that all nine of the different 
authorities who had some jurisdiction over the Islamic population of East Africa would have 
managed to agree on a ‘uniform native policy’ that would have been able ‘to deal 
adequately with the new situation’, whilst fighting not only the East African Campaign but 
all of the campaigns of the First World War, does seem terribly unlikely, especially when one 
includes Germany itself. 
The obvious solution was to reduce the number of interested parties. Buxton suggested that 
if ‘the number of these authorities could be reduced to two – Egypt and Italy – the problem 
would be much simplified.’ Egypt was chosen by Buxton to act for the British Empire 
because ‘The most influential elements in Eastern Africa are Arab or semi-Arab, and there is 
no Government more qualified to control them than that of Egypt.’398 After the cessation of 
fighting Captain Philipps presented the more idealist approach that ‘The war happily has 
demonstrated that thought must henceforward be in terms of Continents, no longer in 
those of State or Protectorate.’399 No one made that claim in this regard whilst the fighting 
was still being engaged. 
In the summer of 1917 Lieutenant Colonel Sykes and Captains Willis and Philipps 
determined this matter. Because ‘German East Africa, if it remained in the hands of the 
Germans after the war, would provide not only a menace to the neighbouring Colonies of 
the British Empire, but as an easy submarine base against India, would threaten a still wider 
sphere (viz. all shipping routes to the East)’ they declared that ‘it was therefore assumed 
that for purposes of general policy G.E.A. [German East Africa] could be considered as a part 
of the British Empire.’400 Their declaration that for the duration of the First World War it was 
to become an unofficial part of the British Empire was apparently not immediately heeded 
by Wingate and Buxton; communication across the Empire was poor. The remaining 
authorities were co-ordinated with when necessary. 
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The expansion of the size of the British Empire in East Africa into German East Africa would 
not allow the British Empire to act with impunity over the entire Islamic population of the 
region. However, as the major military power for the Allies in the East African Campaign, as 
well as the major colonial power, the British Empire was, on the whole, able to 
independently implement their strategies to prevent the threat posed by Pan-Islamism until 




As the long-term status of German East Africa was to remain unsettled for the entirety of 
the remaining years of the First World War, the expansion of the size of the British Empire in 
East Africa into German East Africa did not give the British Empire unilateral control over the 
Islamic population of the region. Yet it did have two important consequences: it removed 
the relatively large Islamic population of German East Africa from the colonial authority of a 
power with which the British Empire was at war, and it placed that Islamic population 
mostly under the authority of the British Empire itself.  
The British Empire had to strategise for the potential of German East Africa returning to 
German rule after the First World War. ‘Whether we eventually take over the country or 
restore it’, Philipps wrote, ‘it is equally necessary to have immediately a co-ordinated and 
active Islamic policy’. Therefore, ‘Should the country be restored to Germany, the effect of 
such influence, exerted meantime, upon the natives and Moslems in particular will be of the 
greatest value in counteracting German anti-ally policy which will probably be in Africa, 
again propagated through Islamic agency.’401 
The British Empire got most of what it desired after the Great War. German East Africa was 
not to return to German rule, yet neither was it formally given to the British Empire. The 
international organisation of the League of Nations declared the new Tanganyika Territory a 
League Mandate under the administration of the British Empire on 20th July 1922. Buxton 
may have been appeased to know that the United States of America never joined the 
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League, and so had no administrative control over the Tanganyika Territory until it was 
declared a United Nations Trust Territory after the Second World War. The Tanganyika 
Territory remained under the control of the British Empire until its independence on 9th 
December 1961. 
Despite these successes, it must be observed once again that the German Empire was not 
the sole source of Pan-Islamism in the region. Consequently, the outcome of this first 
strategy did not result in the termination of the threat posed by Pan-Islamism to the 
security of the British Empire in East Africa. Paradoxically, the expansion of the British 
Empire into German East Africa exacerbated the second source, as it caused Africans from 



















Subchapter Two: The Development of the East African Force Along Tribal Lines 
 
The development of the East African Force along tribal lines was a second strategy proposed 
to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa in 
the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War. As was observed in Chapter 
Five, ‘an unprecedented’ fraternisation of soldiers from different parts of Africa occurred 
around the campfires of East Africa. The conversations that flowed from the non-local to the 
local soldiers were a font for the spread of certain ideologies into an area of Africa which 
had hitherto remained almost entirely unaffected by them.402 The ideas espoused by these 
ideologies were a potential threat to the security of the British Empire in East Africa. Whilst 
Pan-Islamism was not singled out for specific notice in the reports about fraternisation, the 
reports themselves, not least their titles, demonstrated that Pan-Islamism was a major 
ideology that was finding a source into East Africa in this manner.403 
After the threat of these campfire chats had been identified by Captain Philipps, thought 
turned to how to prevent these soldiers from continuing to be a source of Pan-Islamism and 
Pan-Africanism. The African soldiers could not be expelled as they were still needed to fight 
in the East African Campaign; preventing any further ‘unprecedented mixing of 
representatives of almost all the black races of Africa’ was established as the only way to 
counter this problem. The East African Force was to be developed to achieve this.404  
The theory was sound, but the reality was quite different; implementing measures to 
prevent further fraternisation proved to be difficult during a time of hostility. Yet even if 
they had been successful it may well have made little difference; Pan-Islamism had already 
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entered East Africa via the African diaspora and no strategy the British Empire could 
propose could change that fact. 
 
The Rapid Growth of the British Imperial Military Force in East Africa during the First World War 
 
Due to the outbreak of the East African Campaign of the First World War on 3rd August 
1914, it was necessary for the British Empire to quickly expand its imperial military force in 
East Africa. Prior to this date the development of the King’s African Rifles (K.A.R.) had been 
primarily designed with colonial conflict in mind. Charles Hordern chronicled that ‘Although 
both the German and the British protectorates [of East Africa] had been generally pacified, 
certain areas still required special measures… expeditions in the unadministered northern 
areas of British East Africa and Uganda’ to perform such actions as ‘to check the raiding 
propensities’ of certain tribes’ ‘were thus absorbing the greater part of the slender military 
resources of the two protectorates when, as a result of events in Europe, East Africa was 
unexpectedly drawn into the “World War.”’405 
Consequently, the K.A.R. had to develop along other lines very quickly. However, most of 
the troops that joined it on the outbreak of war were poor. The Cabinet Office recorded that 
‘At the outbreak of [the First World War] the only military forces in the East Africa 
Protectorate and Uganda consisted of [the] King’s African Rifles (native soldiers with 
European officers)’ but many members of the European community of the region wished to 
enlist; hence, ‘steps were at once taken locally to raise a body of mounted and unmounted 
European volunteers.’ Furthermore, ‘[it] was also decided, in accordance with 
recommendations of a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, that troops 
from India should be brought to East Africa both for defensive and offensive purposes.’ 
Thus, in August 1915 ‘a considerable number [of the British Empire’s troops in East Africa] 
[consisted] of Indian troops’, who, according to the Cabinet, had ‘been found to be of little 
value from a military point of view.’ The effort of the ‘white troops’ was not commended 
either: ‘Of the white troops’, cabinet papers recorded, ‘a large proportion have little military 
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training; the number of really first-class troops is very small. The sickness among the troops 
generally has been considerable and has had a discouraging, if not demoralising, effect.’406 
‘After the humiliations of [the Battles of] Taveta, Tanga, and Jassini, [in 1914 and early 1915] 
the British fought more creditably’, writes Robert G. Gregory, and it was out of the need to 
‘marshall [sic] their resources for an effective pursuit’ that ‘the British at the end of 1915 
organized an East African force, which consisted of all the British, Indian, and African troops 
then in East and Central Africa as well as contingents from South Africa.’407 It was at this 
point that a fighting force designed around the needs of the East African Campaign, rather 
than one just adapted from peace time, came into fruition. ‘The forces at Smuts’s disposal’ 
by February 1916 ‘consisted of 4,575 Europeans, 5,704 Africans, and 14,303 Indians of 
whom 373 were officers. There were also 3,564 Indian and 19,451 African ‘followers’, 
mostly porters and servants.’408 By the end of the First World War the K.A.R. ‘had grown to 
be 35,424 strong, in twenty-two battalions, the KARMI [mounted infantry] and a Signals 
Company. Eleven per cent of the regiment were Europeans.’ As mentioned in the 
Introduction of this thesis, ‘[excluding] Allied and Naval personnel, about 114,000 troops 
had been engaged in the conflict’, omitting the porters.409  
The British Empire was consequently in possession of a substantial imperial military force 
that was formed of a large number of Indians and an even larger number of Africans; mixed 
together in a heterogenous manner across twenty-two battalions, the KARMI and a Signals 
Company. Sitting around the campfires, this ‘unprecedented’ fraternisation of soldiers from 
different parts of Africa resulted in: 
‘much talk – in the lingua franca which never fails the African – starting from 
stomach and wife, and the distance which they themselves have been brought from 
home to hardship, and touching on the killing of white by black as illustrated before 
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their eyes… for the first time in Eastern Africa [had] arisen a conscious feeling of the 
possibilities of a “black Africa”.’410  
 
‘Homogeneous Rather than Heterogeneous’: The Difficulties of the Practical Implementation  
 
To prevent Pan-Islamism or Pan-Africanism from continuing to spread in this manner, 
Colonel French argued that ‘it should be laid down as a guiding principle that companies 
should as far as possible be homogeneous rather than heterogeneous, tribal rather than 
mixed.’411 M.O.2. concurred that the ‘development of our military forces’ in East Africa was 
necessary. They recommended that ‘As far as possible, it seems wise to use, for native 
garrisons, tribes recruited at a distance from their habitats’ to prevent fraternisation 
between them and the people of the locality.412 
French declared that the development of the East African Force was ‘a point on which it 
appears that immediate action can be taken in organising African troops’. 413 Conversely, 
this was not the same declaration made by the Colonel of M.O.2., who wrote that they had 
found Philipps’ memorandum “Africa for the African” and “Pan-Islam” Recent developments 
in Central and Eastern Africa ‘interesting’, for it bore ‘out our insistence on a really sufficient 
garrison for East and East-Central Africa after the war; and justifies our demand for Artillery 
and Auxiliary Services for the Kings [sic] African Rifles. It also justifies our demands for the 
re-organization and expansion of the Sudanese Army… to check the southward movement 
of Islam’.414 M.O.2. was therefore of the opinion that ‘immediate action’ could not occur, 
and that the development of the East African Force to prevent fraternisation would have to 
wait until ‘after the war’. Interestingly, the answer to why they thought this came from 
French himself, who allowed that due to the ‘very great expansion of the [East African 
Force] which [had] recently taken place’, he was ‘not sure whether it [had] been found 
possible to adhere to this practice.’415 Although French’s statement might seem at first 
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contradictory, it was not; ‘immediate action’ of some level could be taken, but the 
development of an East African Force that contained companies comprised only in a 
homogenous tribal manner could not, due to its inflated size, realistically be undertaken in a 




Whilst everybody involved was in agreement that the theoretical proposal that the 
‘companies’ of the East African Force ‘should as far as possible be homogeneous rather than 
heterogeneous, tribal rather than mixed’, to prevent recurrences of ‘the introduction of 
ideas’ which were ‘prejudicial to the prestige of the white man as a dominating race’, was a 
good proposal, it was decided almost immediately that the practical implementation of it 
was unrealistic whilst the East African Campaign of the First World War continued.416 This, 
as expressed by French, was because the Force had grown to such an extent that a full-scale 
reorganisation would be needed; a reorganisation that would be virtually impossible whilst 
it was engaged in guerrilla warfare.  
This lack of urgency can, however, be attributed to a second cause. Officials of the British 
Empire understood that whilst measures could be implemented to prevent further 
fraternisation, Pan-Islamism had already entered East Africa via the African diaspora and no 
strategy could change that fact. With that in mind, spending many, potentially fruitless, 
hours attempting to redevelop the East African Force along tribal lines whilst it was in the 
midst of the East African Campaign may have seemed pointless. 
When taken together, these two causes combined to result in the second strategy proposed 
to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa in 
the years of the First World War not progressing to the implementation stage. 
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Subchapter Three: The Growth of the Attributes of the Imperial Intelligence Establishment of 
the British Empire 
 
The third strategy proposed to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the 
British Empire in East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War 
was to grow the attributes of the imperial intelligence establishment of the British Empire. 
Sir Reginald Wingate wrote to the Foreign Secretary in February 1918 espousing such a 
course of action: 
‘[As a] guarantee against native unrest… I have for long felt that it is desirable to 
obtain a freer interchange of opinions and information about the progress, moral 
and material, of the Moslem populations throughout the Empire, and more direct 
communications between the Administrations of the less important dependencies 
and the principal centres of Islamic thought. At these centres only can the real trend 
of Moslem opinion be correctly estimated, and the general lines of our Moslem 
policy, propaganda and counter-propaganda be usefully determined.’417 
Wingate therefore advocated two interlinked courses of action to grow the attributes of the 
imperial intelligence establishment of the British Empire: 
(1) ‘[To] obtain a freer interchange’ about ‘the Moslem populations throughout the 
Empire’.  
(2) The implementation of ‘more direct communications between the less important 
dependencies’ such as East Africa and ‘the principal centres of Islamic thought.’ 
The first course of action advocated by Wingate was successful, but only as far as the 
constraints of the First World War would allow. The ability to interchange information about 
the Islamic population of the British Empire was constrained by the lack of expertise on the 
subject, and such expertise could not be easily acquired.  
The second course of action provided for great success. The improvement in 
communications between different areas of the British Empire allowed for information on 
the threat of Pan-Islamism to the security of the British Empire to be delivered quickly to the 
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area where it was required; this significantly helped the British imperial officials who were 
working to secure the Empire in East Africa with their endeavour. However, whilst 
communications did grow and improve, it was ironically less successful in communicating 
that communications had been upgraded. Relevant people continued to lambast the poor 
communications provided by the British Empire after the British Empire had provided the 
desired improvements in communications. Whilst the attributes of the imperial intelligence 
establishment grew, their effectiveness was compromised by this rather bizarre blunder. 
 
‘[To] obtain a freer interchange of opinions and information about the progress, moral and material, 
of the Moslem populations throughout the Empire’ 
 
An important issue, not mentioned in Wingate’s letter, is immediately obvious. To be able to 
‘interchange… opinions and information about the progress, moral and material, of the 
Moslem populations throughout the Empire’ there must first be people who were in 
possession of ‘opinions and information about the progress, moral and material, of the 
Moslem populations throughout the Empire.’ Persons with such specific knowledge of East 
Africa were scarce in the years of the First World War. The British administrations that had 
formed the governance of the British Empire in East Africa had been far too small in the pre-
war years to employ somebody to become an expert in such an apparently inconsequential 
topic as l’Islam noir. There were several people who were able to provide some expertise, 
but only one person can truly be described as having been an expert on the Pan-Islamic 
threat in East Africa in its entirety.  
Thus, to ‘obtain a freer interchange of opinions and information’ it was also necessary to not 
only consult people of expertise, but to actually discover them. 
 
The Need for Experts and for Expertise 
 
In his long essay Captain Bray asserted on several occasions the need to have a greater 
expanse of expertise amongst those who inhabited positions in the British imperial 
intelligence establishment; the lack of knowledge possessed by British officers troubled him 
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deeply from a security viewpoint. He was particularly insistent that local knowledge was key 
to securing the British Empire, stating that ‘Trade and war go hand in hand, local knowledge 
of a locality may ensure a victory, knowledge of events and people prevent a war.’ Giving an 
example that concerned India, he wrote that there had ‘recently been discovered in India a 
conspiracy aimed directly at British rule’, and that it had taken ‘the head of our C.I.D. [the 
Criminal Investigation Department] three hours to explain it to some of our most 
experienced officers, yet this conspiracy, serious as it is, is but one small stone of the 
edifice.’418 
The military and security forces were not Bray’s only object of concern: ‘“Our civil officers 
have become office bound”.’419 On Islam in particular he was even more damning about this 
lack of expertise: ‘the knowledge of British officers of Pan-Islamism and its working even of 
mohammedan history and religion’, he determined, ‘is practically nil.’420 Bray had both a 
moral as well as a security objection to this lack of expertise on Islam, for he believed that 
‘we owe it to our Mohammedan subjects to study the question from every standpoint, at 
home and abroad.’421 
Bray wished to make it very clear that he was not criticising the character or the 
respectability of the people about whom he referred, but merely their lack of expertise on 
Islam: 
‘No-one will deny, myself least of all, the excellent, nay affectionate relations that 
exist between British officers and the native ranks… In the army this has been built 
up by sport and the scrupulous fairness of the Britisher, but I know I do my brother 
officers no injustice when I say that as a whole we are woefully ignorant of 
Mohammedan customs, history and religion, and policy.’422 
For Bray, education was the key approach to improvement. He wrote that ‘I think everyone 
will agree with me when I say that in the past we have paid far too little attention, as Civil 
and Military officers, to [the] problem’ of the ‘Education of our officers, Civil and Military, in 
                                                          







knowledge of the problem [of Pan-Islamism].’ His proposed approach to improve the 
education of British officers as it regarded Islam was as follows: 
‘No British officer should enter the Indian army [sic] before he has passed an 
examination in these subjects, of however simple a nature, at Sandhurst or 
elsewhere… Every officer in the regiment should travel his recruiting area, retention 
examinations should have a stiff paper of the different classes of which his regiment 
is composed… It would help enormously to give a greater understanding between 
Civil and Military administration and be of inestimable value to the State.’ 
Bray continued his rationale by stating that this education should not be stopped once the 
officer had left formal education. Education in the field was to be just as important as 
education in the classroom: 
‘Let more initiative, in local officers, in dealing with provincial questions be 
encouraged. Let British officers be encouraged and assisted in going on leave to 
Persia, Syria, and other countries to add to their inside knowledge of India, the 
conditions prevailing abroad. The British officer is, generally speaking, popular 
wherever he goes. It will increase our influence, add to our knowledge, and help to 
safe-guard us.’423 
At the end of his essay Bray stated that as ‘Long as this note is I have but touched the fringe 
of this huge problem, each subject mentioned is in itself an immense study, which can be 
solved by the loyalty and co-operation and greater knowledge possessed by experts in each 
particular sphere.’424 This lack of expertise evident in the British military, he thus inferred, 
could not be solved overnight. If ‘each subject’ would need ‘an immense study’ and the 
‘experts’ of ‘each subject’ needed to gain ‘greater knowledge’, then his approach was not a 
quick fix to get the British Empire securely through the First World War; his approach would 
require a paradigm shift in the British imperial forces on how they dealt with knowledge 
acquisition both in the classroom and in the field. His approach would require a paradigm 
shift on the exploitation of knowledge from colonial settings. 





Yet it was here that lay the problem, for in the year that Bray composed his essay, 1917, the 
British Empire needed quick fixes to get the British Empire through the First World War 
without its security being compromised by Pan-Islamism. It had neither the time nor the 
resources to promote paradigm shifts.  
Majors Foster and Muggeridge of the East African Intelligence Centre thus had to devise a 
solution to gain the expertise they needed to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the 
security of the British Empire in East Africa during the First World War without there 
actually being many people who had the credentials to express valuable ‘opinions and 
information about the progress, moral and material’ of the Islamic population of East Africa, 
or the time for any person to gain such credentials. 
Firstly, Foster and Muggeridge took full advantage of what expertise East Africa did possess. 
On 5th January 1918, two months after the Intelligence Centre began operations, Foster sent 
a telegram, ‘the contents of which were communicated to all concerned’, which ‘made clear 
the intention that “close collaboration” was to be established “in regard to every kind of 
Intelligence between the Civil and Military Officers in all Protectorates” of East Africa, and 
referred to the possibility of “General Intelligence Centres which would be branches of that 
in Nairobi”, being formed in each in course of time.’425 He was precise in the expertise that 
he required, addressing ‘ a memorandum’ that gave ‘the headings under which information 
was required to the Secretariat in each of the British possessions in the East African area’ 
which ‘[indicated] the nature of the collaboration and assistance which was sought for.’ 426 
Co-operation amongst the officials of the British Empire in East Africa was of paramount 
importance for the acquisition of imperial knowledge, including imperial knowledge 
concerning Pan-Islamism. ‘The term “East African area” [was] employed for the sake of 
brevity and [was] intended to apply to those districts with which the East African 
Intelligence centre [was] primarily concerned.’ These ‘districts’ were listed as: ‘Uganda, 
British East Africa, Conquered Territory, Zanzibar, British Somaliland, Nyasaland and 
contiguous foreign countries, such as Abyssinia, the Congo Belge, Italian Somaliland and 
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Portuguese East Africa’; gaining expertise on all of these ‘districts’ was a considerable task 
for Foster.427 M.I.5. therefore stated that ‘It was hoped that with the help of the Governors, 
Major Foster would secure the cooperation not only of the battalion Intelligence officers but 
also of the civil and police authorities of British East Africa, Uganda, Nyasaland, Somaliland 
and German East Africa, so that all information should be available in the one office.’ 
Wanting not only passive co-operation through the ‘interchange’ of information, Foster ‘also 
hoped that’ there would be more active co-operation, with ‘at least one civil and one police 
officer… associated with the Intelligence office so that all branches of the Administration 
might be represented in the Intelligence office.’428 As examined in Chapter Six, it was 
unrecorded if this hope was fulfilled, but since there was cooperation between the 
Intelligence Centre and the different colonies and protectorates, one can assume that at 
least some civil and police officers became associated with the Centre. 
The ‘nature of the collaboration and assistance which was sought for’ included ‘[notes] on 
firms and individuals in regard to whose movements or activities suspicion was entertained’ 
which were ‘largely culled from the Censor’s records’.429 Furthermore, ‘it was considered 
highly desirable that a representative of the Natives Affairs Department should form a part 
of the Intelligence Department’, so that information on this topic could be acquired.430 
However, while practical, it provided little about the ‘opinions and information about the 
progress, moral and material’ of the Islamic population of East Africa. Here the Intelligence 
Centre was forced to turn to the tiny number of people who had expertise on Pan-Islamism 
in the British Empire. Only one person was able to provide sustained and useful expertise on 
this topic in relation to East Africa: Captain Philipps. 
Captain Philipps explained his field credentials at the beginning of his first memorandum 
“Africa for the Africans” and Pan-Islam” Recent developments in Central and Eastern Africa, 
and these were detailed in Chapter Five. At the time of writing this memorandum on 15th 
July 1917 his professional credentials were that he was a Captain of the Intelligence 
Department of the East Africa Expeditionary Forces and had ‘lately’ been ‘Chief Political 
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Officer Uganda area’.431 As well as this memorandum Philipps wrote multiple documents 
that either directly dealt with the issue of the threat posed by Pan-Islamism to the security 
of the British Empire in East Africa, or were related to this topic. Much of his work on Pan-
Islamism is cited in this thesis. Although he worked for the Intelligence Department his work 
appears to have been mostly self-directed. 
As examined in Chapter Six, a letter sent by Muggeridge to Philipps after the First World 
War clearly demonstrated the importance that his work had had on the success of the 
Intelligence Centre. Muggeridge wrote that ‘I should like to thank you for all the assistance 
you have given the department… The information you have sent from time to time has been 
most useful and has been carefully carded. I am very grateful.’432 
The solitary person to directly cast doubt on Philipps’ statue as the only expert who could 
provide sustained and useful expertise on this topic was an unnamed ‘Colonel’ from M.O.2., 
who wrote that he had ‘been carefully through Captain Philipps [sic] two Memoranda’ and 
had assessed that ‘whilst they do not contain anything new, they are of considerable 
interest.’433 This Colonel may have been right; M.O.2. may have already been in possession 
of all the information contained within Philipps’ writings. However, there is no surviving 
evidence to prove that this was the case, and even if it was the case it would have made 
little difference, for it is clear by the absence of any reference to any previous work on this 
topic by the British imperial officials working to prevent the threat posed by Pan-Islamism to 
the security of the British Empire in East Africa, including Philipps himself, that they had not 
had access to this information before Philipps wrote it. In his letter, Muggeridge wrote that 
Philipps’ information had been ‘most useful’; a curious statement to make if Philipps was 
merely producing work that did ‘not contain anything new’.  
Secondly, Foster and Muggeridge simply accepted their lot. After the above avenues of 
expertise had been exhausted, the Majors understood that there was simply neither the 
time nor the resources during the First World War to wait whilst people gained the 
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credentials to express valuable ‘opinions and information about the progress, moral and 
material’ of the Islamic population of East Africa. It was necessary, they seemed to have 
reasoned, to do as much as they could, and then accept the situation from there. 
This attitude can be seen best in their acceptance of the limited amount of progress that 
could be made in the enactment and enforcement of port controls in the East African 
region. As will be examined in greater depth in Subchapter Seven, the ability of the 
Intelligence Centre to enact and enforce port controls was assessed after the War by M.I.5., 
who deemed it to have ‘only been partially successful.’434 Simply, the extension of port 
controls to ports across the East African region did not occur because between them neither 
the Chief Censor nor the Intelligence Centre had the trained personnel to staff all of the 
major ports to prevent the hand-carrying of letters to bypass the censor, nor the expertise 
to prevent the smuggling of Pan-Islamic propaganda through smaller ports. Accepting 
immediately that they were not going to get such expertise or trained personnel, 
Muggeridge recollected after the War had ended that ‘It was obvious from the first that, in a 
country like Africa, especially, it would be impossible to prevent hand carrying of letters and 
pamphlets.’ Rather than fighting for expertise that they knew would never come, Foster and 
Muggeridge accepted the situation for what it was and did as much as they could with the 
little that they had. Confirming that this had been their plan, Muggeridge wrote that ‘The 
utmost that could be aimed at was to check the practice, and by the capture of a certain 
number of documents to get valuable clues’.435 
Overall, the main purpose for all the officers of the British Empire involved in the East 
African Campaign was to help that Empire win the First World War, or, as it transpired, not 
to lose it. Foster and Muggeridge appear to have understood this and did their best to 
prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa in 
these years with the limited expertise that they possessed, in order to prevent Pan-Islamism 
supporting British defeat in East Africa. 
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Establishing a ‘freer interchange’ of Expertise 
 
A ‘freer interchange of opinions and information about the progress, moral and material, of 
the Moslem populations throughout the Empire’ did come to fruition, but it was perhaps 
not quite as fluid as Sir Reginald Wingate would have ‘[desired] to obtain’. 
The principle reason for this was, as was just examined, the lack of expertise. The likes of 
Captains Philipps, Buxton, Bray, and Wingate himself formed the crux of the British Empire’s 
expertise on the prevention of the Pan-Islamic threat to the security of the British Empire; 
the limited number of these experts naturally obstructed the ability to create a truly free 
interchange, as a small number of people, all of whom were non-Muslim and non-African 
men, could provide only a small number of opinions. 
It is impossible to say with any certainty exactly how much the interchange between these 
persons became ‘freer’ as the First World War progressed; nevertheless, it is clear that they 
read much of each other’s works and did engage in an interchange. Buxton, Sir Charles 
Lucas, and M.O.2. all have surviving documents where they critiqued Philipps’ work.436 
Muggeridge’s letter proved that he, and possibly Foster before him, interacted with Philipps 
professionally, and Lieutenant Colonel Sykes and Captain Willis collaborated with him in 
London.437 Philipps had also interchanged expertise with Willis elsewhere.’438 Colonel 
French commented on both Philipps’ and Willis’ work.439 Wingate’s correspondence shows 
him to have been on top of the matter, and whilst Bray’s work did not contain any 
references to specific names, it is clear that he must have been well versed on his topic.440 
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On reading Bray’s work, Lieutenant Colonel C.E. Wilson of the Arab Bureau wrote to 
Wingate to say that ‘The remarks made [by Bray] under the heading “Intelligence outside 
India” deserve, I think, special attention.’441  
The problem with using any of these documents to prove that a ‘freer interchange of 
opinions and information about the progress, moral and material, of the Moslem 
populations throughout the Empire’ came to fruition is that they were almost all written 
before Wingate wrote that sentence. Why would Wingate call for a ‘freer interchange’ if the 
interchange was already working at the best of its, albeit limited, ability? The answer lies in 
the difficulties that the British Empire had communicating about communications. 
 
‘[More] direct communications between the Administrations of the less important dependencies and 
the principal centres of Islamic thought’ 
 
In his essay Bray also asserted the need for enhanced communications between the officers 
of the British Empire. He declared that ‘The whole question [of communications] is an 
Imperial one. India, Egypt, Aden are but links in the chain of dominion. Yet before the war 
we were woefully ignorant of conditions prevailing in each other’s spheres. A perpetual 
interchange of views, of Intelligence, of affairs, of policy, is an absolute necessity, an 
obligation to our Empire as a whole.’ Such a scheme of organising ‘a good Intelligence 
system’, he argued, ‘would be by no means difficult to organise’, and ‘the expense would be 
trivial compared to the information we should get, the touch we would maintain.’442 
Bray did not directly state the need to establish ‘more direct communications between the 
Administrations of the less important dependencies and the principal centres of Islamic 
thought’ as expressed by Wingate almost a year later, but his ideas were generally similar. 
He favoured the idea of a ‘central’ office at the centre of an imperial intelligence 
communications web, which would encompass both military and civilian activities: 
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‘Since the question is an Imperial one, all information thus received should come 
into one central office and be distributed to all concerned. In short time we could 
organise an Intelligence service that would cover the whole area, would watch each 
separate society, and warn us of any trouble in good time. Our Consular service 
could collect locally and this service should have a military as well as a civil side.’443  
Yet the above comments were written in March 1917, and the letter written by Wingate to 
Balfour was written in February 1918; M.I.5.D. had been founded in September 1916: six 
months previously in Bray’s case and seventeen months previously in Wingate’s. As they 
appeared to be advocating for the establishment of an M.I.5.D.-esque organisation, their 
statements imply that they did not know of M.I.5.D.’s establishment. That, inadvertently, 
rather proved their point; the British Empire could not have an effective imperial 
intelligence establishment if it was so poor at communicating that people who worked in 
imperial intelligence did not know that M.I.5.D. existed. Communications between different 
localities needed improvement, but so did communications between people. 
Nevertheless, Wingate and Bray would no doubt have been pleased to have discovered that 
M.I.5.D. shared their views on the need to improve communications, for part of its mission 
was to receive information ‘into one central office’ and then distribute it ‘to all concerned’. 
M.I.5. ‘hoped’ that if M.I.5.D. ‘could get into touch with the Colonies [M.I.5.D.] might act as 
a clearing-house for all parts of the Empire, and thus a rapid interchange of information 
would be secured.’444 This ‘clearing-house’ side of D Branch’s operation was considered to 
have been a success by M.I.5., who positively evaluated that ‘Through the connection 
established with the Colonies, the Central Special Intelligence Bureau became a centre for 
information and enquiries from all parts of the Empire.’445 
The establishment of M.I.5.D., its receipt of information from across the Empire, and its 
distribution of this information to the East African Intelligence Centre when it ‘concerned’ 
them had an enormously positive impact on the overall implementation of counter-
intelligence in East Africa, for before August 1917, when this Intelligence Centre was 
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instituted by M.I.5.D. ‘The liaison established between the C.S.I.B. and British East Africa was 
not very active.’446 This liaison had been overturned and was to remain overturned; at the 
end of the War M.I.5. recorded that the relationship ‘between the Central Special 
Intelligence Bureau and Major Muggeridge became extremely cordial’.447 
Documents recording the exact nature of the information that was interchanged have 
survived in the public archives only in very small numbers. M.I.5. recorded what sort of 
information M.I.5.D. was interchanging in October 1917: 
‘Although correspondence was confined to the transmission of Intelligence 
concerning the activities of enemy agencies and individual suspects in British 
possessions only… the Central Bureau also worked in close co-operation with the 
Department which dealt with information regarding individuals in foreign countries, 
and was in direct communication with the military Control Officers in allied and 
neutral countries who had charge of the issue of permits and visas to persons 
travelling to the United Kingdom and British Overseas possessions; it also maintained 
constant touch with other State Departments.’448 
M.I.5. was careful to institute an interchange of acquired knowledge amongst many 
different interested organisations without stepping on anybody’s toes: ‘Friendly relations 
were also kept up [by M.I.5.D.] with the naval and military authorities, while at the same 
time any possible encroachment upon their work was avoided, and the satisfactory results 
of close co-operation were constantly evident.’449 
As it was a two-way operation, the East African Intelligence Centre sent acquired knowledge 
to M.I.5.D. themselves. Muggeridge recorded that ‘From the first, monthly reports [had] 
been prepared and despatched to the Director of Military Intelligence and others likely to be 
interested’ and that these reports had ‘contained a summary of the Intelligence that [had] 
been obtained and in some cases, short sections on special subjects.’450 Muggeridge wrote a 
paragraph on the nature of some of this intelligence: 
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‘Notes on firms and individuals in regard to whose movements or activities suspicion 
was entertained, largely culled from the Censor’s records, have been forwarded 
from time to time to other Intelligence Centres and the War Office, when it was felt 
that these were of more than local interest, and a statement, chiefly compiled from 
information from the same source, in regard to those individuals whose record 
seemed to render their future residence in Conquered Territory undesirable has 
been forwarded to His Honour the Administrator and General Headquarters on 
request.’451 
The founding of M.I.5.D. to act as a clearing house for intelligence relevant to such threats 
to the British Empire as Pan-Islamism meant that ‘communications between the 
Administrations of the less important dependencies and the principal centres of Islamic 
thought’ were had from 1916, and from 1917 specifically in the case of East Africa. 
However, such communication was often not ‘direct’. For almost the entire period of the 
First World War for which it was operational, this ‘clearing-house’ side of D Branch was 
considered to be almost exclusive, and only in the closing weeks of fighting did this change. 
The Intelligence Centre then started to communicate directly with other interested parties; 
Muggeridge recorded that ‘liaison was established with the Intelligence Departments at 
Khartoum, Cairo and Berbera with H.M’s Minister at Adis Ababa and H.M’s Consul General 
at Lourence Marques.’452  
Furthermore, it is worth noting that something similar to the commencement of 
‘communications between the Administrations of the less important dependencies and the 
principal centres’ occurred within the British Empire in East Africa itself with the institution 
of the East African Intelligence Centre. The original telegram that formed the Intelligence 
Centre ‘directed that its contents were to be repeated to the Governors of Uganda and 
Nyasaland, H.M. Commissioner for the Somaliland Protectorate and to the Administrator 
Wilhelmstal, and that it was hoped that the Governments concerned would give every 
assistance to the new Department.’453 Situated in the East Africa Protectorate, the 
Intelligence Centre brought all of the ‘lesser important’ British colonies and protectorates of 
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East Africa into direct communication with the protectorate that was of most bureaucratic 
importance during the fighting of the East African Campaign. 
The growth and improvement of communications between different regions of the British 
Empire, and between the different administrations of the British Empire in East Africa, to 
deliver information on the threat of Pan-Islamism, significantly helped the British officials 
who were working to secure the Empire in East Africa from Pan-Islamism with their 
endeavour by allowing both gathered intelligence and expertise on the matter to be shared. 
Whilst it was unfortunate that the improvement in communications was less successfully 
communicated, the information exchanged, and the relationships forged, represented 
growth in the attributes of the imperial intelligence establishment; growth that aided this 




The growth of the attributes of the imperial intelligence establishment of the British Empire 
allowed what little expertise did exist within the British Empire on preventing Pan-Islamism 
from threatening the security of that Empire in East Africa, both in a practical sense – such 
as through knowledge about port controls – and a theoretical sense – such as through 
knowledge about Pan-Islamic opinions – to be shared amongst those whose occupations 
concerned this issue. As such, the third strategy proposed to prevent Pan-Islamism from 
threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa in the years of the East African 
Campaign of the First World War was amongst the most successful of the eight strategies in 
both its implementation and the achievement of its aims. 
However, despite the success of this third strategy the British Empire could not turn back 
time and reduce the growth of Pan-Islamism that had occurred in the years prior to August 
1917, when their use of counter-intelligence in East Africa had been severely limited. The 
British Empire had to focus on preventing Pan-Islamism from fulfilling its threat and 
damaging the security of the British Empire in East Africa whilst the Great War continued to 




Subchapter Four: The Cultivation of British Imperial Strength in the Islamic World 
 
The cultivation of British imperial strength in the Islamic world was the fourth strategy 
proposed to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in 
East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War. Cultivating their 
strength through the Islamic world was a concept the British had already been using to rule 
their imperial acquisitions in this era; this strategy adapted this existing concept to fit this 
new threat.  
On the outbreak of the First World War the British Empire ruled several territories with 
large Islamic populations, such as Egypt, Sudan, India, Sierra Leone, and the Straits 
Settlements, and several more with Islamic minorities. Due to the events of the First World 
War the British Empire gained several protectorates, including Iraq and Jordan, which 
further increased their Islamic population. Whilst it ruled these territories, Mark Curtis 
reminds his reader that the British Empire ‘often ruled through… Muslim forces… by proxy’ 
and ‘sought to uphold “traditional” Muslim authority as a bulwark of its continuing 
authority’, with ‘Islamic law… often allowed to continue in its more conservative forms.’ 
Thus, the British Empire was well versed in cultivating its strength in the Islamic world to 
allow for British imperial rule in territories with large Islamic populations. Curtis argues that 
the ‘co-operation of Islamic elements [with the British Empire] had profound consequences; 
it helps explain the failure of Muslims in many British-ruled territories to respond to the call 
of Turkey’s Ottoman empire [sic] for jihad against the British at the beginning of the First 
World War.’454  
Captain Buxton wrote in December 1917 that ‘According to Sir. Harry Johnston [a British 
explorer of Africa who had worked for the British colonial service], many of the Arab chiefs 
whom he knew in the neighbourhood of Lake Nyassa were intelligent and enlightened men, 
and they or their successors would be likely to take a keen interest in the Anti-Turkish 
movement in Arabia.’ Therefore, ‘[if] a suitable Sherif [sic] could be found who would be 
willing to undertake long journeys in the interior, for the purpose of visiting the local Arabs 
and informing them of the situation in the Hejaz, his mission might have valuable results.’455 
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Britain’s attempt to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the Empire in 
East Africa by cultivating its imperial strength in the Islamic world rested on two points 
raised by Buxton: the need to demonstrate that the Ottoman Empire was no longer a power 
in the Islamic world, and the need to demonstrate to the Islamic population of East Africa 
that the Ottoman’s decline had happened at the will of the British Empire: a much stronger 
power.  
The British Empire brought about the first of these two points by engaging in military 
hostilities against the Ottoman Empire and by supporting the Arab Revolt in the Middle East 
during the First World War. These two events were successful in bringing about the 
militaristic fall of the Ottoman Empire; although the Ottoman Empire did not formally cease 
to exist until 1922, and the caliphate was not abolished until 1924, by the second half of the 
Great War the Empire was irrevocably crumbling away. With ‘many of the Arab chiefs’ in 
East Africa ‘likely to take a keen interest in the Anti-Turkish movement in Arabia’ the 
successfulness of the ‘Anti-Turkish movement’ would help cultivate British imperial strength 
in the Islamic world of East Africa, for not only had the Ottoman Empire’s power collapsed, 
but the British had proved themselves to be the stronger power.  
The British Empire was less successful in controlling the Middle East; the relationship 
between the British and the leader of the Arab Revolt soured before the end of the First 
World War. Yet, paradoxically, this was successful in an unsuccessful way. By the end of the 
First World War the British Empire, which had by then militaristically defeated the Ottoman 
Empire, no longer needed to have such a positive relationship with this leader, so cultivating 
a positive relationship with this man was no longer important to the cultivation of British 
imperial strength in the Islamic world. As regarded East Africa, the success of the anti-
Turkish movement would remain the same, but bringing about the second point, 
communicating it to these ‘Arab chiefs’ in the manner described by Buxton, would become 
harder, for it would be difficult to find ‘a suitable Sherif… who would be willing to undertake 
long journeys in the interior, for the purpose of visiting the local Arabs and informing them 
of the situation in the Hejaz’, when the British Empire was no longer much concerned with 
the situation in the Hejaz. The production of propaganda, as will be examined in Subchapter 
Seven of this chapter, meant that communicating with these chiefs could still occur, but in a 
different manner.  
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In perhaps not the way that Buxton originally intended, the implementation of this fourth 
strategy was successful and positive results were gained as a result. The British Empire 
positively cultivated its strength in the Islamic world, and information about this filtered 
across the Islamic world to the Muslims of East Africa who admired the British Empire’s 
‘anti-Turkish’ stance. 
 
The Fall of the Ottoman Empire 
 
The Hejaz is an area in the west of the modern-day state of Saudi Arabia; the area known as 
the Hejaz during the First World War does not correspond directly with the modern-day 
province of the same name, but it was located in the same general area. Due to the events 
of the Arab Revolt the Ottoman Empire was forced to surrender power over the Hejaz to the 
Sharif of Mecca. Buxton wrote his remarks in December 1917; as the Arab Revolt began on 
10th June 1916, he wrote with the knowledge of the events that had occurred during the 
previous eighteen months. On that date in June 1916 the Sharif of Mecca, Hussein bin Ali, 
declared the creation of the Kingdom of Hejaz with himself as the monarch. 
When the suggestion to do just that had initially been broached by the British Empire the 
Sharif had not been terribly keen. He was a member of the Hashemite family traditionally 
chosen by the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire – the Caliph – to be the steward over the 
Islamic holy cities of Mecca and Medina, and to protect pilgrims when they performed the 
Hajj. Thus, the Sharif owed allegiance to the Sultan. Successive Sultans had ensured that 
successive Sharifs remained weak so as not to be a challenge to their rule. Hussein bin Ali 
entered into correspondence with Sir Henry McMahon, Sir Reginald Wingate’s predecessor 
as the British High Commissioner in Egypt and as a consequence of this correspondence he 
sought to establish an independent Arab Kingdom, with a few ‘modifications’ as instructed 
by McMahon: 
‘Subject to [these] modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support 
the Independence of the Arabs within the territories included in the limits and 
boundaries proposed by the Sherif of Mecca… I am convinced that this declaration 
will assure you beyond all possible doubt of the sympathy of Great Britain towards 
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the aspirations of her traditional friends the Arabs and will result in a firm and lasting 
alliance, the immediate results of which will be the expulsion of the Turks from the 
Arab countries and the freeing of the Arab peoples from the Turkish yoke which for 
so many years has pressed heavily upon them.’456 
To launch a successful endeavour the Sharif of Mecca understood that he too would need to 
cultivate his strength in the Islamic world. His approach was a diplomatic one; it was 
essential that those Arabs who had respected the Ottoman Empire, militarily or religiously, 
were not made to feel foolish for having once done so. To humiliate these Muslims would 
not make allies of them. In this course he made a proclamation on 27th June 1916 – 25th 
Shallban 1334 in the Islamic calendar – in which he established the narrative that the 
Ottoman Empire had been corrupted under the influence of politicians. Therefore, those 
who had supported, or continued to support, the Sultan and wished for the Empire’s 
preservation as the leading power in the Islamic world could legitimately turn away from it 
without feeling that they were betraying it: ‘They made weak the person of the Sultan; and 
robbed from him his honour, forbidding him to choose for himself the chief of his personal 
cabinet. Other like things they did to sap the foundation of the Khalifate. Therefore it had 
been clearly our part and our necessary duty to separate ourselves from them, and 
renounce them and their obedience.’ He continued: ‘We bore with them until it was open to 
all men that the rulers in Turkey were Enver Pasha, Jemal Pasha and Tallat Bay, who were 
doing whatsoever they pleased… We have attained independence – an independence of the 
rest of the Ottoman Empire – which is still groaning under the tyranny of our enemy.’ 
Asserting the independence of the Hejaz Kingdom from the Ottoman Empire, he concluded: 
‘Our independence is complete, absolute, not to be laid hands on by any foreign influence 
or aggression, and our aim is the preservation of Islam and the uplifting of its stand in the 
world.’457 
The short-lived Kingdom of Hejaz was founded in 1916; it lasted not a decade, but it lasted 
for the remaining years of the First World War. With the capture of Jerusalem in December 
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1917, the British Empire held the advantage over the Ottoman Empire in the Sinai and 
Palestine Campaign and, through the Sharif of Mecca, in the Hejaz. Although that Campaign 
was to continue until the following October, the British Empire had already gained, through 
the cumulation of both its military prowess and its diplomatic dealings with the Sharif, what 
it wanted: it eliminated the Ottoman Empire as a militaristic threat and cultivated its own 
imperial strength in the Islamic world for doing so. 
Having been successful in this endeavour, those officials of the British Empire who were 
working to prevent the Pan-Islamic threat in East Africa wished to communicate this 
accomplishment to those in East Africa who were potential recipients of Pan-Islamic 
propaganda and who would be impressed by such an accomplishment. ‘[Intelligent] and 
enlightened… Arab chiefs’ who lived in German East Africa, Nyasaland, and Mozambique 
who took ‘a keen interest in the Anti-Turkish movement in Arabia’ were just the sort of 
people these officials of the British Empire were interested in. In addition to the influence 
they wielded by being Arab chiefs, many lived in German East Africa, which had been 
identified by Captain Philipps as the ‘chief danger zone… [for the] conjunction of Islamic 
propaganda with the cry of “Africa for the “African”’; the British Empire was keen to counter 
Pan-Islamism within the population of the former German colony.458  
Hence, the British Empire had been very successful in cultivating its imperial strength in the 
Islamic world. To transfer this success into the practical prevention of the Pan-Islamic threat 
to the British Empire in East Africa the news of this success would have to be delivered to 
the Islamic population that resided there. 
 
Communicating the Fall of the Ottoman Empire to the Islamic Population of East Africa 
 
It is not clear whether the ‘suitable Sherif’ proposed by Buxton was meant to be the Sharif 
of Mecca. The wording is strange if this was indeed the case; ‘a suitable Sherif’ appears to 
be talking about a hypothetical Sharif, rather than the Sharif of Mecca. It seems likely 
therefore that Buxton spoke not of the Sharif of Mecca, but of a hypothetical Arab who held 
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the title of Sharif who would be willing to work on behalf of the British Empire to spread the 
positive news of ‘the Anti-Turkish movement in Arabia’ to the ‘Arab chiefs’ of ‘the 
neighbourhood of Lake Nyassa’.  
The question as to why Buxton did not intend for the Sharif of Mecca to make this journey 
must therefore be answered. The first answer is perhaps the most obvious: the Sharif of 
Mecca would be far too busy fighting the Arab Revolt to wish to take a long and 
uncomfortable journey through a war zone to talk to ‘Arab chiefs’ over whose lands he 
could make no claim and for no discernible benefit of his own. But a second answer is the 
political truth: by the December 1917 date on which Buxton wrote these remarks the British 
would not have wanted the Sharif of Mecca or his representative to have made this journey. 
The relationship had soured.  
On the British side their self-interest in the Arab Revolt waned quickly in favour of other 
avenues of advancement in 1917. As stated, militarily the British Empire held the advantage 
over the Ottoman Empire in the Sinai and Palestine Campaign, which cultivated in the 
capture of Jerusalem only eleven days after Buxton wrote his remarks. And politically, the 
Empire had other fish to fry in the region; most notably of all, the Balfour Declaration of 2nd 
November 1917. Famously stating that ‘His Majesty’s Government view with favour the 
establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best 
endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object’, this was seen to be in contention 
with the contents of the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence quoted from previously.459 
Furthermore, a secret agreement between the United Kingdom and France written in 1916, 
popularly known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement, carved up the Ottoman Empire’s territories 
in Asia between them; this was exposed in November 1917. Such was the betrayal felt by 
the Sharif of Mecca that Elie Kedouri has written that ‘It is perhaps not too much to say that 
for half a century the correspondence haunted Anglo-Arab relations.’460 
As to whether the Arab Revolt would have ever been a success beyond the Kingdom of 
Hejaz is debatable. Isaiah Friedman has argued in the negative, writing that ‘there was no 
prospect of Hussein being recognized by the Arabs outside of the Hedjaz as their leader; 
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“the Arab movement” was a British, not an Arab, invention.’461 But the issue that soured the 
relationship between the Sharif of Mecca and the British Empire can best be summarised by 
a comment made on the situation by Captain Bray in March 1917. He wrote that ‘Nor must 
we forget the very effective help, this rebellion has been to ourselves. It has helped us to an 
extent, Political and Military, that has perhaps not been fully appreciated.’462 But whilst the 
British did not forget, they did not remember either; greater gain could now be achieved 
from elsewhere, and they sought to achieve it, regardless to the long-term consequences of 
their actions. 
However, on the Sharif of Mecca’s side there exists a tale that is not entirely one of 
victimhood. As early as September 1916 the Arab Bureau recommended caution to the 
Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department. The reason 
for this caution was that they had received information from an informant that the Sharif 
did not himself intend to be honourable to the British: 
The informant ‘expresses his own belief that it was the Sheriff’s original intention to 
play off British against Turks and induce Turks by this means to grant him 
independence guaranteed by Germany. [The informant] recommends us [the British] 
in conclusion to give [the] Sheriff just enough assistance to ensure protraction of the 
struggle between him and [the] Turks, thus keeping them employed and unable to 
detach troops to Iraq.’463 
The idea of cultivating British imperial strength in the Islamic world was exactly that: to 
cultivate British imperial strength. The British Empire, suggested the Arab Bureau, needed to 
be careful that its support of the Arab Revolt did not subsequently lead to the Sharif 
becoming too powerful for them to easily contain. 
So whilst the British Empire was successful in cultivating its power in the Islamic world to 
ensure the rapid decline of the Ottoman Empire, it failed to follow Buxton’s advice on how 
to demonstrate to the Islamic population of East Africa that this had happened at the will of 
the British; there is no surviving document that indicates that they found ‘a suitable Sherif… 
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who would be willing to undertake long journeys in the interior’ to tell the ‘Arab chiefs’ 
what had occurred.   
As will be examined in further detail in Subchapter Seven, sanctioned newspapers were 
distributed to the Islamic population of East Africa. El Hakikat was published by the Foreign 
Office, El Mokattam was ‘more suited for general distribution’, while El Kibla was to be 
circulated only to ‘one or two leading Muslims’; the latter probably because it was produced 
by the Sharif of Mecca. Downing Street was less enthusiastic about this latter paper; they 
had ‘some hesitation with regard to the advantages of propaganda of this nature.’ The 
Governors of the East Africa Protectorate, Zanzibar, and German East Africa were allowed to 
distribute these newspapers in whatever manner they thought fitting.464 It was through 
these newspapers and journals that the Islamic population of East Africa was informed that 
the Ottoman Empire was no longer a great power in the Islamic world, and that this had 
occurred at the hand of the British Empire: the stronger power. British imperial strength in 




While successful, cultivating imperial power in this manner does pose the question as to 
why the British Empire, the largest empire in history, chose to be the director, but not the 
lead actor. Lieutenant Colonel Sykes and the Captains Willis and Philipps had questioned 
just the same thing: ‘In respect to Panislam [sic] the British Government [was] confronted 
with a dilemma – either to pose as a great Mohammedan power herself and to exercise a 
direct influence in the affairs of Islam, or to maintain an attitude of tolerance in matters of 
religion and to counteract the Panislamic [sic] propaganda by suitable measures.’ Their 
conclusion as to why they chose the second method was that ‘The former policy, - that of 
Disraeli, - has been already tried and found wanting, partly from the inconsistency naturally 
inherent in a Christian Power posing as a Mohammedan, and partly from the ineptitude of 
the results obtained. The second policy therefore seemed the more desirable.’465 
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Count Leon Ostrorog, in his essay The British Empire and the Mohammedan, concurred. He 
wrote that ‘It would obviously be a mistake to have either the restoration of the legitimate 
Caliphate or the Reformation of Islam openly engineered by British Christians… 
Mohammedans [should be] exclusively appearing on the stage, although inspired by British 
statement.’466 
Sykes, Willis, and Philipps affirmed that despite this it was the British Empire who was truly 
leading. They clarified that it was ‘not sufficient to supress [Pan-Islamism], we must give a 
LEAD to Mohammedans, intensely loyal as they are to His Majesty and to the British Raj 
they are looking to us in a time of great trouble for sympathy and a lead.’467 Ostrorog 
concurred again, this time in slightly blunter language: ‘But the mistake [to lead openly] 
would be of so childish a nature that it would want very poor brains to commit and still 
poorer brains to advise it’.468 
Bray was also in agreement with these gentlemen, but he proposed a slightly more 
prominent position. He propositioned that ‘If... we come out into the open and publically 
[sic] support the Sherif, as an ally in a Military sense, if we pose, as we can rightly do, as the 
liberators of an oppressed people, if by propaganda we explain this to the masses, with firm 
conviction, I say that we will earn the gratitude of the vast majority of our Mohammedan 
subjects.’469 Having written this in March 1917, it would have been interesting to compare 
these thoughts to Bray’s thoughts in 1918, after the British Empire’s relationship with the 
Sharif of Mecca had soured. Alas, Bray’s thoughts in this latter year are unknown.  
It can never be known how well it would have worked for the British Empire to have taken 
the other option: ‘to [have posed] as a great Mohammedan power’. As it was, taking the 
directors role was enough to get the British Empire through the years of the First World War 
without the threat from Pan-Islamism turning into a reality; the actions they did undertake 
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were sufficient to prevent Pan-Islamism from being able to threaten the security of the 




Cultivating British imperial strength in this manner succeeded in helping to prevent Pan-
Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa by allowing the 
British Empire to demonstrate to the Islamic population of East Africa that the Ottoman 
Empire was no longer a major power in the Islamic world, and that this downfall of the 
Ottoman Empire had happened at the will of the British Empire: the stronger power. The 
British Empire did not cultivate its imperial strength in the Middle East for the purpose of 
executing this fourth proposed strategy, but this cultivation of strength was opportune; the 
officials of the British Empire in East Africa who were concerned with preventing the threat 
from Pan-Islamism understood how it could benefit British imperial security for the 
knowledge of these events to be made known in their region. 
What the British Empire absolutely did not do is concern itself to any great degree in trying 
to rectify the inevitable political fallout that was to come as a result of their actions in the 
Middle East. The British Empire’s primary aim was to win the First World War: this they 
achieved. Their actions prevented threats, such as Pan-Islamism, from threatening the 
security of the British Empire across the world, including in East Africa, during these years; 









Subchapter Five: The Promotion of Weak Central Government and Strong Nationalist Feelings 
amongst the Islamic Population of East Africa 
 
The fifth strategy proposed to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the 
British Empire in East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War 
was the duel promotion of a weak central government and strong nationalist feelings 
amongst the Islamic population of East Africa. Lieutenant Colonel Sykes and Captains Willis 
and Philipps expressed their belief that it was ‘a characteristic of Islam to attempt to unite 
different nations under the one religious flag as if they were a single nationality’; they 
charged that ‘such a policy’ of Pan-Islamism would only be possible if there was ‘a strong 
guiding hand at the head of Mohammedan affairs with a comparatively weak national 
feeling in the different units forming the whole.’ Therefore, they proposed a ‘proper check… 
to PanIslamism [sic]’ that comprised of two parts: ‘(1) a weak central government with no 
more than a spiritual ascendancy over Mohammedans outside its territories, and (2) a 
strong national feeling in every Mohammedan country, which would make the population 
more interested in the political and commercial development of their own country than in 
the Panislamic [sic] principle.’ 
Their conversation having occurred on 29th June 1917, Sykes, Willis, and Philipps resolved 
that the first check had already been ‘met by the establishment of an Arab Kingdom’.  
However, they knew that the second check would be ‘more complicated’ to execute. The 
unique political situation in East Africa during the First World War meant that there was 
‘some danger of the “nationalist” theory if developed leading to disaster’; this ‘disaster’ was 
that Pan-Africanism would use the machinery of Pan-Islamism to spread itself across the 
region. The three gentlemen knew that the resulting ‘African Jehad would be widely 
acceptable and would be likely to spread in a very alarming manner.’470 
Through their actions in the Middle East, the British Empire was indeed successful in 
ensuring that the Islamic world, and thus the Islamic population of East Africa, had only ‘a 
weak central government with no more than a spiritual ascendancy over Mohammedans 
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outside its territories’. The people who ordered these actions to be undertaken in the 
Middle East would not have ranked the implementation of this fifth strategy as especially 
high amongst their priorities; nevertheless, the outcome of their orders was of benefit for 
this strategy. Conversely, the British Empire was not successful in promoting ‘a strong 
national feeling in every Mohammedan country’; the weapon of nationalism was 
determined to be too dangerous a weapon for them to wield in East Africa. 
 
(1) A Weak Central Government 
 
Sykes, Willis, and Philipps were able to resolve that the first check against Pan-Islamism had 
been ‘met by the establishment of an Arab Kingdom’ because of two factors previously 
examined in Subchapter Four: the fall of the Ottoman Empire, which had knocked out the 
only Islamic power in the world with the potential to hold the qualifications to be a strong 
central government with ascendancy over Muslims outside its territories, and the 
establishment of the Arab Kingdom under the Sharif of Mecca, which would never have 
anything beyond a theoretical potential to hold such qualifications. Count Leon Ostrorog 
argued that with the establishment of this Kingdom ‘the Turkish Sultan [had been] reduced 
exclusively to his territorial importance. All pretence to a spiritual influence over all the 
Believers of the earth [became] impossible’. 471 
By initially supporting the Arab Revolt, the British Empire had brought into existence a 
person, the Sharif of Mecca, with the theoretical potential to form a strong central 
government with ascendancy over Muslims outside its territories. This theoretical potential 
stemmed not only from the decline of the power of the Ottoman Empire, but also because 
the Arab Kingdom held ‘the Holy Places and [was] technically adequate to maintain the 
Khalifate.’ However, Sykes, Willis, and Philipps were not concerned, for they believed that: 
‘[The] poverty of the Kingdom, the ignorance amongst the Arabs of modern methods 
of both trade and warfare, their natural conservatism and their low standard of 
mental, moral and physical activity induced by generations of inbreeding, 
                                                          




[combined] to make it probable that the Kingdom will not bear much weight in the 
councils of the world, which may be attempted to be increased by politico-religious 
propaganda from Mecca.’472  
Captain Bray was ‘convinced [that the Arabian Peninsula would unite ‘under one 
government’], not in the sense of the tribes all acknowledging one absolute ruler, having the 
power of life and death over them, but to the possibility of the confederation of the 
country, under one nominal head over say five sub-divisions of local chieftains.’473 Such a 
confederation existing ‘under one nominal head’ would by necessity be weak, and, when 
combined with ‘the poverty of the Kingdom’, Sykes, Willis, Philipps, and Bray were in 
agreement that whilst the Arab Kingdom had credentials enough to make it ‘technically 
adequate’, at its core it was so weak that it actually had the qualifications necessary to fulfil 
Sykes, Willis, and Philipps’ first check against Pan-Islamism. 
 
(2) A Strong National Feeling 
 
Sykes, Willis, and Philipps felt that while ‘a weak central government with no more than a 
spiritual ascendancy over Mohammedans outside its territories’ was fairly self-explanatory, 
their understanding of how ‘a strong national feeling’ would be a ‘proper check’ to Pan-
Islamism required ‘a somewhat detailed examination’. This they accomplished by providing 
their reader with a succinct note as to the ‘national feeling’ in each British colony or 
protectorate in East or North-East Africa:  
‘In Egypt there is a nationalist party largely engineered by self-seeking newspaper 
proprietors. There is also a far more important section of educated Egyptian opinion 
which has considerable motions towards nationalism but is rendered inarticulate 
because they will not identify themselves with the ‘newspaper nationalists’, which 
they know to be dishonest; and they will not ask assistance from the British whose 
presence they deplore. There should be no difficulty in developing a national feeling 
in Egypt though it will be far more difficult to control it.’ 
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‘In the Sudan the greater part is inhabited by Arabs and Sudanese who are all 
Mohammedans; and there is amongst some sections of the more intelligent natives 
a growing desire to take part in their own administration and to be rid of the 
mediation of the Egyptian who has hitherto filled all the lesser administrative 
positions. During the war the dislike of the Egyptian on the part of the natives of the 
Sudan has become much more apparent and with it a desire to elaborate the Sudan 
custom in language, education and manner of life… The formation of a strong 
national feeling in the Sudan would take some years, and would require careful 
handling and far-seeing administration, but it is not impossible.’ 
‘In the South where the negro and negroid population is mainly pagan, the people 
are too primitive to have a conscious feeling of nationality and although some tribes 
are both united and organised, others are only organised locally, while some seem to 
possess no internal control of any lasting value.’ 
‘The same may be said of a large part of British East Africa. It is these fairly populous 
tracts of pagan population that form a fertile field for proselytism to Islam. Very 
little, if any interference with native custom is involved by such conversation, but the 
negro turned Mohammedan (as the Mahdists) is a fiercer and more fanatical 
upholder of the faith than the more educated Arab.’ 
‘In German East Africa there is already a considerable Mohammedan population, and 
there is a tendency, from the coast upwards, for the educated classes to embrace 
Islam. In the course of the war there has been an unprecedented mixing of 
representatives of almost all the black races of Africans... “Liberal” ideas from the 
Cape and Sierra Leone have been discussed over the camp fires and a good deal of 
rather vague political generalisation has been implanted in minds ill-adapted to 
digest the matter or to use it properly. Especially has the doctrine of “Africa for the 
“African” taken a definite form as an ideal in the minds of many.’474 
Having examined the ‘national feeling’ in the British Empire in East and North-East Africa, 
these three gentlemen conceded that nationalism was a dangerous weapon for them to 
wield in the region against Pan-Islamism for, as was stated openly regarding Egypt, creating 
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and controlling such a weapon were two separate things. They discussed that there was ‘a 
possibility of the nationalist feeling being tainted’ by both ‘the dangers of Pan-Islam’ and 
‘this very dangerous doctrine [Pan-Africanism] if it [was] allowed to creep in from the 
South.’ If ‘nationalist feeling’ was ‘tainted’ in such a way, an ‘African Jehad’ would occur, 
which ‘would be widely acceptable and would be likely to spread in a very alarming 
manner.’475 
Philipps himself argued that the use of nationalism in East Africa should not be entirely 
dismissed. He reasoned that ‘a definite policy of encouraging strong and isolated tribal 
nationalism should be one of the most effectual barriers against a violent Pan-African 
upheaval which is, in this conjunction, a very real danger.’476 Nevertheless, he, along with 





Although his portrayal of the Islamic population of the Arabian Peninsula as suffering from 
‘inbreeding’ and ‘ignorance’ was a racist examination, there was some credit to Philipps’ 
accusations that ‘poverty’ and ‘conservatism’, as well as the tribal politics examined by Bray, 
would prevent an Arab Kingdom from forming a strong central government with ascendancy 
over Muslims outside its territories. The gradual removal of ‘spiritual ascendancy’ over 
Muslims, such as it had been, from the Ottoman Empire, and the mutual decline of its 
military prowess during the First World War, removed from that Empire any claim to be the 
strong central government of the Islamic world. Together, these two factors ensured that 
Sykes, Willis, and Philipps’ first check against Pan-Islamism succeeded.  
Conversely, although Philipps promoted the potential of tribal nationalism, the British 
Empire found the use of nationalism too dangerous a weapon to wield against Pan-Islamism 
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in East Africa. Therefore, this second check against Pan-Islamism was unable to be fulfilled 
during the years of the First World War. 
Overall, the fifth strategy proposed to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the security 























Subchapter Six: The Securing of the ‘Insulating Belt’ of East Africa 
 
Securing the ‘insulating belt’ of East Africa was the sixth strategy proposed to prevent Pan-
Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa in the years of the 
East African Campaign of the First World War. ‘Insulating belt’ was the term given to the 
geographic area of central East Africa in which Islam was seldom present in 1917, as 
opposed to the areas around it. There were no definite geographic limitations of this ‘belt’; 
Captain Philipps defined it as ‘between Northern Islam (Arabia and Sudan) and the Congo-
German East Africa group, viz, the Azande, the Baganda, and also the tribes of British East 
Africa’, whilst Colonel French defined it as spreading ‘from Abyssinia with its debased but 
ancient Christianity, to Lakes Albert and Victoria, and which is peopled by pagans untouched 
by any religion and Baganda Roman Catholics and Protestants’.478 On a separate occasion, 
Philipps described it more simply as being ‘N.E. Congo, Uganda [and the] East Africa 
Protectorate’. 479 
This sixth strategy was relatively simple in theory: if Islam could be prevented from 
spreading into the ‘insulating belt’ then there would be no chance of Pan-Islamism 
developing there; ergo, there would be no threat from Pan-Islamism. Philipps described the 
belt as ‘an opportune insulating belt of tribes’, and also, when earlier joined by Lieutenant 
Colonel Sykes and Captain Willis, as an area that ‘separated… two large Mohammedan 
populations’. 480 Securing the ‘insulating belt’ meant preventing these ‘two large 
Mohammedan populations’ from merging. Although preventing the entrance of Islam into 
the ‘insulating belt’ was the primary concern, it was also hoped that it would be a ‘natural 
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barrier equally against an Aethiopian movement [Pan-Africanism] [and] Pan-Islam, or, the 
greater danger of their combination as “Pan-Africa”.’481 [Emphasis original.] 
Two methods were suggested to be implemented to secure this ‘insulating belt’: 
1.  The Promotion of Christianity  
2. The Establishment of a Secular Schooling System. 
Philipps had two commandments for the implementation of these two methods:  
1. ‘Preventive measures should be inaugurated SIMULTANEOUSLY in each area of the 
Belt’.  
2. ‘Such measures should be UNOSTENTATIOUS.’  
He asserted that these two methods needed to be implemented quickly, for ‘to await 
development of the dangers indicated and then to be compelled openly to create means of 
combating them may end in serious complications with the new forces of Islam.’482 No 
doubt he was thinking of Captain Bray’s note of caution, as examined in the introduction to 
Chapter Seven: the British Empire would need to prevent the threat from Pan-Islamism 
without being seen to work against Pan-Islamism itself. 
Yet whilst he wished to act quickly, Philipps candidly remarked that he was not sure when 
these measures could be implemented. He wrote that they should be inaugurated ‘Either at 
once as a war measure of imperial safety, possibly legislatively and financially the easier 
course, OR as part of inevitable changes consequence upon post-war territorial re-
adjustments.’ He expressed concern if the post-war plan was chosen, for he believed that 
‘From the North strong Islamic propaganda is to be anticipated as one of the first acts of 
peace carrying its habitual political aspirations. 483 
Whilst the sixth strategy was relatively simple in theory, it was anything but simple in 
practice. 
The limited surviving documents demonstrate that the implementation of the first method 
did occur during the years of the First World War, but only on a very limited basis. The 
promotion of Christianity was chosen as a method because the ‘insulating belt’ area had ‘a 
                                                          





considerable Christian population and a number of pagan tribes… whose tendency [was] to 
adopt Islam with ease and enthusiasm.’ Sykes et al. realised that this presented ‘a 
considerable field for Mohammedan propaganda, and the possibility of a wide movement 
towards Panislamism [sic] in the near future [made] it desirable to define the Government 
policy towards Islam in these parts and to take steps to adopt suitable measures in 
anticipation.’484 Beyond circumstantial evidence, there is no surviving information specifying 
the successfulness of the very limited implementation of this method. 
Detailed plans for the implementation of the second method were drawn up, but there is no 
hard evidence to prove that a secular schooling system was established by the efforts of the 
imperial intelligence establishment. 
The ‘insulating belt’ of East Africa did remain predominantly free from Islam, and thus 
secure, until the end of the First World War. Although the methods chosen to ensure this 
seem to have failed, this measure of success was the only measure that truly mattered. 
Consequently, the sixth strategy proposed to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the 
security of the British Empire in East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the 
First World War was successful. 
 
The Promotion of Christianity  
 
Philipps provided a brief breakdown of the different reasons for why the tribes who 
inhabited the ‘insulating belt’ were not Muslims:  
‘Islam has so far been able to make but little impression, spiritually or temporally, on 
the spirit-worshipping Azande-Monbuttu tribes to the North West of Lake Albert’; 
‘The Baganda are chiefly Christian, though markedly retrograde owing to recent and 
rigid enforcement of monogamy by the Church Missionary Society.’; ‘The tribes of 
British East Africa are primitive, incoherent, and pagan, though least likely to 
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withstand any wave of Islamic feeling sweeping down from the North or up from the 
coast.’485   
Yet whilst the documents record that Christianity was promoted to these tribes, they 
seldom record how. Sir Lee Stack, the Governor-General of Sudan, provided one rare 
example of this promotion when he wrote in a letter to Sir Reginald Wingate that ‘With this 
end in view Mongalla Province’, in the south of Sudan, had ‘been staffed with Christian 
officials, as far as possible’ by early 1918, ‘and some time [sic]’ prior to early 1918 ‘Sunday 
was made the day of rest in stations away from the river’.486 Whilst the lack of surviving 
records is certainly a primary reason for the deficiency of recorded cases, there is a second 
reason: the British Empire found that there were difficulties with this method, and so its 
implementation was limited. 
Philipps deemed the Baganda tribe to be ‘facile princeps among the Bantu peoples in 
mental capacity and natural civilisation’ and so ‘admirably adapted to form the strongest 
link’ in the ‘insulating belt’. 487 Promoting Christianity to the Baganda late in the war 
presented difficulties due to an event that had occurred in 1914, when ‘Owing to a rigid 
insistence on the part of the C.M.S. [Christian Missionary Society] on the doctrine of 
monogamy… anti-Christian spirit showed itself in the destruction of native teachers’ houses 
and numbers of Baganda either reverted to Paganism, embraced Islam, or emigrated.’ A 
new sect started in 1915 in opposition of this rigid insistence ‘gained numbers of converts’ 
and, whilst it was ‘nominally Christian in enjoying baptism and various Christian virtues’, it 
was considered only nominal because they permitted ‘polygamy and [were] markedly anti-
European (e.g. forbids the use of any European drugs or medicine)’. The ‘younger followers’ 
of the Baganda ‘showed a tendency to adopt the theory that they might as well try the 
Germans under whose régime they hoped to find smaller demands for labour and a lower 
tax.’488 Philipps’ analysis of the issue between the Baganda and the C.M.S. was a little too 
simple, for ‘In theory, virtually all missionaries were opposed to polygamy and most were 
opposed to the baptism of polygamists… However, we should not be misled into reading 
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decisions passed by a majority as if they had unanimous support’, clarifies Steven Kaplan. 489 
Yet the point was made; the topic of polygamy would cause issues if Christianity was 
promoted to the Baganda tribe. To remedy ‘the dangers and difficulties’ that arose from ‘a 
Christian education’ due ‘to the Christian attitude to polygamy’, Sykes et al. recommended 
that ‘it would seem desirable to establish secular schools… where possible.’490 
Fortunately, this difficulty was mitigated slightly by the knowledge that by 1917 no enemy 
missions continued to exist in the ‘insulating belt’, and that the Deputy Governor of the East 
Africa Protectorate, Sir Charles Bowring, had prohibited them from returning to that 
Protectorate after the cessation of the First World War. Enemy missions had been 
discovered to have been ‘the most fertile ground for the seeds of German espionage’ in the 
early part of the First World War, and consequently the missionaries had been moved or 
deported.491 Browning was ‘therefore strongly of opinion that no re-opening of any 
previously existing mission nor the establishment of any new mission by an enemy subject 
or under enemy direction should be permitted after the conclusion of the war, and that the 
employment of an enemy subject in a mission in any capacity should be also prohibited.’492 
Thus, the ‘younger followers’ of the Baganda would have less opportunity to ‘try the 
Germans’.  
A second difficulty was found when Christianity was promoted in the military sphere of East 
Africa. There is evidence that suggests that the British Empire considered developing the 
East African Force along religious lines; in his letter to Wingate, Stack wrote that in February 
1918 there were ‘now no Mahommedan troops in the [Mongalla] Province’.493 But there is 
no further evidence that this occurred; presumably, in similarity to the proposed strategy to 
develop the East African Force along tribal lines, the practical implementation of this was 
unrealistic during the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War. 
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The disunity that was apparently inherent in Christianity was a third difficulty discovered. 
Willis wrote in January 1918 that he had reservations with this entire method. ‘Christianity’, 
he wrote, ‘does not appear to be likely to be the common bond that may bind the races 
together in the future, nor is there any religion so adaptable to the needs of these tribes as 
Islam.’ 494 
These difficulties seem to have combined to result in a method that was occasionally 
implemented, but not implemented enthusiastically or ‘simultaneously’ across the ‘belt’. 
There are no surviving documents that analyse how the promotion of Christianity aided the 
securing of the ‘insulating belt’. To this day Christianity remains the prominent religion in 
Kenya and Uganda, but this is merely circumstantial evidence in the judgment of the 
successfulness of this method. Nevertheless, Christianity and paganism remained the 
prominent religions in the tribes cited by Philipps during the First World War, and that was 
always the desired outcome. 
 
The Establishment of a Secular Schooling System 
 
The second method proposed to secure the ‘insulating belt’ of East Africa was to establish a 
secular schooling system for the education of the African population of the British Empire. 
As stated, Sykes et al. had recommended this for the Baganda tribe as opposed to the 
promotion of Christianity, but it was recommended more fully to remedy the perceived 
issues of Islamic education: ‘the dangers and difficulties’ that the British Empire perceived to 
arise from a ‘Mohammedan education’ were ‘its tendency to acquire political with spiritual 
ascendency’.495 
 
The German Implementation  
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The British Empire was aware that implementing such an education system would be 
advantageous to the prevention of Pan-Islamism because another colonial power had 
already used it in East Africa for the same reason: the Germans of German East Africa. 
‘[Fostering] and [encouraging] any movements of unrest and sedition directed against the 
British Empire’ was shown in Part II to have been ‘a special feature of Germany’s policy’ 
during the First World War, and that amongst the movements, ‘with their accompanying 
plots and conspiracies’, which ‘were supported and in some cases promoted by Germany’, 
was the Pan-Islamic movement.496 The drawback of such a scheme, as outlined in Chapter 
Five, was that the German Empire itself had an Islamic population; if the threat posed by 
Pan-Islamism towards European imperialism was to come to fruition, German East Africa 
would itself be impacted. This knowledge was not lacking in the German administration of 
that colony. In the immediate pre-war era of ‘1912-14 the local German administrations 
were very apprehensive of the increase of Islam among local native populations, as likely to 
threaten white supremacy by a black Pan-Islamic organisation’. The ‘official policy’ in these 
years ‘was anti-Islam.’497 Philipps concurred: ‘It was sudden realisation of the danger of 
political PAN-ISLAM infecting the negorid races which induced the German Government to 
establish secular tribal education in East Africa.’498  
Willis explained why the Germans attempted to use this method to achieve their goal: it was 
because education and Islam were so intertwined. ‘There is little doubt that the chief 
incentive to turn Mohammedan, in the minds of many pagans’, he wrote, ‘is that it provides 
the quickest and easiest way of acquiring a modicum of culture. So much so that in Uganda 
the word “Kafir” has acquired the meaning of uneducated.’ The trick, according to Willis, 
was to provide Muslims with an education without also providing them with a religious 
education; thus, they would be happy at gaining schooling and the imperial authorities 
would be happy because that schooling would not be converting them. The Germans, he 
announced, had worked this out: ‘The passion for education can be met without necessarily 
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combining with it any special religious teaching, and the pagan might then attain equality of 
intellectual training with others, and still maintain his pride in his tribal unit which tends to 
be lost upon the adoption of any special faith.’499 
Maintaining tribal unity was vitally important for the Germans of German East Africa, 
because, similarly to the British, the German Empire relied upon these tribe’s inability to 
unify and challenge imperial rule. In the Bukoba (Lake Victoria) District ‘the German 
Government exercised no direct control over natives but worked through the six Sultans 
whose powers, save for the death penalty, were almost despotic. The Germans had found a 
native population of 170,000 of an unusually high grade of civilisation separated in 
sympathy only by domestic feuds and slight variations of dialect. That is to say’, Philipps 
stated in a document entitled Tribal Secular Schools: German Model., ‘a formidable 
potential enemy whose intelligence might be expected to prescribe alliance as the best 
means of resisting European control in its earlier stages.’ He declared that he had ‘been 
much struck recently in this district by the intense tribal pride existing in small communities 
under separate Sultans, and an aloofness amounting to antipathy to neighbouring tribes 
with whom they are naturally allied by some similarity of speech and custom.’ Concluding, 
Philips wrote that this was ‘the result of a careful and successful German policy of 
weakening isolation, in which secular education is the chief factor.’500 
Knowing that the British Empire was investigating the establishment of a secular schooling 
system, Philipps also provided a detailed plan on both how German secular schools had 
been financed and the structure of its syllabus: 
‘Method.’ From the Hut Tax, ‘Sultans were expected to maintain: (1) Sultans’ armed 
police. (2) Tribal Schools, within their Sultanates.’ For example, in one place ‘two white 
schoolmasters educated natives for positions as: 
(a) Tribal Teachers. 
(b) Government Tax Collectors. 
(c) Sultans’ Clerks 
(d) Clerks to German planters and business houses. 
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Subjects taught were: 
(a) Kiswahili: the official and commercial tongue. 
(b) The three R’s and bookkeeping. 
(c) German imperial history. 
Shortly before taking up their duties in their Sultan’s school, tribal teachers were given 
individual attention by one of the white teachers on tribal history and the agricultural 
development of their districts.’501 
The Germans had also considered one further issue that was at the crux of imperialism: the 
need to educate Africans only to their proscribed place on the chart of civilisation as 
ordained by the Europeans. Knowing that the British Empire valued similar racist policies, 
Philipps wrote an explanation of how the Germans had achieved it: 
‘It was everywhere clearly laid down that native development was to be on parallel 
not joint lines with European civilisation. The ‘Normal’ schools were built and 
maintained at provincial headquarters by Government. Tribal schools were 
maintained by Sultans. In this district there are many soundly educated pagans. 
German was only taught in exceptional cases. Results, from the German political and 
social standpoints, have been excellent. It had not produced the result of either bad 
manners nor any tendency to make the native ape the European which has 
sometimes been the effect of Christian mission education.’502 
The establishment of a secular schooling system was not considered with the interests of 
the African population in mind. 
 
The British Implementation   
 
The credit for suggesting the establishment of a secular schooling system to secure the 
‘insulating belt’ was given by Philipps to the Director of Military Intelligence, George 
Macdonogh, and Colonel French of M.I.1.503 French did make such a suggestion in August 
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1917, but there are no surviving documents that prove that Macdonogh did.504 In addition, 
this was the only referenced mention of Macdonogh’s engagement with the threat of Pan-
Islamism towards the British Empire in East Africa contained within Philipps’ notes. His 
presence here is noteworthy, but not impossible. As the inspiration came from pre-war 
actions of the German Empire, it is certainly plausible that intelligence on those actions 
crossed his desk at some point during the hostilities.  
Whilst Philipps gave the credit to these gentlemen, it was certainly him that studied the 
German secular schooling system; his long documents are recognition of his thorough work.  
Philipps’ first commandment was that ‘Preventive measures should be inaugurated 
SIMULTANEOUSLY in each area of the Belt’. He designated these areas to be: ‘Uganda, the 
East Africa Protectorate, the Southern Sudan, German East Africa and the adjoining 
Portuguese and Belgian territories.’ The implementation of a secular schooling system in 
each area was remarked upon: 
The East Africa and Uganda Protectorates were deemed to be places where the potential for 
positive improvement could be seen by both French, who remarked that in the secular 
schools ‘the spirit of… the tribe, should be cultivated and nowhere can this be done with 
better chances of success than in British East Africa and Uganda where there are numerous 
tribes ethnographically quite distinct from one another’, and Sykes et al., who remarked 
that:  
‘In view of the dangers and difficulties arising from either a Christian or 
Mohammedan education (the former owing to the Christian attitude to polygamy, 
the latter owing to its tendency to acquire political with spiritual ascendency) it 
would seem desirable to establish secular schools in these parts where possible, this 
has been tried with success by the Germans and it is notable that the term ‘Kaffir’ in 
Uganda implies lack of education since all schools there have a definite religious 
tone.’505  
The Governor-General of the Sudan merely remarked that ‘The Education Department is 
considering a scheme for starting secular schools in which the vernacular will be taught’. 
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Stack hoped that this would result in ‘a sufficient number of natives… trained to enable the 
district [Mongalla] to be staffed with officials who will not be Arabic speaking.’506 
Philipps remarked that ‘The Portuguese and Belgian Administration might be approached; 
the danger to themselves of neglect pointed out and their active co-operation at least in 
policy, invited. Portuguese East Africa has, historically and racially become a peculiarly 
dangerous seeding ground for “all-black” movements, and needs particular attention.’ 
Furthermore, he stated that the: 
‘Azande and Mambettu tribes of the N.E. Belgian Congo are among those to whom 
the policy should be applied. It so happens that they are tribes with a proud national 
record and are also more advanced in natural development than any other 
Congolese peoples. Further, they adjoin British territory on two sides. Even were the 
Belgian administration financially unable to agree to the establishment of the secular 
tribal school system, the application of a definite co-ordinated policy could still be 
carried out by them with appreciable effect.’507 
However, these remarks have one important aspect in common: they were just remarks. 
Despite finding agreement from as high as Macdonogh, there is no evidence to prove that a 
secular schooling system was established. The British admired the German secular schooling 





French noted that the promotion of a secular schooling system to secure the ‘insulating belt’ 
of East Africa would not be without its European critics; primarily, the Christian Missions 
who ran Christian schools in the region. He believed that these missionaries would not allow 
such a schooling system to exist for any period of time significant enough for the British 
imperial intelligence establishment to secure the ‘insulating belt’: ‘[The] missionaries will 
not for long be satisfied to allow such secular schools to monopolise the training of the 
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natives. They will compete with them and will bring every possible pressure to bear on the 
Government to ensure equal treatment. It will not be possible to withstand such pressure’. 
This is the only indication enclosed within the surviving records for why a secular schooling 
system was apparently not established. French suggested that a solution might be found by 
allowing ‘only one denomination to work in two adjacent areas (vide Sudan).’508 Willis was 
more optimistic, and stated that secular schooling ‘would not be prejudicial to the Missions 
in as much as they would be offering to the natives not only the education that they could 
obtain at a Government school but also the religious [Christian] teaching into the 
bargain.’509 But the promotion of Christianity across the ‘insulating belt’ was not 
enthusiastically embraced by the British imperial intelligence establishment; the difficulties 
of promoting Christianity had already rendered that method unfeasible.  
If a secular schooling system could not exist in anything but the short-term in order to pacify 
other European interests in the region, then a secular schooling system to secure the 
‘insulating belt’ of East Africa could not exist. This realisation apparently led to the shelving 
of a method that was universally agreed upon by all the British Empire’s officials in East 
Africa who were charged with preventing Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the 
British Empire. 
The first of the two methods suggested to secure the ‘insulating belt’ of East Africa was 
implemented only on a very limited basis. The second was apparently not implemented at 
all. Yet the insulating belt held. Willis reported that by January 1918 ‘There [had] not been 
any influx of “liberal” ideas from outside to the black tribes of the Sudan’510. The combined 
efforts of the seven other strategies proposed to prevent the threat of Pan-Islamism 
resulted in the securing of this ‘belt’. Paradoxically, whilst the implementation of it was 
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Subchapter Seven: The Implementation of Counter-Intelligence in East Africa 
 
The seventh strategy proposed to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the 
British Empire in East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War 
was the implementation of counter-intelligence in the region. Of all eight strategies, this 
seventh strategy was the most diverse in nature; for it was comprised of several facets. The 
use of counter-intelligence grew exponentially in East Africa in the latter eighteen months of 
the Great War. The creation of M.I.5.D. and the East African Intelligence Centre were 
examined in great depth in Chapter Six. Although the evidence is circumstantial, it can surely 
be of no coincidence that the Intelligence Centre was initiated immediately after the 
production of several pieces of work, Captain Philipps’ memorandum “Africa for the African” 
and “Pan-Islam” Recent developments in Central and Eastern Africa in particular, that 
detailed the threat posed by Pan-Islamism to the security of the British Empire in East Africa. 
Through the production of these pieces of work, the British Empire gained the knowledge 
that their imperial territories in East Africa could be threatened not only through the prism 
of guerrilla warfare, but through the prism of Pan-Islamism. 
The implementation of counter-intelligence to counter the threat posed by Pan-Islamism in 
East Africa can be split into four sections, all of which were either placed under the direction 
of the East African Intelligence Centre or were implemented by others alongside it. The first 
of these was the collection and collation of records of intelligence from across the East 
African region, and the surviving documents show that this was a very successful endeavour. 
The second involved the enaction and enforcement of port controls and the registration of 
aliens across the same space; due to the lack of surviving raw intelligence, it is difficult to 
give an objective analysis on how successful this section was. The third section, censorship, 
had been under the direction of the censor prior to its move, after its institution, to the East 
African Intelligence Centre. Censorship was also vital to the implementation of the first two 
sections. The fourth was principally successful; it involved the interception of the agents of 
Pan-Islamism in East Africa. But this success, Philipps volunteered, could have only a limited 
impact on preventing Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in 
East Africa.  
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Despite some failures, overall the implementation of counter-intelligence by the British 
Empire made important inroads to the prevention of Pan-Islamism from threatening the 
security of that empire in East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the First 
World War. Out of all eight of the strategies proposed to counter this threat, it was this 
seventh strategy which was the most successful and, consequently of that fact and of its 
diversity, it is this strategy for which there remains the most surviving documentation.  
 
The Use of Counter-Intelligence by the East African Intelligence Centre 
 
There were three counter-intelligence subjects implemented by the East African Intelligence 
Centre; these three subjects were interwoven and formed the backbone of the work of that 
establishment: 
1. The collection and collation of intelligence records and files from across the wider 
region to a central library located in Nairobi. 
2. The enactment and enforcement of port controls and the ‘registration of aliens’ to 
prevent the importation of enemy-backed literature, especially religious literature. 
3. Censorship. 
 
The Collection and Collation of Intelligence Records from Across the East African Region; the 
Acquisition of Imperial Knowledge 
 
The collection and collation of intelligence records from across the East African region to a 
central library located in Nairobi was a successful endeavour and made an important 
contribution to the prevention of Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British 
Empire in East Africa. Written in January 1919, Major Muggeridge gave a brief historical 
account on how this subject matter had been conducted by the Intelligence Centre: 
‘From the inception of the Department [the Intelligence Centre] it was realised that 
the old available Intelligence files, dealing with tribes and native food supplies were 
out of date and in many cases much information that would be of value was lacking. 
Steps were therefore taken with the object of obtaining as much information as 
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possible on these subjects as well as in regard to European man power, privately 
owned motor cars and similar subjects.’511 
The lack of the ‘Intelligence files [which dealt] with tribes and native food supplies’ and 
information concerning ‘European man power, privately owned motor cars and similar 
subjects’ had an impact across the entire East African Campaign. In 1921 Brigadier General 
C. P. Fendall published The East African Force 1915—1919; an account of the actions of the 
East African Force during the First World War. In this book he was scathing of the failure of 
the British Empire in East Africa to organise its infrastructure for military purposes. He 
separated the infrastructure difficulties faced by the British Empire’s forces into two 
sections: ‘natural difficulties’ and ‘artificial difficulties’.  
By ‘natural difficulties’ he ‘meant those due to the composition of the force, to the distance 
from sources of supply, to the shipping shortage, to the country and climate.’ By ‘artificial 
difficulties’ he meant ‘those due to want of suitable organisation, the idiosyncrasies of chief 
administrative officers, and deliberate obstruction on the part of some who had to do with 
the supply of the force.’  
The ‘natural difficulties’, Fendall determined, could not be helped; for their faults, they were 
but merely the products of the harsh environment in which the fighting was being fought. 
Conversely, the ‘artificial difficulties’ had been brought about in the East African Campaign 
of the First World War by the lack of work to prevent them in either the pre-war or early-
war period. A central library, such as the collection that the Intelligence Centre would 
create, of the intelligence records from across the East African region would have been 
made good use of earlier in the War to reduce these ‘natural difficulties’, but for its lack of 
existence.512 
The Intelligence Centre was not the first establishment to attempt to overcome the ‘artificial 
difficulties’ which occurred because of the lack of a central intelligence records library. The 
Intelligence Department of the East African Force had also collected and collated similar 
information and published it in Intelligence Notes on British and German East Africa, of 
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which there are two surviving editions: December 1915 and March 1916.513 Both of the 
surviving editions of Intelligence Notes were ‘compiled from “Field Notes on German East 
Africa, Aug., 1914,” and from reconnaissance, patrol reports, and other information gained 
since the outbreak of war… [they were] of necessity incomplete.’514 Captain Meinertzhagen 
appealed that anybody who possessed ‘any additional information’ should ‘at once 
[submit]’ it ‘to the Intelligence Department at Headquarters.’515 Intelligence Notes on British 
and German East Africa was a useful start, but it was by no means a library; Meinertzhagen 
made no endeavour to collect and collate intelligence records from across the East African 
region to a central library himself, despite fully understanding the difficulties that resulted 
from the lack of such a central library. He merely appealed for others to send him any 
relevant information they happened to hold. The Intelligence Centre was therefore the first 
establishment to undertake such work; work that was, despite its importance, not 
undertaken until the very last year of the conflict. 
The intelligence records to be collected comprised of ‘all the existing Intelligence papers 
which had hitherto been filed at the headquarters of the various battalions of the King’s 
African Rifles’ and ‘All Intelligence records of permanent interest about the British 
protectorates and those collected during the military operations in German East Africa’. 
They were to be ‘filed at Nairobi’, the location of the Intelligence Centre. ‘[All] information 
possible about the Belgian Congo, Italian Somaliland and Abyssinia’ was also to be 
obtained.516 Major Foster endeavoured to undertake this work immediately. It was recorded 
that: 
‘Shortly after his arrival [in the autumn of 1917], [he] addressed a memorandum 
giving the headings under which information was required to the Secretariat in each 
of the British possessions in the East Africa area, at the same time indicating the 
nature of the collaboration and assistance which was sought for. A Memorandum on 
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the Collection of Military Intelligence… [was] compiled and distributed to officers at 
various stations and posts’.517 
Consequently, these intelligence records, and the information subsequently collected to 
enhance them, were collected by the Intelligence Centre, who then collated them into the 
form of ‘A properly indexed library of maps and a system of charting and filing road reports’ 
that was structured to ‘be readily available’ when needed. This collation started from the 
inception of the Intelligence Centre:  
‘In the early days of the Department a card index was commenced in connection 
with subjects, tribes, persons and places. This has been religiously kept up and forms 
a valuable means of reference. An attempt has been made to study conditions in 
Abyssinia and British Somaliland; the reports from these places and from Khartoum 
are carefully read and carded as are any available books on these territories.’ 
 This collection of relevant information does not appear to have slowed down throughout 
the remaining months of the East African Campaign, for on 7th January 1919 Muggeridge 
wrote that ‘Both the maps and the road reports [were still] constantly being added to.’518  
Exact details as to what was included within these intelligence records was not included in 
the document Extract from a Report on the Organisation of the Intelligence Centre at 
Nairobi; the raw intelligence of this ‘Military Intelligence’ is missing. However, Muggeridge 
did feel the necessity to highlight the three topics that were of the greatest interest to the 
Centre: ‘Pan Islamism, Pan Ethiopianism, and the activities of Missionaries [were] amongst 
the subjects in regard to which every endeavour [had] been made to collect information and 
record the opinions of those competent to judge.’519 Thus, right from the beginning of the 
institution of the Intelligence Centre the collection and collation of intelligence on Pan-
Islamism was a focal point; Foster appreciated the need for ‘obtaining as much information 
as possible’ on this subject.  
Yet Muggeridge appears to have been something of a pragmatist. Due to the lack of 
previous imperial intelligence in East Africa, the intelligence required to prevent Pan-
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Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa was not always 
contained in intelligence records, waiting to be collected and collated into a central library 
by the Intelligence Centre. Therefore, it would have to be discovered. The Intelligence 
Centre was instituted in November 1917 and the armistice was finally enacted in November 
1918; Muggeridge seems to have understood that due to them spending only a relatively 
short period working in the longest campaign of the entire First World War, there were 
many subjects on which he and his colleagues were not, and could not become, the leading 
experts upon, and that in order to succeed in their positions and make the Intelligence 
Centre an operational success it would be imperative for them to gain both intelligence and 
analysis from other, more qualified, sources. Therefore, as examined in Subchapter Three of 
this chapter, the Centre sought out what limited expertise on Pan-Islamism, and other 
subjects, existed. Philipps’ work shone through as being the most informative; Muggeridge’s 
letter to Philipps, in which he wrote that he ‘should like to thank you for all the assistance 
you have given the department… The information you have sent from time to time has been 
most useful and has been carefully carded. I am very grateful’, demonstrated the 
importance of Philipps’ work for the acquisition of imperial knowledge by the Intelligence 
Centre.520 
The collection and collation of intelligence records from across the East African region, and 
the discovery of information and the employment of expertise when these intelligence 
records fell short, was therefore a success for the East African Intelligence Centre; it 
facilitated them in acquiring imperial knowledge about Pan-Islamism. By understanding as 
much as they could about the threats to the British Empire, the Intelligence Centre was able 
to use that knowledge to promote the security of its empire in East Africa in the years of the 
First World War. 
 
The Enaction and Enforcement of Port Controls and the Registration of Aliens 
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Due to its geographic location on the western shores of the Indian Ocean, the importation 
of physical Pan-Islamic propaganda into East Africa occurred primarily by sea. The British 
Empire was aware of this method of ingress and had been since the summer of 1914. 
Therefore, it was ‘Prior to the arrival of Major Foster’ that the ‘searching of natives, both 
male and female, arriving at the ports of the East African [sic] Protectorate’ had 
commenced, and this ‘had been carried out under the supervision and largely at the 
instigation of the Hon. The Chief of Customs’. Earlier in the same document it becomes 
evident that this ‘searching of natives’ occurred not only when they were ‘arriving at the 
ports’, but also when they were ‘leaving’. 521 
The East African Intelligence Centre found these port controls to be inadequate, and the 
desire was expressed to improve them to prevent the physical importation of Pan-Islamic 
propaganda into East Africa through this channel. For guidance ‘Major Foster sought advice 
from the Central Bureau [M.I.5.D.]’ on the subject ‘of the hand-carrying of letters in and out 
of the country, and in this instance… he was provided with a copy of the Regulations issued 
in Egypt for the prevention of letter-smuggling.’522  
The co-operation received by the Intelligence Centre was vital to their endeavour to prevent 
Pan-Islamic propaganda from entering or exiting the region by enacting and enforcing port 
controls. Foster ‘adopted and extended’ the important measure ‘initiated by the Chief 
Censor and Chief of Customs’… [of] ‘the searching of persons, entering and leaving British 
East African ports for hand carried correspondence or mischievous pamphlets’, and received 
support from the latter to do so.523 Reflecting on this support, Muggeridge wrote both that 
‘the Department is greatly indebted to [the Hon. The Chief of Customs] for his enthusiastic 
support of, and assistance in connection with, the more complete measures, embracing 
Europeans, which followed’, and that ‘The Department [was]… greatly indebted to the 
King’s African Rifles Headquarters Staff for the loan of several N.C.Os without whom it 
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would have been impossible to find a suitable personnel to supervise and carry out the 
searching’.524  
At first glance the outcome of this adoption and extension looked positive. M.I.5.D. wrote 
that: 
‘Major Foster instituted a searching squad at Mombasa, and it was reported in 
October, 1918, that his arrangements were working quite smoothly, and that several 
convictions for hand-carrying had been obtained. Major Foster’s successor 
[Muggeridge] was encouraged by the Central Bureau in his endeavours to extend 
this system to other important ports, and to arrange for a travelling squad to visit 
the less-known points of entry unexpectedly from time to time.’ 
However, this was not quite the full story. M.I.5.D. continued their statement: ‘In January 
1919… it was reported that [the Intelligence Centre’s] efforts to carry out these measures 
had only been partially successful.’525 And whilst Muggeridge wrote that ‘The Department’ 
was ‘greatly indebted to the King’s African Rifles Headquarters Staff… to supervise and carry 
out the searching’, he concluded this sentence by writing ‘even at the few ports where this 
has been done.’ Furthermore, ‘It [was] to be regretted that subsequent attempts to extend 
the searching arrangements at other Ports in Conquered Territory’ – the same German East 
Africa that Philipps described as ‘The chief danger zone… [for the] conjunction of Islamic 
propaganda with the cry of “Africa for the “African” – ‘and to provide for a small section to 
pay surprise visits to harbours frequented by dhows only were not encouraged.’526 Hence, 
whilst the British improved the enaction and enforcement of port controls in the East 
African region it remained possible, if one desired to do so, to circumvent them. 
Muggeridge did not attempt to deny this issue; in fact, he directly addressed the problem: 
‘It was obvious from the first that, in a country like Africa, especially, it would be 
impossible to prevent hand carrying of letters and pamphlets. The utmost that could 
be aimed at was to check the practice, and by the capture of a certain number of 
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documents to get valuable clues in regard to mischievous intentions and 
connections. This has to some extent been accomplished, either through the 
instrumentality of the Intelligence Searching Squad at Mombasa, Kilindini and 
Kisumu, or owing to the vigilance of the Censors and Political Officers, and many 
convictions were obtained as the result.’527 
Thus, the Intelligence Centre worked with what limited elements it had. Knowing that they 
had neither the personnel nor the expertise to completely prevent the importation of Pan-
Islamic propaganda into East Africa via the Indian Ocean, ‘to check the practice’ at the most 
popular ports and to ‘capture… a certain number of documents to get valuable clues’ about 
the threats associated with Pan-Islamism seems to have been a sensible course of action to 
undertake to help curb, if not completely prevent, the spread of Pan-Islamism in East Africa 
and so, consequently, to help lessen, if not completely prevent, the threat of Pan-Islamism 
to the security of the British Empire in the region during the First World War.  
 
The Registration of Aliens 
 
In addition to attempting to control the physical movement of written material around the 
region, M.I.5.D. recorded that ‘One of Major Foster’s first steps was to bring about the 
registration of aliens in East Africa’; the Intelligence Centre intended to also control the 
physical movement of people. Foster ‘appealed to the Central Special Intelligence Bureau 
for advice in the matter.’ They obliged and ‘arranged for the Report of the Aliens 
Registration Committee published in Cairo in April, 1917, to be sent to Major Foster by the 
Eastern Mediterranean Special Intelligence Bureau, as the Regulations and policy adopted in 
Egypt were especially well suited for adaption in East Africa.’ Further to this, ‘At the request 
of the C.S.I.B. the Assistant Director of the Eastern Mediterranean Special Intelligence 
Bureau also sent suggestions to Major Foster on the subject.’528 
‘[The] compulsory registration of all persons other than members of His Majesty’s Forces 
entering the area (Nyasaland and British Somaliland excepted)’ was the second of the ‘Two 
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important measures initiated by the Chief Censor and Chief of Customs’ that the Intelligence 
Centre ‘adopted and extended’. However, the Intelligence Centre hit upon a problem when 
it attempted to improve them. ‘The proclamation in regard to’ this measure was separately 
‘issued by the Administration’ of each part of the British Empire ‘in each case (except in 
Conquered Territory, where it was promulgated under Martial Law)’. Consequently, they 
‘differed slightly the one from the other, as it was found impossible to reconcile conflicting 
views as to details… Thus, in some cases, natives of Africa were included, in others 
excluded’.529 Sometimes Africans were treated in the same manner as Europeans and 
Indians by the British Empire and sometimes they were not. 
Muggeridge gave an account both about how the registration of aliens worked and about 
the benefits this had for the Intelligence Centre’s endeavour: 
‘[The] main result was that at all events all Europeans and Indians (except members 
of His Majesty’s Forces and in some cases members of the Administration) [and 
Africans where excluded], had to register their names, nationality, place of 
residence, business, duration of stay, and other important particulars on landing, or 
otherwise entering the area, and severe penalties were incurred for a false 
declaration. An Identity Card with a special number was issued to each individual 
and this was subject to visa at specified places. Series of numbers were allotted to 
each territory within the area, so that it was possible to tell at once, on examination 
of the card, whether it had been issued in Uganda or, say, Conquered Territory. A 
note of the number was made on the Registration Form and a duplicate of that sent 
to the Central Office. Persons disembarking at Kilindini could therefore proceed to 
Conquered Territory or Uganda with the one card and without further trouble, 
except for visa. It is perhaps unnecessary to detail the precautions taken to prevent 
evasion. The assistance of the Police and Civil District Officers was called upon in 
many cases where Censor’s Officers were not stationed, and, on the whole, the 
arrangement has worked satisfactorily and has been productive of valuable 
information, while at the same time giving the authorities a hold over the 
movements of undesirables. The fact that persons of British Nationality were 
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required to register was an unanswerable argument to objections raised, in a very 
few cases, by others.’530 
The information gained by this practise was mixed with the information gained via the 
censorship of the post to help the British Empire identify those who needed to be identified 
to continue to secure the British Empire in East Africa against threats: ‘Careful records were 
kept of individuals in regard to whom, from one cause or another, suspicion arose, with the 
object of ensuring that information in regard to undesirables should be readily available. 
Lists of Germans in the field were also supplied by [the censorship] section of the 
department.’ 
Additionally, to help identify those who needed to be identified to continue to secure the 
British Empire outside of East Africa, ‘Notes on firms and individuals in regard to whose 
movements or activities suspicion was entertained, largely culled from the Censor’s records, 
[were] forwarded from time to time to other Intelligence Centres and the War Office, when 
it was felt that these were of more than local interest’. Furthermore, the security of the 
British Empire in the post-war era was also considered: ‘a statement, chiefly compiled from 
information from the same source, in regard to those individuals whose record seemed to 
render their future residence in Conquered Territory undesirable [was] forwarded to His 
Honour the Administrator and General Headquarters on request.’531 
However, the registration of aliens was not altogether effective. ‘In October 1918, the result 
of Major Foster’s efforts was reported to the C.S.I.B… In the opinion of the Central Special 
Intelligence Bureau, the Identity Card and Declaration Form was open to some criticism… 
but satisfaction was expressed that Major Foster’s efforts had not been entirely in vain.’532  
The intended outcome of the compulsory ‘registration of aliens’ was not elaborated upon by 
the Intelligence Centre. It is clear having greater control over the movements of some, albeit 
not all, of the people entering and leaving the region and moving between areas within the 
region, would help the British Empire to prevent the spread of ideologies by preventing the 
movements of ‘undesirables’. Because of the lack of raw intelligence remaining in the 
surviving documents it is difficult to give an objective analysis on how successful the 
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Censorship commenced on the very first day of the Great War in East Africa. On that day 
Zanzibar started to censor all civilian post. Soon, post proceeding to East Africa was 
censored at Cape Town in advance of it reaching its destination.533 The German propaganda 
that was prevented from entering East Africa as a result took the forms of war pamphlets, 
newspapers, and enemy trading letters.534 General Botha, the Prime Minister of South 
Africa, was not impressed; the censorship instructions for South Africa, he complained to 
Jan Smuts, were ‘entirely based on European conditions and letters are censored for all 
kinds of nonsense.’535 The British Empire was apparently not swayed by such grumbles; the 
censorship was continued for the duration of the hostilities. In January 1919 Muggeridge 
was able to conclude that over the course of the Great War ‘Cable Censorship, centered [sic] 
at Zanzibar, [had] been efficiently carried out.’536  
Censorship was therefore a branch of the British counter-intelligence effort that existed 
throughout the entire East African Campaign to prevent threats to the security of the British 
Empire in East Africa. ‘[In] the early part of 1918’, censorship, ‘which had hitherto been part 
of Force Intelligence General Headquarters was incorporated in the East African Intelligence 
Centre’, where it was ‘most efficiently conducted under the direction of Major R.B. Hopkins 
O.B.E.’537 
The censorship of the press was just as thorough as the censorship of the post; this had 
‘been perhaps more strictly conducted in East Africa than in many other places, chiefly on 
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account of the effect that articles of news of a certain type, which though suitable for 
European consumption might have on the native mind, but the restrictions imposed have 
resulted in very little friction on the whole.’ There was, however, some friction caused 
because of this racial distinction; this friction came about because the narrative published in 
East Africa to prevent ‘the native mind’ from consuming what the British Empire thought it 
ought not to consume was not followed in Europe or in South Africa, resulting in an 
inevitable clash: 
‘The position of the Cable Censor was for a time rendered somewhat difficult owing 
to the Civil Authorities in [Zanzibar] objecting to the publication there of many 
enemy communiques as well as to that of certain portions of Reuters referring to our 
retreat and German atrocities, even though the Cable Censor considered these 
suitable for publication in British East Africa in many cases… to avoid one version of 
Reuters appearing in Zanzibar and another in Mombasa, and Nairobi (which would 
have been contrary to War Office Instructions) the Cable Censor had, under the 
circumstances no alternative but to delete the portions objected to by the Zanzibar 
Administration, which thus in fact became the authority for censoring Reuters over 
the whole area. The gist of the deleted portions subsequently appeared in papers 
received from home or South Africa with the result that the public began to feel that 
the position was worse than it was, while the Press was irritated at what was 
considered to be the unnecessary cutting out by the Censor of news for which it had 
to pay. It was realised however, that to achieve the best results amicable relations 
must be maintained between the Intelligence and those with whom it had to deal. 
Great care was taken to avoid friction, and the turn of events resulting in more 
optimistic news put an end to any divergence of opinion as to what should be 
published.’538 
By initiating ‘the searching of persons, entering and leaving British East African ports for 
hand carried correspondence or mischievous pamphlets’, which resulted in many 
‘convictions’ being ‘obtained as the result’ of their ‘vigilance’, and by introducing ‘the 
compulsory registration of all persons other than members of His Majesty’s Forces entering 
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the area’, and by ensuring that ‘careful records were kept of individuals in regard to whom 
from one cause or another, suspicions arose, with the object of ensuring that information in 
regard to undesirables should be readily available’, and by keeping ‘lists of Germans in the 
field’, the censorship played a vital role in all of the successes achieved by implementing 
counter-intelligence to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British 
Empire in East Africa.  
 
The Use of Counter-Intelligence Conducted Alongside the East African Intelligence Centre 
 
There was one counter-intelligence subject implemented alongside the East African 
Intelligence Centre: 
1. The Interception of the Agents of Pan-Islamism 
 
 
The Interception of the Agents of Pan-Islamism 
 
It is not entirely clear how involved the East African Intelligence Centre was with the 
interception of the agents of Pan-Islamism; Foster and Muggeridge were certainly 
communicating with Philipps, who was the person primarily responsible. As Philipps was 
attached to the King’s African Rifles as the Chief Intelligence Officer in Uganda, in 1917, 
when much of this work took place, the Intelligence Department of the East African Force 
was technically responsible for the implementation of this section. 
As was partially quoted in Chapter Five, Philipps stated that ‘Throughout the German East 
African Campaign, from the 8th August, 1914, onwards, German Pan-Islamic propaganda 
[had] been continuously intercepted by our Military Intelligence agents in the Uganda-
Congo-Sudan area.’ Philipps continued: ‘In 1914 the enemy at once endeavoured to exploit 
the personal element by instigating prominent Mohammedans in his territory to correspond 
with their former associates along the old slave routes in Uganda and the Congo Belge.’ 
These Muslims had agreed to this work because ‘Prominent positions were promised in the 
future Germano-Islamic Empire of Eastern Africa in return for services to be rendered as 
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spies or in tampering with Sudanese troops.’ In 1914 this propaganda took ‘the form of 
personal correspondence and of printed proclamations in Arabic and Swahili, signed by 
Governor Schnee and the ex-Sultan Said Khalif of Zanzibar… German Pan-Islamic agents 
were everywhere amply supplied with funds.’ By 1915-16 ‘enemy propaganda [had] 
assumed a new phase. Printed proclamations, with the green flag, were despatched… They 
set forth: 
1. The JEHAD, laying down that Islam required of all true believers not merely a passive 
but an active resistance to the Allies. 
2. Importance of Allied attempts against German East Africa. 
3. Certainty of eventual German victory in Europe, based on Allied territory actually 
held. 
4. Consequent:  
a. Establishment of Islamic Empire of North and East Central Africa, under 
benign German ‘protection’. 
b. Assistance to be forthcoming for all rebellions, as MOHAHI in French and ALI 
DINAR in Egyptian Sudan (DARFUR) 
5. Complete failure of Allied attack on Stanbul [sic].  
6.  Mutiny of Indian troops at Singapore.’539 
Islamic propaganda was ‘printed and written’ with these ‘green flags’ ‘during the [entire] 
war’; green is the traditional colour within Islam for flags and banners.540 Due to the dates, it 
was doubtless the production of this ‘new phase’ of ‘enemy propaganda’ that caused the 
likes of Philipps to investigate the threats posed by Pan-Islamism to the British Empire in 
East Africa. 
Philipps oversaw the interception of these ‘agents’. He gave a concise account about how 
these ‘agents’ were able to both pass through British military lines, and then continue to 
avoid detection: 
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‘With one Brigade only on a 300 mile front it has been possible for native enemy 
agents to pass through our lines by night. Once through, every Mohammedan is a 
‘brother’, and native fear of legal complications or odium consequent upon betrayal 
of a co-religionist, even if his errand is divulged, induces the ‘friend’ rather to pass on 
the agent quickly than denounce him. Further agents were cleverly chosen by CLAN 
according to the area to be traversed, ensuring them at least tolerance and probable 
immunity from ‘betrayal’ to the European.’541 
These ‘Pan-Islamic agents’ were ‘frequently… intercepted by Uganda Intelligence Agents en 
route from German East Africa to the Sudan, Congo & Darfur. The Ex-Sultan Said Khalif of 
Zanzibar, recently captured, was a leading spirit.’542 Philipps recorded the three techniques 
he employed to intercept these ‘agents’: 
The first technique was to simply to bribe people to betray them: ‘A vigorous counter-
espionage by the pecuniary and political bribery of prominent enemy pagan chiefs resulted 
in my receiving notice of despatch of enemy agents supplied by chiefs’, he wrote. This 
proved to be very successful: ‘interception [occurred] in eighty per cent of cases.’543 
The second technique was a tested method of Notley’s: arrest any European found to be 
involved and deport them. This technique took longer to execute; he had ‘long suspected… 
that two Greek traders… acted as agents between the enemy and the ARAB-SWAHILI 
colonies on Lake Albert’ on the Uganda-Congolese border before he was ‘in a position to 
report’. These Greek traders were called ‘Angelopoulos’ and ‘Lorenzi’, they were ‘flotsam of 
the salve trader’, they ‘acted as forwarding agents to the Sudan’ and they had ‘commercial 
relations with [a firm] of Mombasa.’ Philipps reminded his reader that ‘It should be borne in 
mind that Greeks have everywhere in G.E.A. [German East Africa] been not only strongly 
pro-German in sentiment but also most active contractors to the enemy troops in the field.’ 
That reader was the Foreign Office. ‘I beg’, wrote Philipps to them, ‘to submit that steps 
should be taken to place these Greeks, if not the supporting firm, upon the ‘black list’.’544 
                                                          
541 TNA: WO 106/259: Philipps. ‘Memorandum. Greek Traders’, 13th August 1917. 
542 TNA: WO 106/259: Philipps. ‘Memorandum. “Africa for the African” and “Pan-Islam”’, 15th July 1917. 




The third technique was to prevent Muslim Indian seditionists from sending ‘enemy 
propaganda’ to East Africa from abroad. This was partly combated by enacting and 
enforcing port controls, but it was also combated by attempting to prevent the material 
from being sent in the first place. ‘Attempts are made to counteract enemy propaganda 
among Mohammedan, especially the seditious Indian propaganda which emanates chiefly 
from the United States and Switzerland, by the stoppage of the distribution of pamphlets 
and newspapers through the post and otherwise’, wrote the Foreign Office. They continued: 
‘The French and Italian Government have prohibited the circulation of such matter in their 
respective possessions.’ The Foreign Office wrote in December 1916; this was earlier in 
comparison to many of the other documents relating to East Africa because this issue was 
an empire-wide concern.545  In East Africa specifically, M.I.5.D. reported that in 1917 
‘revolutionary tendencies still existed’ amongst Indian Seditionists in the East Africa 
Protectorate and that these tendencies were ‘inflamed by the Ghadr [a newspaper], many 
copies of which were still finding their way into the Colony.’ In July 1917 Major Notley 
‘suggested that the moment was opportune for the suppression of the paper’, and in the 
following September M.I.5.D. ‘was able to state that representations had been made to 
America for the suppression of the Ghadr and that the editor and staff were under arrest.’ 
Subsequently, ‘It was hoped that the whole matter was now at an end.’546 The Indian 
Seditionist movement certainly did not end in 1917, but, from the limited information 
available, it does appear that by the end of that year the issue of Indians sending Pan-
Islamic propaganda to East Africa was not as great a concern as it once had been. 
The success of the implementation of this method was greatly mixed on geographic lines. 
Due to the ‘vigorous counter-espionage’ he undertook, Philipps was able to report that as 
British imperial troops advanced through the area around Lake Victoria he had enough 
information to immediately arrest ‘all prominent native enemy propagandists in that area 
thus avoiding the danger of their continuing their tactics behind the line of our advance. The 
enemy subsequently attempted to communicate with them in vain.’ Whereas further east 
he had encountered more difficulties: ‘But on the Uganda-Congolese front where the local 
native could not be employed by the enemy, I have hitherto been unable to locate his local 
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forwarding agents.’547 Yet in the north, Captain Willis reported that ‘although it [had] been 
reported on one or two occasions that propaganda [was] sent in the direction of tribes of 
the Sudan from German East Africa there is no reason to believe that it reached its 
destination.’548 
Captain Bray offered no words of comfort from a wider imperial perspective; he felt that 
intercepting ‘agents’ would do little to truly stem the tide of Pan-Islamism. He argued that 
‘To arrest the principle members, though it removes for the moment inflammable material, 
has no more effect in freeing us from kindred and future dangers, or from stopping the 
trend of Mohammedan events, than drawing a few buckets of water from a river stops its 
flow.’549  
Many of these ‘agents’ of Pan-Islamism were intercepted, but this could have only a limited 
impact on the prevention of Pan-Islamism; new agents were recruited to fill the gap. But not 
attempting to intercept these ‘agents’ would have only worsened the situation; if those who 
wished to spread Pan-Islamism had encountered no physical barrier they would have been 
able to spread their message to a greater geographic extent, which would have increased 
the threat posed by Pan-Islamism to the British Empire in East Africa. Consequently, the 
conclusion here seems to be that whilst the interception of the ‘agents’ of Pan-Islamism 
may have had no real success in ‘stopping the trend of Mohammedan events’, by providing 
some form of contest it was successful in preventing Pan-Islamism from spreading to a 




‘On the 1st December, 1917’ Foster ‘reported to the C.S.I.B. that all active espionage 
had been, for the time being, suppressed. He drew attention to the active part 
played by Martial Law in attaining this object, stating that all convictions of sedition 
and espionage had been obtained before Courts – Martial and that suspects had 
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been deported or restrained by the Military Authorities under Martial Law, as 
circumstances demanded.’550 
This was a premature assertion to report. Muggeridge’s statement, regarding port controls, 
that ‘The utmost that could be aimed at was to check the practice’, was written after 1st 
December 1917; it could have been written about any of the topics raised in this chapter. It 
could be the case that Foster, in a similar manner to Notley, was referring only to non-
African ‘active espionage’, in which case he was mostly correct. The learning curve that the 
intelligence establishment of the British Empire underwent during the East African 
Campaign was that the African population of the British Empire could threaten the security 
of the British Empire, and the East African Intelligence Centre was a part of that learning 
curve.  
In 1914 a man was prevented from passing into India via the Khyber Pass from Afghanistan; 
messages to Indian Muslim leaders about the Ottoman Caliphate’s decision to proclaim 
jihad against the British Empire in the event of war had been found ‘Sewn into the linings of 
his clothes.’551 This incident did not occur in East Africa, but it presents another narrative of 
consideration when analysing the usefulness that the implementation of counter-
intelligence had on the effort to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the 
British Empire in East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World 
War: a narrative of luck.  
The British Empire was fortunate that those who wished to spread the Pan-Islamic message 
in East Africa were not themselves particularly sophisticated in their methods; either 
because they did not have access to objects that would allow them to become more 
sophisticated, or because they did not have the knowledge. This meant that great advances 
were able to be gained in preventing Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the 
British Empire in East Africa by such simple tactics as enacting and enforcing port controls at 
the major ports, bribing tribal leaders, and censoring the post. When one takes an 
overarching viewpoint, it appears that much of the success achieved by the British Empire in 
preventing the threats posed by Pan-Islamism were down to the good fortune of having 
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unsophisticated opponents, than it was to their own abilities. Nevertheless, some significant 
successes were achieved by the implementation of this seventh strategy, and that was the 
























Subchapter Eight: The Production and Dissemination of Pro-British Propaganda 
 
The effectiveness of Pan-Islamic propaganda, and the success of the Pan-Islamic movement 
more generally, depended not only on its physical progress throughout the British Empire in 
East Africa, but also on the reception that it would meet from Muslims when they received 
it. In short, the British Empire understood that it would matter a great deal less if Pan-
Islamic propaganda reached its intended recipients if those recipients were not amenable to 
its messages. The British Imperial Government thought that the threat posed by Pan-
Islamism to the security of the British Empire in the years of the First World War was 
sufficient enough to undertake a programme of initiatives to ensure that the Islamic 
population of East Africa was not amenable to its messages. The production and 
dissemination of pro-British propaganda for this purpose was the eighth and final strategy 
proposed. 
The British attempted to influence the opinions of the Islamic population of its Empire by 
utilising the written word. By both collecting written addresses of loyalty from Muslims of 
high standing and by producing newspapers with a pro-British stance they hoped to 
convince the Islamic population of the British Empire that their loyalty rested not with a 
Pan-Islamic ideal, but with their colonisers. This area of work was most intense in the 
second half of the First World War when the potential threat that Pan-Islamism posed to the 
security of the British Empire around the world came to be better understood by British 
imperial officials, but it did exist in the former. In the former the propaganda dealt more 
with the potential German-backed ‘Turkish jehad’ rather than the potential ‘African jehad’ 
of the latter period.552 Furthermore, only a minority of the production of pro-British 
propaganda was focused upon East Africa itself; this was an imperial project predominantly 
run out of Whitehall, and encompassed the British Empire in its entirety. Of all eight 
strategies, this eighth strategy had the greatest geographic scope. 
Success in this endeavour was mixed; some calamitous failures occurred in the international 
arena, but real achievement was gained in promoting a pro-British message to the Islamic 
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population of the British Empire. The British Empire did not produce any analysis about the 
reaction of the Islamic population to this propaganda; it is therefore impossible to 
conclusively state to what extent this eighth strategy was responsible for preventing the 
threat from Pan-Islamism to that empire in East Africa. However, the linear increase in its 
production and the continued enthusiasm shown by British imperial officials to furthering its 
scope heavily suggests that the production and dissemination of pro-British propaganda 
achieved success right across East Africa and beyond. 
 
Addresses of Loyalty from the Muslims of the British Empire 
 
Copying the French 
 
In December 1914 the French Government compiled Volume XXIX of the Revue du Monde 
Musulman, which was a volume composed of ‘Addresses and Testimonials of loyalty from 
Chiefs and religious leaders’ from within the French Empire’s Islamic population. The French 
Empire in North and West Africa had a large Islamic population; the French Government was 
not slow in compiling a new volume of the Revue du Monde Musulman to help ensure that 
this population was not swayed to side with the enemy against their imperial colonisers by 
demonstrating that the ‘Chiefs and religious leaders’ of the Islamic population were firmly 
on the side of the French Empire.553 
A similar episode ensued in the first half of 1916. In the early summer of that year the War 
Office of the United Kingdom received a letter from the propaganda section of the French 
General Headquarters which detailed how tricolour postcards had been distributed to 
Muslims in the French Empire in North Africa, many of which had then been returned with 
pro-French sentiments written upon them, which would be ‘suitable for valuable 
propaganda’ purposes.554 One such postcard contained a poem, which included the words: 
‘Salut à toi, ô Drapeau qui donnes la vie aux âmes, à la science, à la justice, aux bienfaits, aux 
                                                          
553 TNA: CO 323/719/109: Letter from the War Office, London to the Under Secretary of State, Colonial Office, 
2nd June 1916. 
554 TNA: CO 323/719/109: Letter from the War Office, London, to the Under Secretary of State, Colonial Office, 
30th June 1916. 
274 
 
efforts… Ne sois pas abaissé, ô emblème d’élévation! La gloire est pour ceux qui placent leur 
refuge à ton ombre, ô drapeau!555 ‘Suitable propaganda’ indeed!  
After receiving this letter, the War Office became markedly interested with both the 
postcard scheme and Volume XXIX of the Revue du Monde Musulman. On 2nd June 1916 the 
War Office wrote that Volume XXIX ‘contains a remarkable testimony of sympathy with 
France from native Moslem Chiefs, and communities in the French Colonies… They 
condemn the intrigue of the Turkish Government and protest against the proclamation of a 
Holy War at the dictation of the Germans.’ Copying such an idea, the War Office proposed 
to the Colonial Office, could be useful for securing British standing amongst the Islamic 
population of its own Empire, which, in turn, would reduce any threat from the Islamic 
population via Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire: ‘In drawing 
your attention to these publications I am to point out their obvious value for the purposes 
of propaganda, and I am to suggest that a similar production should be undertaken by His 
Majesty’s Government.’556 A letter written on 27th June 1916 made it clear that this 
propaganda was to be published amongst the Islamic population of the British Empire, and 
that in particular within these testimonies those received from Islamic Chiefs and religious 
leaders would be published, as had occurred in the French Empire. Other letters or 
documents which could be suitable for publication for the same propaganda purposes were 
also sought. East Africa was specifically mentioned in this letter as being a place from which 
the War Office was interested in collecting Muslim testimonies of loyalties.557 As regarded 
the postcard scheme, the War Office suggested to the Colonial Office that such a scheme be 
enacted throughout the British Empire and that ‘a collection of the replies, if satisfactory, 
should be published.’558  
 
Collecting the Addresses of Loyalty 
 
                                                          
555 TNA: CO 323/719/109: ‘Au Maroc.’, 3rd July 1916.  
556 TNA: CO 323/719/109: Letter, 2nd June 1916. 
557 TNA: CO 323/719/109: Draft Letter from Downing Street, 27th June 1916. 
558 TNA: CO 323/719/109: Letter from the War Office, London, to the Under Secretary of State, Colonial Office, 
30th June 1916. 
275 
 
Consequently, addresses of loyalty were received from the Islamic population of the British 
Empire: East Africa included. Written on 21st September 1916, one example of such an 
address originated from Malindi in the East Africa Protectorate: 
‘We rejoice greatly that the exalted British Government is defeating this our 
common enemy. The British Government has always been just, and has encouraged 
the Islamic Faith. We have never heard that the great British Government has 
interfered with the Mohamodan religion, and therefore we shall never cease to pray 
to the Most High God to give the British Government strength to defeat all their 
enemies.’559 
Amongst these addresses of loyalty to the British Empire came an address from the Sultan 
of Zanzibar himself. So important was this considered that Sir Edward Grey, the Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, requested that fifty copies be made.560 A great many addresses 
were collected, each with the author expressing a ‘remarkable testimony of sympathy’ with 
the British Empire; the volumes used to bind them are of some considerable weight.561  
Yet despite this considerable weight one attribute is notable; all of the addresses of loyalty 
are positive. No surviving negative addresses have been preserved. It is theoretically 
possible that the British Empire did not receive any, but that explanation would be less likely 
than the prospect that any negative addresses received were simply destroyed without 
documentation. Furthermore, the addresses received were by no means representative of 
the Islamic population of the British Empire as a whole. One must account for the illiterate, 
for those marginalised in the societies in which these testimonies were written (most of the 
women, the children, the remaining slaves, the ill, and the poor), for those invested in their 
self-preservation, and for those whose words were effected by peer pressure; the potential 
of a member of these groups writing their truthful thoughts to their colonisers must, by 
necessity, have been low.  
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From a historiographical perspective these addresses are of limited use to understanding 
the true feelings of the Islamic population of the British Empire towards that empire in the 
era of the First World War. However, the British do not appear to have ever intended to 
study them in such a way; their sole use was to be for propaganda purposes.562  
Despite the War Office writing that a ‘similar production should be undertaken by His 
Majesty’s Government’ in 1916, the British Empire had in fact received similar ‘[testimonies] 
of sympathy’ from its Islamic population in 1914. A fuss was made of the Sultan of Zanzibar’s 
1916 address, but he had been amongst those to have sent one at this earlier point in time, 
where he had written that it was:  
‘My wish that at this time you [his fellow Muslims] and all true Mahommedans 
remain steadfastly loyal to the British Government. Let no consideration or promises 
from Germans prevail upon you to change your allegiance from the mighty Empire of 
England. Remember that England has ever been a true friend and of our interests 
and religion and I commend to you and all Arabs that your attitude now be of 
unswerving loyalty to Great Britain… The German Government is harsh and cruel, 
and they have ever shown themselves scornful and despising Mahommedans. Do 
not believe their words for they lie to gain your confidence and then they will crush 
and ill treat you and our religionists. The Germans in Europe are failing and Great 
Britain and France and Russia and Japan with their millions of soldiers will surely 
crush and defeat these cruel Germans.’ 
Earlier than either the Shariff of Mecca or the British Empire, the Sultan was already 
espousing the narrative that one should critique the Ottoman Empire but not critique those 
who had supported it. His approach was to suggest that the Ottoman leadership was being 
forced into fighting the British Empire by the Germans: ‘I learn from Stamboul [sic] itself 
that the Turkish people do not want to fight the English their friends, but the Germans have 
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forced the Turks to fight. The Germans have taken charge of Constantinople and will verily 
bring to destruction the Turkish Empire and our holy places to suit their own ends.’563 
These testimonies remain intact in the British Library in London. There remains little 
evidence indicating which testimonies were published, where and how they were published, 
or to whom they were published. The only indication as to their success in East Africa is that 
the Pan-Islamic threat to the security of the British Empire in that region continued after 
1916. Therefore, the publication of pro-British propaganda in the form of addresses of 
loyalty ‘from Chiefs and religious leaders’ of the Islamic population of the British Empire 
could have had only limited success in preventing Pan-Islamism from threatening the 
security of the British Empire in East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the 
First World War, because the Pan-Islamic threat continued. 
 
The Production and Dissemination of Pro-British Newspapers to the Islamic Population of the British 
Empire 
 
In an era when the written word was not only the principal means of communication but 
often the only means of communication across any distance where it was not feasible to 
meet somebody in person, newspapers and pamphlets played a major part in the lives of 
both the educated – who read them – and the uneducated – who either had their contents 
explained to them or felt the consequences of the ideas espoused in them. As was surveyed 
in Subchapter Seven, censorship played an important role in the prevention of the Pan-
Islamic threat to the security of the British Empire in East Africa throughout the entirety of 
the East African Campaign of the First World War. However, the censorship and the 
insufficient port controls were inadequate to censor all of the activities of the entire 
population of the East African region associated with the written word. One newspaper that 
was of particular concern for the British was The Daily Chronicle. 
Although its contents were examined by the Foreign Office, there is very little in the 
surviving documents as to this newspaper’s provenance. However, if one looks forward a 
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few decades another newspaper called The Daily Chronicle surfaced in what had by then 
become Kenya Colony. F.D. Corfield described The Daily Chronicle to the British Government 
as ‘one of the two leading radical Indian newspapers’ in the Colony. ‘[The] spread of 
irresponsible publications’, he wrote, ‘was central in the rise of African resistance or 
subversion.’ He wrote here principally of the Mau Mau nationalist movement. Corfield’s 
‘assessment was shared by the authorities, as can be seen from the Intelligence Services’ 
close attention to non-European newspapers and political pamphlets. In Corfield’s view, 
Indian “dissidents” egged on the subversive intent and practice of the African papers.’564 
Corfield wrote that ‘the Indian-owned and edited Daily Chronicle [had a] blatant bias against 
both Government and the European, never missing an opportunity of supporting African 
claims, however fantastic or subversive’.565 It is not clear whether The Daily Chronicle of the 
immediate post-Second World War era involved the same people as the First. Two things 
suggest that the same type of person probably ran it: that the same title was used – perhaps 
to invoke recollections of the original – and that The Daily Chronicle of the First World War 
also published material that would have ‘egged on the subversive intent and practice’ of 
Africans interested in Pan-Islamism. This type of person would have been somebody who 
was not acting with the British Empire’s interests – security or otherwise – in mind.  
The occurrence that brought The Daily Chronicle to the notice of the Foreign Office was 
related to the episode examined in Chapter Two: the supposed conversion of Kaiser 
Wilhelm II to Islam. In September 1915 Eyre Crowe wrote on behalf of Grey to Sir Henry 
McMahon, and forwarded to him the relevant extract: 
‘I transmit to you, herewith, an extract from the “Daily Chronicle” relative to a letter 
alleged to have been addressed to the Sheikh Senoussi by the German Emperor. This 
letter is analogous to other pronouncements whereby, as is reported, it has been 
sought to represent to Moslem opinion that the German Emperor has embraced the 
Islamic religion. No such publications have as yet come to my notice, but I should be 
glad as to be furnished with any evidence which may exist as to propaganda of this 
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nature having deliberately been restored to by responsible German agents. It is clear 
that such evidence would be of considerable value in influencing Roman Catholic 
opinion in allied and neutral countries.’566 
The Headline of the piece was ‘Allah’s Envoy, Islam’s Protector’: Kaiser Wilhelm. The piece, 
in the form of a letter, read:  
‘A French torpedo-boat the other day captured, near Tripoli, a sailing vessel flying 
the Greek flag. On board [was a]… letter, in Arabic, from the Kaiser to the chief of the 
warlike Senoussi tribe:- Praises to the Most High God, Emperor William, son of 
Charlemagn (sic), Allah’s envoy, Islam’s Protector, to the illustrious Chief of Senoussi. 
We pray God to lead our armies to victory. Our will is that thy valorous warriors shall 
expel infidels from territory that belongs to the true believers and the commander… 
Our common enemies, whom Allah will annihilate to the last man, shall fly before 
thee. So be it – William.’  
The letter continued: ‘The “Matin” adds that the Kaiser sent similar messages to Morocco, 
India and Egypt’.567 The ’Intelligence Department’ of the Foreign Office doubted the 
credibility of the contents of this letter: both the idea that the Kaiser had converted and the 
‘Matin’ itself were areas of scepticism for them: 
‘But of the statement made in the Daily Chronicle, viz., that the Kaiser has written to 
the Sheikh es Senussi in a manner calculated to lead the latter to believe that he had 
become a Moslem, there is no available confirmation. The Matin, which is a 
sensational newspaper, is responsible for the text of the alleged letter. The only 
letter from a similarly exalted source which has to our knowledge fallen into French 
hands in the South east [sic] Mediterranean is one addressed or purported to be 
addressed by the Sultan to the Senussi leader.’568  
Thus, this illustration demonstrated to the British Empire how newspapers and similar 
methods of communication were being used to promote a Pan-Islamic cause to threaten the 
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security of the British Empire. To retaliate, they resolved to publish their own pro-British 
propaganda.  
 
Pro-British Newspapers: Content and Destination 
 
In December 1916 the Foreign Office gave a summary about its work in a memorandum that 
displayed an ‘outline of measures taken in various territories with Muslim populations’. By 
this date the Office had begun to identify the threats posed by Pan-Islamism to the security 
of the British Empire, and they had commenced actions to mitigate them. They produced 
and disseminated pro-British propagandist newspapers throughout the entire world to 
pacify the Islamic population of the British Empire: 
‘The Foreign Office, in conjunction with the India Office, circulates as widely as 
possible a propagandist newspaper, “El Hakikat,” with text in Arabic, Persian, in 
Chinese, which will be useful for Kansu and Chinese Turkestan; and a second with 
text in four Indian languages, which will be useful, as far as this Department is 
concerned, for Indian colonies in neutral countries. Similar work is being done with 
other publications in Arabic, such as for example the Moshi document (the latter has 
been circulated in all languages spoken by Moslems, including Chinese and 
Javanese); the Shereef’s [sic] proclamation; a Map of the World at War, with Arabic 
text; an edition of Raemaekers’ Cartoons, with explanatory text in Arabic and an 
Arabic translation of Dr. Ruy Barbosa’s famous speech at Buenos Aires: and there has 
previously been a distribution of two Arabic pamphlets; Cooks “Great Britain and 
Turkey,” and another entitled “The Violation of Belgian Neutrality.” Wide circulation 
has also been given to the true story of the deposition of the late Sheikh-ul-Islam and 
to the manifesto of Bosnian Mohammedan students in Switzerland.’569 
The events then playing out in East Africa made a direct contribution to this work of the 
Foreign Office. An event ‘of particular interest to Moslems’ in Tripoli, Algiers, Tunis, and 
Tangier was to be telegraphed to them: this was the Moshi document referred to.570 The 
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Moshi document was a document found in Moshi in German East Africa by the East African 
Force in 1916 which did not portray the German governance of its colonised Islamic 
population in a positive light. An excellent propaganda piece that could help the British 
Empire to destroy German prestige amongst the Islamic population in East Africa, and 
around the world, it was to be added to the anti-German narrative already espoused in pro-
British newspapers. One Arabic journal that advocated this narrative contained a piece in 
January 1917 entitled ‘German Atrocities Among Muslims in East Africa’. This piece included 
this segment: ‘Those German tigers who were want to devour the Muslims here have been 
hunted away by the victorious British forces, who have captured Dar-es-Salaam. God having 
delivered us from their claws, we are filled with gladness and rejoicing, as men who come 
forth from a prison of misery where they have languished long.’571 Such a narrative as this 
could be only beneficial to securing the British Empire in East Africa from the threat of Pan-
Islamism; the promotion of the British as the champions and the Germans as the hypocrites 
was excellent for this end. Unfortunately, the mistranslation of the Moshi document 
severely limited its ability to be used in this way. As will be examined, the fiasco of its 
mistranslation panicked the British Imperial Government, for they knew that if it were to 
become known it would have the opposite effect than that which they had hoped for.  
The production of counter-propaganda against the pan-Islamic threat continued to 1918, by 
which time the Foreign Office no longer had a monopoly on its creation. As was examined in 
Subchapter Four, a paper entitled El Mokattam was by then being published in Cairo. 
Although it was an Arabic paper it was, according to the War Office, ‘practically controlled 
by our people there.’ El Kibla was another Arabic paper; this one was published in Mecca by 
the Sharif. In April 1918 the Foreign Office asked the War Office to send copies of each issue 
of these papers to ‘our Consuls at Tripoli, Tunis, Tangier, and other places where there is an 
Arabic-speaking Mohammedan population’; preventing Pan-Islamism from threatening the 
security of the British Empire during the First World War was a truly global affair by this 
year.  
The War Office proposed that El Mokattam was ‘more suited for general distribution’ while 
El Kibla would be circulated only to ‘one or two leading Muslims’. Downing Street was less 
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keen about such an idea and wrote in May 1918 that they had ‘some hesitation with regard 
to the advantages of this nature.’ Although there were some reservations, Downing Street 
was not antagonistic to the idea of using the production of pro-British propaganda for the 
purpose of preventing Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in 
East Africa, and around the world. Firstly, they were happy to send copies of these papers to 
the Governors of several colonies and protectorates in East Africa to allow them to decide, 
based on local conditions, how these papers should be disseminated. Secondly, the reason 
that was given as to why Downing Street was so late in replying to the War Office’s letter on 
this matter – an entire month – was because they themselves had been dealing with 
‘urgently pressing questions regarding Oriental newspaper propaganda.’572 By the last year 
of the First World War, newspaper propaganda had stepped up to be a major component in 
preventing dangers, including Pan-Islamism, that threatened the security of the British 
Empire worldwide. 
However, whilst the production and dissemination of pro-British propaganda had by the end 
of the First World War become a major component in preventing Pan-Islamism from 
threatening the security of the British Empire worldwide, less interest was given to East 
Africa specifically.  
The German administration of German East Africa had themselves produced pro-German 
propaganda in the form of newspapers. Captain Philipps summarised the German approach 
of using these newspapers to control the narrative they wished for the population of their 
colony to have access to: 
‘The German Government in German East Africa maintained two native papers 
containing items of news from each station and district, compiled by natives for 
natives under white supervision, with leading articles explaining any native 
legislation, and giving general ideas of the development of the country. These papers 
were published fortnightly and monthly. They had a wide circulation among all 
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classes of literate natives and were a great assistance to the Administration. They 
were much appreciated by the natives’.573 
These German newspapers ‘set forth German Imperial doctrine, local news, items from 
other German tropical colonies, and explained simply any new native legislation and [gave] 
general ideas of development of the country.’574 Elsewhere, Philipps wrote that these 
newspapers ‘were in great demand and exercised a quietly penetrating influence’. 575 
Because they had been so ‘appreciated’ by them, the population of German East Africa 
‘much regretted when [the British Empire’s] Administration refused to carry them on’ after 
the German colony came under British imperial control.576 By ‘[refusing] to carry them on’, 
the British Empire lost one opportunity to control the published narrative to the population 
of German East Africa.  
In 1917 Philipps made that exact argument: the papers ‘should be at once resuscitated’, he 
wrote, because ‘the renewal of these papers would be a valuable measure in combating the 
movements in question, since the educated native conveys the ideas they contain to his 
illiterate friends who are as eager as the Athenians to tell or hear some new thing.’577 
Philipps did not underestimate the difficulty of such a scheme. ‘The employment of a native 
press of explanatory Islamic propaganda is a delicate operation necessitating expert and up-
to-date knowledge’, he wrote half a year later in January 1918. ‘When dealing with the 
opposing sects of Islam and their attitude to Turkey and the Sherif, we cannot be too 
careful, in satisfying the increasing interest of nominal Moslems in religious politics, to 
present the facts in their true light as this crisis of the Moslem faith.’578 Nevertheless, he 
believed that controlling the narrative would allow the British to publish ‘sympathetic 
explanations of current events’ which would ‘forestall the malicious and ignorant rumours 
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which so continually arise among all native peoples.’ ‘[Forestalling]’ these ‘malicious and 
ignorant rumours’, such as the Pan-Islamic ideology, would, in his eyes, prevent Pan-
Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa.579 
This did not happen. In 1920 Philipps wrote: ‘In 1917 I urged the Foreign Office 
(Propaganda) to replace the popular German Swahili press by a simple and popular British 
paper for all Swahili Africa.’ His idea behind this paper ‘was to explain British African 
legislation, as it is introduced, clearly setting out in what way it directly benefits the native 
concerned. Explain, on “Boy’s Own Paper” lines, by what slow process all peoples have 
developed and must develop. To give hints on agriculture and technical education.’ ‘The 
proved value to the Germans of their native press, and its popularity, was admitted’ by the 
Foreign Office, who ‘offered liberally to finance a Swahili press’. Yet in pencil he underlined 
the ending of this sentence for emphasis: ‘the Colonial Office refused to undertake it.’580  
M.I.5.D.’s recollections state that they did publish a newspaper. ‘Early in 1918’, they wrote, 
‘a native propaganda publication was started and was issued, about once a month, in British 
East Africa and Conquered Territory. The vernaculars employed were Swahili (both Roman 
and Arabic characters), and Gujerati.’ However, the purpose of this ‘propaganda publication’ 
was not as grand as Philipps’, for the ‘object aimed at was’ only ‘to explain the causes and 
the progress of the war in very simple language and to counteract mischievous rumours.’581 
East Africa was not ignored in the production of pro-British propaganda to prevent Pan-
Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire, but neither was it singled out 
for any special attention. However, it did benefit from the global view taken by the British 
Imperial Government to the production of this propaganda. Although there is no surviving 
analysis which directly investigated the implementation of this idea, it is apparent from the 
linear increase in the production of propaganda, and the enthusiasm of the likes of Philipps, 
that success must have been felt from the eighth strategy’s implementation.  
                                                          
579 TNA: WO 106/259: Philipps, J.E. ‘African Languages. Uganda.’, in Memorandum on East and Central Africa 
with papers on Pan Islamism and Ethiopianism, Kigezi, British Uganda, 20th January 1920. 
580 Ibid. 
581 TNA: KV 1/16: Muggeridge. C.E. ‘Appendix O. Extract from a Report on the Organisation of the Intelligence 
Centre at Nairobi.’, in Vol II. M.I.5. “D” Branch Report. Imperial Overseas Intelligence 1915—1919: Appendices, 




Forgery and Fiasco: When Failure Struck 
 
Although successful, the production and dissemination of pro-British propaganda for this 
purpose was not without the occasional chaotic occurrence. Whilst no surviving analysis 
exists, two chaotic occurrences were recorded that must have reduced the successful 
impact that the production and dissemination of pro-British propaganda had on preventing 




It was anticipated that the addresses of loyalty received from the Islamic population of the 
British Empire would prove ‘suitable for valuable propaganda’ purposes. This project was a 
success from the collection perspective; a great many addresses of loyalty were received. It 
was possibly this success, in addition to the aforementioned Moshi document, that drove 
the Director of the Arabic Press Bureau to forge an anti-German pro-British statement from 
a Muslim supposedly living in Dar-es-Salaam in 1917. This supposed Muslim was meant to 
have sent a letter to a ‘friend’ living in Tripoli that described the horror he had lived under 
when Dar-es-Salaam had been under German rule, and his gratefulness to the British Empire 
for liberating him and his fellow Muslims. This forgery contained such sentiments as: 
‘We have been like abject slaves, and worse; assuredly the very dogs in civilised 
lands are treated better than the Germans treated us.’ 
‘For the considered end and purposes of the Germans is nothing else than the 
destruction of our race and the ruin of our religion.’ 
‘The German officials here were cruel oppressors, imposing upon the natives a single 
law – that of the rod.’ 
286 
 
‘On the day that we beheld the German forces fleeing in a rout before the 
triumphant British Army our joy overflowed.’582 
The French Government, who came across the letter, had sincerely believed it to be genuine 
and, up until a conversation with the author of the letter in April 1917, British imperial 
officials had had no reason to doubt French assertion of its legitimacy. Why the Director of 
the Arabic Press Bureau did not inform the British Imperial Government, for whom they 
ultimately worked, of their activities is not recorded. Unfortunately for the British Empire, 
so good for propaganda purposes had this fake letter seemed, they had not only produced 
copies of the letter in both English and Arabic for dissemination amongst the Islamic 
population of the British Empire, but they had also made large posters in which the letter’s 
contents were written in Arabic. The copies were, naturally, withdrawn, but not before the 
German authorities had got hold of a copy and described it on the wireless as ‘a clumsy 
forgery.’ This attempt at counter-propaganda had been so poor that there wasn’t even a 




The previously quoted address of loyalty from the Islamic population of Malindi to the 
British Empire on 21st September 1916 was written at a meeting held in the town on the 
same day. At this meeting a letter from Jan Smuts, dated 14 Rajab 1334 of the Hijri (Islamic) 
calendar (which, within one day of probability of error, would have been 17th May 1916 in 
the Gregorian calendar), was read out. In this letter Smuts detailed how he had ‘discovered 
among the German official letters a circular which expressed the antipathy of the German 
Government towards Mohamedanism in their African colonies. Their policy is to prevent 
and wipe out Mohamedanism and they show by the evil designs their strong disapproval of 
Islam.’584 This circular became known as the ‘Moshi Document’. Originally written in 
German, an English translation was made. 
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Imperial British officials became very excited about the discovery of this document. It 
proved that the Germans, through the German Governor Dr Heinrich Schnee, far from being 
a friend of Islam, were merely using it for its own ends: namely, the ‘special feature of 
Germany’s policy to foster and encourage any movements of unrest and sedition’, such as 
the Pan-Islamic movement, ‘directed against the British Empire.’585 The propaganda 
possibilities were endless. However, the Colonial Office were soon to rain on the parade: 
‘According to War Office official translation of General Schnee’s anti-Islamic circular 
contemplated employing Government officials to counteract and even prohibit 
Islamic propaganda, whereas original German seems merely directed against 
participation of Government officials as such in propaganda. Should our 
interpretation be correct publication of mis-translation is likely to embarrass and 
discredit us when real meaning becomes known.’586 
This mistranslation was a disappointment to these imperial officials of the British Empire; 
disappointment no doubt compounded by the knowledge that the mis-translation was 
already in the public sphere. Andrew Bonar Law did not send a telegram stating that it 
‘should not be published as it is not altogether accurate’ until 31st May; fifteen thousand 
copies had already been ordered to be translated into Malay at the request of Grey over a 
week earlier. Bonar Law did not put a date on when the new translation would arrive, 
merely informing his audience that the ‘Correct version should reach you from Egypt in due 
course.’587 
It is not clear what version was read out at Malindi on 21st September 1916, yet the date of 
17th May heavily suggests that it was the mistranslated version. It is also not clear which 
version was examined in the Arabic journal in January 1917. If this mistranslation had 
become more widely known, it surely would, as they feared, have embarrassed and 
discredited the British Empire ‘when [the] real meaning [became] known.’  
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The British Imperial Government in London took an interest in the production and 
dissemination of pro-British propaganda to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the 
security of the British Empire in the years of the First World War; it took less interest in 
preventing the Pan-Islamic threat to East Africa specifically. Primarily, this appears to be 
because the British Empire took a global view on the production of pro-British propaganda. 
But, secondly, this may have also occurred due to the lack of expertise on Pan-Islamism as 
examined in Subchapter Three of this chapter; the very few experts on Pan-Islamism in East 
Africa were seldom present in London during the First World War. Thus, in the seat of 
power the imperial East African voice on this issue must have been relatively subdued.  
Real achievement was gained in promoting a pro-British message to the Islamic population 
of the British Empire. From 1915 onwards the British Imperial Government promoted the 
production of it for this purpose, and many pieces of propaganda, often in the form of 
newspapers or journals, were published and disseminated. Although few of these pieces of 
propaganda were tailored to the East African audience, the Islamic population of East Africa 
was informed of the pro-British message. With the lack of any post-war analysis on the 
Islamic population’s reactions to this propaganda it is impossible to say to what extent this 
eighth strategy was responsible for preventing the threat from Pan-Islamism in that region. 
However, the linear increase in its production, coupled with the continued enthusiasm for 
this production, heavily suggests that the British Empire believed that the production and 








Conclusion: Chapter Seven 
 
The successfulness of the implementation of these eight strategies proposed to prevent 
Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa in the years 
of the East African Campaign of the First World War was therefore mixed: some were 
thoroughly implemented, some were not implemented at all, whereas in some, whilst the 
implementation was unsuccessful, the outcomes desired by the implementation were 
nevertheless still obtained. 
The East African Intelligence Centre and the other interested parties in the region all heeded 
Captain Bray’s note of caution. Despite attempting to implement eight different strategies 
to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in the region, 
they did not attempt to prevent Pan-Islamism itself from existing. The cultivation, 
promotion, and implementation of different strategies to curtail or manipulate Pan-
Islamism was tolerable, but outright suppression would never have been accepted by the 
Islamic community.  
In the conclusion to Chapter Six it was acknowledged that due to both the short time that it 
was in existence and its small number of personnel the East African Intelligence Centre was 
unable to mitigate its inherent impediments. Yet Majors Fosters and Muggeridge appear to 
have done all that they could do to mitigate or eliminate its extrinsic impediments. Unable 
to visit all the ports to ensure that port controls were being enacted and enforced, they 
arranged so that a few ports were visited to ‘check the practice and… to get valuable clues 
in regard to mischievous intentions and connections.’588 When faced with the lack of a 
central library for intelligence records, they successfully assumed the task of collecting and 
collating them from across the East Africa so that such an establishment could be formed in 
Nairobi. And when it was beyond their control to mitigate or eliminate an impediment, they 
simply worked with it, exhausting the avenues of expertise on the Islamic population of East 
Africa that were open to them and then accepting that they would gain no further support 
from that junction. The work the Intelligence Centre performed was an improvement on the 
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work done by Major Notley, but that was all it could be, and Foster and Muggeridge appear 
to have accepted that. 
Major Muggeridge identified that ‘Pan Islamism, Pan Ethiopianism, and the activities of 
Missionaries [were] amongst the subjects in regard to which every endeavour [had] been 
made to collect information and record the opinions of those competent to judge.’589 The 
prevalence of information that M.I.5.D. enclosed about the former, as opposed to the latter 
two, of these three subjects in their section of the 1921 Report demonstrated the 
enthusiasm they possessed to have their success in this area be recognised by the British 
Imperial Government as it transitioned the use of intelligence into the interwar period. 
On the close of the First World War in November 1918 the British Empire in East Africa 
found itself in one piece. Battle-scarred and wounded, it had not been defeated by any 
threat that had been posed to it. The British Empire had prevented the threat posed to their 
security by Pan-Islamism in East Africa: neither Pan-Islamic unity, nor the machinery of Pan-
Islamism, had been successful in bringing about the destruction of the East African region of 
the British Empire. 
This was the conclusion of the counter-intelligence effort against the threat of Pan-Islamism 
in the British Empire in East Africa in the years of the First World War. Yet when the likes of 
Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, Jan Smuts, Richard Meinertzhagen, Claude Foster, and Tracy 
Philipps had left the region far behind East Africa had to attempt to recover. The ‘triple 
curses of war, famine and disease’ were only starting to be overcome when the influenza 
pandemic of 1918-1919 resulted in the deaths of ‘as many as 150,000 people’ in the East 
Africa Protectorate alone: ‘5.5 per cent of the population.’590 The Great Depression, the 
Second World War, and several decades of colonialism still to come placed further European 
burdens on the heads of the East African population. Independence from the British Empire 
was to come to most of East Africa in the 1960s and the continent became fully 
independent from the European empires in the 1970s. The legacies of colonial rule, 
however, could not be as easily discarded as a flag lowered from its pole. 
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On 25th November 1918 the armistice was formally declared in the East African Campaign of 
the First World War. Some fighting was undertaken in the fortnight that intervened after its 
declaration in Europe, but the delay rested principally with Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck’s 
march to Abercorn in Northern Rhodesia. As the only enemy commander to end the First 
World War on British imperial territory, von Lettow-Vorbeck’s place in the history books was 
confirmed. 
As much as an armistice could allow one to do so, the British Empire claimed victory in the 
First World War. No threat posed to the security of the British Empire in East Africa in the 
years of the East African Campaign had been successful enough to bring about its 
destruction; the counter-intelligence arm of the British imperial intelligence establishment 
had become sufficiently developed to effectively counter the threat posed by Pan-Islamism, 
although it was unable to eliminate it. 
The original research that has been presented within this thesis speaks to several different 
literatures. It improves our understanding and challenges our perceptions of such events as: 
the East African Campaign of the First World War, and, therefore, the First World War in an 
imperial setting; the development of British imperial counter-intelligence in Africa in the late 
Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries; and the Pan-Islamic narrative of the Great War, 
where an account that does not prominently involve Europeans has been examined for the 
first time. 
The events of the East African Campaign have been dismissed by historians such as Karl P. 
Magyar, Lother Höbelt, and Richard Popplewell as nothing more than a ‘sideshow’ to the 
more important events in Europe.591 Whilst militarily correct in regard to the outcome of the 
First World War, this dismissal of the East African Campaign as being unworthy of greater 
study has actually been used to dismiss the East African narrative itself as insignificant; this 
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thesis will join the small, yet growing, literature which is tackling this huge gap in the 
historical narrative. By seeking to decentre the automatic centring of the European narrative 
in First World War studies, history such as this is reclaiming history for those whose history 
was once dismissed, and rethinking history for those whose history once dominated.  
The development of the counter-intelligence arm of the British imperial intelligence 
establishment did not come about in a timely manner in East Africa; the East African 
Intelligence Centre functioned for less than thirteen months of the Great War. Through its 
examination of an area of the British imperial intelligence establishment of the First World 
War that has never previously been examined, this thesis has significantly contributed to the 
historiography of British imperial intelligence during this war by providing a great wealth of 
new knowledge and new avenues for research. By placing the work of M.I.5. in an imperial 
setting, this thesis has demonstrated how the negligence of the British Imperial Government 
to its empire in East Africa, how the casual racial prejudice of British imperial officials, and 
how the lack of expertise on Pan-Islamism all interlinked to result in the British Empire 
facing a threat from Pan-Islamism in a region that was not strategically significant to victory 
in the First World War.  
Through its examination of imperial counter-intelligence used in East Africa during the First 
World War, this thesis has also presented new information about the role of East Africa 
within the wider British Empire. This information has significantly contributed not only to 
the historiography of East Africa, but also to the historiography of the United Kingdom, for 
events on the ground in the British Empire are as much a part of British history as events in 
the Imperial Government in London are a part of East African history. 
The study of the Pan-Islamic threat to the First World War has focused on its impact on the 
hostilities that existed between the Europeans and the Ottoman Empire; it has focused on 
those areas that most impacted the Europeans. Whilst, as has been examined, Europeans 
were certainly involved with the Pan-Islamic narrative in East Africa, Pan-Islamism in the 
region did not impact upon the outcome of the War in Europe; thus, the differences 
between the Ottoman and East African experiences of Pan-Islamism have been dismissed. 
Those few historians who have examined it in relation to East Africa have done so only 
vaguely and without any apparent attempt at significant archival research. Such statements 
as ‘The crushing of the Ottomans during World War I, coupled with the apparently 
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inexorable spread of European power, confirmed to many African Muslims that the 
Europeans could not be defeated by force and gradually they came to accept European rule’ 
could only have been written by a historian, and be espoused by historians, who had not 
researched the East African narrative that has been preserved in the archives. Had they 
done so, they would have understood that far from them ‘accepting European rule’, this 
narrative proves that the British Empire was forced to recognise the agency of East Africa’s 
Muslims to challenge imperial power.592 This thesis is entirely original in placing at its heart 
Pan-Islamic concerns in East Africa; in doing so, it places East African concerns at the heart 
of a study about the workings of the British Empire. 
The British imperial intelligence establishment learnt during the First World War that there 
was an operational need for a counter-intelligence effort to exist in the East African region 
of the British Empire. This knowledge was not entirely lost in the post-war era, but the East 
African Intelligence Centre was disbanded and the effort severely downgraded, despite the 
threats from Pan-Islamism and Pan-Africanism still existing. Whilst colonialism continued 
the simple fact of the ending of the First World War could not bring peace to East Africa, but 
British imperial officials were not terribly concerned; the British counter-intelligence effort 
in East Africa during the First World War had been conducted solely to secure the security of 
the United Kingdom, and with the armistice that had, in the short term at least, been 
achieved. Whatever the wishes of M.I.5., the British Imperial Government had no further 
need for such a large effort. The development of M.I.5. in the British Empire outside of 
Ireland in this era is largely non-existent in the literature; this is because this literature, just 
like the establishment itself, is predominantly concerned with the narrative of the United 
Kingdom. The contribution of this thesis to this literature is thus highly significant; it places 
M.I.5., and thus the British Imperial Government, in the British Empire in East Africa, and 
examines British imperial rule through the prism of intelligence, in a way that no other work 
has previously undertaken regarding the First World War. 
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The growth of the imperial counter-intelligence effort of the British Empire in East Africa is a 
major area of thematic concern for this thesis. Other major areas include the entry of Pan-
Islamism and Pan-Africanism into the East African region and the expansion they then 
undertook. The key findings of this thesis are examined in brief below, and answer the 
central research question of this thesis: How did the British Empire attempt to prevent what 
they perceived to be the dangers associated with Pan-Islamism from threatening the 
security of the British Empire in East Africa in the years of the First World War, and how 
successful were they in this endeavour? 
 
The Initial Lack of Counter-Intelligence in the British Empire in East Africa 
 
The First World War erupted in August 1914; whilst the British Empire immediately 
recognised the potential of the German-Ottoman Pan-Islamic threat to the security of the 
British Empire, the threat of an ‘African Jehad’ in the British Empire in East Africa was not to 
be identified for a further three years.593 There were two major reasons for this: the first 
was that the governance of the East Africa Protectorate, the premier bureaucratic British 
protectorate in the region, had been neglected by the British Imperial Government; thus, on 
the outbreak of the First World War, there was not in existence a counter-intelligence 
bureau to undertake the work that was required there, and the counter-intelligence work 
that was being undertaken in London was not extended to cover the British Empire in East 
Africa. The second was that when the Police Force of the East Africa Protectorate was 
tasked with undertaking some counter-intelligence activities in the early years of the War, 
they infused their work with racial prejudice. In 1915 the Provost Marshal, who was also the 
Commissioner of Police, believed that M.I.5. was not interested in the actions of East 
Africans; he believed them to be primarily interested in the actions of white ‘enemy 
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subjects’.594 Consequently, he did not elaborate on the danger posed by this population to 
the security of the British Empire in East Africa, and M.I.5. did not rectify this until 1917. 
Therefore, no counter-intelligence establishment was formed in the East African region of 




The United Kingdom retained control of the land that was to form the East Africa and 
Uganda Protectorates primarily to prevent another European power from occupying the 
land, rather than out of any actual interest in developing or colonising it. Successive British 
Governments had been ‘reluctant to spend money in acquiring new colonial possessions in 
Tropical Africa’, yet had been ‘equally reluctant to leave the field entirely to other European 
powers.’ 595 Formal British imperial rule existed in East Africa out of a perceived necessity to 
protect British imperial security in the Middle East and India, rather than out of a desire to 
physically extend the Empire. 
In the early Twentieth Century the British transformed their intelligence establishment to fit 
the needs of the contemporary world; much of this change was fuelled by the knowledge 
they had extracted out of Africa during the Second Boer War. Yet this change was focused in 
Europe, on European needs; it was an extraction of knowledge production in a colonial 
setting. Like the entire African continent, East Africa was not to be a beneficiary of this 
change. 
Vernon Kell and Mansfield Cumming jointly established the Secret Service Bureau in the 
autumn of 1909 in the United Kingdom. They decided to ‘divide their work’ up. ‘K’ (Kell) 
became ‘responsible for counter-espionage within the British Isles’ (the future M.I.5.) whilst 
‘C’ (Cumming) became ‘responsible for gathering intelligence overseas’ (the future so-called 
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M.I.6.). The evident omission was that there was nobody who was responsible for counter-
espionage, or counter-intelligence more generally, overseas in the British Empire.596 
With the British Empire ruling there out of necessity rather than desire, and with the need 
for colonial counter-intelligence forgotten about in London, there was no imperial counter-
intelligence establishment in the East Africa Protectorate prior to the First World War that 
could, on the outbreak of that war, work to identify, and then counter, the threat from Pan-




Major Notley, the Provost Marshal of the East Africa Protectorate, wrote in November 1915 
that ‘Previous to the outbreak of war no Counter Espionage Bureau existed in British East 
Africa or Uganda, and the very comprehensive German system of espionage, which has 
since come to light, was neither suspected or appreciated.’597  
Notley was tasked with performing a limited amount of counter-intelligence. He focused on 
preventing the work of white ‘Secret Agents’ in the Protectorate and, by his own account, 
he was mostly successful. Although he continued to have problems with some ‘Recently 
naturalised neutrals of enemy extraction’, principally Swedish, he had neutralised the 
threats posed by ‘Enemy subjects’ and the ‘Cape Dutch.’ However, Notley had a major flaw; 
he allowed his work to be infused by racial prejudice. Peculiarly, he was aware of this racial 
prejudice, but believed that M.I.5. in London would not be interested in the actions of 
Africans in East Africa. He wrote: ‘Though [‘coloured Africans’] is the greatest evil we have 
now to contend with in the Colony [sic], we understand it does not concern you [Vernon 
Kell: M.I.5.] so much as the question of European Agents, and the matter will not be dealt 
with further.’598 The British Imperial Government’s main interest in preventing Pan-Islamism 
from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa was not for the sake of 
protecting East Africa, but was to protect the security of the United Kingdom itself. The 
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German Empire’s strategy to subvert the British Empire was based on the idea that the 
more it managed to subvert the British Empire the more the British Empire would be forced 
to keep troops in the Empire to maintain the peace; consequently, less troops would be able 
to fight for the British Empire on the battlefields of Europe. This, the Germans hoped, would 
result in the British Empire either losing the First World War or being forced to sue for peace 
at a disadvantage. Notley’s counter-intelligence effort countered some of this threat, but in 
the early years of the First World War M.I.5. did not appreciate that ‘coloured Africans’ 
resident in East Africa also had the agency to subvert the British Empire, and so did not 
prevent the mixing of Africans from across the continent when they began to arrive in large 
numbers in 1915 to fight in the East African Campaign.  
The East African Intelligence Centre was instituted in November 1917; only on this date did 
imperial counter-intelligence arrive in East Africa. The imperial intelligence establishment in 
London grew rapidly in the two years that had intervened between this date and the date 
on which Notley wrote about his counter-intelligence work. M.I.5. had inaugurated a 
dedicated branch to be responsible for imperial counter-intelligence in the British Empire: 
“D” Branch, and it was “D” Branch that was responsible for the Intelligence Centre’s 
institution. However, in these intervening two years the Pan-Islamic movement, and 
nationalist ideologies such as Pan-Africanism, had become firmly established in East Africa, 
because there had been no person or department working to prevent such an occurrence. 
 
Countering the Threat from Pan-Islamism in the East African Campaign of the First World War 
 
Several officials of the British Empire were responsible for identifying the threat posed by 
Pan-Islamism to the security of the British Empire, but Captain Philipps was primarily 
responsible for having identified the specific threats posed by Pan-Islamism to the East 
African region. Firstly, he identified the two sources of the movement in East Africa: the 
German Empire, through German East Africa, and East Africans and the African diaspora.  
In East Africa, unlike in much of the Islamic world, the Germans were a source of the Pan-
Islamic movement, for, due to the relatively recent spread of Islam across the region, the 
movement was largely unknown there prior to the First World War. Their ‘policy to foster 
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and encourage’, and in East Africa to be a source of, Pan-Islamism was a small part of their 
larger strategy to subvert the British Empire. 599 Philipps studied the relationship between 
German East Africa and Pan-Islamism, and found that it had gone through several different 
phases in the years between the establishment of the Colony and the invasion by the British 
Empire in 1916; using Pan-Islamism for political reasons had not always been well regarded 
by the administration of the German colony.  
Africans arrived in East Africa from across the continent at the behest of the British Empire, 
who needed their labour to fight the East African Campaign of the First World War. These 
Africans mixed in East Africa; they then subsequently mixed with the local African 
population and, eventually, the troops and civilians of German East Africa. An African 
diaspora soon existed across the battlefields of the Campaign. Philipps, who could speak 
African languages, documented that ‘During 1916-17 there [had] been an unprecedented 
meeting of the tribes of Africa campaigning in “German East”’ and that ‘Round the camp 
fires there [had] been much talk… touching on the killing of white by black as illustrated 
before their eyes.’600 Because they were discussed around the camp fires by these newly 
arrived Africans, Pan-Islamism and Pan-Africanism found a source into East Africa. 
Having identified the two sources of Pan-Islamism in East Africa, Philipps then worked to 
identify the exact threats posed by the movement to the British Empire in the region. He 
identified two. The first threat was the traditional threat of Pan-Islamism: that of Pan-
Islamic unity. The second threat was that another movement or ideology that had difficulty 
spreading on its own would use the machinery of Pan-Islamism for its own benefit. 
The first threat was considered the lesser threat. Pan-Islamic unity had been attempted 
before, notably during the German-Ottoman Pan-Islamic threat of the early First World War 
period, and had been found wanting. However, the potential for Pan-Islamic unity, 
particularly in an East African specific context, did still exist. 
The second threat was identified as being the greater threat. The movement that the British 
imperial officials were concerned would take advantage of the Pan-Islamic machinery was 
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Pan-Africanism, which the British took to mean “Africa for the Africans”: an Africa without 
the British Empire. Any ideology or movement that proposed an Africa without the British 
Empire would, by its very definition, be a threat to the security of the British Empire in 
Africa.  
 
 The Prevention of the Pan-Islamic Threat to the Security of the British Empire in East Africa  
 
Two events occurred to prevent these two threats from threatening the security of the 
British Empire in East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World 
War. 
The first was the initiation of the East African Intelligence Centre in November 1917. Whilst 
this Intelligence Centre was not exclusively for the prevention of Pan-Islamism, Major 
Muggeridge, the second commander of the Intelligence Centre, did place Pan-Islamism as 
one of the only three ‘subjects’ he specifically identified ‘in regard to which every endeavour 
[was] made to collect information and record the opinions of those competent to judge.’601 
The second event was the proposal of eight strategies to counter the threat from Pan-
Islamism. Rather than examine them and decide which strategies presented the best 
prospects for success, the officials of the British Empire went with a blunt approach and 
tried to implement all eight simultaneously. Amongst the reasons for this blunt approach 
were that some of these strategies began to be implemented before the institution of the 
East African Intelligence Centre, whilst others were implemented as a result of the changing 
military landscape of the East African Campaign. Naturally, the implementation and 
subsequent success rate of these eight strategies varied significantly: 
 
The Physical Expansion of the Size of the British Empire in East Africa. 
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The removal of the German Empire from East Africa would remove the ability of the German 
Empire to act as a source of Pan-Islamism in East Africa; thus, the first of the eight strategies 
proposed was to win the East African Campaign of the First World War and expand the 
physical size of the British Empire to encompass that land which had hitherto been part of 
German East Africa. This was harder in practice than in theory, both because von Lettow-
Vorbeck was a formidable opponent, and because the British Empire was unable to take 
control of German East Africa without regard to the many other states and administrations 
who could claim some jurisdiction over the former German colony.  
Although neither of these two concerns were resolved before the end of the East African 
Campaign, this first strategy was successful in two ways: it removed the relatively large 
Islamic population of German East Africa from the colonial authority of a power with which 
the British Empire was at war, and it placed that Islamic population mostly under the 
authority of the British Empire itself. Thus, the ability of the German Empire to be a source 
of Pan-Islamism, or to foster and encourage it, in East Africa was significantly reduced in the 
latter half of the First World War. 
 
The Development of the East African Force Along Tribal Lines. 
 
The theory of the second strategy, to prevent any further ‘unprecedented mixing of 
representatives of almost all the black races of Africa’ by developing the East Africa Force 
along tribal lines, was sound.602 However, its implementation transpired to be too difficult 
during a time of hostilities. 
 
The Growth of the Attributes of the Imperial Intelligence Establishment of the British Empire. 
 
The third strategy was comprised of two courses of action: 
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(1) ‘[To] obtain a freer interchange’ about ‘the Moslem populations throughout the 
Empire’.  
(2) The implementation of ‘more direct communications between the less important 
dependencies’ such as East Africa and ‘the principal centres of Islamic thought.’ 
 
The first course of action was successful, but only as far as the constraints of the First World 
War would allow; the ability to interchange information about the Islamic population of the 
British Empire was constrained by the lack of expertise on the subject, and such expertise 
could not be easily acquired. The second course of action proved to be a great success; the 
improvement in communications between different areas of the British Empire allowed for 
information on the threat of Pan-Islamism to be delivered to East Africa quickly. 
 
The Cultivation of British Imperial Strength in the Islamic World. 
 
The fourth strategy was probably not implemented in the way that Captain Buxton, who 
proposed it, intended for it to be. Nevertheless, it achieved what he desired: the cultivation 
of British imperial strength in East Africa. To achieve this, the British Empire demonstrated 
to the Islamic population of East Africa that the Ottoman Empire was no longer a major 
power in the Islamic world; it did this by defeating them militaristically in the Great War. 
The British Empire then informed the ‘many… Arab chiefs… in the neighbourhood of Lake 
Nyassa’ who ‘would be likely to take a keen interest in the Anti-Turkish movement in Arabia’ 
that the downfall of the Ottoman Empire had happened at their will, but this was also not 
implemented in the way that Buxton had intended.603 
 
The Promotion of Weak Central Government and Strong Nationalist Feelings amongst the Islamic 
Population of East Africa. 
 
Overall, the fifth strategy had a very mixed outcome. Lieutenant Colonel Sykes and Captains 
Willis and Philipps proposed a ‘proper check… to PanIslamism [sic]’ that comprised of two 
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parts: ‘(1) a weak central government with no more than a spiritual ascendancy over 
Mohammedans outside its territories, and (2) a strong national feeling in every 
Mohammedan country, which would make the population more interested in the political 
and commercial development of their own country than in the Panislamic [sic] principle.’ 
These gentlemen agreed that, due to the events in the Middle East, the first part had 
already succeeded, but that if the second part was implemented there was ‘some danger of 
the “nationalist” theory if developed leading to disaster’.604 For this reason, the second part 
of this strategy was not implemented.  
 
The Securing of the ‘Insulating Belt’ of East Africa. 
 
The sixth strategy had a rather perplexing outcome. ‘Insulating belt’ was the term given to 
the geographic area of central East Africa in which Islam was seldom present in 1917. To 
prevent Islam, and the potential of Pan-Islam, from entering the area, it was proposed to 
insulate it from the surrounding areas. This was to be achieved by a mix of the promotion of 
Christianity and the establishment of a secular schooling system. This strategy was never 
implemented, but, due to the results of the other seven strategies, the belt remained 
insulated; the outcome was a success, which in reality was all that was desired by the 
officials of the British Empire. 
 
The Implementation of Counter-Intelligence in East Africa. 
 
The seventh strategy specifically concerned the implementation of counter-intelligence in 
the region. This was implemented predominantly, but not entirely, by the East African 
Intelligence Centre. There were some failures but taken as a whole this implementation of 
counter-intelligence made important inroads in preventing Pan-Islamism from threatening 
the security of the British Empire in East Africa. 
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The seventh strategy was the most successful of the eight strategies. It is also the strategy 
for which there remains the most surviving documentation.  
 
The Production and Dissemination of Pro-British Propaganda.  
 
British imperial officials understood that the effectiveness of Pan-Islamic propaganda, and 
the success of the Pan-Islamic movement more generally, depended not only on its physical 
progress throughout the British Empire in East Africa, but also on the reception that it would 
meet from Muslims when they received it. They therefore produced pro-British propaganda 
to ensure that the Islamic population of East Africa was not amenable to its messages. 
Success in this endeavour was mixed; some calamitous failures occurred in the international 
arena, but real achievement was gained in promoting a pro-British message to the Islamic 
population of the British Empire. 
This eighth strategy was run on an imperial level; only a minority of the production of pro-
British propaganda was focused upon East Africa itself. Because it existed on the imperial 
level, the documentation proves that this strategy had the greatest geographic scope of all 
the strategies. 
 
In total, these eight strategies were successful in achieving the conclusion that the imperial 
officials of the British Empire in East Africa desired of them, irrespective of whether each 
individual strategy’s implementation and outcome was obtained: the threat posed by Pan-
Islamism did not bring about the destruction of the East African region of the British Empire 
in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War.  
 
The Objectives for Success 
 
The primary British objective of the East African Campaign of the First World War was the 
prevention of the injury to, or the destruction of, the British Empire in East Africa or the 
Indian Ocean area. Whilst other objectives, principally the conquest of German East Africa 
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and the expulsion of the Germans from the continent, were to present themselves in time, 
the primary objective always remained by far the most important. It truly overshadowed all 
others.  
However, whilst this primary objective remained paramount, it did not command devotion. 
The British were not willing to allow the accomplishment of their primary objective of the 
East African Campaign to have any impact upon them accomplishing their primary objective 
of the First World War: Allied success in Europe.  
In the introduction of this thesis Malcom Page’s figures for the East African Campaign were 
noted. When ‘Allied and Naval personnel’ were excluded, he placed the figures at ‘about 
114,000 troops.’ When ‘excluding those hospitalized for disease’, he placed the British 
Empire’s casualty rate at ‘62,220’, whilst the ‘[deaths] from disease were 48,328, mainly due 
to malaria.’ Another ‘400,000 and 500,000 men’ served as porters.605 The importance of the 
East African Campaign as a campaign of the First World War in its own right should not be 
underestimated, but it is worth placing these figures in context: 
‘Between August 1914 and November 1915, 4,970,902 men were enlisted in the 
British Army… With the existing forces in August 1914, that yielded a wartime total 
of 5,704,416 men in the army at one time or another, approximating to 22.1 per cent 
of the male population of the United Kingdom (thus including Ireland) … To these 
figures can be added 2.8 million men from the Empire.’606 
Based on these figures, only 1.5 per cent of enlisted men from the United Kingdom and the 
British Empire saw service in the East African Campaign. Although one should respect that 
the porters were not included within these figures, this represents only a tiny amount of the 
British Empire’s fighting capabilities.  
The German Empire did not win the First World War, or even the East African Campaign, but 
they successfully sued for an armistice that they ensured did not occur until 25th November 
1918. They were successful in forcing the British Empire to fight for four and a quarter years 
in a region that was strategically useless in achieving victory in the First World War, even if 
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the percentage of British imperial personnel they detained in this region was tiny. For this, it 
is possible to grant Germany, and principally Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, some level of success 
in this campaign. 
The subversion of the British Empire through the promotion of Pan-Islamism was one of the 
strategies undertaken by the Germans to force the British to waste resources in their 
empire. The resources spent on preventing this threat could have been spent elsewhere, 
and in this respect the German Empire got what it desired: the British Empire had to spend 
time and resources battling a threat that would have no impact on the outcome of the 
battlefields of Europe. But granting Germany success on this precise issue becomes a little 
problematic when one approaches it from a numeric viewpoint. No more than six officers 
ever worked for the department that was established to combat this issue: the East African 
Intelligence Centre. And even when one considers all the people associated with it, such as 
the colonial officials, the personnel of M.I.5.D. in London, and the Africans that must have 
been employed by it as soldiers and porters, even a generous analysis of the evidence does 
not point to the number being any higher than just into three figures. Due to the spread of 
Pan-Islamism amongst the African population and the possibility of its machinery being used 
by Pan-Africanism, the threat posed by Pan-Islamism to East Africa was very real. However, 
for the duration of the First World War it could be constrained by a small number of allied 
personnel. Slight success can possibly be granted to Germany for forcing a small number of 
officials of the British Empire to prevent the subversive potential of Pan-Islamism in East 
Africa, but it would be an enormous stretch to offer them anymore than this.  
Despite them being limited, the time and resources spent by the British on preventing the 
threat from Pan-Islamism in East Africa did demonstrate that East Africans had some agency 
to threaten the security of the British Empire. The British Empire’s rights to the land that 
formed its Empire in East Africa were recognised almost without dispute in the international 
sphere in the early Twentieth Century, but that had never been the case in the internal 
sphere of the region. The need to employ these eight strategies confirmed that the British 
Empire’s control over East Africa was not internally complete, even excepting the conflict 
with Germany. Their desires for nationalism, self-governance, religious freedoms, and other 
personal expressions of liberty were expressed by some Africans towards their colonisers, 
and by identifying this threat and allocating, albeit meagre, time and resources to its 
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prevention, the British Empire recognised the agency of East Africans to challenge imperial 
rule. 
 
The British Empire’s Counter-Intelligence Effort in East Africa in the Immediate Post-First 
World War Era 
 
The years of 1914—1918 do not stand out so starkly in East African history as they do in 
European history; colonialism had existed in 1913, would exist in 1919, and continued to 
exist in the intervening years. The British Empire’s counter-intelligence effort in East Africa 
was one entity, however, for which the years of 1914—1918 did stand out; from having not 
existed at all in 1913, it slowly crescendoed in the years of 1914—1918, before almost 
collapsing in 1919. This collapse occurred not out of a want of intelligence subjects to 
counter; for the threat posed by Pan-Islamism and Pan-Africanism did not disappear in 
1919. It collapsed because the British Empire reiterated that their interest in East Africa 
existed primarily to secure the security of the United Kingdom.  
The British Empire declared success against the Pan-Islamic threat to the security of the 
British Empire in East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World 
War. But the threat did not disappear as von Lettow-Vorbeck’s ship slipped over the 
horizon; as Captain Bray had warned in March 1917, Pan-Islamism had ‘gained many 
adherents’ and ‘become an ideal with thousands of the younger generation, and those 
imbued with modern mohammedan [sic] ideas of education’.608 The future of Pan-Islamism, 
and the potential for it to merge with Pan-Africanism, in East Africa, remained a source of 
concern. 
In 1917 Philipps had prophesised that ‘From the North strong Islamic propaganda is to be 
anticipated as one of the first acts of peace carrying its habitual political aspirations.’609 Mr 
A.D. Bethall wrote in March 1918 that ‘Hundreds of ex-soldiers, discharged from the French 
and Italian services, [had] already returned to Somaliland’ and that ‘their experience’ in the 
First World War had ‘immediately promoted them to the military leadership of their sub-
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tribes… In tribal fights men have now learned to some extent to hold their fire, to estimate 
ranges, to use the utmost skill in approach, and to value cover… Unless strong measures are 
taken to suppress it, gun-running will assume unwanted dimensions as soon as hostilities 
are over.’610 Bethall wrote of Somaliland, but similar narratives could be written about many 
parts of colonial Africa. The First World War had not only brought about the anti-colonial 
Pan-Islamic movement, but it had trained and armed East Africans, and returned them 
home with their skills, where they might be, if they had not already been, confronted with 
Pan-Islamic propaganda. 
Nationalist movements continued to grow in the post-First World War era; in addition to 
Pan-Islamism, these presented machinery by which the Pan-African movement could 
spread. On 29th July 1919 Major Muggeridge wrote to Notley about one such ‘native 
movement’: 
‘The fact that the movement is not confined to any one tribe seems to be to 
constitute a possible future danger, for, in the event of a personality or personalities 
ever attempt to organize Pan Ethiopianism [Pan-Africanism] in Central East Africa 
they would be likely to find this society machinery already prepared. The great 
safeguard against Pan Ethiopianism has always been considered to be the 
unlikelihood of tribes combining together, but with such a society as I have 
indicated, getting a wide grip on the natives, the difficulties in the way of 
engineering such a movement are considerably lessened. I would be very greatly 
obliged if you could find out anything more definite about the Society, its aims, and 
personalities, and forward such information as you are able to obtain to this 
office.’611 
The threats posed by Pan-Islamism and Pan-Africanism in East Africa during the First World 
War that had been identified by the likes of Philipps did not disappear in November 1918; if 
anything, they became a great deal more complex as men of fighting age were released 
from the European armies. But instead of continuing, or even expanding, the imperial 
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counter-intelligence work to prevent any them from threatening the security of the British 
Empire in East Africa, the British Imperial Government did exactly the opposite: 
‘I am very sad to think that the Intelligence Section is to be allowed to sink into 
obscurity. It makes one feel that all the work one has done is simply wasted. I was fool 
enough not to believe that the C.O. [Colonial Office] had it in them to cut the whole 
thing down like this, especially as they do not appear to have consulted the local 
government at all. Some day there will be a local bust up and nothing will be known of 
it. Then questions will be asked as to what the Intelligence was doing. I suppose I fought 
too hard to get a special staff and frightened them. I should particularly have liked to 
have got you [Philipps] a decent job as I know that your heart was in the work. However; 
sic transit, as you say.’612 
Muggeridge did not hold back with his thoughts on the dissolution of the East African 
Intelligence Centre in this letter to Philipps in the summer of 1919; this is unsurprising, when 
one considers that he was recorded as stating that ‘it was important that East African 
Intelligence should not be allowed to relapse into what he described as “its pre-war state of 
Parochialism”.’613 
The dissolution of the East African Intelligence Centre was replaced by a ‘one man job’; 
Muggeridge complained that the Colonial Office ‘never consulted the people here in the 
matter at all.’614 The Intelligence Centre was instituted to ensure that the security of the 
British Empire in East Africa whilst it was threatened during the East African Campaign of 
the First World War; with success ensured, the Intelligence Centre was surplus to 
requirements. It was never instituted to support security in East Africa for East Africa’s sake; 
the needs of the Europeans had been fulfilled. 
Thus, Pan-Islamism, and, most importantly for later African history, nationalist movements, 
could exist and grow in the East African territories of the British Empire with only the most 
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minimum of oversight from the imperial colonisers in the immediate post-First World War 
era.  
 




When I designed this thesis, it was my aspiration for it to contribute to several different 
literatures. This was partly because I wished for my work to have the greatest possible 
impact, but also because it is, at its very core, interdisciplinary; it draws from history, 
politics, and geography, and is involved as much with the actions of Muslims in East Africa as 
those of Vernon Kell in London. This aspiration has come to fruition; there are five different 
literatures to which it has contributed significantly: 
 
1. The First World War 
2. East African History 
3. Intelligence History 
4. Islamic History 
5. Imperial History 
 
The First World War 
 
Having once been dismissed by historians as nothing more than a ‘sideshow’ to the 
contemporary events in Europe, this thesis joins the small, yet growing number of works 
focusing on the East African Campaign of the First World War. The history of the British 
Empire’s attempt to prevent the threats posed by Pan-Islamism to the security of the British 
Empire in East Africa through counter-intelligence is but a tiny part of the narrative of the 
Campaign, but it is a part that places East Africa and East African concerns at the heart of 
the research. By producing a narrative that places research about the British Empire within 
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the British Empire, I have placed the British Empire in its true location; not in the corridors 
of Whitehall, but in the streets of the colonised world.  
 
East African History 
 
As I examined in the Introduction to this thesis, I endeavoured to place the centre of 
narrative of this thesis in East Africa, with occasional glances back to London, as opposed to 
placing it in the imperial capital, with occasional glances down at the imperial acquisitions. 
From the start, East Africa and East African concerns were to be at the heart of my research. 
This entire thesis is East African history, but two parts of it demand greater focus here: 
The first is that I have established that the Islamic population of East Africa had an 
experience with Pan-Islamism that was independent of the Ottoman Empire during the First 
World War. This narrative has been missing from East African historiography because the 
East African experience of Pan-Islamism did not notably impact upon the outcome of the 
First World War for the European colonial powers.  
The second is that my research will help to dispel the lingering statements within the 
literature on African colonialism that Africans were docile people who came to accept 
European rule. This thesis proves that, contrary to this, the British Empire was forced to 
devote time and resources to countering the actions of some East Africans and some 
members of the African diaspora; British imperial officials were forced to conclude that, 
despite their racial prejudices, this African population had some ability to threaten the 




In the intelligence literature there has been a scarcity of knowledge about how the British 
Empire’s imperial intelligence establishment worked on the ground in East Africa, as 
opposed to an office in London, in this era. I intended to research exactly this, and I have 
been successful. This thesis is the first ever piece of research to produce a comprehensive 
analysis of M.I.5.’s growth in East Africa during the First World War, and its work to counter 
311 
 
the threat posed to the British Empire in the region from Pan-Islamism. This analysis spreads 
new light not only on M.I.5.’s conduct in the British Empire, but also on topics such as how 
M.I.5. dealt with racial prejudice and how they overcame the lack of expertise in an 
environment where gaining it proved difficult. In short, this thesis has developed an entirely 
new subfield of the intelligence literature: the subfield of the development of M.I.5.’s 




The contribution of this thesis to the literature on Islamic history is in many ways bound up 
with the contribution of this thesis to the literature on East African history. The knowledge 
that the Islamic population of East Africa had an experience with Pan-Islamism that was 
independent of all other experiences with Pan-Islamism during the First World War adds a 
previously unknown element to this literature. 
This thesis also contributes a longer history of Pan-Islamism in East Africa than is already 
provided for in the literature. One cannot draw a direct line between the growth of anti-
colonial Pan-Islamism in the First World War and modern-day jihadist fundamentalist 
groups, such as Al-Shabaab, in the same region, but there is a historical connection; the 
move away from Pan-Islamism as a religious doctrine towards an anti-western doctrine was 
in full swing during the East African Campaign of the First World War, and it did not 




This thesis has offered a fresh perspective on the East African Campaign of the First World 
War by situating the work of the officials of the British Empire into the world of the 
colonised subjects of East Africa. Thus, East Africa does not exist just as another distant part 
of the British Empire at war; instead, Europe exists as a distant coloniser with limited ability 
to enforce its will on its colonised people.  
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Rethinking history in this manner has allowed my thesis to contribute the knowledge that 
East Africans and the African diaspora in East Africa were able to make use of the First 
World War for their own purposes: to discuss, to examine, and to propagate Pan-Islamism 
and Pan-Africanism even whilst they were being ordered to fight or to porter for the 
European colonisers. It has decentred the European narrative of the First World War and 
replaced it with a more cohesive one that acknowledges the contribution of others. 
The actions of the European colonisers themselves have different light shed upon them 
from this perspective; the British Empire claimed to have covered nearly one quarter of the 
world’s land surface, but this claim existed only in the international sphere. In the internal 




Some avenues for future research were briefly examined in the Introduction to this thesis. 
Because this thesis contributes new knowledge to so many different literatures, it opens 
many avenues of potential future research.  
The study of the East African Campaign presents an exciting prospect for any historian 
interested in the First World War. Due to its neglect within the vast literature on the First 
World War there are many possible ways in which one could study the Campaign and make 
a large impact on the literature: from military perspectives to the perspectives of the 
civilians who lived through the guerrilla warfare, and from topics as diverse as gender 
studies to animal husbandry. To work on uncovering narratives that have been dismissed for 
so long presents the historian with a great challenge. The impact, if any, that the growth of 
Pan-Islamism had on hostilities in the East African Campaign is one avenue of future 
research I would be particularly keen to see pursued. One source of Pan-Islamism into East 
Africa was through Africans sent to labour in the East Africa Campaign; I believe it would be 
interesting to uncover how Africans who espoused Pan-Islamic ideals conducted themselves 
in the armies of the European empires. 
The long-term impact, if any, of Pan-Islamism on the British Empire in East Africa would 
continue the work of this thesis into the post-First World War era. Such a research proposal 
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would be of benefit to the historiography of East Africa, for it would surely support the 
conclusion of this thesis that the Islamic population of East Africa had an experience with 
Pan-Islamism that was independent to other experiences. 
This thesis has focused upon the British imperial counter-intelligence effort in the East 
African Campaign of the First World War, but M.I.5.D. was involved with many areas of the 
British Empire. Research needs to be undertaken on the work of the entirety of D Branch, 
both from a bureaucratic viewpoint and a thematic one; Pan-Islamism in East Africa was 
only one subject about which D Branch was concerned. Furthermore, the East African 
Intelligence Centre was dissolved in the immediate aftermath of the War; the immediate 
post-First World War narrative of M.I.5.’s imperial counter-intelligence effort, both in East 
Africa and around the world, is a further topic of research that this thesis has demonstrated 
has the potential to be undertaken. 
Two avenues of future research clearly present themselves: those that place the German 
Empire and East Africans at the centre of the narratives. Studies that placed these two at 
the centre of their narratives would present a comprehensive analysis of both the threat 
posed by Pan-Islamism to the security of the British Empire in East Africa during the First 
World War and the subsequent outcomes of that threat, as well as expand on the 
conclusions that have been drawn in this thesis. 
Africa is projected to have an enormous population growth throughout the Twenty-First 
Century; whilst the legacies of colonialism continue to exist, African influence in world 
politics is ever increasing. Historians of the academy have traditionally been white men and 
have traditionally focused on the history of white men; dismissing the history of East Africa 
as a ‘sideshow’ to the important events in Europe can no longer be accepted. The East 
African narrative of the First World War proves that the First World War was the first world 
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